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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to show the advantage of substance ontology in providing us the 
most preferable framework, both on methodological as well as philosophical grounds, to 
have a better grip on the diachronic problem of personal identity. In this case, substance 
ontology plays multi-faceted roles in terms of allowing us for example, to make sense of 
the persistence of persons over time, intrinsic changes persons undergo while 
maintaining their identity over time, etc. However, substance ontology has not been 
taken seriously by the majority of philosophers. This is because there is a deep seated 
but mistaken assumption among contemporary analytic philosophers that given the 
advances in modern science, substance ontology is irrelevant. It is also not uncommon 
to see philosophers questionably appealing to an extremely controversial Locke’s theory 
of substratum (i.e., ‘something we know not what’) to justify their rejection of any 
notion that goes by the name substance. However, with close examination, at the heart 
of such a rejection of substance ontology lies the naturalistic ontology, according to 
which everything in the universe has to be explained in purely physical terms as dictated 
by the physical sciences (e.g., physics and chemistry). But as I will argue in this thesis, 
when it comes to the metaphysics of the self and its identity over time, the naturalistic 
ontology suffers from a serious lack of explanatory adequacy. I argue that ultimately, the 
controversy over the nature of the self is a metaphysical issue in that it is not for science 
to adjudicate what the nature of the self has to be. In light of this, the conception of 
substance ontology I defend in this thesis can be taken as Aristotelian in spirit as 
opposed to Lockean. The category of substance has a fundamental ontological primacy 
over any other non-substantial entities such as events, places, time, properties (or 
tropes) and so on. I will argue that substance ontology understood in this way is indeed 
the most plausible and sustainable conception. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
A Survey of the Contemporary Philosophical Debate on the Nature of the 
Self/Person and of Personal Identity 
 
Before I introduce the thesis outline, in this chapter, I set out to do two main things: First, I 
will introduce the central question this thesis will attempt to establish and discuss; and 
second, I will discuss the current state of the debate on the nature of the self and personal 
identity. I will take up the first task in the first part of this chapter, and the second task in 
the second part of this chapter. In the first part of this chapter, I will launch into a detailed 
discussion of the ontology of the self. In this regard, for reasons we shall see, I will focus on 
Descartes’ view of the self. In this thesis, one of my main goals is to argue why we should 
take the ontology of the self seriously. So from a dialectical point of view, I find it very 
helpful to begin my discussion with the discussion of the ontology of the self as opposed to 
mapping out the framework of the contemporary personal identity debate.  
 
In the second half of this chapter, I will locate my discussion of the ontology of the self 
within the context of the contemporary personal identity debate. In doing so, I will attempt 
to argue why without taking the ontology of the self seriously, genuine progress is hard to 
come by in the contemporary personal identity debate. That said, in this thesis, I will make 
certain assumptions with which everyone will not agree. For example, throughout this 
thesis, I will argue that genuine self-knowledge or self-awareness is not just a theoretical 
possibility, but such knowledge is actually attainable. Furthermore, I will also argue that our 
belief in our continued persistence over time can be given defensible reasons. To make 
sense of all this, I will argue that our ontology of the self/person must be rooted in our 
commonsense/folk conception of our own selves. Yet I am also aware of the fact that not 
everyone is sympathetic to commonsense ontology (see e.g., Churchland 1988). In light of 
this, the effectiveness of my arguments may be limited. However, I desire that the reader 
give me the opportunity to show the philosophical work my assumptions accomplish and 
withhold judgment about the persuasiveness of my thesis until the larger picture has been 
presented.   
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1.1. The Question 
‘Is the Self a Substance?’1 This question (hereafter the substantial-self question) runs 
together two notions that are hotly debated in the current intellectual climate besetting the 
issue of personal identity. One is the notion of the ‘self’; and the other is the notion of 
‘substance.’ As we shall see, each of these notions has been defined and construed 
differently by different philosophers. So we might think that the difficulty we face regarding 
these notions is just dealing with any ambiguities, if such there be, that beset them. Once 
we dispel any such ambiguities, we might assume that these notions would require no more 
serious engagement. Unfortunately, that is not the case. This is because, in dealing with 
these notions, we inevitably come across serious ontological questions lurking right under 
our nose that need to be taken into account. For example, what is a self? What is a 
substance? Do such things exist? If so, what is the mode of their existence? In short, are 
these things real? Contra many contemporary philosophers who are dismissive of such 
ontological questions (see e.g., Dennett, 1991; Metzinger, 2009; Churchland, 1988), in this 
thesis I will attempt to show that, in fact, such questions can be given clear and defensible 
answers.   
 
I will suggest that our inquiry into the problem of personal identity must begin with what I 
shall call the Aristotelian question that takes the form: ‘what is X?’ Given an inherent 
distinction between substance and the properties it bears, the category of substance enjoys 
an ontological primacy over that of the other categories such as qualities. So following 
Aristotle, I will insist that, in answering the above question, we must make use of ‘is’ in its 
primary sense. As Aristotle remarks, “and all other things are said to be because they are, 
some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others 
affections of it, and others some other determinations of it (Met. Z. 1 1028a 18-20; see also 
Cat. 5). The crux of Aristotle’s point here is that the existential status of ‘beings’ belonging 
to other categories (e.g., qualities, quantities, affections, etc.), depends on the category of  
_______________ 
    1 I adopted this question from Ian Gallie’s article entitled: ‘Is the Self a Substance?’ (1936). Gallie 
himself favors the logical construction view of the self. Grice also (1941; reprinted in Perry, 1975) following 
Gallie’s lead, defends the logical construction theory of the self. To this list, we can add Ayer, who also claims 
that the self is a logical construction from a series of our experiences (e.g., see 1967: Ch. VII). I will find such 
views of the self deeply wanting.  
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substance. This is because non-substantial entities are not self-subsistent and hence they 
need a bearer, i.e., substance. So in asking the question ‘what is X,’ we are engaging in a 
metaphysical inquiry about the nature of X. Hence, I sharply disagree with Ayer, when he 
says that such questions are “requests for definitions of a particular sort,” (1936: 46). At the 
least, if we follow Aristotle in this matter, our concern is first and foremost to understand 
the nature of things as opposed to engage in mere linguistic practice (i.e., talk about words).   
 
So we must begin our inquiry into personal identity by asking the question: what is a 
self/person? As Noonan remarks, “the problem of personal identity is more illuminatingly 
titled “the problem of the self’s identity,” (Noonan in Gasser and Stefan 2012: 89). Noonan’s 
remark here reflects two key things to our present discussion. One has to do with the self 
itself, whereas the other has to do with its (i.e., self’s) identity. As we shall see, however, in 
most contemporary discussions on personal identity the ontology of the self is neglected. 
Philosophers spend much of their time discussing the identity of the self as if the question 
of the ontology of the self itself has already been taken care of. In his ‘What We Are?’, 
Olson also remarks, “Why it is that so many philosophers have felt entitled to theorize 
about personal identity without thinking about what we are, is an interesting question. The 
answer probably lies in the general neglect of metaphysics throughout the English-speaking 
philosophy”, (2007: 22).2  
 
Moreover, I will argue that the issue of the nature of the self and its identity is not only an 
ontological matter, but it is also a practical matter. As Harold Noonan insightfully remarked: 
What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us 
can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the 
relationship between a person and his body. The nature of personal identity over 
time, and the link, if any, between personal identity and bodily identity are aspects 
of these problems and it is this, of course, that accounts for the immense  
_______________ 
2 However, once Olson had seriously complained that since there is no agreement on what the notion 
of the self is, we should entirely stop talking about it (1998). While agreeing with Olson with respect to the 
lack of agreement among philosophers in characterizing the notion of the self, I find his conclusion to be 
unjustified for reasons we shall see in this thesis. For various opinions on the notion of the self, see again 
Gallagher and Shearer, eds., (1999); Gertler and Shapiro, eds., (2007); Gallagher (2000); the self in philosophy, 
psychology, psychopathology and neuroscience, see Gallagher, ed. (2011).  
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philosophical interest in the concept of personal identity. But, perhaps unlike some 
other philosophical problems, the nature of personal identity is not merely of 
interest to professional philosophers, but also a matter of great practical concern to 
all of us, philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Man has always hoped to survive 
his bodily death, and it is a central tenet of many religions that such survival is a 
reality (1989/2003:1).  
 
One important lesson we can draw from Noonan’s remarks here is that the issue of the 
nature of the self and its identity has two inseparably linked aspects to it: one is theoretical; 
and the other is practical. On the theoretical side, as we shall see, the focus will be mainly 
on trying to figure out what the sorts of ontological questions we have raised earlier are 
supposed to imply regarding us, i.e., human beings. On the practical side, the focus will be 
on trying to work out what the implications of the answers we give for the ontological 
questions would mean for us personally. So to have a complete picture of the theory of the 
self, maintaining the synergy between these two aspects will not be an option. If we could 
show this to be the case, then all the more it will strengthen Noonan’s observations as 
stated above. But in recent years, as we shall see, of the two aspects I pointed out above, 
the importance of the practical aspect to the nature of the self has been called into serious 
question by some influential philosophers like Derek Parfit (1984). In light of this, it could be 
asked if the proposal for maintaining the synergy between the two aspects will be viable at 
all. Before addressing such concerns, first we need to locate the above proposal in its 
proper context. It is only after we do that we can be in a better position to see if there is any 
justification for it. I will take up this issue beginning in § 1.2.   
 
That said, returning to the substantial-self question, one of the things we are invited to do is 
to affirm or to deny whether or not the self belongs to the category of substance. To clearly 
see how this is supposed to work, first we need to turn the substantial-self question into an 
evaluable statement that takes the form: ‘X is F’. Here we can substitute the variable ‘X’ for 
‘the self’ and the predicate ‘F’ for ‘a substance’. In doing so, we can construct a statement 
as follows: ‘the self is a substance.’ Although put in this way, the statement makes perfect 
grammatical sense from the standpoint of the present discussion, however, it faces an 
underlying semantic ambiguity. To show the nature of such an ambiguity, I adopt the 
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distinctions E.J. Lowe (1989:3-4) draws on the varieties of the copula (i.e., ‘is’). Here they 
are: 
 (a) The ‘is’ of predication/attribution (e.g., ‘Plato is intelligent’, ‘Sky is blue’).  
 (b) The ‘is’ of identity (e.g., ‘Water is H2O’).  
 (c) The ‘is’ of instantiation (e.g., ‘A kangaroo is a mammal’).   
  (d) The ‘is’ of constitution (e.g., ‘A human brain is a collection of cells’).3 
 
Engaging in full-fledged analysis of (a)-(d), would take us too far afield. So I only want to 
base my discussion on this particular question: Which reading of ‘is’ should we adopt to 
grasp the semantics of ‘is’ in the statement, ‘the self is a substance’? One way we can 
answer this question is by applying each reading of ‘is’ in (a)-(d) to that of the above 
statement and see which reading captures its meaning. There are different ways one could 
take in dealing with this issue. Here I go along with the Aristotelian conception of substance 
(see Cat. 2a 11ff).4 Since Aristotle’s view of substance will be discussed throughout this 
thesis, I will be brief in what follows.  
 
According to Aristotle, inter alia, a substance is a property bearer. Being a property bearer, 
a substance is a subject of predication, i.e. other things are predicated of it but not vice 
versa. (e.g., ‘Socrates is white’). Aristotle gave a special term for subjects of predication—
primary substances, namely ‘the individual man’ (Cat. 2a11). In light of this, applying (a)’s 
reading to the above statement could be seriously misleading, if we understand ‘a 
substance’ to mean a primary substance. This is because, primary members of the category 
of substance, i.e. ‘individual Socrates’ are not predicates but subjects (see further Ross, 
1924:1xxxii-xc).5 Hence, (a)’s reading in relation to the above statement (i.e., the self is a  
_________________ 
4 But defenders of bundle and substratum theories of substance could take an approach that is 
opposed to the one I am adopting here (see e.g., Loux, 1998: Ch.3).  
5 However, on Aristotle’s view, there is a sense in which a substance can be said a predicate. Aristotle 
assigns for this notion another special term—secondary substances, namely ‘man’ and ‘animal’ (Ibid.). 
Aristotle calls secondary substances kind universals (e.g. humanity) as opposed to mere property (e.g., 
blueness). In illustrating this latter point, Ross remarks, “What is this thing? A man. What is a man? An Animal. 
What is an animal? A substance.’ ‘Substance’ is the last predicate we come to if we pursue such a line of 
inquiry…” (Ross, 1924: 1 xxxiv). Although for now we are not interested in exploring the relation of this latter 
notion of substance to the above statement (i.e., the self is a substance), we will return to it in due time. As we 
shall see, the two notions of substance are interdependent in an ontological sense of the term, i.e., one needs 
the other for its existence.  
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a substance’), remains to be problematic. How about the (b) reading? By applying this 
reading to the above statement, we are committed to taking the terms ‘the self’ on the one 
hand, and ‘a substance’ on the other hand, as co-referring expressions. That means that 
these expressions must have the same referent. So far so good. But the problem we 
encounter with (b)’s reading comes when we begin to give an account of the 
nature/identity of this referent to which both of the above expressions are meant to stand 
for. This is the point of serious contention in philosophy of mind, between the proponents 
of substance dualism (one brand or another) and physicalism (one brand or another). While 
the former group, accepts the duality of substance (i.e., nonphysical and physical), the latter 
group endorses only a non-dual conception of substance (i.e., physical). I will take up this 
issue in chapter six. For now I content myself with the above brief analysis. But as it stands, 
the (b) reading does not pose any serious problem to the above statement.  
 
That said, what are we to make of the remaining two readings, i.e., (c) and (d) in relation to 
the above statement? Given the Aristotelian framework introduced in the Categories, 
applying the (c) reading to the above statement will be problematic. This is because primary 
substances, although they can be instances of, for example, a kind universal—man or 
humanity, they themselves cannot be instantiated by any other entity (cf. footnote # 4; also 
see Loux, 1978: 158-163; Lowe, 2000: 350-353). So applying the (c) reading to the above 
statement simply misplaces the primary substance in the domain of that of a secondary 
substance, the very point that is being disputed here. So the prospect for the (c) reading in 
helping us capture the semantics of ‘is’ in the above statement is no better than that of the 
(a) reading. Finally, the (d) reading itself does not seem to fair any better either. To see this, 
I want to bring out a further analysis of the notion of substance, as I shall call it, in terms of 
in its scientific sense on the one hand, and in its metaphysical sense on the other. Here we 
can capture the scientific sense of substance, via philosophers’ favorite example ‘the statue 
and the bronze.’ According to one view (which I am inclined to endorse), the relation 
between the statue and the bronze is not based on identity (see Aristotle Met. Z. 1033a 4-
20, Z. 8 1033b 1-9; Baker, 2000: Ch.2). That is, the bronze is what constitutes the statue of 
which it is made. In other words, the statue, say of Goliath, is distinct from the bronze (i.e., 
staff) that constitutes it. Moreover, Goliath and the lump of bronze, inter alia, have 
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different modal properties. For example, Goliath can’t survive if it is squashed and turned 
into another statue, say of a watch. But the lump of bronze survives such a change. On the 
other hand, Goliath survives the loss of some of its part (e.g., a finger). But the same thing is 
not true of the lump of bronze, since any loss of its particles would compromise its identity. 
At least, at this point, I do not wish to enter into a contemporary debate over the 
relationship between the statue and the bronze. My aim here is only to illustrate the point 
that, taken in its scientific sense, stuff or aggregates of matter can be said to be a substance. 
Such talk is in fact prevalent in chemistry, where various chemicals/elements are often 
described in the language of substance (see Connell, 1988: 10).  
 
But having said that, if we still stay within the Aristotle’s Categories, the scientific sense of 
substance plays no role whatsoever in terms of helping us capture the meaning of ‘is’ in the 
above statement (i.e., ‘the self is a substance’). This is because, in the Categories, Aristotle is 
working with the metaphysical notion of substance for which, he gives a technical Greek 
word, ουσια/ousia, the noun from the verb ‘to be’ (einai). For Aristotle, ousia means, 
among other things, fundamental existent (see Cat. 2a11). Although the English term 
‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek word ousia, the former is a conventional rendering, 
which came from the Latin substantia, i.e., ‘something stands under.’ However, both 
‘substance’ and substantia fail to capture the literal meaning of ousia. In fact, the English 
term ‘substance’ could be misleading, implying a kind of stuff (Cohen 2009: 197). The 
closest literal translation that does justice to ousia is ‘being’ or ‘entity’ (Ackrill 1963: 77). 
Ousia can also be construed as ‘reality’ or ‘fundamental being’ (Cohen 2009: 197) or ‘an 
ontologically basic entity’ (Loux 1991: 2 ff). But things are not that straightforward when it 
comes to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where the notions of ‘matter’ and ‘form’ are introduced 
(see e.g., Met. Z-H). Even then, as I will argue, Aristotle did not detract from his original 
position, where he takes primary substances (ousia) as fundamental entities, i.e., other 
things depend on them but the converse does not hold. In light of such considerations, 
therefore, there seems to be no plausible way by which we can apply the (d) reading to the 
above statement.  
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Although as we have seen, the alternatives (a)-(d) all have their drawbacks, from the 
standpoint of the contemporary discussions on the nature of the self, the (b) reading still 
has central importance. Given the (b) reading, therefore, if one affirms that the self belongs 
to the category of substance, then whatever characterization we give to the notion of 
‘substance’ will apply to the ‘self.’ In this case, the converse would also be true. On the 
contrary, if one denies that the self belongs to the category of substance, then the link 
between the notion of the ‘self’ and the notion of ‘substance’ would collapse. That means 
that we cannot apply the characterizations we give to the notion of ‘substance’ to that of 
the self and vice versa. Currently the prevailing assumption among the contemporary 
philosophers is that the era of understanding the self as a substance has gone out of favor. 
Consequently, for most, if not all analytic philosophers, the substantial-self question has lost 
its relevance.  
 
For example, Sydney Shoemaker once remarked that nowadays the question of whether the 
self is a substance and whether personal identity over time requires a substance, has a 
musty smell to it. Despite the fact that the question in the past played a central role in 
discussions of personal identity in Locke, Butler, Hume, and Reid, it has not been the central 
question in contemporary discussions of personal identity. In most such discussions, the 
question simply is not addressed (2003: 381).6 Here I take Shoemaker’s observation as 
indicative of three distinct, but interrelated issues that need to be examined carefully. 
These issues are: (i) the rejection of the substantial-self for personal identity over time; (ii) 
the rejection of the centrality of the substantial-self question for personal identity; and (iii) 
the absence of the substantial-self question from most discussions of personal identity, 
respectively.7 Here (i)-(iii) together constitute what I shall call: the marginalization of the 
ontology of the self. But as will be shown throughout this thesis, the marginalization of the 
_________________ 
6 But in his Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Shoemaker claims that philosophical discussions of the 
nature of persons/selves have often focused on the question, ‘Is the self a substance?’ (1963: 41). In section 
2.1, we will see the reason why in recent years this question has been pushed aside by most personal identity 
theorists. 
7 A detailed discussion of these issues will be given in chapters two through eight.  
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ontology of the self in contemporary analytic philosophy is primarily rooted in (i). But at this 
point, the question that comes to mind is this: why do most analytic philosophers unite in 
embracing (i)? To answer this question, first we need to answer our original question, i.e., 
the substantial-self question. Here I will begin my discussion with a well-known classical 
response to the substantial-self question. 
 
1.1.1. Rene Descartes’s Answer: 
Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question was responsible in setting the initial tone 
for the modern philosophical debate on the nature of the self (see e.g., Frondizi, 1953: Ch. 
1; Armstrong 1999: 2; Atkins 2005: 7). Moreover, as we shall see, Descartes’s answer to the  
substantial-self question provided a backdrop against which subsequent philosophers (e.g. 
Locke) developed their own alternative views of the self. But before we turn to Descartes’s 
answer, it is worth reminding ourselves of the remark that was made in § 1.1, with respect 
to what we are invited to do with respect to the substantial-self question. We had said that 
this question invites us to affirm or deny whether or not the self belongs to the category of 
substance. If the self belongs to the category of substance then whatever characterization 
we give to the one equally applies to the other. That means that both terms, i.e., the self on 
the one hand and a substance on the other hand, refer to one and the same thing (i.e., 
entity). But how are we supposed to show this? This is where Descartes’s answer to the 
substantial-self question comes into play.  
 
Descartes’s answer emerges from two standpoints—epistemological as well as ontological. 
Taken from the standpoint of epistemology (i.e., theory of knowledge), Descartes’s focus is 
on the question of whether or not we know that the self exists. On the other hand, taken 
from the standpoint of ontology (i.e., theory of the nature of being), Descartes’s emphasis is 
on spelling out the nature of the self, i.e., what kind of thing that it is. Let us now look 
briefly at each one of these points. 
  
1.1.1.1 The Epistemology of the Self 
Descartes develops his epistemology of the self within a framework of his general theory of 
knowledge. Central to Descartes’s general theory of knowledge is the notion that genuine 
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knowledge must be free from any error (see Meditations on First Philosophy AT VII: CSM 
1984; also see Bonjour 2010: Ch. 2; Feldman 2003: 52-60). But how did Descartes go about 
ensuring error free knowledge? Details aside, Descartes’s uses his well-known methodic 
doubt to filter out instances of genuine knowledge from those that are not (cf. Williams, ed., 
1993: Introduction; Stroud 1984: Ch. 1). For example, Descartes rejects the senses as being 
genuine sources of knowledge arguing that in principle they could be susceptible to serious 
deception (e.g., evil demons, dream states), thereby producing false beliefs (see First 
Meditations AT VII 18-23: CSM 12-15). That said, when it comes to the epistemology of the 
self, the only genuine knowledge producing source, as Descartes sees it, is a priori 
introspective reflection—rooted in the first person perspective (see Second Meditation AT 
VII 24-34:CSM 16-23). It is in this sense that Descartes speaks of self-knowledge. As 
Descartes remarks:   
While I was trying thus to think everything false, it was necessary that I, who was 
thinking this, was something. And observing that this ‘I am thinking, therefore exist’ 
[Cogito ergo sum] was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of 
the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without 
scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking (Discourse AT VI 32: CSM 
I 127). 
 
Descartes’s point here is that an act of thinking is inextricably linked with a thinker’s 
existence. So given Descartes view, the sense of the phrase ‘inextricably linked’ needs to be 
understood both from the epistemic as well as the ontological standpoints. It is epistemic in 
that an act of thinking provides one with the basis for one’s self-knowledge. It is also 
ontological in that thinking strongly presupposes a thinking being. This is the central point 
that underlies Descartes’s famous Latin dictum, Cogito ergo sum (Cogito for short). Cogito 
terminated Descartes doubt by assuring him of his existence (cf. Frege 1956).8 Long before 
Descartes, Augustine also had invoked the Cogito argument to combat the skepticism of the 
Academy (see e.g., De civitate dei, XIII; XI: 26; De trinitate, Bk. X. Ch. 10; also cf. Ganeri, 
2012: 57-60; Menn, 1998; Kehr, 1916). But it was Descartes who appropriated the Cogito 
explicitly in the first person stance (see Anscombe in Cassam 1994: 140). In doing so,  
_______________ 
8 Descartes is not sceptic in an ancient Pyrronian sense, according to which knowledge is not possible. 
Descartes’s skepticism is merely methodological—aimed at establishing a secure foundation for knowledge.   
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Descartes shows why one cannot succeed in doubting one’s own existence, without thereby 
implying a prior grasp of one’s existence. As Thomas Nagel nicely sums up:  
In the Cogito the reliance on reason is made, explicit, revealing a limit to this type of 
doubt. The true philosophical point consists not in Descartes’ conclusion that he 
exists….nor even in the discovery of something absolutely certain. Rather, the point 
is that Descartes reveals that there are some thoughts which we cannot get outside 
of (Nagel 1997: 19; also cf. Frege 1956; Mctaggart Vol. 1 1921: 56-58).  
  
So we can sum up Descartes’s official view of the epistemology of the self as follows: the 
self knows its existence, because its existence is firmly secured in first person awareness of 
itself. That said, notice that Descartes’s Cogito does not specify the nature of this self. This is 
a deliberate move on Descartes’s part, since here his focus is on showing the role of the first 
person thought in establishing one of the key aspects of self-knowledge, i.e., one’s 
knowledge of one’s own particular thoughts (cf. Cassam 1994: 1). At least for now, the “I”, 
in the Cogito functions in what I shall call: a neutral fashion. Here by ‘a neutral fashion’, I 
mean that the “I” in the Cogito does not necessarily favor, for example, the substance 
dualists’ understanding of it (e.g., immaterial thing) over that of the 
materialists’/physicalists’ (e.g., material thing) and vice versa. Hence, one need not 
subscribe himself/herself to either position to be able to see the gist of Descartes’s Cogito.  
 
Here an example from Ludwig’s Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books will bring my 
point home. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two uses of “I”: (a) “the 
use as object”; and (b) “the use as subject” (1958: 66). An example of (a) is “my arm is 
broken” and an example of (b) is “I think it will rain”, “I have a toothache” (Ibid. 66-67). 
Details aside for now, for Wittgenstein, the category of (a) admits an error. For example, as 
Wittgenstein points out, in an accident it is possible that one may feel a pain in one’s arm, if 
one sees a broken arm at one’s side thinking that it is one’s own arm (i.e., thereby forming a 
false belief). But in the case of the category of (b) there is no possibility for an error. For 
example, if I am in pain, then I cannot be mistaken about who is in pain. This is because my 
awareness of my own pain experience is squarely rooted in my first person awareness of it.  
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So the semantics of “I” in the Cogito aligns with Wittgenstein’s (b) as opposed to (a).9 Taken 
this way, it seems to me that primarily the mode of self-knowledge implied in Descartes’s 
Cogito, is not propositional in nature, which takes the form: I know that P. Rather, it is what 
Bertrand Russell of The Problems of Philosophy describes as: knowledge by acquaintance, 
which takes the form: I know P.10 So we can be said to know something in the sense of 
knowledge by acquaintance, as Russell remarks, “[when] we have acquaintance with 
anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of 
inference,” (1959: 25). Here Russell’s point is that the things that we come to know by 
direct acquaintance are not the result of, for example, a certain conclusion derived from a 
set of premises. It is quite the opposite. That is, as I understand it, knowledge by 
acquaintance is an instance of knowledge, whereby the subject finds himself/herself simply 
knowing something. Here by ‘simply knowing something’, I mean with no precondition put 
in place on the basis of which one comes to know something. Instead the locution, ‘simply 
knowing something’ stands for, as it were, an immediate grasp of something. For example, 
if I am in a pain state, then I know the state I am in directly. If I am asked how I know that I 
am in a pain state, the right thing for me to say is this: I just know it. Hence, in such 
contexts, seeking an inference based answer for the ‘how’ question effectively becomes 
meaningless or so it seems to me. This is because my knowledge of my being in a pain state 
is not dependent on me first doing something else before I come to know it. Gareth Evans 
seems to be thinking along similar lines when he says: 
A subject’s knowledge of what it is for the thought ‘I am in pain’ to be true may 
appear to be exhausted by his capacity to decide, simply upon the basis of how he 
feels, whether or not it is true—and similarly in the case of all the other ways of 
gaining knowledge about ourselves (Evans in Cassam 1994: 187).  
 
In light of this, if my brief analysis above on Cogito is right, then we can say that the 
knowledge implied by “I” in Descartes’s Cogito is ultimately de re (i.e., a thing) knowledge as 
opposed to being merely de dicto (i.e., propositional) knowledge (cf. Chisholm 1976).11 That  
_______________ 
9 Dorit Bar-On also advances similar arguments in her excellent book, Speaking My Mind: Expression 
and Self-Knowledge (e.g., see 2004: Ch. 2). 
10 However, Russell’s own view on this issue underwent change. But that does not affect my point 
here. 
11 For an excellent discussion concerning De re and De dicto modality, see Plantinga (1974: 1-36); also 
see Davidson, ed., (2003: Ch. 1).  
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is, what Descartes claims to have known via Cogito is quite literally himself (cf. Merleau-
Ponty, Part Three, 1962: Ch. 1). Put differently, for Descartes, Cogito provides an epistemic 
basis for de re knowledge. This seems to be the background assumption for Descartes when 
he says in his Second Meditation: “this proposition, I am, I exist, necessarily true whenever it 
is put forward by me or conceived in my mind,” (AT VII 25: CSM 17). In light of this, if my 
reading of Cogito into Russell’s conception of knowledge by acquaintance holds true, then 
we can plausibly assume that ultimately one’s knowledge of oneself is not theory laden at 
all, contra to current orthodox accounts in analytic philosophy in general and cognitive 
neuroscience in particular. This is the view I very much want to defend in this thesis. I shall 
call this: a non-theory laden conception of the self/person. I will pick up this discussion in 
chapter seven.  
 
That said, before I end my discussion in this section, I anticipate one objection (to be 
discussed in chapter eight) against my hitherto analysis of Cogito. For example, it may be 
said that both Descartes’s Cogito in general and the analysis I have given for it in particular 
suffer from circularity. For example, in his The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, José Luis 
Bermúdez gives the most sophisticated account of such circularity. But I should note that 
Bermúdez’s own account is not given in consideration of Descartes’s Cogito. Regardless of 
that, however, my interest in Bermúdez’s objection has to do with its direct relevance to the 
present discussion, as well as to what I briefly indicated earlier as a non-theory laden 
conception of the self/person. With this caveat in mind, here are the two types of circularity 
that Bermúdez discusses: 
Any theory that tries to elucidate the capacity to think first-person thoughts through 
linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun will be circular, because the 
explanandum is part of the explanans either directly…or indirectly. Let me call this 
explanatory circularity (1998: 16).  
 
Bermúdez also identifies what he calls capacity circularity: 
 
The capacity for reflexive self-reference by means of the first-person pronoun 
presupposes the capacity to think thoughts with first-person contents, and hence 
cannot be deployed to explain that capacity. In other words, a degree of self-
consciousness is required to master the use of the first-person pronoun (1998: 18).   
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Bermúdez claims that both the explanatory circularity and the capacity circularity constitute 
what he calls: the paradox of self-consciousness (see 1998: 14-24). Bermúdez also suggests 
the way out of both forms of circularity. He sums it up as follows:  
A nonconceptual content is one that can be ascribed to a thinker even though that 
thinker does not possess the concepts required to specify that content. 
Nonconceptual first-person contents are those that fall into this category and that 
can be specified by means of the first-person or indirect reflexive pronouns. This 
nonconceptual first-person content offers a way of breaking both forms of circularity 
(1998: 49ff).  
 
We have yet to see whether the circularity Bermúdez pointed out above can be successfully 
avoided. Also I remain unpersuaded by Bermúdez’s ingenious solution aimed at avoiding 
such circularity. I will argue that Bermúdez’s account of circularity suffers from the 
conflation of a disposition with its manifestation. Contra Bermúdez, as I will argue, if the 
nonconceptual first-person content is understood in dispositional terms, then under the 
right circumstance, its manifestation will take place in terms of a capacity, namely for 
reflexive self-reference via the use of the first person pronoun. So once we take a 
dispositional approach to understand nonconceptual first person content, Bermúdez’s 
explanatory as well as capacity circularity turn out to be harmless.  
 
The focus of our hitherto discussion has been on the first aspect of Descartes’s answer to 
the substantial-self question, i.e., the epistemic aspect of the existence of the self. We now 
turn to the second aspect of Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question—which 
deals with the question: what kind of a thing the self is.   
 
1.1.1.2 The Ontology of the Self 
Descartes develops his ontology of the self within a framework of his metaphysics of 
substance. As we recall in § 1.1.1, we had said that in the context of the modern discussion 
of the ontology of the self, Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question gives us the 
first instance of the identification of the self with a substance. Here is the first clear example 
of such identification:       
I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and 
which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. 
Accordingly this ‘I’-that is, the soul by which I am what I am-is entirely distinct from 
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the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be 
whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (Discourse AT VI 33 CSM: 127).    
 
This passage encapsulates three key aspects of Descartes’s characterization of the nature of 
the I, i.e., the self; (i) I is a substance, whose nature wholly consists in thinking; (ii) “I” is a 
referring expression, which in this case stands for a thinking thing; and (iii) I as a substantial 
thinking thing is: nonspatial, independent of and distinct from the material thing (i.e., the 
body), is capable of existing without the body and maintains self-identity over time. Of (i)-
(iii), as we shall see, the most controversial aspect of Descartes’s characterization of I 
remains to be (iii). It is also (iii) that underlies Descartes’s well known: the mind-body 
problem. But what is the metaphysical basis of (iii)?12 This is the question that Descartes 
deals with in great detail both in his Second and Sixth Meditations. But for present 
purposes, I do not concern myself with these details since my goal here is only to look at the 
second aspect of Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question exclusively from the 
standpoint of substance ontology.13  
 
In this regard, both in Second and Sixth Meditations, Descartes expands upon (i)-(iii), where 
his main focus is on establishing the ontological status of the self.14 For example, Descartes  
__________________ 
12 For details on Descartes’s mind-body problem (e.g., the problem of psychophysical causal 
interaction, see Kim (2006; 2005: Ch. 3); Heil (1998); Cottingham (1986: Ch. 5). In chapter six, I will discuss 
some issues in philosophy of mind in relation to the self.   
13 In Principles of Philosophy Descartes speaks of two notions of substance in light of which he laid the 
initial ground for his discussion in Meditations. First, a substance is a thing that exists independently, i.e., 
exists by itself. As Descartes states, “By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists 
in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence,” (Principles AT VIII I.51 CSM: 210). Cottingham 
(1993: 160) remarks that here, Descartes’s definition of substance directly echoes Aristotle’s view of 
substance, according to which “a substance is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the 
individual man or the individual horse,” (Cat. 2a 11). As Cottingham further points out, “the contrast here is 
between things which exist independently (such as individual horse) and properties or attributes (such as 
being fleet-footed) which can only be predicated of, or belong to, a subject,” (Ibid.). Second, a substance is a 
bearer of properties. For example, a material substance or the physical body bears properties such as 
extension in space, size, figure whereas the immaterial substance is a bearer of thought (Principles AT VIII I. 
48-53 CSM: 210). That said, for Descartes, only God satisfies the requirement of independent existence in a 
sense of not needing to depend on anything whatsoever. Created things need God’s concurrence in order to 
exist (see for details, Woolhouse 1993: Ch. 2). So the notion of substance cannot be used univocally, i.e., in the 
same sense for God and other created entities (see, Principles I.51 CSM: 210). In his own way, Spinoza also 
defends an Aristotelian notion of the independent existence of substance, see e.g., Ethics trans., Parkinson 
(2000: 15-17). For sophisticated account of what an independent existence amounts to, see Lowe (2009).  
14 Descartes uses terms such as: mind, self and soul and “I” interchangeably.   
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asks, “But what then am I?” (Second Meditation AT VII 28 CSM: 19). He answers this 
question by saying that he is, “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is 
unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions,” (Ibid.). Here Descartes’s answer 
runs together three key features that constitute the nature of the self, which will also be the 
focus of my attention throughout this thesis. The features I have in mind are: the self as an 
agent (e.g., willing and unwilling); the self as a bearer of cognitive/mental states (e.g., 
doubt, affirms); and the self as a distinct entity—from the properties it bears. In his Sixth 
Meditation, Descartes expands upon these features mainly by drawing the distinction 
between the body and the mind on the one hand, and the role they each play on the other 
hand (see AT VII 72-90 CSM: 50-62). For example, Descartes argues that only an incorporeal 
substance is the subject of mental properties. Likewise, only corporeal substance (i.e., 
physical body) is a bearer of physical properties such as motion, shape, figure, size, etc., (cf. 
footnote # 12 above). In light of such considerations, Descartes gave an affirmative answer 
to the substantial-self question i.e., the self (i.e., immaterial) is a substance.   
 
1.1.2 Alternative answers  
 
As indicated in § 1.1.1, I pointed out that Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question 
was responsible for subsequent alternative philosophical theories of the self. For present 
purposes, there is no need to list all of these alternative theories of the self nor will it be 
practical to discuss them on an individual basis.15 So, in this section, I will suggest five 
representative categories under which alternative answers to the substantial-self question 
can be grouped. These are: (a) broadly Cartesian answers; (b) broadly Lockean answers; (c) 
broadly Humean answers; (d) broadly Kantian answers and (e) broadly Aristotelian 
answers.16 However, in suggesting these categories, I am not implying, for example, that  
________________________ 
15 Outside of analytic philosophy, the notion of the ‘self’ crops up in many other places as well (e.g., in 
sociology, in cultural anthropology, in psychology, in political theory, in world religions, in films, 
fictional/literary writings, just to mention a few). In this thesis, however, my discussion of the notion of the 
self will be confined entirely to analytic philosophy. That said, for a nice representative view of the self both 
from analytic and continental philosophical traditions, see Atkins (2005). Specifically, for the theory of the self 
in the transcendental tradition, see Carr (1999).  
16 Here the ideas in one way or another are linked to Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant and Aristotle.  
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any given answer to the substantial-self question neatly fits only into one of the above 
domains/categories. On the contrary, as we shall see, answers to the substantial-self 
question may well be partly Lockean in one sense and partly Humean in another sense and 
so on. So we should not necessarily take these categories as rigid benchmarks against which 
we determine which category any given answer to the substantial-self question must 
belong.   
 
1.1.2.1 The Two Reasons 
 
That said, at this point, the question that comes to mind is this: why did philosophers 
suggest alternative answers to the substantial-self question? In other words, why did they 
refuse to settle for Descartes’s answer? While a full-scale answer to this question will take 
us too far afield, in the context of the present discussion, two reasons come to mind: (1) 
Descartes’s identification of the self with a substance; and (2) Descartes’s recognition of the 
self as a metaphysical entity. Here (1) and (2) are inextricably interrelated. In (1) the term 
‘identification,’ should be understood in light of our discussion in § 1.1 and § 1.1.1.2. In 
these sections, we saw that the terms the ‘self’ and a ‘substance’ refer to the same thing—
thereby implying strict logical identity. On the other hand, in (2) the term ‘recognition,’ 
should be understood from an epistemic standpoint in that it is intended to show that one 
thing is being recognized as something. Such knowledge, for example, takes the form: I 
know P as Q. As we recall, Descartes speaks of knowing himself as a thing whose essence is 
to think (see § 1.1.1.2). In light of this, I shall call the ‘identification,’ in (1) Metaphysical 
Identification; and the ‘recognition,’ in (2) Epistemological Recognition. Having clarified the 
sense in which we are using the terms ‘identification’ and ‘recognition’ we are now in a 
position to see why the majority of analytic philosophers distance themselves from 
embracing Descartes’s answer to the substantial-self question.  
 
1.1.2.2 Locating the Objection   
One way we can show this is by looking at Descartes’s substance ontology, which, in light of 
our discussion in § 1.1.1.2 can be summed up under the following three definitions:  
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(D1) X is a substance=df (a) X exists; (b) X does not depend on Y for its existence but 
Y depends on X.  (Y refers to creatures such as human beings).  
 
(D2) X is an incorporeal substance=df (a) X exists; (b) X is a non-physical thing: (i) X 
does not occupy space, (ii) X does not depend on any material thing, and (iii) X 
is capable of existing without the body, (iv) X maintains strict identity over 
time; (c) X is a bearer of mental properties M; (d) mental properties M depend 
on X for their existence but X does not depend on M for its existence.  
 
(D3) Y is a corporeal substance=df (a) Y exists; (b) Y is a physical thing; (c) Y is a 
bearer of physical properties P; (d) physical properties P depend on Y and Y 
also depends on P.    
 
The majority of contemporary analytic philosophers who are critical of Descartes’s view of 
the self exclusively target (D2).17 The variable ‘X’ in the definiens of (D2) is to be substituted 
for the term ‘self’. To clearly see the philosophers’ reasons for rejecting (D2), it would be 
helpful to analyze the objection raised against it at three levels. Doing this is extremely 
important, since objections against Descartes’s (D2) often go unchecked. So we need to 
show which objections are effective and which ones are not. I shall call the three levels as 
follows: the existence, the terminology and the unity levels, respectively.  
 
A. The Existence Level  
At the existence level, the objection mainly consists of the conjunction of D2-(a) and D2-(b)’s 
main definiens i.e. the self is a non-physical thing. The nature of this objection can be stated 
as follows: since the self is said to be a non-physical thing and a non-physical thing is 
unobservable, it follows that its existence cannot be established (see e.g., Quinton in Perry, 
ed.: 1975: 54-55; Perry 1977; Glover 1988: 98; Dennett 1991; Kolak and Martin, eds., 1991: 
339). But we have yet to see whether this conclusion follows. That said, it is not difficult to 
pin down the assumption behind this objection. That is, if X exists, then X must be an object 
of observation. But what if X is not observable? If we take the above assumption at face 
value, then what we should say in response to this question seems to be this: if X is not  
_________________ 
17 In Descartes’s time, Hobbes rejected (D2), see Leviathan, ed. (1994); see also Gassendi’s First Set of 
Objections, AT VII 257-277: CSM 179-193; Descartes’s Reply: AT VII 351-361: CSM 243-249; AT VII 385-391: 
CSM 264-267; also see Seventh Set of Objections with the Author’s Replies, AT VII 451-561: CSM 302-383. For 
early Wittgenstein’s (i.e., Tractatus) objection against (D2) see Kripke’s excellent discussion (1982: 122-145).  
All of these objections can be subsumed under what I called objection at the existence level (see A below).  
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observable, then it does not exist.18 Such a response in turn leads us to another question: 
Does unobservability necessarily imply non-existence? More to the point: Is the self’s 
unobservability (whatever that means) necessarily imply its non-existence? Here I inserted a 
qualifying phrase ‘whatever that means,’ so as to show in the course of our discussion that, 
the very notion of ‘the observability of the self’ is deeply misguided—which needs to be 
abandoned altogether. I will return to this issue in chapter three. But before I answer the 
above question, I need to mention two key historical precedents that are directly 
responsible for the objection under consideration. The first one has to do with the advent of 
modern science; and the second one has to do with Hume’s extremely influential answer. 
For example, regarding the former, Dennett remarks:  
Since the dawn of modern science in the seventeenth century, there has been nearly 
unanimous agreement that the self, whatever it is, would be invisible under a 
microscope, and invisible to introspection, too (1991: 412). 
 
With respect to the latter, in his A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume remarks:  
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can observe any thing but the perception….If any 
one upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of 
himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him….tho’ I am certain there is no 
such principle in me (I. IV. VI 1888: 252).  
 
In his remarks, Dennett has already implicitly alluded to Hume’s view, as the phrase 
‘invisible to introspection’ indicates.19 So in this case, Dennett’s remarks nicely encapsulate 
the unobservability of the self both from the standpoint of scientific experiment on the one 
hand and one’s introspection on the other. At this point, many philosophers (including  
___________________ 
18 Of course, here one can ask: what is existence? Or alternatively: what does it mean for something 
to exist? As is well-known, in the post Frege-Russell-Quine era, the debate besetting the notion of existence 
focuses, inter alia, on the analysis of existential quantification and reference (see .e.g., Aune 1985: Ch. 2; 
Williams 1981; Quine 1969: Ch. 4, Russell in Marsh 1956). For present purposes, I do not need to get into this 
highly technical area of logic and philosophy of language. In The Search for Truth, Descartes states: “To know 
what that is, all we need do is to understand the meaning of the word [i.e., existence], for that tells us at once 
what the thing is which the word stands for, in so far as we can know it. There is no need for definition, which 
would confuse rather than clarify the issue,” (AT X 525: CSM II 418). But Descartes’s proposal here need not be 
seen along the lines of Frege’s, Russell’s and Quine’s analysis of the notion of existence. As we already saw in 
the Cogito case, Descartes seems to be working with an intuitive notion of existence, which in the words of 
Mctaggart, ‘a species of the real’ (see e.g., Mctaggart Vol. I 2 1921: 1-2, 57-58).  
19 I will discuss Hume’s view in detail in chapter three. So I will not engage in serious discussion yet.  
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Dennett), assume that Descartes’s D2-(b)’s main definiens (i.e., the non-physicality of the 
self) justifies their denial of D2-(a), i.e., the self’s existence. In the next section, I will 
question the plausibility of such a move. More importantly, I will point out that those who 
reject Descartes’s D2-(a) on the basis of D2-(b)’s main definiens are trading on an 
ambiguous term ‘observation.’ Before I discuss that, l now turn to the terminology level 
since it is directly linked to the existence level.  
 
B. The Terminology Level 
As we saw at the existence level, the main objection that was raised against the existence of 
the self has to do with the alleged undetectability or unobservability. Those who embrace 
the ‘undetectability of the self’ objection also raise other objections at the terminological 
level. In this regard, the objections stem from the four terms Descartes interchangeably 
uses to refer to himself. These terms are: ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘I’ and ‘self’ (see footnote # 12 in § 
1.1.1.2). As summed up in (D2) in §1.1.2.2, for Descartes, all of these terms refer to a non-
physical entity/thing. But since the ‘undetectability objection’ rules out the existence of a 
non-physical entity, Descartes’s opponents conclude that the above four terms do not have 
a referent. So to think otherwise, according to Descartes’s opponents, would be to endorse 
what Gilbert Ryle (objecting to Descartes’s view of the self) describes as, “the dogma of the 
Ghost in the Machine,” (1949: 15). Furthermore, Ryle claims that Descartes’s view of the 
self is a category mistake, which is false not just in detail but also in principle (emphasis 
mine, Ibid.16).  
 
But Ryle’s remarks above are not only questionable but are also extremely misleading. If as 
Ryle boldly asserts that Descartes’s view is false in principle, then such remarks do seem to 
suggest that there is nothing we can positively learn from what Descartes has to say about 
the ontology of the self. Contra Ryle, therefore, I will argue that there are things we can 
positively learn from Descartes’s view of the self. As they stand, Ryle’s remarks above can 
only be taken as a paradigm example of an extreme reaction against Descartes’s view of the 
self.  
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But Ryle was not alone in holding such an extreme anti-Cartesian view. He also has 
influential followers. For example, Anthony Kenny in his The Metaphysics of Mind, remarks, 
“Like Ryle, I regard the inheritance of Descartes as being the single most substantial 
obstacle to a correct philosophical understanding of the nature of the human mind,” (1989: 
vii). Thus, Kenny rejects both the self as an entity and the first person pronoun “I” as a 
referring expression (see Ibid. 87-88). Similarly, Daniel Dennett remarks, “What is a self? 
Since Descartes in the seventeenth century, we have had a vision of the self as a sort of 
immaterial ghost that owns and controls a body the way you own and control your car,” 
(Dennett in Kolak and Martin, eds., 1991: 335; also see Dennett 1991; 1984; 2003). 
Descartes’s notion of the ‘soul’ is also described as ‘a ghost in the machine,’ as ‘religious or 
spiritualistic beliefs,’ as ‘spiritual substance,’ etc., (see e.g., Hofstadter and Dennett, eds., 
1981; cf. Murphy and Brown, 2007: Ch. 1; Armstrong 1999: Ch. 2; Tye 2003: 133). It has also 
been said that in the age of cognitive science, the mind can only be taken as an aspect of 
the brain that arises from the complex physical brain mechanism (see e.g., Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999: 3-10; cf. Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Bennett and Hacker 2003: Ch. 
12).  
 
But the main problem with such reactions against Descartes’s view of the self has to do with 
the fact that they all attack the straw man version of Descartes’s position. For example, 
Descartes never talked about the notion of ‘ghost’ in any of his own writings. In this regard, 
Mel Thompson rightly points out that Ryle was solely responsible for portraying the self as a 
“ghost” and in doing so, for caricaturing what he then takes as the “official” dualist view of 
the relationship between the mind and matter as “the ghost in the machine”. Thompson 
complains that these days, in philosophy (as in many other spheres of life such as politics), 
caricatures are more memorable than historical characters. As Thompson further notes, this 
has been the sad reality of Descartes’s view of the self, which is often seen through Ryle’s 
logical behaviorist eyes (2009: 17-18).  
 
Similarly, Descartes never used the term ‘soul’ for theological/religious reasons contrary to 
the orthodox view. For example, as Cottingham argues, although Descartes’s talk of a non-
physical soul is compatible with theology, his belief in the thinking part of him being non-
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material was not motivated by theological reasons. Cottingham claims that the modern 
reader may well be misled by the word ‘soul’ supposing that it is ‘spiritual’ in the sense of 
having to do with heightened aesthetic, moral or religious sensibilities. But Cottingham 
claims that Descartes’s ‘soul’ is by no means limited to the ‘soulful’ (in the modern sense) 
aspect of our mind. Rather in Descartes, ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ are synonymous and merely 
function as convenient labels for res cogitans—that which thinks. The bottom line here is 
that when Descartes uses the above terms, he has in mind the whole range of conscious 
mental activity (1986: 111).  
 
Thompson-Cottingham’s remarks above show why widespread anti-Cartesian views of the 
self are based on serious mischaracterization of what Descartes actually says about his view 
(Bolton 1994: xx). More importantly, in his own time, Descartes was well aware of the 
problem of his critics distorting his view of the self. For example, in responding to one of his 
critics, Bourdin, Descartes remarks:  
Here, as almost everywhere else, my critic represents me…with comments that are 
wholly at variance with my true views. But it would be too tedious to list all his 
fabrications….As for what should be termed ‘body’, or ‘soul’ or ‘mind’…I gave an 
account of two things, namely that which thinks and that which is 
extended….However, I did call one of the substances ‘mind’ and the other ‘body’; if 
my critic does not like these terms, he may employ others, and I shall not complain 
(AT VII Seventh Set of Objections with Replies 487 BB CC: CSM 329).  
 
In bringing this point up, however, I am not implying that Descartes’s view of the self is free 
from problems. As I will briefly explain in the next section, that is not the case. Having said 
that, the objections raised at the terminological level, do not seem to pose any serious 
threat to Descartes’s view of the self. How about the ‘unobservability of the self’ objection 
that was raised at the existence level? Since this is the issue I will discuss in detail in chapter 
three (in relation to Hume’s view of the self) and in chapter seven (in relation to my own 
view), here my remarks will be very brief.  
 
As I see it, the ‘unobservability of the self’ objection rules out the self’s existence based on a 
misleading assumption, i.e., for something such as a self to be real, it must be observable. 
But the question remains: observable in what sense? We commonly use the verb ‘to 
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observe’ in a literal sense, that is linking it with direct observation on the one hand and in a 
non-literal sense, i.e., linking it with indirect observation, on the other hand. From the 
standpoint of a literal sense of observation for example, as I write up this thesis, all being 
equal, I am epistemically justified in making the following inferences:  
(i)  I observe that the laptop in front of me has a certain size, a certain shape and it 
occupies a certain region of space, inter alia.  
 
(ii)  My fingers are typing on the computer keypad as I feel the pressure, the clicking 
sound, etc. 
 
(iii)  What I am typing is appearing on the computer screen, which I can read, delete, 
etc.  
 
Such inferences in (i)-(iii) are often made under the assumption that we are directly 
observing objects that fall within our visual field, in this case, the desktop in front of me. 
There is also what I am calling a non-literal sense of observation, according to which the 
existence of something perhaps can only be inferred on the basis of analyzing its effect. In 
this case, a non-literal sense of observation is suggested under the assumption that certain 
things can be observed indirectly. For example, physicists tell us that we do not directly 
observe atoms, yet we believe in their existence given our knowledge of their properties 
(e.g., tracking electrons that bounce off atoms). Likewise, we do not have direct access to 
black holes owing to their immense gravitational pull, from which light itself cannot escape. 
But the lack of direct access to observe such things is hardly a reason to infer that atoms or 
black holes do not exist. It is not uncommon in science to postulate the unobservable to 
account for the behavior of the observable things (see e.g., Green 1999/2003). Of course, 
here I am not using such analogies from science to defend Descartes’s view of the self. 
Rather, my point is that such analogies from science can help us see the implausibility of 
assuming (quite in general) that if something is unobservable then it must be the case that 
its existence must be unreal.   
 
Having distinguished between direct and indirect observation, what can we then say in 
response to the ‘undetectability or the unobservability’ of the self objection? As I had said 
earlier, this objection trades on an ambiguous term, ‘observation’. Those who reject 
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Descartes’s view of the self do not make effort at least in what sense they are demanding 
the observability of a non-physical self, that is, either in a literal or non-literal sense. But 
since in the literature, Ryle’s ‘ghost in the machine’ is taken as a canonical expression to 
dismiss Descartes’s view of the self, I assume that the non-physical self is denied existence, 
assuming that it does not pass the observability criterion (taken in the literal sense of 
observation). If this is what Descartes’s opponents have in mind in dismissing Descartes’s 
view of the self, then it remains unclear what force their objection would have against 
Descartes’s position. It seems that Descartes’s opponents are relying on Hume’s, as we shall 
see (in chapter three), deeply mistaken assumption that introspection must necessarily 
entail perceiving the self. For example, having failed to perceive a self via introspection, 
Hume concluded that there is no such thing called a self (see e.g., a quotation from Hume’s 
Treatise under the existence level in § 1.1.2.2).  
 
By contrast, Descartes’s view of the self can be shown to be compatible with both senses of 
observation as laid out above. All we need to do here is qualify the sense in which we use 
observation in relation to self-knowledge. Doing this is extremely important not to find 
ourselves making a Humean sort of mistake I mentioned above. So how should we go about 
qualifying observation in relation to self-knowledge? Here I return to my earlier point in § 
1.1.1.1. In this section, I argued that Descartes’s cogito primarily has to do with de re 
knowledge. I also suggested that the best way to capture the sense of de re knowledge is by 
spelling it out in terms of knowledge by acquaintance, i.e., unmediated knowledge of the 
self. So it is open for Descartes without repeating Hume’s mistake of requiring ‘self-
perception, i.e., perceiving oneself as an object,’ to say that he has direct knowledge of 
himself. But by ‘direct’ here we don’t mean that we observe the self as we directly observe 
objects such as a chair or a table in front of us (cf. Shoemaker 1963: Chs. 1-2). Rather, by 
‘direct’ we mean one’s own awareness of oneself immediately without being filtered 
through anything whatsoever (cf. Moreland 2009: Ch. 5). Even if we do not (perhaps 
cannot) spell this out in adequate words, the fact seems to remain. That is, self-awareness is 
an obvious phenomenon. But objections often cited against such claims, by appealing to 
psychiatric disorders or cases of personality fragmentation, do not stand their ground. I will 
explain and respond to one such objection in chapter eight. So if the sense of observation is 
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understood in a way qualified in the preceding paragraph, then Descartes’s view of the self 
can escape the ‘unobservability proves the non-existence of the self’ objection.  
 
Similarly, there is textual evidence in Descartes’s Second Meditation, which suggests that 
Descartes seems to have thought that we can have knowledge of a self via indirect means 
such as its actions. For example, as Descartes remarks, “But what then am I? A thing that 
thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is 
unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions (AT VII 28 CSM: 19). The gist of 
Descartes’s point here is that he knows what a thinking thing is by listing what such a 
thinking thing does. Put differently, the self’s existence can be inferred from its operations. 
In light of such considerations, the ‘unobservability of the self’ objection against Descartes is 
not decisive.  
 
C. The Unity Level 
It is at the unity level that we find what can be taken as the most serious objection against 
Descartes’s view of the self. Before we see this objection, it would be helpful to recap (D2) 
from § 1.1.2.2.  
(D2) X is an incorporeal substance=df (a) X exists; (b) X is a non-physical thing: (i) X 
does not occupy space, (ii) X does not depend on any material thing, and (iii) X 
is capable of existing without the body, (iv) X maintains strict identity over 
time; (c) X is a bearer of mental properties M; (d) mental properties M depend 
on X for their existence but X does not depend on M for its existence.  
 
The objection at the unity level stems particularly from (D2)-b’s clauses (i) and (ii). Given (i), 
it is difficult to see how the self can causally interact with the material body, since it (i.e., 
the self) does not occupy space. Following the tradition in the literature, I shall call this the 
causal interaction problem. On the other hand, Descartes’s statement in (ii) generates what 
I shall call: the unity problem. That is, if the immaterial self does not depend on any material 
thing, then we wonder what to make of the basis for the unity between them. So the 
interaction and the unity problems stand or fall together. In the Second and the Sixth 
Meditations, Descartes addresses each of these problems, although one can still wonder 
whether he succeeded in solving them. Here it is not my intention to defend Descartes’s 
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theory of the self against these problems nor am I interested to take any position as to 
whether or not the above problems are fatal to Descartes’s substance dualism.  
 
But most philosophers think that the above problems are insuperable (see e.g., Kim 2005: 
Ch. 3; Dennett 1991; Atkins 2005: 9; cf. Garrett 1998: 6-9). There are others who do think 
that the above two problems are not insuperable. So with some modification, they defend 
Descartes’s view of the self (see e.g., Swinburne 1997; Foster 1991; Hart 1988; Robinson 
2003). Yet those who deem the interaction problem and the unity problem as insuperable 
often insist that self is unreal (see e.g., Garrett 1998: 6-9). On the other hand, those who 
defend Descartes’s view of the self, while acknowledging the above two problems, still 
embrace Descartes’s notion of the entityhoodness of the self. For reasons we shall see 
throughout this thesis, my own sympathy lies with those who retain the notion of the self as 
an entity.  
 
1.1.2.3 The Lesson and the Challenge  
Despite making some positive remarks about Descartes’s theory of the self, I do not claim to 
have shown that Descartes has established the existence of the self. In fact, that was not my 
aim. Rather, what I have merely attempted to do is demonstrate that Descartes’s theory of 
the self is not as absurd as it is often portrayed in the literature (cf. Hawthorne in Van 
Inwagen and Zimmerman 2006: Ch. 3). If this is right, then good lessons can be learned from 
Descartes’s theory of the self. One of the lessons I have in mind can be stated in the form of 
a conditional statement (CS) as follows:  
 
(CS-1): If the self exists, then it must be a certain kind of entity, i.e., a substantial 
entity.  
 
As we shall see, I will be putting (CS-1) within the framework of the Aristotelian 
metaphysics. It is in light of the Aristotelian metaphysics that I want to defend (CS-1) in this 
thesis. That said, however, describing the self in the third personal language as stated in 
(CS-1) above has its own drawbacks. First, third person language portrays the self as if it is 
an object, which if it exists, must be found upon searching for it. I already expressed my 
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dissatisfaction with this sort of Humean requirement. But this requirement still remains to 
be one of the most popular objections pressed against a defender of the substantial self. I 
will return to this issue in chapter three. Second, the third person language breeds 
confusion over what a self is supposed to be.  
 
For example, some philosophers (not to mention psychologists) often talk about the self in 
terms of locutions such as ‘ecological self’, ‘interpersonal self’, ‘extended self’, ‘private self’, 
‘conceptual self’ (Keisser in Kolak and Martin, eds., 1991: Ch. 24); ‘constructing a self’ (cf. 
Gergen Ibid. Ch. 23; McCall in Mischel 1977: Ch. 10); ‘immersed self’, ‘participant self’ and 
‘underself’ (see Ganeri 2012: 14); ‘the situated self’ (Ismael 2007); ‘the quantum self’ (Zohar 
1990); ‘multiple selves’, ‘hierarchical self’, ‘parallel selves’ (Elster ed., 1985: 1-34); ‘having a 
self’ and so on. For now, there is no need to analyze all of these locutions. By way of 
illustrating the kind of confusion I have in mind, I will say something briefly with respect to 
the last locution, i.e., ‘having a self’.  
 
It makes sense when someone says that he/she has a particular personality. For example, 
we often talk about someone having rude personality versus excellent personality. Taken in 
either sense, the point is that based on our judgment of the quality of how a person 
interacts with us or other people, we draw a certain conclusion with respect to his/her 
personality (see e.g., Goldie 2004; also cf. Maltby, Day, et. al., 2007: Ch. 1). If this is how we 
are supposed to understand what it means to have a self, then the self seems to have been 
identified with personality.20 But those who take the self to be an entity would reject 
identifying the self with personality as a category mistake. This is because the self is the 
owner of various sorts of personalities without being itself an amalgamation of those 
personalities. In this case, the confusion has to do with swapping the self for personality and 
vice versa. On a similar note, William Alston remarks: 
The homunculus-taboo led many theorists to identify the ‘self’ with a person’s 
cognitions or evaluations of himself, or attitudes to himself. The ‘self’ is an 
organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics  
__________________ 
20 I will return to this issue with some detail in chapter eight in relation to some psychological 
disorders. 
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and relationships of the ‘I’ of the ‘me’, together with values attached with these 
concepts. It can only breed confusion to identify my self with my conception of 
myself (Alston in Mischel 1977: 66). 
 
The gist of Alston’s remark above is that the misguided [Rylean sort of] fear about 
homunculi, i.e., a little man inside (i.e., brain) can hardly justify swapping two distinct 
domains back and forth as if they are identical. But in saying this, neither Alston nor I 
assume that all forms of everyday talk in which ‘self’ appears is problematic. For example, 
Elmer Sprague nicely sums up how we use in everyday talk ‘self’ as prefix and suffix in such 
compounds as ‘self-conscious’, ‘self-centered’, ‘myself’, ‘themselves’, ‘I am not myself 
today’ and the like (see Sprague 1978: 25-26). But at the moment, my concern is not with 
such ubiquitous everyday usage of the term ‘self’. Rather what I am interested in is with an 
ontological implication of the use of ‘self’ in locutions mentioned earlier (e.g., ‘having a 
self’). In that case, we saw that the third person language opens a door for confusion. So in 
the interest of avoiding any such confusion as well as for other reasons we shall see, I spell 
out (CS-1) in terms of first personal language as follows:  
 
(CS-2): If I am a self, then I must be a certain kind of entity, i.e., a substantial entity. 
 
As we saw, Descartes’s official answer to the substantial-self question is in line with what is 
stated in (CS-2) above. But there are three other alternative answers to the substantial-self 
question that I want to briefly mention here. The first is Locke’s answer. In his An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (see Ch. XXVII Nidditch, ed.: 1975), Locke does not 
commit himself to the view that the self is a substance. Although Locke himself was a friend 
of substance ontology, as I shall argue, he divorced the notion of the self from substance. In 
doing so, he strengthened most of the contemporary philosophers’ opposition to the 
ontology of the self. I will pick up this discussion in chapter two.  
 
The second is Hume’s answer. In his Treatise of Human Nature (see Part I and Part IV 1888 
ed., Selby-Bigge), Hume dismisses altogether the traditional notion of substance (associated 
with Aristotle) in general, and Descartes’s doctrine of the self in particular—Hume’s own 
official view being that a self is a bundle of properties. In this case, Hume’s view even all the 
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more led some influential philosophers to advocate for a ‘no self theory’ (e.g., Parfit 1984). I 
will discuss Hume’s view in chapter three.  
 
The third is Kant’s answer. In ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant argues against what he calls rational doctrine/pure psychology, which attempts to 
establish the subject of judgment (i.e., experience) through non-empirical means such as 
mere analysis and demonstration (see Smith, ed., A341/B399-A344/B402). So in the ‘First 
Paralogism,’21 Kant attempts to show why we have no epistemic ground to establish the 
substantiality of the self (A349-A351). In saying this, Kant is directly challenging the 
Cartesian view of the self (see also Gardner 1999: 145-148). However, as Patricia Kitcher 
points out, like Descartes, Kant believes that any cognitive state requires a subject. Yet 
unlike Descartes, Kant does not conceive of this self as a simple substance, but as a system 
of syntactically connected or connectable states (1990: 187). In this case, as we shall see in 
chapter three, Kant’s view is anti-Humean.   
 
Of the four answers we have considered so far to the substantial-self question, as we shall 
see,  Locke’s and Hume’s answers are the ones that take center stage in setting the tone for 
the contemporary philosophical debate on personal identity. By contrast, Descartes’s 
answer is largely overlooked. But so far, I have not said anything about the Aristotelian 
answer. This is because the notion of the self is not something Aristotle explicitly discussed, 
although it could be reconstructed from his works (see e.g., Owens 1988: 707-722). Since 
Aristotle is most well-known, inter alia, for introducing the ontological concept of 
substance, my own interest lies on this aspect of his work. In light of this, in this thesis, one 
of my main goals is to develop a positive case for substance ontology with an aim to show 
its relevance both for the ontology of the self/person and the metaphysics of personal 
identity. In this regard, I will critically examine both Locke’s and Hume’s views on substance 
ontology on the one hand, and the contemporary neo-Lockeans’ and neo-Humeans’ 
reaction towards substance ontology on the other hand. At this point, it may be asked why  
_________________ 
21 According to Kant, “a logical Paralogism is a logical syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its 
content what it may,” (A341/B399).   
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putting much emphasis on criticizing non-substance ontology approaches is needed. Such 
an emphasis is needed due to a wide-spread skepticism in the literature that substance 
ontology can be effectively used to shed light on the problem of the metaphysics of 
personal identity over time (see e.g., Martin and Kolak, ed., 1993). In this regard, most 
philosophers’ skepticism is rooted in Locke’s and Hume’s analysis of traditional substance 
ontology. So in my view, an adequate defense of a positive account of substance ontology 
requires us first to engage with alternative approaches. I will take up this discussion in 
chapters two through five. In doing so, ultimately, my aim is to appropriate Aristotle’s 
notion of substance in defending the conditional claim stated in (CS-2) above. That is: If I am 
a self, then I must be a certain kind of entity, i.e., substantial entity. I will situate this 
conditional claim entirely within the framework of Aristotelian metaphysics. In doing so, my 
goal is to defend the entityhoodness of the self by giving broadly Aristotelian reasons. It is 
from such discussion that what I shall call: the Aristotelian answer to the substantial-self 
question will eventually emerge. Bringing Aristotle in this way into the contemporary debate 
on the ontology of the self in general and personal identity in particular has not been 
sufficiently emphasized.22 So, I consider my discussion in this regard to be one of the crucial 
aspects of my contribution to the ongoing debate.  
 
1.1.2.4 Boethius’s Way 
Up to this point, the substantial-self question has been discussed only in relation to the 
notion of the self. But there is another important notion which I have not yet linked to the 
substantial-self question. That is: the notion of a person. Etymologically, the term ‘person’ 
derives from the Latin persona: a mask worn by an actor who plays some kind of role or 
character. The same meaning applies to its closest Greek cognate προωσπον/prosopon. This 
notion had originated in the Roman law, where persons are perceived to be bearers of legal  
_________________ 
22 For excellent works done in recent years within the framework of broadly Aristotelian metaphysics, 
see e.g., Lowe (1996), (1998), (2006) and Oderberg (2007).   
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rights. The notion of the person also became associated with moral value through the 
influence of Christian tradition (see for details Mauss trans., Halls in Carrithers and Collins, 
eds., 1985: Ch. 1; Peacocke and Gillett, eds., 1987).  
 
In everyday language, the notion of the person is coextensive with other frequently used 
terms, namely ‘human being’ and ‘man’. In fact, in ancient philosophy, for example, there is 
no term for ‘person’ which is distinct from ‘human being’ (Gill, ed., 1990: 7). In this case, we 
can swap the predicates of any of the following three sentences with each other salva 
veritate, i.e., without any loss of meaning:  
(A) David Cameron is a person 
(B) David Cameron is a man 
(C) David Cameron is a human being.  
 
But as we shall see, the liberty we exercise in swapping (in ordinary usage) the predicate 
terms above in (A)-(C) without risking ambiguity is only temporary. This is because, 
following John Locke’s definition of a person (see below), bioethicists and philosophers 
argue that the above predicate terms do come apart, i.e., they can be mutually exclusive. In 
such cases, for example, the notion of the person is often singled out as having unique 
status over other terms such as ‘human being’. Here a good case in point is the current 
abortion controversies that primarily focus on the question of whether or not a fetus has 
the status of personhood. But how are we going to settle this issue? The answer directly 
hinges on what one takes a person to be (see e.g., Oderberg 2000: 174-184; cf. Perry 2002: 
199). To make sense of how philosophers usually argue about the notion of the person, first 
we need to understand how they often tend to think about it. For example, Sprague claims 
that the term ‘person’ is not a name that stands for a distinctive kind of thing, as ‘frog’ or 
‘diamond’ may be. Rather as Sprague claims, we use the term ‘person’ as a sort of title that 
we bestow on something if that thing satisfies certain appropriate criteria, as ‘doctor’ or 
‘policeman’ may be (1978: 61).  
 
Here Sprague speaks for many philosophers. So given Sprague’s characterization of the 
notion of a person, the question remains: Is person a sortal concept? By sortal concepts, 
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following Wiggins, I mean those concepts, “that present tensedly apply to an individual X at 
every moment throughout X’s existence,” (2001: 30; also see Lowe 1989: 1). For example, 
the term ‘human being’ is a sortal concept, since it satisfies Wiggins’s principle. By contrast, 
terms ‘president’ or ‘infant’ do not satisfy Wiggins’s principle, since these concepts are 
applied to any given entity temporarily. For example, I was an infant at some point in the 
past but that concept no longer applies to me. Currently Barack Obama is the president of 
the United States. But after his second term in the Oval Office, the title ‘president’ will no 
longer actively apply to him. Wiggins calls the latter sorts of concepts phased sortals 
whereas he calls the former (i.e., human being) substance sortals. Wiggins claims that only 
substance concepts give a fundamental kind of answer to the question ‘what is X?’ (Ibid.). In 
light of this, Sprague’s characterization of the notion of the person above forces us to 
consider ‘person’ only as a phase sortal. Others like Christian Kanzian (in Gasser and Stefan 
2012: Ch. 11) argue that the term ‘person’ is an incomplete sortal, which must depend on 
other full-fledged sortals like a ‘human being’ for it to be a complete sortal. Such view of 
personhood is what I very much want to dispute in this thesis.  
 
However, to get a clear picture of why most philosophers take the notion of a person as 
phase sortal, it would be helpful to look at some questions that P.F. Snowdon (in Lovibond 
and Williams, eds., 1996: 36) suggests any account of a person must address:  
(1) Is the term ‘person’ ambiguous, or can the uses of it be brought under a single 
concept? 
 
(2) Is the term ‘person’ one in which if an object satisfies it at any time during that 
object’s existence then the object must satisfy it at all times? If not, can we make 
sense of the idea of a pre-existent object of some type becoming a person, or 
something which is, at some time, a person ceasing to be a person? 
 
(3) In our elucidation of the term ‘person’ we often refer to psychological features, 
but how should we pick out those features?  
 
As to (1), there is no doubt that the term ‘person’ is ambiguous, since it is used to designate 
human persons, artifacts (i.e., robots, computers, corporations), extraterrestrial persons (if 
there are any), divine persons such as God, angels, demons and non-human animals such as 
apes and dolphins (see e.g., Puccetti 1968; DeGrazia in Singer, ed., 2006: Ch. 3). So those 
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who take the notion of the person to fill different roles or functions argue that there cannot 
be a single notion of a person (see e.g., Rorty and Morton in Gill, ed., 1990: Chs. 1 and 2 
respectively). So in the context of the present discussion, we disambiguate the term 
‘person’ by adding an adjective in front of it and describe it as ‘human person’. Unless 
otherwise indicated, in this thesis, by ‘person’ I always mean ‘human person’.  
 
That said, how should we go about answering the questions in (2) above? In the course of 
our discussion, I will suggest my own answers to the questions. But my main discussion in 
this regard will come in chapter eight, where I will examine the answers given to (2) by 
three influential philosophers, namely Singer (1993), Tooley (1972) and Dennett (in Amelie 
Rorty 1976). These philosophers (including many others who follow them), typically answer 
the questions in (2) above as follows: personhood is not something an entity has, for 
instance, since the time of conception. Rather, personhood is something an entity gradually 
comes to have after a period of some developmental stage (e.g., infancy). These 
philosophers also claim that personhood is something an entity could lose altogether under 
certain circumstances that have to do with amnesia, senility, being in a comatose state, etc.   
 
At this point, the question that comes to mind is this: what properties are essential for an 
entity such that, were an entity to lose them then that entity becomes no longer a person? 
On the flip side, a question can also be asked: what properties must an entity have in order 
for it to be able to continue as a person? These are questions that the majority of 
philosophers attempt to settle by answering question (3) above (see e.g., Noonan 2003). 
They do this mainly by appealing to Locke’s definition of a person, according to which, “a 
person is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection; one that can consider it 
self as it self; and the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only 
by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking,” (Essay, XXVII, 9: 335).  
 
As we shall see, my own view as to what constitutes personhood stands sharply opposed to 
that briefly highlighted above. I will raise serious objections against Singer’s, Toole’s and 
Dennett’s conception of personhood. I will do this by situating my objections in the current 
discussion of the metaphysics of dispositions (see e.g., Bird 2007; Martin 2008; Heil 1998, 
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2012). As we shall see, Singer, Tooley and Dennett seriously conflate, among other things, 
the manifestation of dispositions with the entity that manifests those dispositions. In other 
words, they fail to see the distinction between an object that manifests certain dispositions 
on the one hand and the manifesting of dispositions on the other. They also mistakenly 
think that an object’s failure to manifest certain dispositions is evidence for the object’s 
non-existence. These are profound confusions and once we get a good grip on the nature of 
the confusions related to personhood, we can see clearly why the idea that personhood 
begins in conception (i.e., fertilization) is defensible. One of the contemporary philosophers 
who rigorously defends the view that personhood begins in conception is Oderberg (see 
e.g., Oderberg 2000).   
 
I have said enough by way of showing how the concept of a person is understood in the 
context of the broader literature.23 But as I indicated at the beginning of this section, my 
goal is to link the concept of a person to the substantial-self question. To do this, I want to 
understand the notion of a person as an entity representing concept in the same way that I 
did with the notion of the self (see e.g., § 1.1.2.3). That is, in the words of Chisholm, 
“persons are entia per se [i.e., real things] and not entia in alio—not ontological parasites 
like shadows,” (1989: 57). But what sort of conception of person would capture 
Chisholmean assumption? Here I suggest the medieval conception of personhood as 
described by Boethuis (480-526 AD). In one of his theological tractates, Boethuis defines 
persona as follows: “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature” (H. F. Stewart, 
trans. 1918: 85). Here Boethuis’ definition of a person is rooted in classical notions of 
substance and rationality (see Gill, ed., 1990: 7). In this case, Aristotelian substance 
ontology takes center stage. For example, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD) defended 
Boethuis’s conception of person within the framework of Aristotelian substance ontology 
(see e.g., I Sentences, d. 25, q. I, Mandonnett, ed., Vol. I, 600-606; also see Wippel 2000: 
24). More importantly, Boethuis himself had written a commentary on Aristotle’s 
Categories (see In Categorias Aristotelis libir quattuor. Migne PL 64). In light of such  
______________________ 
23 For a detailed account of the definition of a person from historical, theological as well as 
contemporary philosophical standpoints, see Jenny Teichman (1985: 175-185). 
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considerations, it is not difficult to see Aristotle’s influence on Boethius’ view of a person.24    
So following Boethius and Aquinas, I too want to defend the notion of a person as a 
substantial entity.25 That said, as I did with the notion of the self in § 1.1.2.3, here too I spell 
out the notion of the person in a conditional statement using first person language as 
follows:  
(CS-3): If am a person, then I am a certain kind of entity, i.e., a substantial entity. 
 
 
In light of the hitherto considerations, we can rephrase salva veritate the substantial-self 
question as the substantial-person question, i.e., Is the person a substance? That means that 
we can use either formulation of the question to get across the same point, that is, the 
substantiality of the self/person. So in this thesis, I will use the terms ‘self’ and ‘person’ 
interchangeably.26  
 
What I have tried to do up to this point has been to underscore the importance of taking 
the self/person as an entity. From now on, I will locate my discussion of the substantial-self 
question or the substantial-person question within the framework of the contemporary 
debate on personal identity. I now turn to that discussion.  
 
1.2 Historical Context 
In their Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century, 
Martin and Barresi point out two significant revolutions that took place in personal identity 
theory. As Martin and Barresi describe:   
In the eighteenth century in Britain, there was a revolution in personal identity 
theory. In our own times, beginning in the early 1970s, there has been another. It is 
 well known that in the earlier revolution, the self as immaterial soul was replaced 
______________________ 
24 Boethuis’ view of personhood is mainly motivated in getting clearer about the Christian Doctrine of 
Trinity and the person of Christ (see e.g., Marenbon, ed., 2009: 107, 112-13, 118-24, 145-51, 158, 164-5, 175).  
25 Aquinas’s view of personhood raises some complications that I am not interested to go into. For 
example, Aquinas believes in composite person (i.e., body and soul). But he also seems to hold that soul 
cannot be complete without the body. Scholars fiercely debate on the details of Aquinas’s view see e.g.,                                  
Toner (2009: 121-138). But nothing I will say here hangs on such controversies. 
26 Locke also uses these terms synonymously, see Essay XXVII; also see Shoemaker (1963: Ch. 1); 
Lowe (1996; 2008). Others oppose such synonymous usage see e.g., Abelson (1977: Ch. 6).  
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with the self as mind. This replacement involved movement away from substance 
accounts of personal identity, according to which the self is a simple persisting thing, 
toward relational accounts of personal identity, according to which the self consists 
essentially of physical and/or psychological relations among different temporal 
stages of an organism or person (2000: ix). 
 
Again with respect to the contemporary revolution, Martin and Barresi say:  
At the heart of the revolution in our own times has been the emergence of two 
questions where previously, it seemed, there had been only one. The traditional 
question is: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity 
over time? That is, what must obtain in order for the same person to persist, and 
what, if it does obtain, guarantees that the same person persists? The new question 
is: What matters fundamentally in a person’s apparently self-interested concern to 
survive? That is, from the perspective of what, in normal circumstances, would 
count as a person’s self-interested concern to survive, is it fundamentally personal 
identity that matters—does the person fundamentally want to persist—or is what 
matters other ways of continuing that do not themselves suffice for identity? (ibid.). 
 
The impact of each of these revolutions in shaping up the direction of the contemporary 
debate on personal identity is undeniable.27 But the question that still remains is, whether 
these revolutions have contributed towards our understanding of the issue of personal 
identity in a positive way. To see this, it is crucial to make some observations with respect to 
the changes that came about as a result of these revolutions (hereafter the 18th century 
revolution and the 1970s revolution, respectively). First, as we can see from the first quote 
above, the 18th century revolution was responsible for: (i) the beginning of the 
_____________________ 
27 See the details on the development (and outcome) of these revolutions from a historical aspect in 
Martin and Barresi (2000). For a more comprehensive account of the history of the development of personal 
identity and the self that goes all the way back to the ancient Greece, see again Martin and Barresi, The Rise 
and Fall of Soul and Self  (2006). Whilst these two works give an impressive and rigorous account of the history 
of personal identity and the self that spans well over 2000 years, as will be made clear in this thesis, I remain 
very much opposed to the conclusions these authors seem to draw with respect to the nature of the self and 
of personal identity as a result of their historical studies. For example, both of these authors reject the 
substantial view of the self, as no longer a viable (or at the least deeply problematic) view to advocate. It is 
worth comparing Martin’s and Barresi’s position to that of Richard Sorabji’s, who also has done an extensive 
study on the nature of the self and personal identity. In his Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about 
Individuality, Life and Death (2006), Sorabji defends a positive view of the self within the framework of the 
notion of embodiment. He also thinks that the notion of the self is capturable via ‘I’ thoughts. He rejects the 
Humean/Parfitean account of the self, which reduces the self to the sum of a bundle of properties. Also see 
Jerrold Seigel’s The Idea of the Self (2005), sophisticated and extremely detailed account of the self since 1600 
to present. Seigel gives inter alia thorough critique and response to post-modern notion of the autonomous-
egocentric and disengaged view of the self. Also see, Udo Thiel’s discussion of personal identity from 
Descartes to Hume (2006).  
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abandonment of ‘substance ontology’ in personal identity theory; and (ii) the beginning of 
the establishment of the ‘relational account of personal identity’. As we shall see in chapter 
three, in the case of both (i) and (ii) above, John Locke’s influence is immense. Second, the 
1970s revolution first and foremost should be understood as being responsible for the 
considerable attempt made by philosophers to establish (ii) above, as the most preferred 
view of personal identity against that of the substance account of personal identity.  
 
More importantly, the 1970s revolution was also responsible for the subsequent attention 
given to what Martin and Barresi describe as (in the second quote above), the traditional 
question, which is concerned with providing a necessary and sufficient condition for 
personal identity over time on the one hand and the notion of whether or not numerical 
identity is what matters in one’s own survival on the other. In the latter case, Parfit’s 
influence excels any other contemporary personal identity theorist (see e.g., Martin 1998).  
 
Although I agree with much of Martin’s and Barresi’s observations regarding the effects of 
the two revolutions briefly discussed above, I remain unpersuaded with their emphasis on 
singling out only two questions (i.e., the traditional question and the what matters in 
survival question) as defining the nature of the contemporary debate on personal identity. 
In this chapter, I shall try to show why I think Martin’s and Barresi’s observation is short-
sighted. Contrary to many philosophers, I hold that the most central question in 
contemporary personal identity theory is neither the ‘traditional question’ nor the ‘what 
matters in survival question,’ but what I call the ‘ontological question’ or what I called 
earlier the Aristotelian question. In light of what I will have to say in defense of the 
Aristotelian question, this thesis will insist that the announcement often made by many 
contemporary philosophers with respect to the irrelevance of substance ontology for 
personal identity is not only premature, but ultimately, it is an implausible position to 
adopt. I will push one step forward and defend in this thesis the claim that currently the 
most preferred view, i.e., ‘relational/psychological account of personal identity’ is 
unsuccessful in advancing our knowledge of our identity as persons. I will argue that what is 
often considered as progress in the ‘relational account of personal identity,’ is something  
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that is based on questionable methodology,28 which mainly appeals to various sorts of 
puzzle cases. So if what I will say in this regard turns out to be right, then the most 
preferable and defensible view of personal identity and the self/person will indeed be the 
one that is spelled out within the framework of substance ontology. In light of this, the main 
goal of this thesis is to defend the importance of substance ontology for personal identity. 
Throughout this thesis, therefore, I will be giving several interconnected but distinct 
arguments that flag out the centrality of substance ontology for our understanding of 
personal identity on the one hand and the nature of the self/person on the other. This 
means that I will be rejecting the 18th century revolution’s move away from substance 
account of personal identity to relational account of personal identity. I hope to show in this 
thesis why my rejection in this regard is justified. 
 
1.2.1. The Common Answer 
That said, however, as Martin and Barresi have observed, the contemporary philosophical 
debate on personal identity very much focuses on the traditional question. Recall that the 
traditional question concerns with providing a necessary and sufficient condition for 
personal identity over time.  So if we were to ask the question: What precisely is at the 
heart of the contemporary philosophical debate on personal identity? The most common 
answer we would get is a ‘criterion of identity’ for persons.29 This notion was introduced in 
philosophical discussion by Gottlob Frege.30 In the Grundlagen, Frege remarks, “If we are to 
use symbol a to signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether 
b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion,” (1884: § 62 
trans by Austin 1953; see also Dummett 1973/1981). Frege gave an example for such 
___________________ 
28 My own account of how to best utilize puzzle cases/thought experiments, in this case, will be 
discussed in chapter four.   
29 See e.g., Perry (ed.) (1975); Rorty (ed.) (1976); Noonan, (1989) and (2003); (1993) (ed.), 2009; 
Williamson (1986); Parfit (1984: Part III); Swinburne and Shoemaker (1984); Kolak and Raymond, ed. (1991); 
Baillie (1993a), (1993b); Oderberg (1993); Sider (2000b); Olson (2010); Korfmacher (2010) and Gasser and  
Stefan (ed.) (2012). What I will say here regarding this notion is very sketchy. A detailed treatment of this 
notion awaits Chapter five.  
30 However, Lowe claims that Frege deserves credit for having introduced the terminology so much 
more than the notion of the criterion of identity itself, since the notion of the criterion of identity was already 
understood by Locke long before Frege (see, e.g., Lowe 1989b: 2). It was also Locke who first coined the term, 
‘sortal’ (see Essay III.III.15: 417). 
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criterion. As he sates, “The judgment ‘line a is parallel to line b’… can be taken as an 
identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of a direction, and say: ‘the direction of line a 
is identical to the direction of line b’’’ (Frege 1884: § 64). Frege’s point is that parallelism is a 
criterion for identity between two lines. The notion of criterion of identity is also at the 
heart of the contemporary discussions besetting the problem of personal identity. In this 
regard, John Locke was the first and arguably the most influential historical figure who set 
the agenda for the problem of personal identity in its modern form.31 For example, in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, chap. XXVII (27), Locke posited this 
question: “wherein personal identity consists,” (Essay, chap. 27: 9).   
 
In asking such a question, Locke was after, what the contemporary philosophers describe 
as, the diachronic identity of persons. This is the notion that pertains to identity over time. 
This aspect of identity is often contrasted with synchronic identity, which concerns identity 
at a time.32 Of these two aspects of identity, diachronic identity is the one that dominates 
the contemporary discussion on personal identity.33 As we shall see, it is also the one that 
proves to be difficult to get a handle on in relation to the problem of diachronic personal 
identity. But is there a problem of personal identity? Many will answer this question with a 
resounding ‘yes’. But if we follow David Lewis’s lead here, our answer must be ‘no, there 
isn’t any problem’. As Lewis remarks:  
Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing 
is ever identical to anything else except itself. There is never any problem about 
what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. And there is 
never any problem about what makes two things identical; two things never can be 
(Lewis 1986: 192-193).34 
 
I take the gist of Lewis’s claim here to be the trivial logical truth that can be expressed 
formally as: (∀x) (x=x). That is, for all X, X is identical to X. In other words, identity is  
___________________ 
31 We will look at Locke’s theory of personal identity in chapter two.   
32 I will make some relevant distinctions in regards to the notion of identity in § 1.2.2.  
33 Synchronic identity itself is a subject of considerable controversy. For example, since the unity of 
consciousness presupposes unity and multiplicity at a given time, it has been said that cases such as multiple 
personality disorder and split brain pose a challenge to synchronic identity. This objection directly comes face 
to face with the claim I will be defending in this thesis, namely the unity of the self both in the synchronic 
sense as well as in the diachronic sense. I will respond to this particular objection in chapter eight.  
34 See also Kripke (1972/1980: 3-5); Salmon (2005:153-154); Lowe (2002: Ch. 2).    
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reflexive, inter alia. This reflexive identity relation also obeys Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility 
of identicals, according to which if X is identical to Y then whatever is true of X must also be 
true of Y and vice versa. I will return to this issue in some detail in chapter five. In chapter 
six, I will rely on Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility of identicals to defend the claim that the 
person/self is distinct from the physical body that embodies it. Leaving that aside for now, it 
is clear that as Lewis sees it, self-identity holds of necessity, i.e., it could not be otherwise. 
Formally the notion of self-identity can be stated as follows: (∀x) □(x=x). That is, for all X, 
necessarily X is identical to X.  
 
For some philosophers, however, this feature of identity may come across as mystifying, 
since it entails the relation everything has to itself and nothing else. To put it formally: (∀x) 
(Rxx). In this regard, the question we face is this: ‘how can a thing be said to stand in 
relation to itself’? Such a relation seems to be difficult to make sense of. In common 
parlance, however, we make perfect sense of the difference between the following two 
statements:  
A.  John got mad at Smith 
B.  I am mad at myself 
 
What (A) says is that, ‘John stands in an angry sort of way in relation to Smith’. Similarly, 
given that the person who is uttering the statement is making first personal assertion, it 
seems unproblematic to understand (B) also to mean, ‘I stand in an angry sort of way in 
relation to myself’. Moreover, the nature of the relation in (A) is extrinsic, i.e., one object 
standing in relation to another object whereas in (B) the relation is intrinsic, i.e., no outside 
object other than oneself, is standing in relation to oneself. In the latter sense, therefore, 
the relation is internal to oneself (cf. Cameron in Poidevin, Simons et al., eds., 2009: 267). 
Given that the relation in (B) is internal, one may object to it in the following way. That is, in 
the case of (A) it seems easy to determine the relata in the predicate ‘got mad at’ (e.g., John 
and Smith). But in case of (B), it is hard to establish the relatum without running into 
circularity. For example, as Noonan remarks, “numerical identity can be characterized, as 
just done, as the relation everything has to itself and to nothing else. But this is circular, 
since “nothing else” just means “no numerically non-identical thing” (2009). Here two 
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questions come to mind: one has to do with whether such circularity is vicious and the 
other has to do with whether such circularity can be avoided. For reasons we shall see, I 
take the circularity here to be both benign and unavoidable (cf. Hawthorne in Loux and 
Zimmerman 2003: 99).35   
 
Following Lewis’s lead, Noonan recently argued that the traditional problem of personal 
identity should be reformulated as the question that is not about identity (see Noonan in 
Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 4).36 As it stands, it seems to me that Lewis’s insistence on the 
unproblematic nature of everything being necessarily identical to itself seems to be entirely 
accurate. The onus, therefore, must be on anyone who thinks otherwise, to show us how 
and why anything can fail to be identical with itself.37 Assuming that Lewis is right in saying 
that there is no problem about identity, in what sense then diachronic identity may be 
taken to pose a problem, if not in the sense of the very notion of identity? One way we can 
answer this question is by looking at the issue from the standpoint of, inter alia, 
classification and reidentification, i.e, identification over time. Diachronic identity for 
objects in general and human persons in particular, presupposes that objects endure 
through time despite undergoing various changes.38 But the question is how do we go about 
picking out objects over time? Here is where we begin to see the role and place of the 
notion of the criterion of identity in personal identity discussions. For example, T.E. 
Wilkerson remarks that when we claim to have identified an X, we mean either we have 
discovered that it was an X as opposed to a Y or a Z, or we may be claiming that it was the 
same X that we picked out in the past (Wilkerson 1974: 22; Cf. also Rorty (ed.), 1976: 
introduction). In this case, as Wilkerson further points out, we face two kinds of questions: 
______________________ 
35 That said, as far as the reflexive identity relation goes, it may appear to be, as Lowe remarks, an 
odd feature of relation, which can only obtain between a thing and itself. Perhaps the best we can say here is 
that we have an unusual relation. But that does not give us any plausible reason to deny that we have a 
genuine relation (2002: 23). 
36 In light of Lewis’s dictum, Noonan’s article focuses on indeterminacy in personal identity as 
opposed to the source of indeterminacy being in identity itself.  
37 One may object to such claim inter alia by appealing to quantum mechanical effects regarding the 
identity of electrons in the superposed state/quantum entanglement. But not everyone agrees that quantum 
mechanical effects pose a threat for self-identity applied to persons or substances (see e.g., Heil 2012: 44-52; 
Stairs in Kolak and Martin 1993: Ch. 28).  
38 This is a central point, to which I will return in due course.   
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 (a) What kind of thing is an X?; and (b) How do we decide whether this X is the same as 
that? (ibid.). The former question deals with classification. Here an example would be: ‘the 
object I saw under the freeway bridge last night was a homeless man, not a dog or a rock.’ 
The later question deals with reidentification. An example of this would be: ‘this man is 
identical with the homeless man I saw last night under the freeway bridge.’ Wilkerson 
characterizes types of the first and the second example, in terms of ‘statements which 
classify’ and ‘statements which reidentify’, respectively (Ibid.).  
 
Wilkerson also rightly emphasizes that the distinction between classification and 
reidentification needs to be qualified. Firstly, classification presupposes reidentification. 
That is, once we classify things, we need to think of those things as persisting in order to 
reidentify them at a later time (Ibid. 23).39 Secondly, reidentification presupposes 
classification. For example, we can’t classify something for the second time unless we have 
already classified it for a first. Thirdly and more importantly, in classifying the kind of things 
which may be reidentified, one is necessarily counting those things on the basis of using 
concepts which have criteria of distinctness built into them (Ibid. 23). As Wilkerson nicely 
sums up: 
For example, in classifying a thing as a cabbage I am not merely distinguishing one 
part of the world from the rest of the world, I am also counting the number of 
cabbages in this bit of the world. In contrast, in classifying a thing as red I am not 
counting anything, for the concept of red does not on its own yield any principle of 
counting…[thus] one should not suppose that the problem of counting arises only 
when one is asking questions about reidentification. Clearly if the question of 
reidentifying Xs is to arise at all, then the concept of X must yield a principle of 
counting (as ‘cabbage’ does and ‘red’ does not); but if the question of 
reidentification has arisen, then the problem of counting has already arisen with the 
question of classification (Ibid. 23).40 
 
 
The upshot of the above brief discussion on classification and reidentification in relation to 
personal identity requires us to look for the principles which govern how we count persons 
and trace their careers over time (Lowe 2000: 272). It is at this point that philosophers claim  
________________ 
39 Wilkerson draws this point from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
40 For more discussions, see Lowe (1989a); Strawson (1959: Ch. 1); Searle (1969: 85-94).       
 
  
55 
 
that we need a criterion of personal identity.41 It is also a good place for us to see some of 
the characterization of the notion of ‘criterion of identity’ before we see its application to 
diachronic personal identity. But before I introduce some of these characterizations, it is key 
for us to understand first how in the context of the present discussion, philosophers use the 
term ‘criterion’. In this case, the term ‘criterion,’ could be viewed from two standpoints:  
 
First, ‘criterion’ can be used to answer the question: “what evidence of observation and 
experience can we have that a person P2 at t2 is the same person as a person P1 at t1?” 
(Swinburne, in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: 3). Let us call this: the evidential criterion 
question. Here an example would be (among other things) the first person memory, where 
one distinctly remembers having done something in the past. In this case, one can use the 
first person memory as evidence for his/her persistence over time. Second, the term 
‘criterion’ is also used as a metaphysical principle to establish personal identity over time. 
The second sense of criterion is often described as constitutive, the metaphysical-cum-
semantic criterion of personal identity (Noonan 2003: 2).42 When philosophers debate 
about the problem of personal identity, what they have in mind is the second sense of 
‘criterion’. So it is also in the second sense of ‘criterion’ that we need to understand the 
following characterizations of criterion of identity.  
 
Schematically, Lowe characterizes the ‘criterion of identity’ as follows: “if X and Y are Ф, 
then X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y satisfy condition Cφ” (Lowe 1989a: 23). 
Lowe’s slightly modified version of the same schema runs: “if X and Y are things of kind K, 
then X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y stand in the relation Rk to one another,” 
(Lowe 2000: 272). It seems that Lowe’s schema can be applied to establish the identity of 
objects in general. In this sense, Lowe’s schema allows for wider application. Olson’s 
schema runs: “necessarily, if X is a human person at time t and Y exists at another time t*, 
X=Y if and only if…,” (Olson in Gasser and Stefan 2012: 47). Similarly, following Olson, Hud 
___________________ 
  41 However, whether we can come up with an informative criterion for personal identity is a subject 
of intense controversy, to which we will return in due time. 
42 In saying this, however, we are not assuming that the evidential criterion is irrelevant. As we shall 
see, it plays an important role in its own right.  
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Hudson remarks, “one perplexing philosophical puzzle concerns how best to complete the 
following sentence: Necessarily, if X is a human person at a time, t, and Y is a human person 
at a distinct time, t*, then X=Y if and only if and because______________,”(Hudson in 
Gasser and Stefan 2012: 236). Hudson also reformulates criterion of diachronic personal 
identity that is amenable for ‘perdurantists’ 43 theory of persistence over time: Necessarily, 
if X is a momentary stage of a human person at a time, t, and y is a momentary stage of a 
human person at a distinct time t*, then X is a momentary stage of one and the same 
human person as Y if and only if and because_____________, (Hudson in Gasser and Stefan 
2012: 236). 
 
In light of the Lowe-Olson-Hudson schemata, the contemporary major controversies 
surrounding personal identity boils down to specifying conditions for personal identity over 
time. I shall call this the problem of establishing conditions of diachronic personal identity. 
By specifying such conditions, most (if not all) personal identity theorists,44 hold that the 
blank at the end of the biconditional (in the above schemata) can be filled out with an 
appropriate non-trivial answer. But what constitutes an ‘appropriate non-trivial answer’ in 
this context? As we shall see, reaching a consensus on this point proves to be exceedingly 
difficult, to say the least. Yet on this very issue philosophical debates have continued 
unabated. From time to time we see significant efforts being made by philosophers to 
establish a criterion of identity for persons. The question is: have these efforts been 
successful? As we shall see, the answer for this question is not encouraging.  
 
I hope that the hitherto brief discussion has given us some highlights of the issues that take 
center stage in the contemporary controversy on personal identity. In a nutshell, the issue 
comes down to answering one key question. That is: “what are the logically necessary and 
___________________ 
 43 Perdurantists hold that a concrete particular is made up of distinct temporal parts that exist at 
various times. By contrast, endurantists hold that a numerically one and the same concrete particular exists at 
different times. For details, see, Loux (1998: Ch. 6); Hawley (2001: Chs. 1 & 2); Haslanger and Kurtz, eds., 
(2006); and Kanzian ed., (2008). I will have something to say about these issues in relation to substance 
ontology.     
44 Here I have in mind, in particular, those who identify themselves as defenders of the relational 
account of personal identity.  
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sufficient conditions for a person P2 at time t2 being the same person as a person P1 at an 
earlier time t1?” (Swinburne in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: 3). As we recall, this was 
what Martin and Barressi earlier called the traditional question (hereafter the persistence 
question).    
 
1.2.2 Common Approaches   
Views of diachronic personal identity that address the persistence question are customarily 
divided into two main categories, namely the complex views and the simple view.45 
According to the complex views, personal identity over time consists in some further facts, 
i.e., other than itself. By contrast, according to the simple view, personal identity does not 
consist in any further fact other than itself (Gasser and Stefan 2012: 3). So the dispute 
between the complex views and the simple view with respect to diachronic personal 
identity mainly hinges on what the locutions, i.e., ‘some further fact’ and ‘no further fact,’ 
amount to. To make sense of these locutions, first we need to link them to the notion of the 
criterion of identity. As we recall from our brief discussion in § 1.2.1, the criterion of 
personal identity specifies logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the persistence of 
persons/selves over time. That is, necessarily, if X is a human person at time t1 and Y exists 
at another time t2, X=Y if and only if_________.  
 
So how should one go about completing the blank at the end of the above biconditional? 
This is precisely the main point at which theorists of the complex views and theorists of the 
simple view disagree with each other. But before I briefly explain this disagreement, I want 
to make some distinctions between various aspects of the notion of identity, which are 
often confused in discussions related to personal identity. I also want to explain the relation 
that exists between notions such as ‘persistence’, ‘change’ and ‘identity’. 
 
 A. Identity: Numerical and Qualitative   
________________ 
45 Parfit was responsible for introducing this distinction (see in A. Montefiore, ed., 1973). Recently, 
Olson argued that no such sharp boundary can be drawn between these views see Olson (in Gasser and Stefan 
2012: Ch. 2). Olson may well be right in this regard, but for present purposes, I will stick to the existing 
tradition in maintaining the distinction.   
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In its ordinary every day usage, identity usually pertains to how one conceives of oneself. 
For example, I may view myself in terms of different categories such as Ethiopian-American, 
male, graduate student, father, husband, and suchlike (see e.g., Ludwig 1997). For present 
purposes, I set aside such considerations of identity, since for now, my interest is to look at 
the concept of identity that derives from logic.46 In this regard, logicians tell us that the 
concept of identity is an equivalence relation, namely reflexive, symmetrical and transitive 
relation. As we recall, in § 1.2.1, I briefly discussed reflexive relation: (∀x) (x=x). The 
remaining two relations are symmetrical relation (SR) and transitive relation (TR). Formally 
these relations can be described as follows:  
(SR):  (∀x) (∀y) [(x=y) → (y=x)], (i.e., for all X and for all Y, if X is identical to Y then Y is 
identical to X).  
 
(TR): (∀x) (∀y) (∀z) [(x=y & y=z) → (x=z)], (i.e., for all X, for all Y, for all Z, if X is 
identical to Y and Y is identical to Z, then X is identical to Z).  
 
Here the identity statements themselves are distinguished from all others by one important 
property, i.e., they always obey what is commonly known as the Leibniz’ Law or the law of 
the Indiscernibility of Identicals (§ 1.2.1).47   Leibniz’s Law (LL) can be symbolized as follows: 
 
(LL):  (∀x) (∀y) [(x = y) → (P) (Px ↔ Py)], (i.e., for all X, for all Y, if X is identical to Y 
then for any property P, X has P if and only if Y has P). 
 
__________________ 
46 In saying this, however, I am not assuming that an ordinary way of conceiving our identity has 
nothing to do with philosophical concept of identity. For discussion of philosophical notion of identity in 
relation to non-philosophical notions of identities such as social identity (see e.g., Williams in Harris 1995: Ch. 
1). Since my goal in this thesis is to discuss the notion of identity from the standpoint of personal identity, I do 
not intend to get into the contemporary discussion on identity simpliciter. In this regard, see e.g., Munitz, ed., 
(1971); Griffin (1977); Geach (1980); Noonan (1980); Noonan, ed., (1993); Brody (1980); Oderberg (1993a); 
Hirsch (1982); Williams (1989); Gallois (1998); Wiggins (1980/2001; 1967); Hawthorne in Loux and  
Zimmerman (2003: Ch. 4); and Parsons (2000).  
47 This law should not be confused with what is generally regarded to be a very controversial law 
known as: identity of indiscernibles, according to which if any given two things share identical (i.e, similar) 
properties, then those things are identical (i.e., one and the same thing). Formally this principles reads: (∀x) 
(∀y) [(P) (Px ↔ Py) → (x=y)]. See Max Black’s famous universe with two qualitatively indiscernible spheres, 
which he used it as a counterexample against identity of indiscernibles (1952). For a defense of the identity of 
indiscernibles, see Brody (1980: 7-20). For summary of contemporary controversies on this issue, see Foster 
(2010). On the other hand, sometimes it has been said that Leibniz’s first law itself would be false in 
intensional context in which coreferring terms could not be substituted salva veritate. But this objection is 
entirely out of step with Leibniz’s first law. For very good discussion on this see Jubien (1997: Ch. 4); see also 
Wiggins (2001: Chs. 1-4).  
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According to Leibniz’s Law, for example, if Mihretu and John are identical, then Mihretu and 
John share one and the same properties. In this case, what we have is not two different 
entities—Mihretu and John. Instead what we have is one and the same entity, i.e., Mihretu 
is John and vice versa. Here the ‘is’ in the statement ‘Mihretu is John’ implies strict 
numerical identity. But numerical identity itself must be distinguished from another relation 
that goes by the same term ‘identity’ or what is sometimes known as ‘qualitative identity’ or 
‘exact similarity’. For example, if we have two red and round discs which share all and only 
the same properties, they would still be two discs and not one. This is precisely because an 
individual thing like a disc is not exhausted by its properties (Moreland 2001: 21). Here we 
can understand the relation that holds between two qualitatively similar (but numerically 
distinct) discs as tokens of the same type.  
 
But when it comes to personal identity, first and foremost we are interested in numerical 
identity as opposed to mere qualitative similarity. In other words, we want to know 
whether or not qualitative change is compatible with numerical identity. For example, what 
happens if a banana changes its colour from green to yellow over time? Do we still have the 
same (i.e., numerically identical) banana? If the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then such 
an answer would imply that one and the same banana survived changing its colour from 
green to yellow. This means that numerical identity is entirely compatible with qualitative 
change but the converse is not true (cf. Shoemaker in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: 72). 
Philosophers also distinguish between synchronic and diachronic identity. That is, X and Y 
are said to be synchronically identical, just in case X and Y are numerically identical at any 
given time; whereas X and Y are said to be diachronically identical just in case the numerical 
identity holds between them over time. But in making such distinctions, we are not 
assuming that there are different kinds of identity. As Olson rightly reminds us, identity 
does not come into two kinds, namely synchronic and diachronic. Instead all we are saying 
here is that there are two kinds of situations where we can ask how many people there are. 
That is, the synchronic situations involving just one moment whereas diachronic involving a 
stretch of time (Olson 2010). Along similar lines, Lowe also claims that identity is univocal, 
that is, there are not different kinds of identity for different kinds of things, any more than 
there are different kinds of existence. Instead, what we have is different criterion of identity 
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(Lowe 1989a: 22). Having made such distinctions, I now briefly explain in the next section, 
how the three notions, namely ‘persistence’, ‘change’ and ‘identity’ are interrelated.  
 
B. Persistence, Change and Identity 
Suppose that you had met me six years ago. Back then you would have noticed that I had 
full hair on my head. You would also have noticed that after six years, I have lost half of my 
hair. The question then is: am I bald? Not necessarily. This is because, the term ‘bald’ in the 
statement such as ‘Mihretu is bald,’ is a vague predicate. In my case, for example, I can ask: 
how much hair must I lose to be ‘a bald person’? In answering such a question, we 
inevitably come to face a borderline case (see Keefe 2000; Sorensen 1997/2012; Williamson 
1994). But for now, I ignore matters related to vagueness or indeterminacy. Instead my 
point here is that in losing my hair, I have undergone a qualitative change. In contemporary 
philosophical parlance: I had the property of full hair at t1 but at t2 (having lost half of my 
hair), I have gained a new property, i.e., the property of half hair (cf. Plantinga 1974). In 
Aristotle’s language, this is an instance of numerically one and the same object receiving 
‘contraries,’ 48 i.e., incompatible properties over time (see Cat. 4a10: Ch. 5). Once again, as 
pointed out earlier in §1.2.2 A, numerical identity is compatible with qualitative change (cf. 
Smith and Oaklander 1995: Ch. 5).  
 
So at least initially, most of us grant that objects persist through some qualitative change.49  
____________________ 
48 But such contraries cannot be had by an object at a time for that would entail contradiction. There 
are some controversies among philosophers on this issue, for example, see the next footnote.  
49 However, we should keep in mind that the kind of reasoning sketched out here does not necessarily 
apply in the case of other sorts of changes, each of which can be traced back to Aristotle. For example, take 
what is known as substantial change. This sort of change involves a substance’s coming into existence or 
ceasing to exist. There is also a sort of change known as change of composition. This sort of change involves 
replacing parts of a certain object either entirely or some part of it over time. Can a certain object then survive 
change of composition? The most familiar example of this is a well-known case of the Ship of Theseus. 
Suppose that we replace all of the planks of the ship one by one and out of the old planks we built a new ship. 
The question then becomes: do we still have the same object or ship? (For details, see Lowe 2002: Ch. 4 and 
Carter 1990: Ch. 6). On the other hand, contemporary metaphysicians fiercely debate over what Lewis called 
the problem of temporary intrinsics—i.e., how persisting things change their intrinsic properties. As Lewis puts 
it, “when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary 
intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. How is such change possible?,” (1986: 204-205; see 
also Hawley 2001: 16-17; Gallois 2005/2011). This is an interesting issue in its own right but for the present 
purposes I am not interested to pursue it in any direct way. For objection against Lewis’s temporary intrinsics 
see Lowe 1988: 72-77; for Lewis’s reply to Lowe, see Lewis 1988: 65-72. However, recently serious doubt has 
been raised as to whether there is even any puzzle about change (see e.g., Rychter 2009: 7-22).   
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However, we need to keep in mind that not all objects persist through qualitative change in 
the same way owing to the fact that different sorts of objects have different persistence 
conditions which are determined by their own criterion of identity (see e.g., Lowe 1989a: 
Ch. 2; Carruthers 1986: 72-76). In light of this, if one allows for the interrelation between 
persistence, change and identity to hold, then one may have some reservations, at least 
initially, to subscribe oneself to Heraclitus’s doctrine of change, according to which, 
‘everything is in a constant flux like a river,’ (Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1957, 1983: Ch. VI). 
Similarly, it is hard to endorse Parmenides’s doctrine of change, according to which, ‘what is 
[i.e., a particular object] cannot change at any time or in any respect from what it is at 
present’ (see Ibid. 251-252). Heraclitus’s claim above amounts to the denial of the 
permanence of objects through qualitative change; whereas Parmenides’s claim amounts to 
the denial of objects changing in any respect whatsoever. Unfortunately, each of these 
remarks in their own way flies in the face of our experience.  
 
Of course, someone who embraces Heraclitus’s doctrine of impermanence may object to 
my remarks above by making a distinction between how things really are and how things 
appear. For example, if we drop a stick inside the pool full of water, we visually experience 
it as bent or twisted. Yet we know that a stick inside the pool is neither bent nor twisted. 
Rather it is straight. As we look up to the blue sky on a cloudless day, we experience the sun 
as moving. But in the post-Copernican era, we know that the Sun does not move but it is the 
Earth that moves on its axis. Similarly, in the case of the famous Müller-Lyer illusion, the 
two horizontal lines look to us as if they differ in length. Yet in reality the lines are of equal 
length. More can be said on this issue. But for now, the above examples suffice (see e.g., 
Kosso 1998: Chs. 1-2; cf. Bradley, 1908). So in light of such considerations, a defender of 
Heraclitus’s doctrine of impermanence (by drawing some parallel) may say that our 
persistence over time is no different than what we see in the case of the above examples. 
So our sense of our personal persistence over time does not reflect the way things actually 
are. For two main reasons I reject such a parallel as well as the conclusion. First, the way we 
come to know objects in the external world is significantly different from the way we know  
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ourselves. For example, the former is primarily based on observation whereas the latter is 
primarily based on introspection. Moreover, in the case of the latter, our sense of 
persistence over time is rooted in our own self-consciousness, self-awareness or self-
knowledge. None of these things, at least in any direct way seems to apply to the former. If I 
am right here, then the examples I pointed out above are disanalogus and hence fail to do 
the kind of work that a defender of Heraclitus’s doctrine hopes that they do. Second, if as 
Heraclitean claims that we do not persist over time, then a number of counterintuitive 
consequences ensue. It seems pointless to lock up criminals for their actions, since by the 
time the police catch someone; a person they arrest is no longer the same person. So what 
is the point in arresting him? Similarly, it seems wrong to recognize people for their hard 
work, say for example, Peter Higgs, for his outstanding work on the prediction and 
subsequently on the discovery of the higgs boson/particle. If we take Heraclitus’s doctrine 
at face value, then it remains unclear how we can avoid such highly controversial 
assumptions, to say the least. The sense in which we can grant Heraclitus’s assumption is, 
only if, we take the sense of change in its qualitative sense as opposed to in its numerical 
sense (see again § 1.2.2 A). Perhaps against all such considerations, the Heraclitean may still 
insist that we do not persist over time. In that case, how do we know that we are 
numerically changing from one moment to another? Of course, here it can equally be asked: 
how do we know that we are not changing numerically from one moment to another? I do 
not belabor to settle these questions here. But in the course of my discussion in this thesis, I 
will give reasons why the Heraclitean objection remains to be unpersuasive.    
 
Most philosophers who debate about the metaphysics of persistence, however, do not 
dispute the fact that objects persist through qualitative change (see e.g., Haslanger and 
Kurtz, eds., 2006: 1-26). Instead as Haslanger and Kurtz explain, philosophers’ contention 
over persisting objects has to do with how objects persist through change (Ibid.). In this 
regard, we have three main accounts of the metaphysics of persistence. The first account is 
perdurantism, according to which objects persist over time by having temporal parts (Lewis 
1989: 202-204; see for details Hawley 2001). The second account is, exdurantism (stage 
theory), according to which ordinary objects such as selves/persons are momentary stages 
and only persist for a period of time in which those stages exist. That is, such objects do not 
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last more than an instant. But according to one of its notable defenders, Sider, the stage 
view includes a counterpart theory of de re temporal predication. That is, as Sider remarks, 
“the truth condition of an utterance of ‘Ted was once a boy’ is this: there exists some 
person stage X prior to the time of utterance, such that X is a boy, and X bears the temporal 
counterpart relation to Ted,” (2001: 193; also see Sider in Haslanger and Kurtz: Ch. 5). 
Finally, the third account is, endurantism, according to which ordinary objects persist by 
being wholly present throughout their lives (see for details, Merricks 1994; Haslanger and 
Kurtz 2006; Hawley 2001: Chs. 1-2).50 As we shall see, my own sympathies lie with the 
enduratists’ account of diachronic persistence.  
 
So from the hitherto brief analysis, we can see that the three notions, namely persistence, 
change and identity are interrelated in such a way that they presuppose each other. But 
notice that at the heart of these notions lies the notion of an object. That is, we can only 
make sense of notions such as persistence, change and identity, if there is (in the first place) 
something that persists through change while retaining its numerical identity. Similarly, 
Simons remarks, “for something to change, it must exist before, during, and after the 
change, and so must survive it,” (Simons in Oderberg 1999: 24). The implication here being 
that the notion of an object is fundamental in that notions such as persistence, change and 
identity are analyzed in terms of it, but the converse does not hold. This is a crucial point 
that has to be seen in relation to the answer given in §§ 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.4 to the 
substantial-self/person question (i.e., the self/person is a substance). In light of this, 
throughout this thesis, the question I will be exploring is this: what does it take for an 
ordinary familiar object like a self/person to persist through change while retaining its 
identity (i.e., numerical)?  
 
C.  The Difference 
Returning to the complex views and the simple view, for the most part, the contemporary  
________________ 
50 Concerning various accounts of time and persistence, see again Haslanger and Roxanne Marie 
Kurtz, eds., (2006: 1-26; Hawley 2001: 30-34). The three main accounts of time are: eternalism (all time exists, 
i.e., past, present and future), presentism (only the present time exists) and growing block view (only past and 
present time exist but no future). For an extensive reference on issues related to persistence (see Hawley 
2010).  
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philosophical debates on this issue has been dominated by two main approaches. These 
are: (i) psychological criterion (e.g., Johnston 1987; Perry 1972; Parfit 1971; 1984; 
Shoemaker 1970; 1984; Garret 1998; Noonan 2003); and (ii) physical criterion (e.g., Williams 
1956-7; Thomason 1987; Olson 1997; Ayers 1990; van Inwagen 1990).51 On the other hand, 
the simple view has not been given the same level of attention in the literature (see e.g., 
Olson 2010). But recently effort has been made to meet this gap.52  
 
But what precisely is the gist of the difference between the complex views and the simple 
view? As briefly explained earlier, proponents of the complex views maintain that personal 
identity consists in some further facts other than identity itself. By contrast, the simple view 
theorists claim that personal identity does not consist in any further fact other than identity 
itself. Defenders of the complex views also argue that, an informative, non-trivial, non-
circular, non-identity involving analysis can be given for diachronic personal identity. In this 
regard, some form of psychological and/or physical criterion is what these philosophers 
have in mind. By contrast, the simple view theorists claim that no informative, non-trivial, 
non-circular, non-identity involving analysis can be given for diachronic personal identity. 
The simple view theorists therefore consider psychological or physical continuity criterion as 
providing us with evidential basis for personal identity as opposed to providing us with a 
constitutive criterion (see e.g., Lowe in Gasser and Stefan: Ch. 7; see also Lowe 1996; 
Swinburne 1984; Merricks 1998).  
 
Moreover, proponents of the complex views and proponents of the simple view disagree on 
whether or not diachronic personal identity is different from the identity of other kinds of 
familiar things such as a ship, plant and so on. According to defenders of the complex views, 
personal identity is not different from the identity of other things (e.g., Shoemaker in 
Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 6; see also Madell 1981: Ch.1). By contrast, proponents of the 
simple view argue that personal identity is different from the identity of other things and  
________________ 
51 Each of these approaches comes in various forms.  
52 For example, in 2012 an anthology has been published by Cambridge University Press entitled 
‘Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?’ According to its editors Gasser and Stefan, the book’s main aim is 
raising the profile of the simple view (2012: 1).  
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thus, no constitutive criterion can be given for it. But in the case of the identity of other 
things (e.g., trees), like the proponents of the complex views, the simple view theorists too 
claim that constitutive criterion can be established (see Noonan in Gasser and Stefan 2012: 
Ch. 4: 85-87). 
 
But in talking about whether or not identity is different in the case of persons on the one 
hand and in the case of other things on the other, we are not in any way compromising our 
previous position on the univocality of identity across the board. That is, there are not 
different kinds of identity for different kinds of objects but only different situations under 
which we can track the identity of various sorts of objects (see § 1.2.2 A). Keeping this point 
in mind, the disagreement between the complex views and the simple view focuses first 
and foremost on whether or not a necessary and sufficient condition can be established for 
diachronic personal identity. For now, I have said enough by way of summarizing the central 
differences that exist between defenders of the complex views and defenders of the simple 
view. I will discuss the details involved in these issues in chapters four and five.  
 
D. Methodology  
As we shall see, despite over forty years of effort (i.e., since the early 1970s), the dispute 
besetting the question of whether or not constitutive criterion can be given for diachronic 
personal identity remains to be without any solution. Even those who claim that 
constitutive criterion can be given for diachronic personal identity, still vehemently disagree 
with each other as to the sort of conditions that are needed to establish it. In this regard, 
the debates are somewhat mired in stalemate. But why is that? I will argue that fanciful 
puzzle cases (often invoked in personal identity discussion) are mainly (if not solely), 
responsible for such a stalemate. It has become almost an established orthodoxy in 
personal identity literature to invoke puzzle cases as a starting point of personal identity 
discussions. But why should we stick to such a trend as a matter of principle? Should we not 
follow Wilke’s (1988) lead in discussing personal identity without thought experiments? 
Must thought experiments put methodological constraint on how we think about the 
problem of personal identity? However we go about answering these and similar other 
related questions, I will reject a currently dominant trend that puts puzzle cases in the 
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driver’s seat, in the sense of letting them set the agenda for discussions on personal identity 
What is the alternative then? My own answer will be to say that we should begin our 
discussion with a focus on the Aristotelian question.  
 
E. Thesis Outline  
This thesis is divided into four parts. Part one deals with scene setting. In the present 
chapter, I have done a broad survey of some of the core issues besetting the contemporary 
philosophical debate on the nature of the self as well as personal identity. Part two 
concerns with historical legacies. I will begin this part (chapter two) with the exposition and 
discussion of John Locke’s theory of substance, the self and personal identity. In chapter 
three, I will discuss David Hume’s theory of the self, substance, and personal identity. My 
discussion in both of these chapters will focus on the negative as well as the positive 
legacies we have inherited from these thinkers, which have significant bearing on the 
contemporary debate on personal identity. The discussions I advance in these two chapters 
will prepare us to better understand the dynamics of the contemporary debate on the 
nature of the self and personal identity. That said, one of the reasons to talk about Locke 
and Hume is to draw a contrast between their approach and that of Aristotle’s.  
 
Part three focuses on the contemporary debates on personal identity. I will begin this 
section (chapter four) by discussing the methodology of thought experiments. I will criticize 
the way thought experiments are being utilized in contemporary personal identity debates. 
I will relate this discussion in chapter five to the Psychological Criterion view of personal 
identity. Although this is not the only view of personal identity, in this thesis it will be my 
primary focus. This is mainly because currently this view is the most influential. So my 
discussion of other views of personal identity will only take place in relation to this view.  In 
chapter six, I will present two representative views, one from a strict materialist camp (e.g., 
Frank Jackson’s strict physicalism) and the other from a dualist camp (e.g., Lowe’s non-
Cartesian substance dualism) and argue that the materialistic view lacks the resources to 
account for a range of issues that are central to understanding the nature of the self, 
namely substantiality, mental causation, emergent properties, agency, self-
knowledge/reflexivity, etc.   
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In part four, I introduce and defend (chapter seven) my own novel view which I call the Neo-
Aristotelian View of the Substantial Self/Person. I put forth a view of a person/self that is 
spelled out entirely within the framework of Aristotelian substance ontology. But in doing 
so, everything I will say in defense of my view of the self/person will be constrained by the 
following conditional statement: If the Aristotelian substance ontology is true, then…. At the 
heart of the theory I defend, is the rejection of any sort of bundle/relational view of the self. 
Finally, in chapter eight, I consider some objections against the view of the self I defend in 
chapter seven.  
 
I will end my thesis with a brief summary of the entire discussion presented and its 
outcome. My concluding remarks will point out some of the future areas of research. In this 
regard, my focus will be on the emergence of the phenomenal consciousness and the self.  
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Chapter Two 
 
John Locke on Substance, the Substantial-Self/Person Question and Personal Identity 
 
 
This chapter has two parts. The first part deals with Locke’s theory of substance and the 
second part deals with Locke’s theory of personal identity. Initially the relevance of 
discussing Locke’s theory of substance may not be obvious. But as we shall see, Locke’s 
theory of substance informs every major issue Locke raises in his discussion of personal 
identity. Unfortunately, when philosophers discuss Locke’s view of personal identity, they 
advance their discussion without giving attention to Locke’s theory of substance. 
Furthermore, whenever most philosophers talk about Locke’s theory of substance, they 
often merely mention it to justify their own negative attitude toward substance ontology. In 
this regard, Locke’s own infamous characterization of substance as ‘something we know not 
what’ is to blame. But then Locke has, as he sees it, a good reason for characterizing 
substance in such a way. In the first part, I want to clarify Locke’s intentions in this regard 
thereby also arguing why we should take Locke as a realist about substance ontology. Once 
we do that we also need to understand how his theory of substance informs his theory of 
personal identity. My discussion in this regard is novel in this chapter. Since I intend to point 
out some serious deficiencies often underemphasized in Locke’s theory of personal identity, 
my discussion in § 2.2 will be expositional in nature. My aim in doing this is to explain 
Locke’s view of personal identity as closely as possible to how Locke himself understood it. 
In light of my discussion of Locke’s theory of substance and personal identity, in § 2.2 C I will 
make some critical observations with respect to Locke’s view of the self/person. Ultimately, 
this chapter will pave the way for my critical engagement with contemporary neo-Lockean 
views in chapter five.  
 
It would hardly be an overstatement to say that Locke is singularly responsible for setting 
off the tone for the contemporary philosophical debate on personal identity. As Noonan 
memorably remarks in his book on Personal Identity, “It has been said that all subsequent 
philosophy consists merely of footnotes to Plato. On this topic, at least, it can be truly said 
that all subsequent writing has consisted merely of footnotes to Locke,” (2nd ed., 2003: 24). 
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Furthermore, Noonan rightly observed that the majority of philosophers who write on 
personal identity call themselves ‘Lockean’ or ‘neo-Lockean.’ Even those who do not 
consider themselves as such, still develop their views of personal identity in opposition to 
Locke. So either way, Locke’s discussion of personal identity continuous to be influential 
(Ibid). While all of this is true of Locke’s continued legacy, contemporary philosophers’ 
engagement with Locke’s theory of personal identity has been and still is unduly selective. 
In this regard, I have in mind four aspects of Locke’s view that have received much attention 
in the literature. These are: (i) Locke’s diachronic criterion of personal identity; (ii) Locke’s 
definition of a self/person; (iii) Locke’s thought experiment, i.e., the cobbler and the prince 
or its modern variations; and (iv) the famous Reid-Butler objections (e.g., 
circularity/contradiction) against Locke’s consciousness/memory criterion for personal 
identity over time and the subsequent Neo-Lockeans’ attempt to respond to it (see chapter 
five).  
 
So Noonan’s remarks above in regards to Locke’s place in contemporary personal identity 
debate, inter alia, are constitutive of (i)-(iv). But the same conclusion could hardly be true of 
Locke’s substance ontology on the one hand, and what I shall call his theological motivation 
in proposing his theory of personal identity on the other. Here by ‘theological motivation,’ I 
have in mind, among other things, a Christian view of the future ‘bodily resurrection’ and 
the ‘eschatological judgment,’ that will ensue. These issues are severely neglected by 
contemporary personal identity theorists, thereby giving us a misleading picture that such 
issues are not central to Locke’s theory of personal identity. So in this chapter, my main aim 
is to show, inter alia, that Locke is a realist about substance ontology and such ontology is 
central to his view of personal identity. As we shall see, Locke’s own theory of substance 
comes in two main varieties, namely substratum and particular sorts of substances.  
 
However, the conception of substance ontology I shall seek to adopt in defending the 
substantiality of the self is Aristotelian in its orientation as opposed to Lockean (see chapter 
one in §§ 1.1 and 1.1.2.3). (Although despite his departure from the Aristotelian tradition, 
the roots of Locke’s own conception of substance ontology can be traced back to Aristotle). 
In this chapter, I will also argue that to properly understand Locke’s view of personal 
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identity in his own terms, not taking into account his theological motivation will not be an 
option. This is, for at least two good reasons: (i) theological motivation is the main context 
within which Locke develops his view of personal identity; and (ii) the conditions Locke 
proposes for diachronic personal identity are directly rooted in his theological motivation 
(see e.g., Forstrom 2010: esp., Ch. 1). One of my main goals in chapter is to show the 
positive role substance ontology plays for personal identity despite Locke’s own ambivalent 
attitude towards it.  
 
2.1 Substratum before Locke  
The notion of ‘substratum,’ has been around since the time of Aristotle. The notion was first 
introduced within the context of change, i.e., qualitative as well as substantial.53 Following 
Aristotle’s lead, medieval scholastic philosophers (e.g., William Ockham, Johns Duns 
Scotus), also extensively discussed substratum in relation to change (see for details Pasnau 
2011: Ch. 2). At the heart of such discussion lies, inter alia, what Robert Pasnau describes as 
the substratum thesis, according to which, “all natural change requires a substratum that 
endures through the change,” (Ibid. 18). So before Locke, the notion of substratum was 
spelled out as something that persists through change.54 However, unlike the scholastic 
philosophers before him, Locke links substratum to properties as opposed to change. 
 
2.1.1 The Need for Substratum  
Locke’s proposal of the theory of substratum aims at answering one key question. That is, 
do properties (e.g., colour) or qualities need bearers? As we shall see, Locke answers this 
question affirmatively. But how does Locke go about the task of accounting for the bearer 
of properties?  How does he describe it? Does the supposed property bearer have its own 
nature, i.e., its own identity via which we come to know what it is? Does Locke have a  
_______________ 
53 As we recall from chapter one in § 1.2.2 B, the first kind of change is an alteration in a substance 
(e.g., an orange changing its colour from green to yellow) whereas the second kind of change happens to a 
substance (e.g., when something is born or dies).  
54 Of course, the notion of things enduring via qualitative change may not be that difficult to make 
sense of (see e.g., chapter one § 1.2.2 B). But what do we make of the idea of something persisting or 
enduring via substantial change? This is the question that triggers the Aristotelian notion of prime matter that 
is supposed to be conserved through all change. Details aside, for scholastic philosophers, this is where the 
discussion that besets the notion of substratum proves to be extremely difficult to pin down (see for details 
Pasnau 2011: Chs. 2 and 3).   
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uniform and uncontentious way to characterize his theory of substratum? Such questions 
are still hotly debated and disagreements over what constitutes the right answer to them 
are far from over.55  
 
What is a substance? Locke answers this question by pointing out the role of senses and 
reflections (Essay Book II, chap. XXIII).56 Locke claims that the mind is furnished with a 
number of simple ideas or qualities, which are found in ‘exterior things.’ But what is the 
source of these simple ideas? Locke claims that such simple ideas are obtained via the 
senses. Furthermore, for Locke, the mind on its own operations is capable of noticing the 
unity of qualities, i.e., such qualities ‘go constantly together’ in experience (Essay II, XXIII. 1). 
So such unity observed in simple ideas is often attributed as belonging to one thing, even 
describing it under one name. But for Locke, what is being understood as one simple idea is 
rather a combination of many ideas (Ibid.). However, here we need to keep in mind that 
even if Locke considers an idea as subjective mental phenomenon (e.g., see Essay II, VIII. 8), 
his use of the term ‘idea’ is not always fixed. That is, Locke also uses the term ‘idea’ to refer 
to a quality of a subject existing external to the mind which produces a particular idea in our 
mind (see further Lowe 1995: 19-22).   
 
Locke tells us that the notion of the unity we observe in simple ideas forces us to ask a 
question. That is, what enables these simple ideas, i.e., qualities of a physical object to stay 
in unity? More precisely, what underlies such unity? Initially, Locke’s answer for this 
question may come across both as arbitrary and ad hoc. For example, Locke claims that 
simply because we cannot make sense of how qualities or simple ideas can subsist by 
themselves, we tend to assume that something grounds them or supports them. As Locke 
states:  
...not imagining how these ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, 
to suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do 
result, which therefore we call substance (Essay II, XXIII. 1).  
 
_________________ 
55 I will briefly say something about the contemporary controversies in § 2.1.4. My discussion in § 
2.1.1-2.1.4 has appeared in Metaphysics or Modernity, Baumgartner, Heisenger and Krebs, eds., 2013: Ch.1.  
56 Unless indicated otherwise, all references of the Essay are from the Peter H. Nidditch edition 
(1975).  
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Here some take Locke’s remarks at face value and think that Locke’s proposal of substratum  
as the bearer of sensible qualities is just a place holder. That is, its significance lies only in 
helping one make sense of the underlying ground for the unity of qualities whether or not 
the idea of substance itself is real. Commenting on the above quote, Alexander Campbell 
Fraser suggests:  
The expressions ‘not imagining how’—‘we accustom ourselves to suppose’ seem to 
refer to our idea of substance to ‘imagination’ and ‘custom,’ instead of finding it 
implied in the very intelligibility of experience; for although ‘custom’ may explain 
our reference of such and ‘simple ideas’ or qualities to such and such particular 
substances, it does not show the need in reason for substantiating them, in order to 
conceive that they are concrete realities (in Fraser, v. 1: 390, footnote 3).  
 
If Locke’s skepticism (or seeming agnosticism) towards the reality of substance is 
substantiated, then it would pose a problem for Locke. Lowe remarks that, among other 
things, the reason why Locke’s account of the idea of substance generated more 
controversies than any other topic we find in Locke’s Essay has to do with its implications 
for theological thought. This was most importantly in relation to the accounts of God’s 
nature and the immortality of the soul.  
 
Doctrines such as (1) transubstantiation, i.e., a view that bread and wine transforms into the 
body and blood of Christ; and (2) the Trinity, i.e., the Father, Son and Holy Spirit while 
distinct persons, yet share the same indivisible divine nature, are rooted in the idea of 
substance (Lowe, 2005: 59). So the only plausible way that seems available to maintain the 
intelligibility of the idea of substance, as Lowe remarks, “would be to declare it innate” 
(Ibid.). In light of this, Lowe further remarks that for the religious establishments of Locke’s 
time, Locke’s empirical based understanding of the idea of substance was seen as a slippery 
slope down the road of atheism (Ibid.). This is because, inter alia, since God is taken to be a 
substance, to endorse Locke’s account of substratum would require us to confess ignorance 
about our knowledge of God himself. But such confession (for the religious establishment of 
Locke’s day) of our ignorance of the knowledge of God is nothing short of moving in the 
direction to embrace atheism.     
 
But is the above fear of the dangerousness of Locke’s view of substance justifiable? Details 
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aside, one way to answer this question is to look at Locke’s response to one of his main 
critics, the Bishop of Worcester Edward Stillingfleet. As we recall, Locke employs some 
suspicious sounding phrases when he talks about substratum or substance: “…we accustom 
ourselves to suppose…” For Stillingfleet, such phrases came across as unacceptable on the 
basis of their implications for theological thought as briefly discussed earlier. So, in his third 
Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke clarifies his use of the phrase ‘supposing’ claiming that it should 
not be taken as a ground to label him as being skeptical of the reality of substance. In his 
Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke makes it clear that since we cannot conceive of the existence of 
qualities per se without being substantiated, it follows that there must be something we call 
substance that underlies them (see Fraser, footnotes Essay II, XXIII. 1: 390-391). In this case, 
Locke is claiming to be a realist about substance ontology. Taken this way, the suspicion we 
put forth earlier as to whether or not Locke is a realist about substance ontology seems to 
lack any ground. Thus, we can say that the notion of ‘substance’ for Locke is not just a place 
holder after all. So I disagree with Armstrong when he says that Locke’s substratum, or to 
use Armstrong’s own term ‘thin particular,’ is a mere postulate (1989: 60).  
 
2.1.2 What is Locke’s Substratum? 
However, Locke claims that we have no idea of the notion of pure substance in general, or 
substratum. All that we can say with respect to substratum is that it is something that 
supports the qualities that produce simple ideas in us, yet we can give no further analysis of 
it. For Locke, pure substance is simply something ‘one knows not what supports’. As Locke 
states:  
If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he 
would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, 
what is it, that Solidity and Extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better 
case, than the Indian…who, saying that the world was supported by a great 
Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great 
Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back’d 
Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what (Essay II, XXIII. 2; also cf. Bk. II. Ch. 
Xiii § 19).  
 
Here Locke’s point is that inquiry into what exactly substratum is, is not an open ended one. 
Even if we know that qualities (e.g., colour, weight) have bearers, they have no role to play 
by way of revealing the ‘identity’ of the thing that underlies them. So ‘substratum’, despite 
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its key role in underlying qualities, is epistemically inaccessible to us. Hence, we cannot 
keep on asking endlessly what substratum is. In light of this, Locke suggests that the best 
way to end our curiosity, to get to the bottom of the identity of substratum, is by confessing 
ignorance.57 Perhaps, here Locke’s emphasis on ignorance could be taken as a deterrent to 
unnecessary explanatory regress. Despite such prima facie benefit, Locke’s own insistence 
on the unknowability of pure substance turns out to be less illuminating. But insofar as 
Locke is concerned, he sums up his theory of substratum as follows:   
The idea then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being 
nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, 
which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support 
them, we call that Support Substantia; which, according to the true import of the 
Word, is in plain English, standing under, or upholding (Essay II, XXIII. 2). 
 
Regardless of Locke’s realism about substance ontology, as we shall see, his characterization 
of substratum as briefly stated above did not sit well with many philosophers. But to have a 
complete picture of Locke’s view of substratum, first we should link it to his other notion of 
substance, to which I now turn.   
 
2.1.3 Locke’s Particular Substance 
Unlike the ‘general idea of substance,’ which Locke takes to be obscure and for which no 
positive account is available, he is much more comfortable in talking about particular sorts 
of substances (Essay II, XXIII, 3: 392-3). According to Locke, we come to know particular 
substances via combinations of simple ideas. As we saw in § 2.1.1., Locke thinks that the 
way simple ideas get combined or unified is through our senses, which make qualities exist 
together. Locke also claims that simple ideas “…flow from the particular internal 
constitution, or unknown essence of that substance,” (Essay II, XXIII, 3: 393; see also John 
Yolton 1985: 104). Although it is unknown, according to Locke, “essence may be taken for 
the very being of anything, where by it is what it is,” (Essay III, III. 15: 417). Locke claims that 
essence is in substances’ unknown constitution of things, upon which their discoverable  
_____________________ 
57 That said, however, it is important to keep in mind that for Locke, the general idea of substance is 
not made of via a process of combining many simple ideas, which eventually lead to the formation of complex 
ideas. By contrast, the abstract or general idea of substance is formed only via the process of abstraction and 
hence it refers to a mental process (see e.g., Essay, II, XI. 9). See Berkeley’s objection to Locke’s doctrine of 
abstraction in the Introduction to the Principles (1998).  
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qualities depend (Ibid; cf. Yolton 1985: 103-104). Locke takes such construal of ‘essence’ to 
be the proper signification of the term (Ibid). Here, by ‘proper signification,’ Locke seems to 
be referring to its Aristotelian sense (Lowe, 2011: 4). For example, in Metaphysics Z.4, 
Aristotle claims that essence is one of the marks by which we determine substance. The 
English term ‘essence’ is derived from the Latin word essentia which is the translation of the 
Greek phrase ‘to ti en einai’ or ‘what it was to be’. The other equivalent phrase Aristotle 
uses that captures the notion of essence is ‘to ti esti’ or ‘the what it is’. Aristotle tells us that 
the essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself. As Aristotle puts, “For 
being you is not being musical; for you are not musical in virtue of yourself. What, then, you 
are in virtue of yourself is your essence (Met. Z 4 1029b 13-15). It seems then that Locke is 
echoing a conception of essence that takes its cue from the Aristotelian tradition.    
 
That said, here and in other passages in the Essay where Locke talks about ‘internal 
constitution’ or ‘essence,’ he has in mind the microstructural atomic organization of a 
macroscopic object, which he describes as the ‘real essence.’ Locke distinguishes ‘real 
essence’ from another notion of essence which he calls, ‘nominal essence,’ according to 
which the abstract general idea constitutes any particular sort of substance.58 Although the 
essence of a substance (e.g., that which makes a substance to be what it is) remains to be 
unknown, qualities have a bearer, i.e., substance.59 In light of this, Locke claims that we  
____________ 
58 Locke explains abstract general idea as follows, “The use of Words then being to stand as outward 
Marks of our internal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular Idea that we 
take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular 
Ideas, received from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in 
the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and the circumstances of real Existence, as 
Time, Place, or any other concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from particular 
Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to 
whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas….Thus the same Colour being observed to day [sic] in 
Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a 
representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name Whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same 
quality wheresoever to be imagin’d or met with; and thus Universals, whether Ideas or Terms, are made,” 
(Essay, II, XI. 9). For controversies on Locke’s notion of essence, see Atherton and Bolton in Chappell (1998: 
199-213 and 214-225 res.). For further discussion on Locke’s two essences (see Lowe 2005: 78-81; 1995: 76ff).  
59 Given the science of Locke’s day, the ultimate constituents of microscopic objects were not known. 
That is why Locke confesses ignorance about his knowledge of the real essence. Hence, following a 
philosopher Pierre Gassendi and a scientist Robert Boyle, Locke adopted a hypothesis of corpuscularianism, 
according to which matter is composed of minute particles. See for details, Anstey (2000); and Barger (1976: 
133-206).     
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come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, etc., as particular substances (Essay II, 
XXIII. 3: 393). In the traditional Aristotelian sense, things such as a particular man, a 
particular horse, etc., are concrete individual objects that persist through change. Although 
here Locke may be seen as echoing a conception of particular substances similar to that of 
the Aristotelian, he is using the notion of ‘particular substance’ in a somewhat looser sense 
(see e.g., Lowe 2005: 61). That is, for Locke, particular substances amount to certain ideas 
co-existing in unity which constitute them, i.e., they are rooted in observable qualities 
which make up the complex ideas of those substances.  
 
Given such considerations, Locke rejects the scholastic notion of ‘substantial form,’ as 
having any relevance in terms of helping us to understand the nature of substances (Essay 
II, XXIII. 3: 393). Here ‘substantial form,’ stands for the real and immaterial principle in 
substances that confers them the attribute via which they are defined (see Fraser footnote 
3, Essay II, XXIII. 3: 393). For Locke, our ideas of complex substances always have an 
‘obscure’ and ‘confused idea of ‘something,’ in which they inhere. That means that Locke’s 
substratum is not identical with a particular substance, whose properties it (substratum) 
supports. As Locke states:  
When we talk of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c., 
though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of 
those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the 
thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should 
subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by 
some common subject; which support we denote by the same substance, though it 
be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support 
(Essay II, XXIII. 4: 395; also see II, XXIII. 6: 396).60  
 
Although Locke calls such things as man, horse, sun, etc., particular substances, he does not 
consider them to be ontologically fundamental substances, which is contrary to the 
Aristotelian tradition (see e.g., Cat., 5). Instead for Locke only three things are ontologically 
fundamental substances. These things are: (1) God who is eternal; (2) finite spirits or souls   
___________________ 
60 Locke makes similar remarks with respect to the operations of the mind. He says that since we 
cannot conceive mental states (e.g., thinking), existing without their bearer, we posit a different sort of 
substance which Locke calls spirit. But we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of the spirit (Essay 
II, XXIII. 5: 395-6). 
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and (3) indivisible particle of matter (Essay II, XXVII. 2: 440). Thus, for Locke, “All other 
things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances,” (Essay II, XXVII. 2: 
441). What is Locke’s point here? The answer to his question comes from Locke’s 
conception of what a ‘mode’ is.   
 
In this regard, as Lowe explains (2005: 60-64; see also Ayers 1991: Part I), the term ‘mode’ 
which Locke uses has its root in the scholastic metaphysical tradition. But despite such 
terms as ‘substance’, ‘attribute’ and ‘mode’ being central for scholastic metaphysicians, not 
everyone embraced them during Locke’s time. For instance, Locke himself was critical of the 
scholastic tradition. But for Locke, the notion of ‘mode’ plays a pertinent role, inter alia, in 
relation to his view of particular substances. Given the scholastic tradition, attributes are 
universal properties that all particular substances that fall under the same general kind have 
or share in common. On the other hand, modes are the particular ways those universal 
properties are instantiated in different particular substances. For example, a particular 
material substance such as a ‘body’ manifests the property of being spatially extended. The 
body also has a shape, which is the mode of the property of its spatial extension. But as 
Lowe further remarks, for Locke ‘a particular shape’ is itself a particular as opposed to a 
universal. That means that a particular shape of the body belongs only to that particular 
body. But other particular substances may still possess their own exactly similar shapes. 
Here note that for Locke, properties are particulars (i.e., tropes) as opposed to universals, 
i.e., multiply exemplifiable entities (Cf. Essay III, III. 1: 409).   
 
So even if we consider the shape of a table as a ‘real being,’ a particular shape is not to be 
taken as a particular substance per se. That is, the shape of a particular table simply refers 
to the way a table is spatially extended. Since a ‘mode’ is not in and of itself a substance, it 
follows that a ‘mode’ depends both for its existence as well as its identity on a substance 
whose mode it is. As Lowe remarks, Locke’s particular substances can be summed up as 
follows:  
According to Locke’s stricter way of talking, it seems, many of the middle-sized 
material beings that we are apt to classify as particular substances—notably highly 
complex individuals such as plants, animals—are properly speaking only dependent 
entities, arising from the various complex ways in which the general attributes of 
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matter are instantiated by large aggregates of material atoms. That is to say, they 
are strictly speaking only modes, or combinations of modes (Ibid. 64). 
 
2.1.4   The Snapshot of Reactions  
As indicated earlier, even if we have good reasons to believe that Locke was a realist about 
substances, his characterization of substratum as ‘we know not what property bearer’ 
understandably has brought against him a battery of criticisms from philosophers. 
Furthermore, as we shall see, Locke’s characterization of substratum paved the way for the 
current prevalent anti-substance ontology attitude in contemporary metaphysics of 
personal identity. Although the controversies surrounding Locke’s theory of substratum are 
important in their own right, engaging with them would take us too far afield. So in what 
follows, I will say just enough to give an example of some of these controversies with an aim 
to show their place in contemporary debates besetting the role of substance in personal 
identity.  
 
As we saw in § 2.1.1, the earliest objection against Locke’s theory of substance was 
motivated by Stillingfleet’s theological worry about the Christian doctrine of the trinity. 
Others in Locke’s time raised their objections against Locke’s substratum largely based on 
metaphysical and epistemological grounds. In the case of the former, for example, Henry 
Lee echoing Aristotelian tradition, argued that the relation that exists between substance 
and property is asymmetrical. That is, substance is always a bearer of property but the 
converse is not true (see Lee 1702, II.23. 1: 110). Yet for Lee, in spite of the asymmetric 
relation that exists between substance and property, Locke made a serious mistake in 
divesting substance of its properties (II.23. 3: 110-111). So Lee’s main worry against Locke’s 
notion of pure substance has to do with the divorce Locke introduced between pure 
substance and property. That is, Lee’s point is that Locke deprived substratum of any 
property. As we recall, for Locke, substratum, though it is a property bearer, is not itself 
knowable. But Lee argued that once we divest pure substance of all its properties (via which 
we come to know what pure substratum is), the result is to find ourselves in the dark.  
 
Along similar lines with that of Lee’s, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his New Essays, expresses 
serious doubts against Locke’s characterization of pure substance. Leibniz also thinks that 
  
80 
 
divesting the concept of substance of its attributes is problematic, since the only way we 
come to grasp the very nature of substance is via its qualities or properties (for details see, 
New Essays II.23. 2: 218). On the other hand, unlike Lee and Leibniz, each of whose 
objections is metaphysical in nature, John Sergeant (another of Locke’s contemporaries) 
raised an epistemological objection against Locke’s substratum. As Sergeant remarks:  
While I perused Mr. Locke's 23th Chapter, of the Idea of Substance, I was heartily 
grieved to see the greatest Wits, for want of True Logick, and thro' their not lighting 
on the right way of Philosophizing, lay Grounds for Scepticism, to the utter 
Subversion of all Science; and this, not designedly, but with a good Intention, and 
out of their Sincerity and Care not to affirm more than they know. He fancies that 
the Knowledge of Substance and Extension are absolutely Unattainable….(1697, 
13.22-23: 238).  
 
Sergeant certainly gives credit to Locke for exercising an epistemological modesty by not 
pretending to know more than he does about the nature of substance. Yet for Sergeant, 
such epistemological modesty comes with a price. That is, suspending judgment in matters 
such as substance creates a fertile ground for skepticism. Hence, the ultimate consequence 
of such skepticism shakes up the very foundation of our knowledge of things. Locke’s 
contemporaries then are unified in their insistence on the inadequacy of Locke’s 
characterization of substratum or pure substance in general as ‘something we know not 
what.’61  
 
Beyond Locke’s own immediate contemporaries, George Berkeley and David Hume also 
attacked the doctrine of substratum. Berkeley’s objection is rooted in his doctrine of 
immaterialism, according to which only spiritual reality exists. Since Berkeley’s 
immaterialism is based on the principle of ‘esse est percipi, i.e., to be is to be perceived, 
Locke’s characterization of substratum as ‘something we know not what property bearer,’ 
stands in sharp conflict with it (see for details Principles § 3, 6 and 16-17). Hume, whose 
ontology does not accommodate a distinct property bearer, ruled out Locke’s substratum as 
nothing more than a piece of metaphor (Treatise, Book I: 16; see also Lowe 1995: 83). I shall 
say more on Hume’s view in chapter three.  
___________________ 
61 For detailed discussion of the objections of Locke’s contemporaries against the doctrine of 
substratum, see Guta in Baumgartner, Heisenberg and Krebs (2013: Ch. 1); see also McCann (2001: 87-105).  
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The question remains: where does all this leave Locke’s theory of substance? Is Locke’s 
theory of substance misguided? I personally think not. As Sergeant rightly noticed, Locke’s 
insistence on the unknowability of substratum is motivated by his epistemological modesty  
 (i.e., by not pretending to know more than he does). Yet Locke’s main goal in proposing 
substratum does seem to be primarily metaphysical in nature. That is, Locke on purely 
ontological grounds, seems to have realized that properties or qualities necessarily need 
some sort of bearer for them to exist. Hence, there cannot be free floating qualities (cf. 
Lowe 1995: 76-77). More importantly, as Lowe remarks, when Locke characterizes 
substratum as ‘something we know not what’, he (Locke) seems to be implying that it may 
have a nature which may be known to other beings such as angels and God (e.g. Essay II, 
XXIII. 6; Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 28 as quoted in Lowe, 2000: 507). If so, the 
objections Locke’s immediate critics raised against his theory of substance are not 
insurmountable.  
 
In light of this and similar other considerations, contemporary philosophers such as C.B. 
Martin, E.J. Lowe, M.R. Ayers, Jonathan Bennett, J.L. Mackie, Margaret Atherton, and 
Martha Brandt Bolton have proposed various solutions to provide a defensible framework 
for Locke’s theory of substance. Though the amendments these philosophers suggest differ 
from each other, they all agree that Locke’s theory of substance is not a result of careless 
conjecture and thus must not be immediately dismissed. Again looking at these solutions 
would take us too far afield. So I will not discuss them (see, for details, Martin, 1980; Lowe, 
2000 & 2005; Ayers, in Tipton, I.C., 1977; Mackie, 1976; Bennett, Ayers, Atherton and 
Bolton, in Chappell 1998).  
 
One thing we can say from the hitherto discussion of Locke’s view of substance is this: 
maintaining the distinction between the category of substance and property, clearly echoes  
the Aristotelian tradition.62 Moreover, as we shall see, Locke’s theory of personal identity 
was significantly shaped by his view of substance. However, Locke by rejecting substance as  
________________________ 
62 Also for Aristotle’s influence on Descartes’s, on Spinoza’s and on Leibniz’s conception of substance, 
see Woolhouse’s excellent discussion (1993). 
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a ground of personal identity, ultimately leaves us with an unsatisfactory view of diachronic 
personal identity. These issues will occupy the final part of this chapter. I now turn to that 
discussion.  
 
2.2 Personal Identity and the Substantial-Self/Person Question 
Locke introduced both his general theory of identity and the theory of personal identity in 
the second edition of his Essay, Book II, ch. XXVII, entitled ‘Of Identity and Diversity.’63 Since 
in this section my aim is to explore the role of substance ontology in Locke’s theory of 
personal identity, I will not directly discuss Locke’s general theory of identity.64 In the 
context of the present discussion, Locke’s relational theory of personal identity is often seen 
as a terminus point of the pre-Lockean era of a substance based account (see Kolak and 
Martin 1993: 164; Martin and Barresi 2000: 1-11). In relational theory, the ‘relations,’ are 
said to obtain among impermanent conscious memories (Kolak and Martin 1993: 164). As 
we shall see in chapter five, Locke’s relational view of personal identity paved the way for 
most contemporary personal identity theorists to abandon substance ontology. Yet unlike 
contemporary neo-Lockeans, as we shall see shortly, Locke himself maintains both a 
substance ontology as well as the relational view of personal identity.  
________________________ 
63 Locke included this chapter in the second edition of his Essay at the request of his friend William 
Molyneux (see e.g. Locke’s response to Molyneux, August 23, 1693, and March 8, 1695; see also Nidditch, 
1975: xix-xxv).  
64 At the heart of Locke’s general theory of identity, we find two closely related issues: (a) the 
principium individuationis (principle of individuation); and (b) sortal terms and their criterion of identity. In this 
section, Locke tells us how we get our ideas of identity and diversity. In this case, we get our ideas from our 
mind making regular comparison of the very being of a thing (e.g., organism) existing at any given time and 
place with itself existing at a different time and place, which enables us to form the ideas of identity and 
diversity (Essay II, XXVII. § 1: 328; cf. Ibid. 5-10; also Forstrom 2010: 18; Ayers 1991: part III, esp., 205-253). I 
shall call this, Locke’s diachronic conception of the origin of identity (OI). This can be schematized as follows: 
(OI): If X exists at t1 at a place P1 and again if the same (i.e., numerically identical) X exists at a different time, t2 
at a place P2, → X at t2 = X at t1. On the other hand, Locke’s view of diversity is the notion that two things of 
the same kind cannot exist in the same place at the same time (Essay II, XXVII. § 1. 15: 328). So whenever we 
have distinct objects of the same kind (e.g., two cats), Locke claims that we have diversity, since objects of the 
same kind necessarily exclude each other thereby making co-occupation of a single region of space impossible. 
In light of this, Locke concludes, “one thing cannot have two beginnings of Existence, nor two things one 
beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same instant, in the very 
same place; or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning is the same 
thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but divers,” (Ibid. 
20-25). I shall call this, Locke’s exclusion principle for synchronic existence of objects (EO). This can be 
schematized as follows:  (EO): If X exists at t1 at a place P1, then it is not possible for another object of the  
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A. The Order   
In chapter one in § 1.2.2 E., I suggested that our inquiry into the problem of personal 
identity must begin with what I called the Aristotelian question, i.e., ‘what is X?’ This is 
because, it is only after we tackle the ‘what is X’ question that we can be better prepared to 
take up the subsequent ‘what is the identity of X’ question. Although as we shall see, the 
‘what is X’ question is inextricably linked with the ‘what is the identity of X’ question, it is 
always the former question that must take the driver’s seat. In this regard, Locke begins his 
discussion in the right order. That is, before attempting to settle the question of wherein 
personal identity consists (i.e., what is the identity of X?), Locke answers the ‘what is X’—
i.e., ‘what is a person’ question. As Locke remarks,  
This being premised to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider 
what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason 
and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable 
from thinking (Essay II, XXVII. 9: 335).  
 
Locke’s requirement for diachronic personal identity is rooted in a person’s consciousness 
of his/her past deeds. But before we unpack Locke’s idea here, first it is crucial to get clear  
____________________ 
same kind X* to be at t1 at a place P1. Hence, X ≠ X* (see Ibid.; also cf. Swinburne 1968/1981: Ch.1 esp., 13ff). 
Locke claims that since God, Finite Intelligences and Bodies are different kinds, they do not exclude each other 
from the same place (see Essay II, XXVII. § 2ff). But these things exclude the being of the same kind. In light of 
such considerations, Locke concludes: “From what has been said, ‘tis easy to discover, what is so much 
enquired after, the principium individuationis, and that ‘tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being 
of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind,” (Ibid. § 3). On the 
other hand, Locke’s treatment of (b) above is related to his discussion of the identity of ‘mass of matter’ and  
‘living organisms,’ which according to Locke have different identity criterion. For example, in the case of a 
mass of matter, its identity consists in the co-existence of each part of the mass that makes the whole. So any 
addition or subtraction of the part will compromise the identity of the whole (see Essay II, XXVII. 3: 330). Here 
Bennett and Alston describe Locke as a ‘mereological essentialist’ (1988: 28). But in the case of living 
creatures, Locke maintains that their identity consists in the same life they partake as opposed to in the 
changing material particles that contribute to the overall internal organization of that life (see Essay II, XXVII. 
4: 330-331). Likewise, Locke argues that the identity of animal (Essay II, XXVII. 5. 331) and the identity of man 
(Essay II, XXVII. 6. 331-331) consist in the life sustained under the organization of successively fleeting 
particles. Since Locke associates different criterion of identity to different sortal terms, there is a debate as to 
whether or not Locke is a sortal relative identity theorist. As Garrett puts it, “Sortal relative identity arises 
where objects X and Y are held to be numerically identical qua Fs, but numerically distinct qua Gs,” (1998: 24). 
Here ‘F’ and ‘G’ stand for sortal concepts of a kind such as dog, man, etc. For a defense of relative identity, see 
Geach (1980). But there is no conclusive exegetical evidence in Locke’s Essay that shows that Locke is a 
relative identity theorist (see e.g., Chappell, 1989: 69-83). That said, my own view is that everything Locke says 
in regards to the identity of a person/self, man and other things Locke presupposes absolute numerical 
identity (also cf. Lowe 1995: 100-101). For critical discussion of Locke’s general theory of identity (see Mackie 
1976: 140-145; also see, Ayer Part III: 205-253).  
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on three interrelated notions in the above passage. Here I have in mind, ‘a thinking being’, 
‘thinking’ and ‘consciousness’ respectively.   
 
1. A Thinking Being  
At first glance, Locke’s ‘thinking being’ appears to comfortably coincide with that of 
Descartes’s res cogitans. But there is an important difference between Descartes’s and 
Locke’s appropriation of this phrase. As we saw in chapter one § 1.1.1.2, for Descartes, res 
cogitans is an immaterial substance. Although Locke too speaks of a person as a thinking 
being, unlike Descartes, he leaves the nature of a thinking being entirely unspecified (cf. 
Butler in Perry 1975: 101). That is, Locke does not tell us whether, in his view, a thinking 
being is an immaterial substance or a material substance. The main reason for this has to do 
with Locke’s confession of our ignorance of the nature of an underlying substratum (see in 
this chapter §§ 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3; also cf. Essay II, XXVII. 17: 341).65  
 
2. Thinking 
For Locke, the noun ‘thinking’ covers the whole range of acts of awareness (Yolton 1985: 
29). As Locke remarks:  
It [is]…impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. 
When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we 
do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this 
every one is to himself, that which he calls self: It not being considered in this case, 
whether the same self be continued in the same, or diverse Substances (Essay 
II.XXVII. 9: 335).  
 
Here the gist of Locke’s point is that when I perceive in any of these modes such as seeing, 
hearing, believing, etc., I also know that I am seeing, hearing, believing, etc. That is, I am 
aware that it is I who am perceiving (Yolton 1985: 30). So, for Locke, it is the act of reflective 
awareness that accompanies all modes of awareness, which in turn gives one his/her sense 
of self. In this case, Locke’s account of how we come to have a sense of self seems to stand 
in sharp conflict with Dennett’s claim that, “Each normal individual of this species [i.e.,  
_______________ 
65 In personal conversation, Lowe also brought to my attention that here Locke is attempting to give a 
neutral view of personhood that can be embraced both by dualists as well as materialists (physicalists). For 
Locke’s assessment of Descartes’s view of the self (see Forstrom 2010: Ch. 2).  
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Homo sapiens] makes a self. Out of its brain it spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the 
other creatures, it doesn’t have to know what it’s doing; it just does it,” (1991: 416). Here 
Dennett’s point seems to be that we get our sense of self from an involuntary activity of the 
brain. That is, we are just passive recipients of whatever trick our brain plays in creating a 
sense of a self (i.e., for each of us individually). But how could this be? If Dennett’s remarks 
are examined from one’s own first person perspective, they appear to be unconvincing. As I 
will argue throughout this thesis, first person awareness of oneself is hardly created as a 
result of one’s brain playing some sort of trick, as Dennett mistakenly supposes. So 
following Locke, I too, maintain that our sense of self seems to be fundamentally rooted in 
our awareness of our own selves.     
 
3. Consciousness  
Locke’s concept of ‘thinking’ as briefly spelled out above is directly related to his concept of 
consciousness. Although we find no systematic analysis of consciousness in Locke’s Essay, in 
Book II, chapter one, Locke defines it as follows: “Consciousness is the perception of what 
passes in a Man’s own mind,” (Essay II. I. 19: 115).66 What this comes down to, as Noonan 
remarks, is that for Locke, when one is conscious to oneself, such knowledge is only 
available to oneself alone. Only a person who is conscious to himself/herself is a witness to 
his/her own acts (2003: 42). So, if we take consciousness in the sense of ‘consciousness to 
oneself,’67 then for Locke, it stands for knowledge of oneself or knowledge of one’s own 
thoughts and actions (Ibid. 42; see also Yolton 1993: 51). Hence, for Locke, there can be no 
ownerless acts of thinking, willing, believing, seeing, etc., (Yolton 1993: 51). In this regard, 
Locke stands in sharp contrast to Hume, who reduces everything to ownerless distinct 
ideas/perceptions (see e.g., Treatise, 1-7 & IV.VI: 251ff). In light of this, we can conclude 
that, for Locke, consciousness is reflexive (cf. Martin and Barresi 2000: 14).  
 
Having briefly looked at Locke’s notion of a ‘thinking being,’ ‘thinking,’ and ‘consciousness,’  
 
__________________ 
66 For a recent defense of this conception of consciousness by Locke (see Coventry and Kriegel 2008: 
221-242). 
 67 Noonan attributes the locution ‘consciousness to oneself’ to Locke (see, 2003: 42).  
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we are now better prepared to look at Locke’s main account of the role of substance in his 
account of personal identity. More specifically, my focus will be on Locke’s answer to the 
substantial-self/person question and its relation to substance. I will situate this discussion 
within the context of Locke’s theological motivations (i.e., eschatological resurrection and 
judgment).   
 
 
B.  The Substantial-Self/Person Question, Migrating Selves/Persons and Substance    
What exactly is the self/person according to Locke’s account: is it a substance or some sort 
of property? It is here that we begin to see Locke’s interesting but yet at the same time 
conflicting answers that he gives to the substantial-self/person question. To make sense of 
Locke’s point here, it is extremely important first to understand what I shall call the scenario 
of migrant selves/persons. For Locke, a self/person migrates from one substance to another 
depending on whether or not its consciousness extends to its past actions/deeds (cf. Essay 
II. XXVII. 10-11: 335-337). What does all this mean? Let us begin with the following quote by 
Locke:  
Whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the same 
Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons (Essay II. XXVII. 12: 337).  
 
Here Locke’s question has two parts. The first part concerns whether, despite a change in 
substance, there can be the same person; the second part concerns whether, despite being 
the same substance, there can be different persons. In responding to the first part of the 
question, Locke claims that it is difficult to determine the sameness of immaterial 
substance, since we cannot be certain regarding whether the consciousness of past actions 
can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. This is even more difficult, as 
Locke seems to think, in the face of the possibility of “one intellectual substance 
representing to it, as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other 
Agent” (Ibid. 13: 338). On the other hand, regarding the second part of the question (i.e., 
which concerns whether despite being the same substance there can be different persons), 
we may ask: what possible scenarios could we think to answer this question? If we let Locke 
himself answer this question, here is what he has to say:  
Whether the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its past 
Duration, may be wholly stripp’d of all the consciousness of its past Existence, and 
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lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again: And so as it were beginning a new 
Account from a new Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this 
new State (Essay II, XXVII.14: 338).   
 
Locke’s point here is that for the same immaterial being to be a sustainer of two distinct 
persons, two conditions have to be satisfied. Condition 1 (C1) requires the loss of the 
substance’s entire past memories/recollections of its deeds (beyond any hope of 
restoration). Here we need to keep in mind that, for Locke, memory is first personal or 
biographical, which presupposes one’s remembering of past action as one’s own (see Lowe 
2000: 277-283).68 Condition 2 (C2): requires the substance to have an entirely new 
beginning of experience that has no link whatsoever with the previous one. So for Locke, if 
(C1) is satisfied, then that would bring about ‘the loss of the earlier person’; whereas if (C2) 
is satisfied, then ‘a new person’ emerges. To make sense of this, we only need to 
understand Locke’s famous criterion of memory, according to which a person P is identical 
with himself/herself of a year ago or two weeks ago, etc., if he/she remembers the thoughts 
he/she had or the action he/she had done a week ago or a year ago, etc. More specifically, 
following the Lowe-Olson-Hudson schemata (see chapter one §1.2.1) for the ‘criterion for 
identity,’ we can say that for Locke, if a person P2 at t2 and a person P1 at t1 are the same, 
then P2 is identical with P1 if and only if P2 and P1 satisfy the memory condition as described 
above. But what if the memory condition is not satisfied, i.e., in this case, if P2 fails to 
remember P1’s past thoughts or actions? For Locke that would mean that P2 is not identical 
with P1 and vice versa. So for Locke, having an active memory of one’s past thoughts or 
action is decisive for one’s identity over time.69  
 
In light of this, Locke thinks that given (C1)-(C2), we can have a scenario where the same 
substance can be said to be the sustainer of two distinct persons. But Locke’s remarks here  
_______________ 
68 Here Locke’s notion of memory is first personal or biographical memory. Other variants of memory 
include factual memory (e.g., I can be said to remember that George W. Bush was the President of the USA 
prior to President Obama) and memory of practical skills (e.g., I can be said how to ride a bike (see further 
Robert Audi 1998: Ch. 2).  
69 Of course, here we should not overlook what constitutes a person’s identity at a time as well. But in 
the case of personal identity at a time, we cannot appeal to memory. Here it has often been said that multiple 
personality syndrome as well as split-brain syndrome raises a challenge in our effort to identity a person with 
itself at a time. I will have something to say about this issue in chapter eight.  
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might bring some odd, and in fact, ultimately an implausible picture to our mind regarding 
human persons. For example, though the analogy is not perfect, let us take the old 
fashioned cassette tapes or any modern day CDs and other electronic recording devices. 
The songs recorded in these recording devices can be entirely wiped out and be replaced 
with entirely new music/songs. Suppose that we remove the songs from one of the CDs or 
cassette tapes and record on it entirely new songs. In this case, we have the same CD or 
cassette tape but distinct songs. From this, it follows that the CD or cassette tape can be 
recycled numerous times. But such a model, even if it makes perfect sense in the case of 
cassette tapes, seems to be less than helpful to understand what constitutes personhood in 
the case of human persons, to say the least. But I won’t defend my claim just yet, since my 
goal here is to look at Locke’s view on its own ground.   
 
Locke goes on defending the plausibility of (C1)-(C2) by appealing to those who believe in 
the pre-existence of the soul. As Locke states:  
All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind, since they allow the 
Soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent State, 
either wholly separate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should 
not, ‘its plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity reaching 
no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent Spirit not having continued so 
many Ages in a state of Silence, must needs make different Persons (Essay II, 
XXVII.14: 338-339).   
 
Locke, following what he already stated in (C1)-(C2), shows us here how the pre-existence 
of the soul with no prior remaining consciousness can be a sustainer of different persons. To 
bring his point home, Locke remarks:  
Suppose a Christian Platonist or Pythagorean, should upon God’s having ended all 
his Works of Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since; and 
should imagine it has revolved in several Human Bodies, as I once met with one, who 
was perswaded his had been the Soul of Socrates…how reasonably I will not dispute 
(Essay II, XXVII.14: 339).  
 
Since for Locke, only consciousness constitutes personal identity, it (consciousness) can be 
sustained by different souls/substances. So Locke asks: “…would any one say, that he, being 
not conscious of any of Socrates’s Actions or Thoughts, could be the same Person with 
Socrates?” (Ibid.). Here Locke expects us to say that he who does not remember the actions 
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of Socrates cannot be the same person as Socrates. Locke realizes that an immaterial spirit 
is taken as something that thinks in us and also keeps us the same through the constant 
change of our bodies. But in the absence of the consciousness of past Actions, Locke rules 
out any hope of having the same person even if we still have the same soul. In light of this, 
Locke says: 
But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of Nestor or 
Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person with either of them? 
Can he be concerned in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think 
them his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed? So that 
this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of those Men, he is no 
more one self with either of them, than if the Soul of immaterial Spirit, that informs 
him, had been created, and began to inform his present Body, though it were never 
so true, that the same Spirit that formed Nestor’s or Thersites Body, were 
numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the 
same Person with Nestor, than if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a 
part of Nestor, were now a part of this Man, the same immaterial Substance without 
the same consciousness, no more making the same Person by being united to any 
Body, than the same Particle of Matter without consciousness united to any Body, 
makes the same Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the 
Actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same Person with Nestor (Essay II, 
XXVII.14: 339).  
 
1. Context  
Here Locke’s discussion on personal identity is generally considered to be rooted in three 
central theological convictions. These are personal immortality, bodily resurrection and the 
final judgment day (see e.g., Forstrom, 2010). Details aside for now, Locke’s convictions 
about these three theological issues frame the context within which he discusses personal 
identity. But recently Galen Strawson, in his book entitled Locke on Personal Identity: 
Consciousness and Concernment, remarked that the basic idea behind Locke’s discussion of 
personal identity does not depend on the Day of Judgment in any way (2011: XX-XIII). As 
Strawson puts it:  
The idea of the Day of Judgment is no doubt, a fantasy, but the fundamental idea 
behind Locke’s discussion of personal identity does not depend on it in any way 
although he was bound to pose the question of personal identity in eschatological 
terms in which his conception of personal identity (or moral identity) is intuitively 
natural, is independent of the story of the Day of judgment (Ibid.).  
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Having set the scene by dismissing Locke’s theological convictions, Strawson in the 
remainder of the book gives an extended defense of the forensic (i.e. moral) notion of a 
person. Strawson also accuses Butler, Reid and Berkeley of seriously distorting Locke’s view 
of personal identity (see Ibid. Ch. 1).70 But are Strawson’s remarks right in the above 
passage? The answer is not at all. Contra Strawson, nothing Locke says in his Essay on 
personal identity makes sense without its theological context. In fact, an eschatological 
judgment and the resurrection are so central for Locke that he discusses them in great 
detail in his unpublished essay, “Resurrectio Et Qua Sequuntur” (see King 1829: 316-323). 
The point here is that Locke never wrote his chapter on personal identity out of mere 
philosophical curiosity (cf. Forstrom, Ch. 1). In light of this, the very forensic notion of a 
person that Strawson defends in his book, as I will argue, is inextricably linked with Locke’s 
theological context (also cf. Noonan 2003: 24). Hence, I find Strawson’s remarks above to be 
entirely misguided.    
 
Once Strawson’s type of mistakes are dismissed, it becomes clear that the stance Locke 
takes on personal immortality, bodily resurrection and the final judgment day, directly 
shapes his engagement with key philosophical approaches of his time, namely Cartesian 
dualism, Hobbesian materialism, Cambridge Platonism and Boyles’ corpuscularian 
mechanism (see further Forstrom, 2010: Ch. 1). In light of this, as I already mentioned, 
whatever Locke says on personal identity is aimed at making sense of the above three 
theological convictions he firmly endorses.  
 
With this brief background in mind, we can see why Locke continues to stress the centrality 
of one’s being conscious of one’s past actions and thoughts to ensure the sameness of the 
person. Once we grant this, Locke thinks that we may be able to conceive the person at the 
resurrection and the person prior to the resurrection to be the same even though the body 
of the resurrected person will not be the same as the body the person had prior to that 
resurrection. Locke drives his point home with his most quoted thought experiment: 
_________________ 
70 Here it is not my interest to discuss Strawson’s criticism of Butler, Reid and Berkeley. My point here 
to show that Strawson himself cannot escape a similar criticism he attributes to others.  
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For should the Soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s 
past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobbler as soon as deserted by his own 
Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable 
only for the Prince’s Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? (Essay II, 
XXVII.15: 340).  
 
The point of Locke’s thought experiment here is that a person goes wherever his/her 
consciousness goes—this is an insight that has had immense influence on the contemporary 
neo-Lockean philosophers (e.g., see Noonan, 2003). For Locke, a Cobbler with the Prince’s 
consciousness should be considered to be the same person as the Prince. Notice here that 
Locke introduces the notion of accountability into his consideration of why a Cobbler with 
the Prince’s consciousness is only responsible for the actions of the Prince. As we shall see, 
for Locke, the last Judgment Day is linked with accountability which, in turn, is central to his 
notion of a ‘moral person’.  
 
But in light of Locke’s above thought experiment, the question remains: Are the terms 
‘person’ and ‘man’ coextensive? Locke realizes that given the ordinary way of speaking, 
‘person,’ and ‘man’ are co-extensive in that they stand for one and the same thing. This is 
because, as Locke sees it, everyone has a liberty to speak as well as apply certain ideas to 
objects as he/she thinks fit. For Locke, one also has a liberty to change the ideas one 
associates with objects as often as one pleases. However, Locke quickly makes remarks that 
indicate that we should not expect co-extensiveness with respect to spirit [substance], man, 
and person. As Locke puts it:  
But yet when we will inquire, what makes the same Spirit, Man, or Person, we must 
fix the Ideas of Spirit, Man, or Person, in our Minds; and having resolved with our 
selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or 
the like, when it is the same, and when not (Essay II, XXVII.15: 340).71   
 
But why should we think that a difference in ideas can be a basis, as Locke seems to think, 
to deny the co-extensiveness of substance, man and person? For example, triangle and 
trilateral are different concepts but the terms are coextensive. Why can’t we likewise treat  
________________ 
71 This is one of those passages where Locke introduces what Noonan calls a ‘tripartite ontology, 
namely person, man and substance’ (2003). 
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Locke’s tripartite terms, i.e., substance, man and person as coextensive? Locke would not 
want to treat these terms as co-extensive. One of the reasons has to do with the place 
Locke gives for consciousness, since that is what constitutes personal identity. As Locke puts 
it:  
Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah’s Flood, as that I saw an 
overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt 
that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames overflow’d last Winter, and that 
view’d the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same self, place that self in what 
Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same my self now whilst I 
write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) 
that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not 
whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as 
much concern’d, and as justly accountable for any action was done a thousand Years 
since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for which I did the 
last moment (Essay II, XXVII.16: 340-341).    
 
Once again this passage shows, as do many of the others we have seen so far, Locke’s 
emphasis on the centrality of consciousness in ensuring the sameness of the self on the one 
hand and the centrality of substance as its bearer on the other (regardless of substance 
contributing nothing at all in grounding personal identity). So for Locke, insofar as the self is 
conscious of its own past actions, the question of personal identity can be settled. But what 
precisely does Locke mean by a self?  Locke tells us that a self is a conscious thinking thing 
regardless of whether it is made up of spiritual, or material simple, or a combination of 
both. Moreover, a self as Locke describes it is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain. A 
self is also capable of happiness or misery. A self is also concern’d for itself as far as that 
consciousness extends (Essay II, XXVII.17: 341).  
 
In light of this, Locke wants to link the notion of the self and personal identity. Given the 
above definition of the self, Locke thinks that we can make sense of the right and justice of 
reward as well as punishment; happiness and misery. As we recall, notions such as reward 
and punishment are rooted in eschatology or in what will happen at the last Judgment Day. 
So the bottom line for Locke is that personal identity consists not in the identity of 
substance but in the identity of consciousness. It is only then that a person stands fit before 
God to receive either reward or punishment for his/her actions.  
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But what if I lose the memory of some parts of my life beyond any hope of retrieving them. 
Am I not the same person who did those actions even if I am not able to recall them now? 
Locke responds to this objection by telling us what the first person pronoun ‘I’ is applied to. 
Locke claims that ‘I’ is applied here only to man. But if the same man is taken to refer to the 
same person, then ‘I’ can be taken to also refer to the same person. However, if it is 
possible for the same man to have two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses over a 
period of time, then we get two different persons (Essay II, XXVII. 20: 342). That seems to be 
why, as Locke thinks, human laws do not punish the mad man for the sober man’s actions 
nor the sober man for the mad man’s actions (Ibid.).  
 
But Locke expects that his own response to the above objection may not be appealing. This 
is because, as Locke claims it is difficult to conceive how the same individual man can be 
two persons. To help us get a grip on this difficulty, Locke gives us three ways by which we 
can understand what is meant by the same individual man: (1) it could mean the same 
individual, immaterial thinking substance or the same numerical soul, and nothing else; (2) 
it could mean the same animal in total abstraction from an immaterial soul; and (3) it could 
mean the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal (Essay II, XXVII. 21: 343). In light 
of what he has already said about the centrality of consciousness being a ground for 
personal identity, Locke denies (1)-(3) as contributing anything substantial towards personal 
identity. We arrive at this conclusion, as Locke thinks, because of the difference that exists 
between the identity of man (Essay II. XXVII.6: 331-332) and person (see details, Essay II, 
XXVII. 21: 343).   
 
For Locke, as we have been seeing all along, the emphasis on consciousness as the only 
ground for personal identity is motivated by his conviction about the last Judgment Day. 
Locke tells us that in the great [Judgment] Day, God will reveal every hidden secret in the 
human heart. But what justifies anyone’s facing punishment is a person’s being conscious of 
his/her deeds. This is the only condition that needs to be satisfied to be able to answer to 
God. Therefore, as Locke’s thinks, no one will be responsible for what he/she cannot 
remember (Essay II, XXVII. 22: 343-344). Here Locke re-echoes his emphasis on the 
centrality of consciousness, which is what unites remote existence into the same person. In 
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short, for Locke only consciousness makes self. That means that, as Locke further claims, 
self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance; rather it is determined only by 
identity of consciousness (Essay II, XXVII. 23: 344). So for Locke, a substance can only be 
part of the self insofar as the consciousness of the self is attached to it, otherwise it is no 
longer part of what one calls one’s self (Essay II, XXVII. 24: 345).  
 
Unlike Parfit (1984), who argues that what matters in survival is not identity, Locke seems to 
be stressing the opposite point. Locke claims that every intelligent being sensible of 
happiness or misery must grant that there is something that is himself/herself that he/she is 
concerned for (Essay II, XXVII. 25: 345-346). As we shall see, for Locke, at the center of 
concern for oneself lies one’s own future identity, which makes a difference during the 
future resurrection as well as the Final Judgment Day. If so, what then grounds the 
continuity of the self over time as the same self? Before we answer this question, we need 
to keep in mind that, in some sense, what Locke says about the non-centrality of the bearer 
of consciousness (i.e., substance) in grounding personal identity lends some support for 
Parfit’s claim that what matters in survival is one’s counterpart’s existence who is only 
psychologically connected with the prior self. There are lots of issues we can raise at this 
point; but for now we won’t pursue that discussion until chapter five. That said, contra 
Parfit, we can safely say that Locke does not rule out the importance of the concern one has 
for one’s own future identity. In light of this, Locke remarks:  
This self has existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and therefore 
‘tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any 
certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same 
consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds 
himself to be the same self which did such or such an Action some Years since, by 
which he comes to be happy or miserable now (Essay II, XXVII. 25: 345-346).  
 
So for Locke the continuity of the self over time is grounded in the continuity of the same 
consciousness. But Locke further points out the bearer of consciousness itself does not have 
to be the same numerical substance. Several substances over a period of time may have 
been united or separated from the self. But what matters, as Locke sees it, is the continuity 
of the same self with the same consciousness, despite the diversity of its bearers. Hence, 
Locke concludes:  
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And so we have the same numerical Substance become a part of two different 
Persons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various 
Substances….Any Substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is a part of 
that very same self which now is: Any thing united to it by a consciousness of former 
Actions make also a part of the same self, which is the same both then and now 
(Ibid. 346).  
 
I will close my expository discussion of Locke’s view of personal identity with another key 
aspect of his theory, that is, the forensic notion of a person. I now turn to that discussion.  
 
2. Locke’s Notion of a Moral Person 
Towards the end of his Essay Locke shifts his focus to the notion of a moral person. As we 
recall, Locke opens his Essay with what can fairly be described as the ontological 
characterization of the notion of a person according to which, a person is: (1) a thinking 
intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection; (2) one that can consider itself as itself; and 
(3) the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking (Essay, II. XXVII. 9: 335).  
 
Locke’s notion of a moral person is situated within the context of the three theological 
convictions that we pointed our earlier, namely personal immortality, resurrection and the 
last Judgment Day. Taken in the moral sense, ‘person’ is a technical term. Locke also 
understands the term ‘person’ to be synonymous with the term ‘self’. Taken in the technical 
sense, Locke says that person is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit. In 
this case, Locke tells us that the term person belongs only to intelligent agents who are 
capable of a law, happiness and misery (Essay II, XXVII. 26: 346). Locke claims that to make a 
person be accountable for his/her deeds, his/her personality must extend itself beyond the 
present existence into the past. But how does that happen? Locke tells us that it happens by 
consciousness, which becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past 
actions. For Locke, one’s concern for happiness and any other experiences of a person are 
determined to be one’s own, only by consciousness. As Locke states:  
And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that 
present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had 
never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; i.e. Reward or Punishment, on the 
account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or miserable in its first 
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being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a Man punish’d now, for what he 
had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, 
what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miserable? 
(Essay II, xxvii. 26: 346-347).  
 
It is clear that for Locke, what justifies a person’s receiving reward or facing punishment 
depends on whether or not a person appropriates past actions to himself/herself. But what 
does Locke’s notion of ‘appropriating’ one’s past actions amount to? In this regard, Kenneth 
Winkler gives us what seems to me to be an unsatisfactory analysis of the notion. According 
to Winkler, for Locke, “consciousness of a past act is merely a representation of it as one’s 
own; it is not knowledge of the pre-existing fact that the act was one’s own” (in Vere 
Chappell, 1998: 154).  
 
Winkler’s suggestion here is a bit puzzling. If appropriation of a past act is no more than a 
mere representation of it as one’s own, then we will be forced to say that a person deserves 
reward or punishment for acts he/she has never done. All that a person needs to do is to 
just to be able to represent certain past acts as his/her own. But that seems to be deeply 
implausible. In fact, in light of the immediate context of Locke’s discussion here, Winkler’s 
suggestion does not reflect Locke’s view. So contra to Winkler, the truth of the matter here 
seems to be exactly the opposite of what Winkler states in the second half of his remark, i.e. 
appropriation does not require knowledge of the pre-existing fact that the act was one’s 
own. This point is made particularly clear by Locke’s own remarks:  
And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when 
every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid 
open. The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, 
that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever 
that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed those Actions, and 
deserve that Punishment for them (Essay II, xxvii. 26: 347).  
 
So for Locke, what ultimately justifies God’s distribution of reward or punishment at the last 
Judgment Day, is squarely contingent on what a person appropriates to himself or herself. 
But such appropriation is not, as Wrinkler mistakenly thinks, a mere representation of past 
acts as one’s own; rather it is a genuine attribution of past acts as one’s own with the  
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conviction that those acts are done by oneself.72 That being said, our hitherto discussion on 
Locke’s forensic notion of a person can also be captured in light of John Rawl’s highly 
influential Theory of Justice (1971/1999). Central to Rawl’s theory of justice, inter alia, is the 
notion he describes as, ‘justice as fairness’ (Ibid. 3). The basic idea behind this notion has to 
do with an equal treatment of persons regardless of their social status. Rawl argues that the 
equality of all people consists in nothing but in the fact that, “each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override.…,” (Ibid. 3). Similarly, Locke’s main point is that at the last Judgment Day, in 
distributing punishment or reward for the actions of persons, God must exercise ‘justice as 
fairness’.  
 
The gist of Locke’s notion of Identity and Personal Identity can be summed up as follows:  
 
 
 
 
Personal Identity 
 
 
Persons/selves 
 
 
Consists in 
 
 
The same consciousness 
despite the changing 
substance that bears it 
 
 
 
 
Identity73 
 
 
 
Living organisms Parcel of matter 
- Man 
- Animal 
- Trees, etc.  
 
 
Consists in Consists in 
 
 
The same life that              The coexistence of each 
continues despite part of the mass that  
changing particles makes the whole (i.e.,  
 without any particle     
                                            being added to or sub- 
                                            tracted from the whole 
 
 Figure 1 Figure 2 
 
Having looked at what Locke has to say about substance, identity and personal identity, I 
will end this chapter with some observations I think are still unresolved in Locke’s theory of  
________________ 
72 Having covered a lot of ground regarding wherein constitutes personal identity, Locke ends his 
Essay by giving a brief discussion of the difficulty which we still have in understanding the nature of the 
substance as well as the problems that arise from misapplying names to various ideas. Locke ends the chapter 
by claiming that continued existence makes identity (Essay II, xxvii. 27-29).   
73  For a summary of Locke’s general theory of identity, see again footnote # 64.  
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personal identity.   
 
C. Outstanding Issues in Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity  
Again what exactly is the self/person, according to Locke’s account: is it a substance or 
some sort of property? In light of our discussion in § 2.2 A and B as well as in § 2.1.3, Locke 
has left us with the following conflicting and perhaps even contradictory answers (cf. Flew 
1951; Shoemaker 1963: 45-46; also cf. Chisholm 1976: 108):  
1. A person is an intelligent thinking being (i.e., be it a material or immaterial 
substance).  
2. When a person thinks, it is substance (immaterial) that thinks in a person.   
3. A self/person is a conscious thinking thing. 
4. There are only three fundamental substances: (i) God; (ii) finite souls; and (iii) 
indivisible particles of matter. Everything else dissolves into complex modes or 
relations.  
5. Man is not a person owing to the different persistence or identity conditions each 
requires. For example, man’s identity consists in the ‘same life’ whereas a person’s 
identity in the same ‘consciousness.’  
6. Self/person is constituted by consciousness.    
 
Of (1)-(6) above, (4) obviously rules out a self/person from the class of substances. So based 
on (4), we can say that for Locke, the self/person is not a substantial entity. But then, (3) 
seems to conflict with (2). This is because given (2), it is not a person that thinks after all, 
but an immaterial substance that thinks in a person, whereas given (3), a person is said to 
be an entity that thinks. How can Locke maintain both (2) and (3) at the same time? Again 
(1) seems to stand in direct tension with (2), (3) and (4). To see this, we need to pay 
attention to (1) where Locke seems to be saying that a person is a substance even though 
we do not know its nature, i.e., whether it is material or immaterial. But if a person is a 
substance in either sense, i.e., material or immaterial, then Locke faces three difficult 
questions: (i) what justifies Locke’s exclusion of a person from the class of substances as 
evidenced by (4)?; (ii) what justifies Locke’s denial of a person as a thinker as evidenced by 
(2)?; and (iii) what justifies Locke’s definition of a self/person as a thinker which he has 
already seemed to have denied as evidenced by (2)? Finally, since Locke denies that the 
notion of ‘man’ coincides with the notion of ‘person’, as (5) indicates, we are left 
speculating what a self/person is supposed to be. So given (6), it may be thought that, since 
a self/person is not a substantial entity, it can only be constituted by consciousness. More 
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precisely, selves or persons do seem to be logical constructions out of the consciousness 
that annexes itself to various changing substances. To be even more precise, a self/person is 
a complex mode (see e.g., LoLordo 2012: Ch. 2; see also Figure 2 in § 2.1.3). If this is true, 
then ultimately, Locke’s two key characterizations of a self/person in (1) and (3) above make 
no sense whatsoever.   
 
Along similar lines, Chisholm also points out his worry about the Lockean notion of the 
transfer of a self/person from one substance to another. In this case, Chisholm remarks: 
But if I am placed in a certain thinking substance and am not identical with that 
thinking substance, then there are two different things—the thinking substance and 
I. But if there are two things, which of us does the thinking? (1976: 108).  
 
Chisholm claims that there are only four possibilities to answer the question at the end of 
the above quotation (Ibid): (a) Neither of us does the thinking—that is, neither of us thinks. 
(b) I think but the thinking substance does not think. If so, Chisholm asks: why call the latter 
a ‘thinking’ substance, then? And what relation do I bear to this thinking substance given 
that proper parts of substances are themselves substances? But if I am myself a thinking 
substance, what is the point of saying there is another thinking substance in which I am 
‘placed’ or to which I am ‘annexed’? (c) the thinking substance thinks but I do not. If so, 
Chisholm claims that this is absurd. This is because, given Locke’s view, it is not really I who 
think; rather, it is some other thing that thinks in me—some other thing that does what I 
mistakenly take to be my thinking’; and (d) both the thinking substance and I think. Isn’t this 
multiplying thinkers beyond necessity? If I want my lunch, does it follow that two of us want 
my lunch? Or does the thinking substance want its lunch and not mine?  
 
Chisholm’s observations above entirely coincide with my own earlier observations in (1)-(6) 
above. I agree with Chisholm when he says it is reasonable to conclude that there is no 
significant sense in which we can make sense of the transfer of a self from one substance or 
individual thing to another (1976: 108).  
 
At this point, we should admit that Locke’s answer to the substantial-self/person question is 
a real mess, to say the least. To my knowledge, Locke has not given us any solution by way 
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of dealing with this mess nor did he seem to be aware of the problem himself in his theory. 
Although I do not intend to come to Locke’s defense on this front, it is worthwhile 
commenting on what led him to such a problem in the first place, and the possible way out 
for Locke. With respect to the first point, it seems to me that the main source of the 
problem for Locke’s answer to the substantial-self/person question has to do with his own 
unsettled view of the role of substance in his theory. Locke, largely owing to his deep 
commitment to his empiricist epistemology and metaphysics, denied substance as a ground 
for personal identity (cf. LoLordo 2012, esp., Ch. 2). But the question then is: how does 
consciousness fair better in grounding personal identity compared to a substance? I answer 
this question by way of suggesting one possible way Locke could redeem what I described 
above as a mess in his theory. Although for reasons we have already seen, Locke adamantly 
clung to the consciousness/memory criterion for personal identity over time, there is a 
sense in which a substance based account would do a better job for all the same reasons 
Locke opted for a memory based criterion.  
 
That is, when a person fails to remember his/her past actions, what is happening is not as 
Locke mistakenly seems to think, there is an absence of the original person in that particular 
substance. Rather, what has happened is the failure of the manifestation of a certain 
disposition, which in Locke’s case would be a memory. That means that failing to manifest a 
certain disposition (for whatever reason), does not show that that person’s identity is 
compromised. Rather what it means is that the same person who endures over time is not 
able to manifest that particular disposition. If Locke had understood that the manifestation 
or the lack thereof a certain disposition would not compromise a person’s identity, then he 
would have happily identified a self/person with a substance. In doing so, he would have 
given us a much more defensible and plausible theory of personal identity over time. How 
then would my suggestion above have eased Locke’s fear about the last Day Judgment?  
 
Here we can say that since, as theists believe, God is all-knowing and all-powerful,74 even if  
____________________ 
74 For present purposes, I do not concern myself with qualifying in what sense such divine attributes 
should be understood. My point here is simply that God’s knowledge and power are such that He can know 
and do what seems to be impossible to know and do from the standpoint of humans.  
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a certain person fails to remember his past actions, God would still have ways to distribute 
fair reward and punishment. For example, God could reinstate the disposition a person has 
lost and on that basis proceed with his reward and punishment duty. It seems then that 
Locke’s assumption that the loss of a disposition necessarily implies the migration of a 
person from one substance to another is unconvincing. I will return to similar issues in 
chapters five and eight.  
 
Having discussed Locke’s view of substance and personal identity, in the next chapter, I turn 
to Hume.  
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Chapter Three  
 
David Hume on Substance, the Substantial-Self Question and Personal Identity   
 
In chapter two, I attempted to show, inter alia, how Locke’s theory of substance, the 
substantial-self/person question and personal identity are all interrelated. I argued that 
even if in Locke’s theory, substance does not ground personal identity, it still plays an 
important role in terms of being a bearer of consciousness. Yet, Locke’s rejection of 
substance as a ground for personal identity did not work out in his favour. In this case, as 
we saw, Locke’s conflicting set of answers to the substantial-self question rendered his 
theory to be less than satisfactory. Having discussed Locke’s view of personal identity and 
substance, it is important to turn to Hume’s. One of the main reasons is that, properly 
understanding how Locke and Hume thought about personal identity will put us in a better 
position to get a complete picture of their influence on contemporary personal identity 
theorists. For example, Parfit can be taken both as a paradigm example of someone who 
represents the Humean—the reductionist view of persons and personal identity (see e.g., 
1984: Part III; also cf., Behan in Tweyman III 1995: Ch. 94 and Capaldi in Tweyman III 1995: 
Ch. 87; Noonan 2003: 85) as well as the neo-Lockean tradition. I will discuss Parfit’s own 
view in chapter five. So the discussions of the last chapter as well as the present chapter are 
meant to prepare us for chapter five, where my focus will be on the contemporary personal 
identity debates with reference to the neo-Lockeans.   
 
In this chapter, I will discuss substance, the substantial-self/person question and personal 
identity from Hume’s standpoint. Hume discusses these issues in Book I of A Treatise of 
Human Nature (hereafter Treatise).75 As we shall see, these three notions together 
constitute what I shall call a three-pronged source for what Hume has to say, inter alia, 
about change, the persistence of objects over time, the identity of objects and what it 
means to be a subject of experience (i.e., a self/person). The other part in the Treatise that 
is relevant to understand Hume’s discussion of the above issues is the Appendix, which is  
_________________ 
75 Hume does not discuss personal identity in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU). 
All my references to Hume’s Treatise are from L.A. Selby-Bigge’s second edition (1978). For more recent 
editions of Hume’s Treatise (see Norton and Norton 2000).  
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included at the end of Book III.76 As is well known, in the Appendix, Hume openly confesses 
that his theory of personal identity is unsuccessful and yet he does not give us any tangible 
reason(s) for his recantation (cf. Penelhum 2000: 99).77 Rather than follow the current 
orthodoxy in putting on the table yet another speculative reason for Hume’s recantation, I 
will draw some positive lessons from it and show how such lessons can be used in defense 
of a realist account of substance ontology—which is the main focus of this thesis. So in this 
chapter, my goal is both to explain Hume’s account of substance ontology in his own terms 
and also examine whether the challenges he raises against it pose any serious threat for 
those who defend it.  
 
3.1 Background Assumption  
As Locke’s empiricism was based on the premise that all knowledge is rooted in sense 
perception and reflection (see e.g., chapter two), Hume also holds that experience is the 
sole window into any inquiry that we engage in. Hume strongly believes that, since the 
science of man is the only solid foundation for all other sciences, it (i.e., the science of man) 
must be rooted in experience and observation (Treatise XVI). Hume thinks that we cannot 
go beyond experience. But as Benedict Smith points out, Hume’s view of experience is 
multi-faceted, ranging from introspection to commerce with others (unpublished paper, pp. 
4-8). So for Hume, any hypothesis or philosophical system that pretends to discover the 
fundamental qualities of human nature must be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical 
(Ibid. XVII; see Lindsay 1964: Intro.; Smith 1941; Norton, ed. 1993).  
 
3. 2 Hume’s Project  
Given his empiricist metaphysics and epistemology, as we shall see, in the Treatise, Hume’s 
discussion of substance, the substantial-self/person question and personal identity is 
negative. However, some philosophers claim that Hume’s negative discussion of these  
___________________ 
76 Unless otherwise indicated, I discuss Hume’s view of the self and personal identity based on 
Treatise Book I and the Appendix.  
77 This has left contemporary philosophers but to speculate a great deal about the reasons for Hume’s 
dissatisfaction with his own theory of personal identity. Unfortunately, in this regard, there is no consensus in 
sight (see e.g., Garrett 1981: 337-358; Swain in Traiger 2006: 141-148; Behan in Tweyman III 1995: Ch. 94; 
Capaldi in Tweyman III 1995: 631-334; Traiger in Tweyman III 1995: 716; Pitson 2000: Ch.4). 
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things is part of his strategy in clearing the way for his own positive account of the self that 
comes later in Book II of the Treatise (see e.g., Capaldi 1975: 92-93; cf. Baillie 2000: 37ff).78   
 
So philosophers who take this line of argument view Hume as a realist about the self (see 
e.g., Bricke 1980: ch. 4; cf. Swain in Traiger 2006: ch. 8; Passmore 1976; Stroud 1977; 
McIntyre 1979, 1989; Pike 1967; Beauchamp 1979; Triager 1985; Flage 1990; Loeb 1992). In 
light of this, it has been claimed that whatever criticisms Hume advances against the self, or 
a substance, such criticisms only target a certain conception of them. For example, Bricke 
remarks, 
Hume does not deny the existence of selves. Nor does he deny tout court that selves 
are substances. What he does deny is a certain philosophical theory, the substrate 
theory, that purports to explain or elucidate the fact that selves are substances (see 
e.g., Bricke 1980: ch. 4; see also Norton 1982: IX and Introduction).  
 
For reasons that we shall see, Bricke’s as well as other like-minded philosophers’ 
characterization of Hume’s stance on the nature of the self or substance is highly 
questionable. I will argue in this chapter that Hume’s view on substance, the substantial-
self/person question and personal identity, should be taken at face value (e.g., cf. Sybil 
Wolfram 1974: 586-593; Noonan 1999: Ch. 5, 2003: Ch. 4; see also Chisholm 1969: 7-21; 
Perry 1975: 26-30; also cf. Penelhum 2000: Chs. 3-6). Given this approach, as we shall see, it 
will be entirely unclear whether Hume’s negative discussion of substance, the substantial-
self/person question and personal identity is motivated by his desire to offer us his own 
positive alternative view of the self or a substance. So I take philosophers who think 
otherwise to be confusing their own reconstructed view of what they believe or think Hume 
is saying (or perhaps even should have said) about these things with the actual view Hume 
clearly endorses in the Treatise. To make sense of all of this, first we need to ask one central 
question. That is: what is Hume’s project in the Treatise regarding substance, the 
substantial-self/person question and personal identity? 
___________________ 
78 Other books by Hume that philosophers use to establish their claim about Hume’s realism about 
the self include: An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, see Beauchamp (1999); An Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, see Beauchamp (1998).  
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I take Hume to be a philosopher who sets himself up for the task of, ‘deconstruction’.79  The 
straightforward dictionary sense of this term can be described as tearing down something 
that was built up. But for present purposes, I intend to use the term ‘deconstruction’ as 
described by Samuel Wheeler III, in his Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy. According to 
Wheeler, “Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy primarily addresses analytic philosophers, 
especially those who do not think that other traditions in philosophy might be capable of 
contributing something of interest to philosophy,” (2000: 1). Here Wheeler’s 
characterization of ‘deconstruction,’ nicely fits what Hume does in the Treatise. In this case, 
Hume’s deconstructionism targets three main traditions, namely the Aristotelian, the 
Cartesian and the Lockean.  
 
3.3 Hume’s Framework 
To put Hume’s deconstructionism project in its proper context, first we must begin with his 
doctrine of ideas. Central to Hume’s theory of ideas is the notion of perception, which he 
says constitutes two distinct kinds, viz., impressions and ideas. By impressions, Hume has in 
mind those perceptions with the most force and violence (impression of reflection). An 
example of such impressions include: sensations, passions and emotions. On the other 
hand, by ideas, Hume refers to what he describes as the faint images of such things in 
thinking and reasoning (Treatise, 1; see also An Abstract to Treatise, 647). For Hume, the 
difference between impressions and ideas consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, 
with which they strike the mind and make their way into our consciousness (Ibid.). Although 
there is a resemblance between impression and ideas, Hume claims that such resemblance 
is not universally true (Ibid. 3). This is because, in Hume’s view, impressions are always 
superior to ideas in a sense that the former is the source of the latter but not vice versa 
(Ibid. 4-5). As Pears remarks, “Hume’s empiricism is rooted in his axiom that all our ideas 
are derived from impressions,” (1990: vii). In the literature, this is often labelled as ‘the copy 
principle,’ (see e.g., Morris and Brown 2014: § 1.4). Hume himself sums up the primacy of  
___________________ 
79 I borrowed this term from a famous literary critique Jacques Derrida (see e.g., Royle 2003: ch.3; 
Stocker 2006).   
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impressions over ideas as “the first principle [he established] in the science of human 
nature,” (Treatise, 7).  
 
Hume further expands his discussion of the primacy of impressions over ideas by 
distinguishing between simple and complex perceptions (cf. chapter two § 2.1.1; Locke’s 
Essay II, chapters, VII-IX and XII). Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas admit of no 
distinction or separation whereas complex perceptions are distinguishable into parts. In the 
case of the first, for example, Hume claims that the idea of red which we form in the dark 
and the impression which strikes our eyes in bright sunlight differ only in degree not in 
nature (Treatise, 3). To illustrate the latter, Hume uses an example of a particular colour, 
taste and smell as qualities that are all united in a particular apple. Here Hume correctly 
points out that these are various qualities which can be distinguished from each other 
(Treatise, 2).  
 
From this, Hume may be taken to be endorsing ‘a two-category ontology’. That is, if the 
various qualities that are said to be united in a particular apple are distinguishable from 
each other on the one hand and the apple in which they inhere on the other, then it is 
sensible to conclude that an apple is a distinct bearer of those qualities. Here in the words 
of Heil (2012: 2-3) we have ‘complementary categories’: the apple is a bearer/a substance 
and the properties are ways that the apple is. But Hume, as we shall see, denies any of such 
analysis. What is his alternative proposal? The answer emerges from Hume’s 
deconstructionism, which will be discussed shortly.80 As we shall see in due course, the very 
distinction Hume draws between impressions and ideas on the basis of criterion such as 
‘force’ and ‘vivacity’ is far from clear. Regardless of such problems, however, for Hume  
_________________ 
80 Hume further divides impressions into two kinds, namely sensation and those of reflection. For 
Hume, the former arises in the soul from unknown causes whereas the second is derived from our ideas. As 
Hume states: “An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or 
hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which 
remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns 
upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be 
called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and 
imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that 
the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of 
sensations, and deriv’d from them” (Ibid. 7-8). 
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impressions and ideas are pertinent for his deconstructionism to get off the ground. 
However, here the key point to keep in mind is that for Hume, impressions and ideas are 
the primary sources of the concepts or ideas we form regarding objects of our experience 
(cf. Fodor 2003). Hume’s view of concept acquisition does not focus on mastering the 
meaning of a particular word to understand the concept of what that particular word stands 
for. That method of concept acquisition is what the later Wittgenstein seems to suggest in 
his Philosophical Investigations (see e.g., 1953: 208). Hume’s view of concept acquisition is 
quasi-inference based. (This is not to be confused with strict logical/deductive inference). 
How does Hume’s quasi-inference model work? Hume explains this by introducing three 
interrelated notions, namely resemblance, association and cause and effect, each of which 
also plays a critical role in Hume’s deconstructionism. For Hume, these notions together 
establish a framework within which he analyses the role of impressions and ideas in the 
process of concept acquisition. In Hume’s own words, I will sum up these notions under § A 
below.   
 
A. Resemblance, Association, and Cause and Effect 
Hume claims that we all experience the connection between ideas. For example, simple 
ideas give rise to complex ones. But the question remains: What is responsible for the 
connection or association of ideas? In other words, what is the ‘uniting principle’ among 
ideas? It is mainly in response to this question that Hume proposes the three notions 
mentioned above. As Hume describes:  
‘Tis plain, in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas to 
any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient 
bond and association. ‘Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their 
objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie  
contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same 
method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its 
objects. As to the connexion….’Tis sufficient to observe, that there is no relation, 
which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily 
recall another, than the relation of cause and effect between their objects….These 
are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the 
imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are 
united in our memory (Treatise, 11-12; see also EHU §§ II and III).  
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One of the key questions that comes from Hume’s remarks in this passage can be put as 
follows: Is the principle of unity a figment of our own imagination or something that we 
come to grasp in the nature of things that we experience? I shall call this: The Disjunctive 
Question. From Hume’s standpoint, the answer to The Disjunctive Question mainly depends 
on what we take the principle of union/association of those complex ideas (that arise from 
simple ideas) to amount to. Hume divides such complex ideas into Relations, Modes and 
Substances (Treatise, 13). Of these three complex ideas, relations have to do with objects 
that admit of comparison. Hume analyses such ‘philosophical relations’ under seven general 
domains (Treatise, 14-15). These are: (1) resemblance; (2) identity; (3) space and time; (4) 
all objects which admit of quantity, or number; (5) objects that possess the same quality in 
common; (6) contrariety and (7) causes or effects. That said, before taking up my discussion 
of Hume’s deconstructionism of substance, the substantial-self/person question and 
personal identity, in the next section to follow, I will briefly point out some difficulties that 
beset Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas.  
 
B.  What Is the Difference?  
As we recall, for Hume, the ‘force and vivacity’ attached to impressions are the basic 
features that distinguish it from the ideas. But how are we supposed to understand ‘force 
and vivacity’? As Wayne Waxman points out, there are difficulties in understanding these 
notions. To see this, Waxman asks us to recall that in Hume’s view, the difference between 
impressions and ideas rests on those features of perceptions that immediately make their 
way to consciousness and those we come to know via experience and custom (see again § 
3.3). For example, the main principle of Hume’s theory of ideas, i.e., that every idea is 
copied from an antecedent impression, is experiential in nature. The only elements of 
Hume’s principle that are independent of experience (i.e., accessible to immediate 
perception) are the resemblance between impressions and ideas and the temporary 
precedence of one against the other (see e.g. Treatise 73 and 168f). But for Hume, even the 
resemblance relations we notice between impressions and ideas are the result of 
associative imagination (Treatise 10). In light of this, Waxman asks: is there any immediate 
perceptible difference between impressions and ideas, prior to, and independent of, both 
experience and associative imagination that warrants their distinction? (1994: 27).  
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Hume’s response to this question is affirmative, since he thinks that we are aware of the 
‘force’ and ‘vivacity’ among the perceptions of the mind with no recourse to experience 
(Ibid.). Given such a response, Waxman claims that it is not surprising to see Hume relying 
on some quality (perception) that can be directly sensed and felt (Ibid.). But the question 
remains: what quality of perception does Hume have in mind? The answer for this question 
is far from clear. As Waxman puts it:  
One possibility is that it [quality of perception] is something like the difference 
between scarlet and brick red; or between red and purple; or perhaps that between 
blinding light and dim. But it is equally possible that actual seeing — even in a pitch 
black room (i.e. uniformly black visual sensation) — and mere recollection (even that 
of an intensely bright, sharply delineated scene, viewed only a moment before, i.e., 
an image of sensation). Or perhaps in yet another direction: a directly discernible 
feature not of the objects present to consciousness themselves (i.e. perceptions) but 
of our consciousness of them (i.e. a kind of primitive intentional attitude adopted 
towards perceptions). It is even unclear whether impressions and ideas are not 
simply diverse aspects of perceptions, so that a perception counts as an impression 
if it is regarded as a present content of consciousness and an idea if deemed a 
representation of something distinct from it (Ibid.).  
 
Given the lack of clarity on what Hume’s notion of ‘force’ and ‘vivacity’ amount to, it 
remains hard to see the merit of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas (see 
further Ibid.). Yet as we shall see, Hume’s deconstructionism has much to do with this 
distinction. So to properly understand what Hume has to say about other issues (e.g., 
substance), we cannot help but pay close attention to Hume’s distinction. Having put in 
place the relevant background information, l now turn to my discussion of Hume’s 
deconstructionism of substance, the substantial-self/person question and personal identity.  
 
3.4. Hume’s Target 
What Hume says in the Treatise about each of these things, i.e., substance, the substantial-
self/person question and personal identity is interrelated. Hence, for the most part, as we 
shall see, the objections Hume raises against one can equally be applied against the other. 
This is because Hume uses similar tools to deconstruct certain conceptions of these things. 
Here by ‘similar tools,’ I mean to refer to Hume’s doctrine of ideas which was discussed in § 
3.3. That said, the first instance of Hume’s deconstructionism against substance comes in § 
VI entitled ‘Of modes and substances.’  Hume remarks:  
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I WOU’D fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the 
distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, 
whether the ideas of substance be deriv’d from the impressions of sensation or 
reflexion? If it be convey’d to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what 
manner? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if 
by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that 
substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea of substance therefore be 
deriv’d from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist. But the impressions of 
reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can 
possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct 
from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning 
when we either talk or reason concerning it (Treatise, 15-16).  
 
In this passage, Hume has raised what I take to be a three-pronged objection against 
substance ontology. First, Hume rejects the classical substance-attribute distinction. Let us 
call this: the Distinction Objection. In classical theory, as Armstrong explains, “It is natural to 
distinguish a thing, an individual, a token, from any particular properties that the thing 
happens to have,” (1989: 59). An example of such distinction would be an apple (i.e., 
substance) and its redness, size, shape, etc., (i.e., its attributes). Second, Hume denies that 
one can have a clear idea of substance and attribute/property. Let us call this: the 
Knowledge Objection. Hume’s third objection concerns with the origin of substance. Hume’s 
point is that if substance exists, then it must be locatable in impression or reflection (see 
again footnote # 80). Since in Hume’s view, one cannot locate substance in an impression, 
there will be no other way to establish a distinct category of substance. Let us call this: the 
Origin Objection. For Hume, the above three objections feed into each other in a sense that 
the first objection is rooted in the second one and the second one is rooted in the third one. 
That is, as Hume sees it, we can only be justified in drawing the distinction between 
substance and its attributes, if it were the case that we had a distinct idea of each. But to 
have a distinct idea of each (i.e., substance and accident/property), first we would have to 
know how substance could originate from impressions of reflection. So taken from Hume’s 
standpoint, in attempting to respond to the above objections, one cannot isolate one—i.e., 
must respond to all of them. With this challenge put in place, Hume’s conclusion is that we 
have no idea of substance distinct from a collection of qualities. So Hume further remarks:  
The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of 
simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name 
assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that 
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collection. But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular 
qualities, which form a substance, are commonly referred to an unknown 
something, in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction should not 
take place, are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the 
relations of contiguity and causation (Treatise, 16; see also Ibid. 16).  
 
Here we can see that Hume understands Locke’s substratum (i.e., an unknown something) 
to be a fiction, dispensing altogether with the notion of substance understood as a distinct 
bearer of properties. As we shall see, throughout his discussion of substance in relation to 
the self as well as personal identity, Hume hangs onto Locke’s infamous characterization of 
substance as ‘unknown something’. In doing so, he wants to show why it is a mistake to 
endorse realist substance ontology. Here by ‘realist substance ontology,’ I mean a 
conception of substance as a property bearer, as pointed out in chapters one and two. In 
deconstructing the asymmetrical relation that exists between a substance and the 
properties it bears, Hume’s end goal is to establish his own bundle theory, according to 
which a thing is identified with the bundle of its properties. Of course, among famous 
British empiricists, Hume is not the first in proposing a bundle theory. Berkeley before him 
already argued that material objects are a collection of sensible qualities (see e.g., 
Principles, 53). But unlike Hume, regarding the mind, Berkeley was not a bundle theorist, 
since he maintains the distinction between the mind/self and its properties (see Ibid.). So 
compared to both Berkeley and Locke, Hume took a radical step of reducing ordinary 
familiar objects to a mere collection of properties. In doing so, Hume may be taken as one 
of the early pioneers of the tradition of a one-category ontology defended by contemporary 
eminent philosophers such as Russell (1940), Williams (1953), Campbell (1990), Hochberg 
(1964),  Castañeda (1974), Ayer (1954) and Simons (1994).  
 
3.4.1 What is Next?  
In raising the three pronged objections as outlined above, Hume’s next move is to use them 
collectively to deconstruct substance, the substantial-self/person question and personal 
identity. In this case, Hume’s deconstructionism of these things is located within the three 
traditions identified in § 3.2, namely the Lockean, the Aristotelian and the Cartesian 
traditions. As we saw above, Hume already dismissed Locke’s notion of substratum calling it 
  
112 
 
a fiction. Similarly, in ‘Of the Antient Philosophy,’ in Part IV of the Treatise in § III, Hume 
remarks:  
I am persuaded, there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of 
the fictions of the antient philosophy, concerning substances, and substantial forms, 
and accidents, and occult qualities; which, however unreasonable and capricious, 
have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature (Treatise, 219).  
 
But what are the reasons that persuaded Hume to label the ancient philosophical 
conception of substance, inter alia, as a fiction? Hume explains:  
‘Tis evident, that as the ideas of the several distinct successive qualities of objects 
are united together by a very close relation, the mind, in looking along the 
succession, must be carry’d from one part of it to another by an easy transition, and 
will no more perceive the change, than if it contemplated the same unchangeable 
object. This easy transition is the effect, or rather essence of relation; and as the 
imagination readily takes one idea for another, where their influence on the mind is 
similar; hence it proceeds, that any such succession of related qualities is readily 
consider’d as one continu’d object, existing without any variation. The smooth and 
uninterrupted progress of the thought, being alike in both cases, readily deceives 
the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of 
connected qualities….In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is 
apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue the 
same under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a substance, 
or original and first matter (Treatise, 220; see also Ibid. 221-225).  
  
The gist of Hume’s point comes down to answering what I earlier called the Disjunctive 
Question. That is: Is the principle of unity a figment of our own imagination or something 
that we come to grasp with in the nature of things that we experience? If Hume’s above 
account with respect to how we come to form a belief in a continuing object is true, then 
we have no other option but to endorse the first disjunct of the Disjunctive Question. But in 
endorsing the first disjunct, that is in considering the unity we ascribe to objects of our 
experience as a figment of our imagination, Hume is effectively telling us to rule out the 
second disjunct. Notice again that the second disjunct presupposes the unity we experience 
in the object of our experience to be grounded in the nature of the things themselves, as 
opposed to being the result of our own psychological extrapolation. So given Hume’s 
argument, the ‘or’ in the Disjunctive Question is to be understood as an exclusive ‘or’ as 
opposed to it being an inclusive ‘or’. That is, as we know from rules of elementary logic, the 
disjunction, P v Q, is true in the exclusive sense of the term iff one but not both disjuncts are 
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true. By contrast, if the ‘or’ in the disjunction, P v Q, is taken in its inclusive sense, then each 
disjunct could be true, although we are presented with a choice to pick one of the disjuncts. 
Put this way, as we shall see, Hume’s account of the unity of things, regardless of whether 
we are concerned with the objects we experience in the external world or those of our own 
mental life, is highly questionable.  
 
Most importantly, given the Disjunctive Question, Hume’s suggestion that we can do away 
with the second disjunct in favor of the first disjunct hardly holds water unless Hume gives 
us a compelling reason to do so. Now we can see at least why Hume is adamant in opposing 
the second disjunct in the Disjunctive Question. That is, if one embraces the second disjunct, 
then one cannot avoid its implication for substance as a principle of unity. What should we 
do then? Should we take Hume’s conclusion and move on? Not without a fight, at least. 
Hume should earn our concession to his conclusion. If Hume establishes his case for the 
irrelevance of realist substance ontology, then those of us who are sympathetic to such a 
realist ontology cannot help but concede to him. But will Hume deliver a better option? At 
this point, I can only say that it is yet to be seen. In making such remarks, I am expressing 
my disagreement with those philosophers who seem to have ruled out that Hume’s 
rejection or critique of the doctrine of substance is successful (see e.g., Flage 1990: Ch. 4; 
Allaire in Tweyman III 1995: Ch. 47).  
 
Hume’s criticism of the notion of substance goes beyond the Lockean and the Aristotelian 
traditions. For example, in Part IV of the Treatise in § V, Hume turns to Cartesianism. Here, 
Hume’s target is the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity and indivisibility of a 
thinking substance (Treatise, 240-244). As he did in the case of the previous two traditions, 
Hume also insists that for the Cartesian doctrine of immaterial substance to have any 
chance of being real, it must meet certain conditions. As Hume states:  
As every idea is deriv’d from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the 
substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; which is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv’d. For how can an impression represent a 
substance, otherwise than by resembling it? For how can an impression represent a 
substance, since, according to this philosophy it is not a substance, and has none of 
the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance? (Treatise, 232-233).  
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Here Hume has in mind what I had identified earlier as the Knowledge Objection (which 
requires one to have a clear idea of substance) and the Origin Objection (which requires an 
account of the origin of substance). In the remainder of § V, Hume argues that since the 
philosophers he criticizes have failed miserably in terms of meeting these objections, the 
whole idea of substance in general and Cartesian immaterial soul in particular, is not worth 
talking about. As Hume states:  
Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of a definition are 
we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; which seems to me a 
sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and 
immateriality of the soul, and makes me absolutely condemn even the question 
itself….We have no perfect idea of any thing but a perception. A substance is entirely 
different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance. Inhesion in 
something is suppos’d to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. 
Nothing appears to support the existence of a perception (Treatise, 234).  
 
Here by particular definition, Hume is referring to Descartes’s own definition of substance 
as ‘something which may exist by itself,’ (Treatise, 233; cf. see § 1.1.1.2 footnote # 12). 
Hume claims that if this definition is true, then perceptions also qualify as having the status 
of substances, since they can exist by themselves without needing any bearer. In saying this, 
Hume is once again raising the Distinction Objection we saw earlier. That is, there is no need 
for a distinct bearer of perceptions. Why? As Hume thinks, we have no idea of substance. 
But Hume’s claim here about the actual possibility of the existence of ownerless 
perceptions, is a moot point to which we should pay close attention. It would be very 
interesting to know how it would be possible for ownerless perceptions to exist (see also 
Treatise, 222). This is an issue I will take up when I discuss Hume’s account of personal 
identity. That said, as we shall see, Hume extends his deconstructionism to personal identity 
as well. Before I take up that discussion, it is worth reflecting on Hume’s hitherto 
deconstructionism against substance ontology.  
 
3.4.2 Hume’s Psychologism81 
The term ‘psychologism’ is often used to show what one takes to be the mistake of  
____________________ 
81 For debate on physchologism in general as well as its original source, see Martin Kusch 
(2007/2011). But here in discussing Hume’s Psychologism, I am neither assuming nor implying that psychology 
is irrelevant in discussing substance ontology in general or personhood in particular.   
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identifying non-psychological with psychological entities (Kusch 2007/2011). For example, 
Frege thought that it is a mistake to base mathematics upon psychology, since the latter is 
vague and inexact. Here Frege is running what is understood to be an anti-psychologistic  
argument (see e.g., 1884: 38ff; see also Kusch 2007/2011 § 4). Along similar lines, what I am 
here calling Hume’s Psychologism is intended to show why Hume’s account of the source of 
our idea of substance is problematic. Hume’s account of the source of our idea of substance 
is psychological in nature, since as we saw, he appeals to an impression of sensation or 
reflection. But how well does Hume’s psychologism fair if seen in light of the three-pronged 
objection identified earlier, namely: (a) the Distinction Objection; (b) the Knowledge 
Objection; and (c) the Origin Objection? Again here we need to evaluate the merit of these 
objections against the backdrop of the three traditions Hume’s deconstructionism targets, 
namely the Lockean, the Aristotelian and the Cartesian.  
 
In this case, (a) targets the distinction between substance and the properties it bears. Since 
Aristotle, Locke and Descartes each makes such a distinction, the objection certainly 
attracts their attention. But (b) that focuses on one’s claim to have a clear and distinct idea 
of substance does seem to attract only Descartes’s attention. This is because, Descartes 
clearly claims that he has a ‘distinct and clear idea’ of the distinction between immaterial 
substance and material substance (see e.g., Principles of Philosophy AT VIII 60: CSM 213; see 
also chapter one § 1.1.1.2). However, Descartes does not say that such an understanding of 
the nature of substance comes via derivation from some sort of impression. So the force of 
(b) against Descartes’s claim will not be that strong. How about (b) against Aristotle? As we 
shall see in chapter seven, Aristotle begins his theory of substance by taking the reality of 
ordinary familiar objects like human beings for granted. That is, for Aristotle people, trees, 
stones, etc., are real. So Aristotle would not have been moved by (b), since he does not 
exercise conceptual inference to establish the reality of such things. But this does not mean 
that Aristotle does not use concepts to think about things. That is a different matter. I will 
have something to say about this issue in chapter seven.  
 
What can we say about Locke’s take on (b)? I would say that Locke would not have been 
moved by (b) either. As we have discussed in chapter two, for Locke, the general idea of 
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substance is not made via a process of combining many simple ideas, which eventually lead 
to the formation of complex ideas. By contrast, the abstract or general idea of substance is 
formed only by the process of abstraction and hence it refers to a mental process. 
Moreover, Locke does not claim to have a clear idea of the nature of substance at all. So 
Locke can easily turn his back against (b). That leaves us with Hume’s (c), which deals with 
the origin of our idea of substance. This is the objection that Hume cannot afford to lose 
against Aristotle, Locke and Descartes. I say ‘Hume cannot afford to lose’ because Hume’s 
Psychologism is rooted in (c) so much more than in (a) and (b). Whose attention here will 
Hume get then, that is Aristotle’s, Locke’s or Descartes’s? Unfortunately, given our 
discussion of Descartes’s and Aristotle’s account of substance in chapter one, and also given 
our discussion of Locke’s account of substance in chapter two, Aristotle, Descartes and 
Locke would all reject Hume’s (c). The main reason for this is that none of these 
philosophers came up with their conception of substance ontology via a mechanism of 
Hume’s sort of psychologism.  
 
So Hume cannot just get what he wants by setting up the terms of the debate in such a way 
that only serves his case. Hume needs to take his opponents’ views of substance on their 
own terms and give us reasons why we should reject them. As things stand, at least for 
now, Hume has not done that. In light of this, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Hume’s Psychologism is entirely of his own making. That is to say that, Hume has not yet 
established that the problem he tries to locate in the views of other philosophers is 
something that his opponents would readily admit is actually a problem to their views. 
Hence, it remains unclear what significant role his Psychologism could play in enabling 
Hume to succeed in his deconstructionism project (cf. Oderberg 2012).  
 
But Hume’s failure to establish (c) against Aristotle, Locke and Descartes, significantly 
weakens the force of his other objections, i.e, (a) and (b). This is precisely because as I had 
pointed out earlier, the three-pronged objection feed into each other in a sense that (a) is 
rooted in (b) and (b) is rooted in (c). So what are Hume’s chances to bounce back again? I 
will explore an answer to this question and other similar ones in Hume’s discussion of 
personal identity. I now turn to that discussion.  
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3.5 The Substantial-Self/Person Question and Personal Identity  
In the Treatise Part IV § VI entitled, ‘Of Personal Identity,’ we come across Hume’s official 
presentation of his view of the self and personal identity.82 Hume’s theory of personal 
identity is shaped, inter alia, by his criticism of substance. As we recall, the heart of Hume’s 
criticism of substance has to do with his rejection of an independent principle of unity. We 
saw this point in detail in § 3.4.1 where I analyzed the Disjunctive Question. As we recall, the 
Disjunctive Question asks: Is the principle of unity a figment of our own imagination or 
something that we come to grasp in the nature of things that we experience? For Hume, 
there is no straightforward way to deal with this question. So his own solution as we saw in 
our earlier discussion was to deconstruct it. As we shall see, this question also crops up 
repeatedly in Hume’s discussion of personal identity. Here too, Hume’s goal is to show the 
irrelevance of a certain way of understanding the principle of unity.  
 
3.5.1 The Starting Point  
Unlike Descartes and Locke, each of whom began the analysis of the ontology of the 
self/person with the Aristotelian Question (i.e., what is X?), Hume’s starting point is with the 
unity of the self/person. As Pears remarks, “Hume shows little direct interest in the criteria 
for identifying a person across an interval of time,” (1990: 121; see also Noonan 1999: 189). 
The reason for this, as we shall see, partly has to do with Hume’s own conception of 
identity. That said, Hume opens his discussion of personal identity by attacking the rival 
views. As Hume states:  
There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately 
conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in 
existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its 
perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, that most violent passion, 
say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and 
make us consider their influence on self  either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt 
a further proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be deriv’d 
from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing, of 
which we can be certain, if we doubt of this (Treatise, 251).  
__________________ 
82 Hume discussed the notion of the self in his other writings as well. In this regard, for an excellent 
discussion on Hume’s unpublished works, as well as posthumously published works, see McIntyre in Tweyman 
III (1995: Ch. 93). 
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As Robison rightly points out, Hume thinks that the philosophers he has in mind [most likely 
Descartes being one of those] are mistaken in attributing to a self/person three essential 
features: (a) it continues to exist through the whole course of our lives; (b) it remains the 
same throughout its existence; and (c) we are intimately conscious of it (Robinson in 
Tweyman 1995: 690). But why does Hume reject the features in (a)-(c)? Unsurprisingly, 
Hume’s answer is that these features fail to meet the Origin Objection. As we recall from 
our discussion in § 3.4 above, the Origin Objection has to do with the inability to account for 
the origin of substance. In this case, Hume raises the Origin Objection in relation to the self. 
As Hume remarks: 
Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is 
pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain’d. 
For from what impression cou’d this idea be driv’d? This question ‘tis impossible to 
answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet ‘tis a question, 
which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear 
and intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to very real idea. But 
self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions 
and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference. (Treatise, 251).  
 
Here Hume’s point is that unless the Origin Objection is met, any claim one makes about the 
ontology of the self turns out to be unjustified. Moreover, Hume sets the bar so high for a 
defender of the self, when he says:  
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue 
invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist 
after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and 
pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all 
exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or 
from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such 
idea (Treatise, 251-252).  
 
In this passage, Hume wants to put a defender of the ontology of the self on the back foot 
by putting forth two demands, each of which may seem difficult to satisfy. Hume’s first 
demand is that a defender of the ontology of the self must establish the impression that 
gives rise to the idea of the self. Hume’s second demand is that even if it is supposed that a 
defender of the ontology of the self can show the impression that gives rise to the idea of 
the self, there is an intractable problem yet to be faced. That is, since an impression does 
not endure over time, Hume claims that any attempt to establish an idea of an 
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enduring/persistent self in variable impression will not be successful. Thus, either way 
Hume thinks that a defender of the ontology of the self has no option but to reconsider her 
position (cf. Robison in Tweyman 1995: 699). But the question remains: why would a 
defender of the ontology of the self accept the terms of the debate set by Hume? This 
question reminds us of our discussion of Hume’s psychologism in § 3.4.2. If my conclusion in 
that section with respect to Hume’s psychologism is correct, then we can adopt a similar 
line of critique to show why Hume’s arguments against a defender of the ontology of the 
self will ultimately fail to succeed. But before we take up any such discussion, we need to 
probe further into Hume’s reasons for challenging rival views of the self.  
 
3.5.2 Where is It?  
In this case, Hume’s most famous objection against the realist ontology of the self comes in 
the following passage (also see chapter one § 1.1.2.2 A):  
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself any time without a perception, 
and never can observe any thing but the perception…I am certain there is no such 
principle in me (Treatise, 252).  
 
Here Hume puts observability as a precondition for the existence of the self. So he wants to 
test it (i.e, the self’s observability) through engaging in an introspective investigation. One 
thing that is distinctive about Hume’s introspective investigation of the self has to do with 
the fact that it is rooted in Hume’s own first-person perspective. Yet despite Hume’s first 
personal introspective investigation, the self did not turn up in perception. Hence, Hume 
concluded that there is no such thing we call a self. If Hume is right, then he has raised a 
powerful objection against a defender of the realist ontology of the self. Hume’s objection 
targets a Cartesian self (Kim 2005: 31-35; see also Flew 1986: 94-98). However, we need to 
keep in mind that the objection also has a wider application that challenges any view that 
conceives a self as a distinct property bearer of some kind. Here I say, ‘some kind,’ in order 
to leave room for non-Cartesian ways of characterizing the notion of the self. In chapter six, 
I will discuss one such characterization of the self/person.  
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Most contemporary philosophers argue that Hume’s failure to detect a self in experience 
undermines any positive support one can give for the realist ontology of the self. For 
example, Searle remarks, “Hume is absolutely right; there is no experience of this entity…,” 
(2004: 203). Kripke also claims that “Descartes’ notion seems to have been rendered 
dubious ever since Hume’s critique of the notion of a Cartesian self,” (Kripke 1980: 155 
footnote # 77; see also Grossman 1965: 41-42; Ayer 1963: 83; Dennett 1991: Ch. 13; 
Armstrong 1980: 64; Westerhoff 2011: 66; cf. Blackburn 1999: 138-140). Despite an 
overwhelming company Hume enjoys from the contemporary philosophers, not everyone 
thinks that Hume’s search for the self through introspection is even the right sort of 
approach to begin with.  
 
For example, Shoemaker claims that Hume’s denial may have some intuitive appeal to it. 
Yet for Shoemaker, the basis for Hume’s denial is far from clear in terms of what exactly it 
means, or what its philosophical implications are. Assuming that the basis for Hume’s denial 
is empirical, when Hume looks within for a self, what he ended up finding was instead only 
particular perceptions. In light of this, Shoemaker claims that Hume’s denial that he is 
aware of a self can scarcely have the same basis as one’s well-founded denial that one sees 
a tea kettle. For Shoemaker, the latter denial is well-founded only assuming that one has 
some idea of what it would be like to see a tea kettle. By contrast, Shoemaker claims that 
Hume is emphatic on the point that he has no idea of self qua subject of experiences nor 
does he think that he has any idea of what it would be like to introspect one. Shoemaker 
claims that despite the initial appearances, the basis for Hume’s denial can hardly be 
empirical (Shoemaker in Cassam 1994: 119). In light of this, Shoemaker concludes, “If the 
basis of the Humean denial is less than clear, so also is its meaning. Sometimes it is put by 
saying that we are not ‘acquainted’ with a self or that we are not, in introspection, 
presented with a self ‘as an object’. But what is it to be acquainted with something in the 
required sense?,” (Ibid.). Chisholm also remarks: 
Our idea of ‘a mind’ (if by ‘a mind’ we mean, as Hume usually does, a person, or a 
self) is not an idea only of ‘particular perceptions’. It is not the idea of the perception 
of love or hate and the perception of cold or warmth, much less an idea of love or 
hate and the heat or cold. It is an idea of that which loves or hates, and of that which 
feels cold or warm….That is to say, it is an idea of an x such that x loves or x hates 
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and such that x feels cold and x feels warm, and so forth (Chisholm 1969: 9; see also 
Russell 1912: 27). 
 
Shoemaker and Chisholm in their own way touched upon two important points, which I 
already discussed in chapter one and also continue to discuss throughout this thesis. The 
first point is that, trying to look for a self as if it is an object is not only mistaken, it does not 
even make sense (see again chapter § 1.1.2.2 A & B). This is also Shoemaker’s main criticism 
of Hume’s introspective exercise in looking for a self. The other point has to do with the 
implication of the first person account of one’s experience. Notice that as I pointed out 
earlier, Hume’s report about the absence of a self in introspection, is rooted in Hume’s own 
first person account. If so, as Chisholm rightly observed, Hume’s denial of a self cannot be 
established without presupposing it. In chapter seven, I will be developing this idea in my 
own way to defend a realist ontology of the self.   
 
On the other hand, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant agreed with Hume that the self 
might not be located in experience, given the changing nature of appearances. As Kant 
remarks, “consciousness of self…is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and 
abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances,” (A 107). However, unlike 
Hume, Kant insisted that one’s experiences have to be unified. But such unity of 
experiences can only happen if all of one’s representations are attributable to a single 
subject in order for them to qualify as one’s own. Kant claims that to ensure the unity of 
experiences, there must be a condition which precedes all experiences that makes 
experience itself possible. Kant calls this a ‘pure original unchangeable apperception’ 
(Ibid.).83 Furthermore, in the Transcendental Deduction B, Kant further argues why all of our 
representations must belong to a single subject. As Gardener sums it up:  
It is not that each of my representations must be actually accompanied by the 
reflection that it is mine, nor that I must be able to form a single thought 
comprehending all of my representations in one grand totality: Kant’s claim is just 
that each of my representations must be such that it is possible for me to recognize 
it as mine in an act of reflection. For satisfaction of this condition, the representation 
___________________ 
83 Kant borrowed the term ‘apperception’ from Leibniz, for whom it meant perception of one’s states 
(see Gardner 1999: 145).  
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 ‘I’, as invariant, a priori representation free from empirical content is essential; 
‘otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have 
representations of which I am conscious’….‘I think’—the necessity of the possibility 
of its accompanying my representations expresses the condition that any domain of 
objects must be conceived in the perspective of a thinking subject,” (Gardner 1999: 
146; see also Strawson 1966). 
 
At this point, the question that comes to mind is this: Is Hume an eliminativist or a 
reductionist about the self? Based on the passage we saw at the beginning of this section, it 
is hard to categorize Hume in either domain. Yet we can get a clear answer for this question 
by looking at Hume’s alternative proposal which, as we shall see, paves the way for Hume’s 
deconstructionism of the self.  
 
3.5.3 The Bundle View of the Self  
Hume claims that once we set aside the ontology of the self that some metaphysicians 
defend, we can affirm the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection 
of different perceptions. Hume tells us that these perceptions succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity and are in constant flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their 
sockets without changing our perceptions (Treatise 252).84 This is the clearest instance of 
Hume’s reductionism of the selves/persons to bundles of perceptions. As we shall see in 
chapter five, Hume’s reductionism of selves will also figure in the works of influential 
personal identity theorists like Parfit. Hume considers the mind as something that is being 
constituted by successive perceptions, which has no simplicity nor identity that we naturally 
attribute to it (Treatise, 253).  
 
What do we make of Hume’s claim that the self is a bundle of perception? Notice that in § 
3.5.2, Hume told us that he could not detect a self through introspection. What this means 
is that Hume could not find the impression that matches with the impression(s) that is 
supposed to be constitutive of the self. The question then is: on what basis is Hume telling 
____________________ 
84 Here Hume’s remarks are Heraclitean in their tone. A pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus is 
credited with saying that everything is in a constant flux (Raven and Schofield 1957/1983: 195). However, 
unlike Hume, Heraclitus still maintains that, “men should try to comprehend the underlying coherence of 
things: it is expressed in the Logos, the formula or element of arrangement common to all things,” (Ibid. 186).  
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us now that the self is a bundle of perceptions? What criterion (if any) has he used to 
distinguish self-constituting perceptions, from those that are not?85 To my knowledge, I 
have not come across Hume’s own answer for this question. Since nothing gives an 
underlying unity for the bundles that are supposed to constitute the self, it remains hard to 
make sense of how discrete perceptions come together to constitute a concrete object like 
a self. Moreover, it remains unclear what the nature of the relation that is supposed to exist 
between discrete perceptions. Hume’s view in this regard is a precursor to contemporary 
bundle theory. As Loux explains:  
On this view [i.e., contemporary bundle view] familiar objects are complexes or 
wholes whose constituents are exhausted by those attributes that can be the objects 
of perceptual or introspective awareness. Denying the need for underlying subject 
for attributes, these empiricists have frequently invoked metaphors to express their 
analysis of the structure of concrete particulars. A concrete particular, we are hold, 
is nothing more than a “bundle,” a “cluster,” a “collection,” or a “congeries” of the 
empirically manifest attributes that common sense associates with it (1998: 103). 
  
 
But the question remains: “What is the ontological “glue” that holds the different items in 
each of these bundles together?” (Ibid). As we can see from the hitherto discussion, Hume’s 
deconstructionism of a realist conception of substance and the self, has not in any clear way 
yielded the result Hume had expected. The question is: Will Hume’s deconstructionism yield 
the result he wants when it comes to personal identity?  
 
3.5.4 Personal Identity 
Hume begins his discussion of personal identity by asking the following question: “What 
then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, 
and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the 
whole course of our lives?”, (Treatise, 253). Hume tells us that in order to answer this 
question, the issue of personal identity has to be approached from two aspects: (1) personal 
identity as it regards our thought or imagination; and (2) as it regards our passions or the  
________________________ 
85 This is an important question that often seems to have been passed by Hume’s scholars, see e.g., 
Capaldi in Tweyman III (1995: Ch. 87); Penelhum (2003: Ch. 5); McIntyre in Tweyman III (1995: Ch. 93); Traiger 
in Tweyman III (1995: 92). However, in this regard, Pike attempts to defend Hume (1967: 159-165).  
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concern we have in ourselves (Ibid.). Hume discusses (1) in book I of his Treatise. He 
discusses (2) in book II of his Treatise. As already indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
this thesis focuses on (1).  
 
For Hume, the above question serves as a background assumption, in light of which he tries 
to show why we are mistaken in attributing identity both to ourselves as well as to other 
objects (Treatise, 253). As we recall, for Hume, identity is one of the philosophical relations. 
That is, as Hume explains, identity is the most universal of all relations, in that it is common 
to every being whose existence has any duration (Treatise, 14). However, Hume claims that 
when it comes to applying this relation to ourselves as well as to other things, we often 
make serious mistakes. What precisely are these mistakes and how is it that we end up 
making them? Before we look at this question, I want to point out two notions that are 
central to Hume’s diagnoses of our mistaken conception of identity.  
 
Hume claims that we have a distinct idea of an object which persists as invariable and 
uninterrupted through time. Hume calls this identity or sameness. Hume contrasts this 
notion of identity with the notion of diversity, which pertains to several different objects 
that exist in succession and are connected together by a close relation (Treatise, 253). Hume 
thinks that our fundamental mistake in thinking that objects endure through time arises 
from conflating the notion of identity and the notion of diversity with each other. But 
Hume’s own claim that objects remain the same (i.e., without experiencing any change) 
through time is wrong. I already explained in chapter one that qualitative change, say, of 
the apple changing its colour from green to red (while remaining the same apple), can be a 
counterexample to the way Hume characterizes the notion of identity. Contra Hume, 
variation of time presupposes some sort of change, whether that is qualitative, substantial 
or change of composition (see again chapter one § 1.2.2 B). If so, every kind of change that 
objects experience through time, does not necessarily pose a threat to their identity (cf. 
Penelhum in Tweyman III 1995: 658).86 In other words, identity is not incompatible with  
_________________________ 
86 Of course, at this point, it may be said that at the microscopic level, when elementary particles 
enter into an entangled state, there is no fact of the matter as to their identity. Lowe, for example, argues that 
this could be an instance of an ontic indeterminacy as opposed to epistemic or semantic (see e.g., Lowe 1994:  
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change (cf. Noonan 1999: 205). Having said that, however, Hume’s own main claim is that 
our fundamental mistake in believing in the persistence of objects through time, emanates 
from attributing identity to objects (i.e., perceptions)—that exist only in succession and 
connected by a close relation. Hume’s point is that we make a mistake when we confuse 
identity with relation. But what is the source of such confusion?  
 
In this case, Hume blames imagination. For Hume, imagination is one of the faculties by 
which we repeat our impressions (Treatise 8). Hume claims that imagination makes us 
consider things to be uninterrupted and invariable. Thus, we mistakenly substitute the 
relation we witness among succeeding objects, for things that endure through time. As 
Hume remarks:  
The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and 
renders its passage as smooth as if it is contemplated one continu’d object. This 
resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the  
notion of identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may 
consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure that the next 
to ascribe to it perfect identity, and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted. Our 
propensity to this mistake is so great from the resemblance above-mention’d, that 
we fall into it before we are aware….In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, 
we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects 
together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu’d 
existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into 
the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation (Treatise, 254).  
 
This passage once again sums up Hume’s deconstructionism in the context of his discussion 
of personal identity. In this passage, we also see that Hume’s psychologism comes in full 
force. Hume’s focus is on diagnosing how we mistakenly attribute identity to objects of our 
perception on the one hand and to ourselves on the other hand. Notice that Hume is 
consistently applying what I introduced in § 3.4, as the three-prong objections, namely the 
Distinction Objection, the Knowledge Objection and the Origin Objection. As we recall, the 
first objection deals with the distinction between the self and its properties. The second  
__________________ 
110-114). Here my point only applies to ordinary familiar objects at the macroscopic level (e.g., selves, trees, 
etc.). So my point still stands.   
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objection deals with our knowledge of the impressions that gives rise to the self; and the 
third objection deals with our lack of specifying which impressions are responsible for the 
idea of substance and the self. Regarding identity, Hume remarks:  
For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted 
objects, our mistake is not confin’d to the expression, but it commonly attended 
with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something 
mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions (Treatise, 
255).  
 
In talking about the identity we ascribe to persons, Hume remarks, “the identity, which we 
ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one,” (Treatise, 259). This means that, as 
Hume sees it, the identity we attribute to persons is not different from the identity we 
attribute to plants, animals, ships and houses. In each of these cases, there are changes that 
take place. For example, trees lose the matter that composes them. Houses get demolished 
and could be rebuilt out of completely different materials. Despite such changes, we often 
freely attribute identity to these objects, even when none of the objects are the same with 
the original objects (see e.g., Treatise, 256-258). However, here Hume seems to be 
conflating two notions of substance. As we recall, in chapter one, I distinguished between 
the stuff/matter notion of substance on the one hand and the notion of substance taken as 
a fundamental existent or ousia, on the other hand.  
 
Taken in the first sense of substance, for example, a tree can lose the particles that 
compose it at any given time without losing its identity. That means that the stuff/matter 
that composes a tree should not be equated with the tree itself. I can say that the tree in 
my backyard is the same tree that I have known since I came to England. But since I came to 
England, the tree in my backyard has recycled several times the stuff that composes it—as a 
matter of biological process. Yet, I am justified in saying that the tree in my backyard is the 
same tree that endures the loss of stuff that composes it from time to time. Similarly, 
persons endure through mereological replacement. As Moreland remarks, “we are enduring 
continuants even though we undergo various changes and our bodies experience part 
replacement,” (2009: 115). Of course, mereological replacement in the case of material 
objects (e.g., ship, houses) is extremely controversial, which does not concern us for present 
purposes (see e.g., Lowe 2002: Ch. 2). But Hume’s denial of strict identity to living creatures 
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on the basis of the loss of material composition is clearly a non-starter. In this regard, as we 
saw in chapter two, Locke is much more careful.   
 
Yet against all such considerations, Hume remarks: 
The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a 
like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, 
therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the 
imagination upon like objects (Treatise, 259).   
 
Hume claims that there is no difference between the identity of persons and the identity of 
other things, such as artefacts, plants and animals. In this case, Hume’s claim is extremely 
influential in the contemporary personal identity debate. For example, as I explained in 
chapter one, the complex view theorists follow Hume in this regard (see e.g., Shoemaker in 
Gasser and Stephen 2012: Ch. 6). Hume further strengthens his point as follows:  
 ‘Tis evident, that the identity, which we attribute to the human mind, however 
perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions 
into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which 
are essential to them. (Treatise, 259).  
 
Hume’s point is that distinct and different perceptions that exist are not united by any 
underlying principle of any kind (cf. Treatise, 260). Hume thinks that there is no way for the 
human mind to observe “any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of 
cause and effect, when strictly examin’d, resolves itself into a customary association of 
ideas,” (Treatise 259-260). Hence, Hume concludes,  
‘Tis therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and 
causation, that identity depends; and as the very essence of these relations consists 
in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of personal 
identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the 
thought along a train of connected ideas, according to the principles above-
explain’d. (Treatise, 260). 
 
For Hume, an uninterrupted progress of our thought, which we attribute to the successive 
existence of a mind or a thinking person, is produced by resemblance and causation. Unlike 
Locke who thought that memory plays a critical role in personal identity, Hume briefly 
argued that memory only discovers personal identity (Treatise, 262). That means that 
memory plays only an evidential role in a sense of allowing us to have knowledge of our 
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own identity. In light of the hitherto considerations, Hume claims that questions about 
personal identity are grammatical rather than philosophical difficulties. Hume also says that 
all the disputes besetting the identity of connected objects are merely verbal in so far as 
they lead us to some fiction or imaginary principle of union (Treatise, 262). Here Hume’s 
remarks represent the climax of his deconstructionism, where he announces that no 
substantive discussion can be had with respect to the principle of union (i.e., substance).   
 
3.5.5 Hume’s Confessions  
Hume applied his deconstructionism to substance, the self, and identity/personal identity. 
As we saw, Hume had nothing positive to say about these things (Cf. Wolfram 1974: 586-
593). Where does all that leave Hume’s deconstructionism? At this point, it is important for 
us to briefly look at the implications of Hume’s own confessions in the Appendix (see 
Treatise, 633-636). As I have already stated at the beginning of this chapter, I am not 
interested to engage in contemporary speculation regarding the reasons for Hume’s 
confession in the Appendix. These speculations are still ongoing. My own take on Hume’s 
confession in the Appendix is different from orthodox approaches. I take Hume’s words in 
the Appendix at face value. That is, Hume was deeply dissatisfied with his theory of personal 
identity.  
 
The first thing to notice in the Appendix is that Hume hasn’t abandoned his position on 
substance, the realist ontology the self, and identity/personal identity (see e.g., Treatise 
633-635). In my view, what is distinctive in the Appendix about Hume’s confession has to do 
with his realization that his deconstruction project comes at a price. For example, as Hume 
describes:  
But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find 
myself involv’d in such a labrynth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to 
correct any former opinions, nor how to render them consistent (Treatise, 633). 
 
In this particular confession, Hume is telling us that he doesn’t know how to correct his 
previous opinions concerning personal identity. In this regard, for example, Hume rejected 
that identity is not a fact that holds in the nature of things. Rather, identity is something we  
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conjure up in our imagination. Hume himself understood that deconstructing the uniting 
principle (i.e., substance) was not as simple as he had first thought. As Hume remarks:  
In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent: nor is it in my 
power to renounce either of them, viz that all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct 
existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or 
did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d be no 
difficulty in the case (Treatise, 636). 
 
Again what we see in this confession is that Hume’s deconstructionism has no advantage by 
way of helping us make sense of our experience of the world around us in general, and in 
our own case, as subjects of experience, in particular. Ironically, in light of Hume’s 
confession, it seems fair to say that to have a defensible ontology of the self on the one 
hand, and the metaphysics of identity/personal identity on the other, we still need 
substance ontology.  
 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, our main focus has been on Hume’s discussion of substance, the self and 
identity/personal identity. In this regard, we saw that Hume’s discussion is negative. We 
also saw in detail what I called Hume’s deconstruction project. Hume applied his 
deconstructionism against three main traditions, namely, the Aristotelian, the Lockean and 
the Cartesian. We also saw that Hume’s epistemology is rooted in his strong empiricism. In 
light of this, Hume rejected traditional metaphysical claims about the ontology of the self. 
We also saw that Hume’s rejection of traditional metaphysics in favor of his own strong 
empiricism has not proven to be entirely helpful when it comes to issues such as substance 
ontology, and identity/personal identity. As Hume’s own confession in the Appendix seems 
to indicate, jettisoning metaphysics may not be as simple as it initially might seem to be. If 
this is right, then such a finding all the more strengthens the background assumption of this 
thesis, which is the importance of traditional metaphysics for the ontology of the self. That 
said, in part three of this thesis, my discussion will focus on the contemporary issues that 
deal with the methodology of thought experiments and the personal identity debate. In 
chapter four, I will take up the first issue and the second issue will be discussed in chapter 
five. In chapter six, I will discuss issues related to the self in philosophy of mind.  
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Chapter four  
 
Thought Experiment and Personal Identity 
 
In chapters two and three, my main focus has been in showing the historical relevance of 
Locke and Hume in relation to the contemporary personal identity debate on the one hand, 
and their account of substance ontology in relation to the self/person on the other hand. In 
this case, one of the things I tried to emphasize was that our interest in Locke and Hume is 
not confined just to their historical significance. Rather their influence has continued well 
into our time. Both of these philosophers, in their own way, have set the tone for the 
contemporary personal identity debate. As we shall see in chapter five, Locke’s legacies can 
be seen in the neo-Lockean tradition; whereas Hume’s legacies can fairly be attached to the 
contemporary reductionist account of personal identity. We will have a chance to see 
concrete examples of each of these instances in chapter five. That said, in this short 
chapter, my main aim is to tackle the issue of methodology in the personal identity debate 
with a particular focus on the neo-Lockean tradition.  
 
Initially, how this chapter fits into the overall dialectic of the thesis may not be clear. But for 
reasons we shall see, a discussion of this issue is crucial, since it is related to the discussion I 
will be undertaking in chapter five on the contemporary debates on personal identity on the 
one hand, and the negligence of substance ontology on the other. For example, one of the 
ways most contemporary personal identity theorists try to justify their marginalization of 
substance ontology is by appealing to thought experiments. Of course, in this regard Locke 
himself opened the door by denying the centrality of substance ontology for personal 
identity via his soul-swap thought experiment. However, as I will attempt to show in this 
chapter, it would be problematic to use thought experiments as a methodological proper to 
argue for personal identity.  
 
In light of this, my bringing the issue of methodology right before chapter five is a deliberate 
strategic move on my part. As I already indicated in chapter one (see § 1.2 footnote # 27), I 
want to suggest my own way with respect to how to best utilize puzzle cases in the context 
of personal identity debates. In this case, I will emphasize three things.  
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A. The role thought experiments must be allowed to play.  
B. The constraints within which thought experiments must be exercised.  
C. The place thought experiments deserve and do not deserve.  
I shall call (A) the Role Condition; (B) the Constraint Condition; and (C) The Priority 
Condition, respectively. In § 4.5, I will explain what (A)-(C) amount to. I will also argue why it 
is important for thought experiments invoked in personal identity discussions to satisfy (A)-
(C). In light of this, whatever I say in this chapter concerning the use of puzzle cases will be 
confined to personal identity. So the remarks I make may not be applicable to the use of 
thought experiments in other contexts, say for example, in scientific contexts or otherwise. 
Moreover, the discussion I advance in this chapter will not be exhaustive. As indicated 
earlier, my interest in this short chapter is not to discuss the methodology of thought 
experiments for its own sake.87 Rather, my goal is specific and aimed at paving the way for 
the discussion I will advance in chapter five which concerns with what is being prioritized in 
the contemporary personal identity debates on the one hand, and what is being pushed 
aside on the other.  
 
In this case, as we recall, in chapter one (see § 1.2 and 1.2.2 D), I had expressed my 
suspicion that the lack of consensus in the contemporary personal identity debates, can in 
part, if not in whole, be attributed to the way thought experiments are often utilized in 
thinking about the problem of personal identity. But how are thought experiments used in 
personal identity debates? This is the question I will attempt to answer in what follows. In 
attempting to answer this question, my goal is to reiterate the point I have been 
emphasizing in this thesis, which is, in thinking about the problem of personal identity, our 
starting point must be what I called the Aristotelian Question that takes the form: ‘what is 
X?’ As we shall see in chapter five, it remains very difficult to see what role (if any) the 
Aristotelian Question plays, when the neo-Lockeans discuss about the problem of personal  
________________________ 
87 For an excellent discussion on thought experiments quite in general (see Sorensen 1992; Horowitz, 
and Massey, eds. 1991; Brown and Fehige 2008). For thought experiments in natural science (see Brown 
2011). For thought experiments in philosophy (see Rescher 2005; Haggvist 1996).  
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identity. In this case, the problems I had located in Locke’s own account of the ontology of 
persons (see again chapter two § 2.2 C), equally afflict the modern-day neo-Lockeans’ 
account of the ontology of persons. I will take up this discussion in chapter five.   
 
4.1 Thought Experiments in the Neo-Lockean Tradition  
What is distinctive about the neo-Lockean tradition is that, not only is it currently the most 
popular approach in personal identity debates, but it is also the most pro-thought 
experiment tradition (Rovane 1998: 35). Of course, the non neo-Lockeans also appeal to 
puzzle cases in debating the problem of personal identity. But when the non neo-Lockeans 
do that, as we shall see, their discussion is often framed in terms of a response given against 
the neo-Lockeans’ view of the Psychological Criterion for personal identity (see e.g., Olson 
1997: Ch. 3; Williams 1973: Chs. 2-4). So in this case, the neo-Lockeans are primarily 
responsible for the discussions often generated in the literature. No doubt that the neo-
Lockeans drew their inspiration to appeal to puzzle cases from Locke’s ‘the prince and the 
cobbler’ thought experiment. As we saw in chapter two, this thought experiment focuses on 
the consequence of “soul swap” for the identity of persons. That is, if the soul of the prince 
enters the body of the cobbler and vice versa, then the prince will be identified with the 
cobbler’s body and ditto for the cobbler. This means that given Locke’s view, “a person goes 
wherever his/her soul goes”. Of course, this does not mean that for Locke, a person is a 
soul; rather the soul is a bearer of a person (see again chapter two). Although the neo-
Lockeans do not follow Locke in embracing the notion of the soul, as we shall see, they 
make a similar Lockean point by substituting the “soul swap” scenario for a “brain swap” 
scenario.  
 
In this case, the neo-Lockeans’ focus on well-known cases of brain transplant, scattered 
existence (i.e., brain stored in a vat), bionic replacement, teletransportation, fission and the 
like (see e.g., Garrett 1998: 16-17; Shoemaker 1984: Part Two; Parfit 1984: Part Three; also 
see Shoemaker 1963: 22-25). That said, however, unlike his modern day followers, Locke 
himself did not give a prominent place for thought experiments. His brief discussion of the 
prince and the cobbler thought experiment was not meant to set a methodology proper for 
how to think about the problem of personal identity. As we saw in chapter two in § 2.2 A, 
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Locke himself opened his discussion of personal identity with the Aristotelian Question. But 
as we shall see, the neo-Lockeans do not seem to have learned this crucial lesson from 
Locke.  
 
4.2 What are Thought Experiments?  
Philosophers describe the key features of thought experiments in philosophy by using 
various terms and expressions. For example, Williamson calls them “the armchair methods,” 
(2007: 179). Brown and Fehige call them, “devices of the imagination,” (1996/2014). 
Robinson describes them as, “tools” employed in conceptual analysis (2004: 537). Sorensen 
compares them to “compasses” used for determining direction (1992: 288). However, as 
they stand, these expressions are not informative enough in telling us about how the 
methodology of thought experiments work. In this case, in her famous book entitled Real 
People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Wilkes explains the central idea 
behind the thought-experimental method as follows:  
Suppose that we want to test a claim made by some scientific theory (and hence to 
test the theory); suppose we want to see what might follow if certain theoretical 
claims were true; suppose we want to examine the range and scope of a concept. It 
may be appropriate, in all these different domains, to ask a ‘what if…?’ question. 
Such a question typically postulates an imaginary state of affairs, something that 
does not in fact happen in the real world. …By such means…we may, perhaps, get a 
weaker or stronger reason for thinking a scientific claim to be true or false; for 
claiming a discovery about the limitations and scope of one of our everyday 
concepts (1988: 2).  
 
Although Wilkes’s characterization of the methodology of thought experiments focuses on a 
scientific theory, her remarks are equally applicable to thought experiments in philosophy. 
Philosophers also appeal to imaginary cases to see what might follow if certain imaginary 
state of affairs were true. They ask questions such as "Would it be the same F if p?” where p 
states some sort of science fiction scenario (Robinson 2004: 537). Philosophers attempt to 
answer such questions on the basis of the sort of responses evoked by imaginary cases, in 
light of which they also attempt to show the limitations and scope of our everyday 
concepts/beliefs concerning a particular issue. For example, as Gendler remarks:   
By presenting content in a suitably concrete or abstract way, thought experiments… 
evoke responses that run counter to those evoked by alternative presentations of 
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relevantly similar content. But exactly because of this, the responses they evoke may 
well remain in disequilibrium with responses evoked in alternative ways. When 
thought experiments succeed as devices of persuasion, it is because the evoked 
response becomes dominant, so that the subject comes (either reflectively or 
unreflectively) to represent relevant non-thought experimental content in light of 
the thought experimental conclusion (2007: 86).  
 
As Gendler sees it, thought experiments evoke responses that would eventually lead one to 
embrace a certain conclusion regarding a particular issue. In this case, most personal 
identity theorists take Gendler’s remarks on board, since they too believe that imaginary 
cases are used to elicit responses. For example, in this case, one of the most popular and 
influential imaginary cases in personal identity literature is Parfit’s Teletransporter. Parfit 
opens his discussion on personal identity with the Teletransporter thought experiment 
(1984: Ch. 10). Parfit’s imaginary story has two parts. In the first part, Parfit’s remarks:  
I enter the Teletransporter. I have been to Mars before, but only by the old method, 
a space-ship journey taking several weeks. This machine will send me at the speed of 
light. I merely have to press the green button. Like others, I am nervous. Will it 
work? I remind myself what I have been told to expect. When I press the button, I 
shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a moment later. In fact I 
shall have been unconsciousness for about an hour. The Scanner here on Earth will 
destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact states of all of my cells. It will 
then transmit this information by radio. Travelling at the speed of light, the message 
will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. This will then create, out of 
new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine…Examining my new body, I find no 
change at all. Even the cut on my upper lip, from this morning’s shave, is still there 
(1984: 199).  
 
In the second part, Parfit remarks:  
 
Several years pass, during which I am often teletransported. I am now back in the 
cubicle, ready for another trip to Mars. But this time, when I press the green button, 
I do not lose consciousness. There is a whirring sound, then silence. I leave the 
cubicle, and say to the attendant: ‘It’s not working. What did I do wrong?’ ‘It is not 
working,’ he replies, handing me a printed copy. This reads: ‘The New Scanner 
records your blueprint without destroying your brain and body….But it seems to be 
damaging the cardiac systems which it scans…though you will be quite healthy on 
Mars, here on Earth you must expect cardiac failure within the next few days…,’ 
(Ibid. 199-200).  
 
What do we make of Parfit’s imaginary story? Given the fanciful nature of the thought 
experiment, one could be tempted to dismiss it outright. But Parfit disagrees. This is 
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because since the imaginary story arouse in most of us strong beliefs, Parfit claims that one 
cannot be justified in dismissing it. For Parfit, these beliefs are not about our words; rather, 
they are about ourselves. Parfit claims that imaginary cases allow us to discover what is 
involved in our continued existence over time as the same people. That is, imaginary cases 
expose what we believe about the nature of personal identity over time (1984: 200). In light 
of this, in the first part of the imaginary story above, Parfit’s point is that even though the 
Scanner destroys one’s brain and body, out of the blueprint that is beamed to Mars, 
another machine makes one’s organic Replica (Ibid.). In the second part of the imaginary 
story, even though the Scanner does not destroy one’s body and brain, through the 
blueprint sent to Mars one’s Replica is produced. But after a little while, one will suffer 
cardiac arrest. But in such case, one’s Replica will take up one’s life where one leaves off 
(Ibid.). So after one’s death here on Earth, one’s life and that of one’s Replica overlap. Parfit 
calls this the “Branch-Line Case,” (Ibid. 201).  
 
Parfit’s imaginary story elicits different responses. For example, (i) some might take it to be 
the fastest way of travelling to Mars (Ibid. 200); (ii) another person might say that no human 
being could survive teletransportation (see e.g., Johnston 1987: 64); and (iii) Parfit’s own 
end goal is to convince his readers that, insofar as one takes having one’s Replica as good as 
ordinary survival, it remains entirely irrelevant to insist that “numerical identity is what 
matters in survival” (see e.g., Ibid. Chs. 11-12). But how should one adjudicate over the 
responses in (i)-(iii)? Notice that, of (i)-(iii), the most serious response is the one that is given 
in (iii). This is because, (iii) is not a simple response; rather it is a serious metaphysical claim 
about the state of one’s identity. But why should we think that the Teletransporter story is 
adequate enough to convince us to embrace (iii)? Why can’t one settle for (ii) instead? For 
reasons we shall see in § 4.2-4.4, establishing the responses elicited on the basis of thought 
experiments in philosophy will not be as straightforward as most philosophers often tend to 
think. As we shall see, in this regard, not everyone receives the conclusions that are based 
on imaginary stories with open arms.  
 
4.3 Contemporary Philosophers’ Attitude toward Thought Experiments 
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As Nozick once remarked, “so many puzzling examples have been put forth in recent 
discussions of personal identity that it is difficult to formulate, much less defend, any 
consistent view of identity and non-identity,” (1981: 29). In their essay entitled, “When are 
Thought Experiments Poor Ones?” Peijneburg and Atkinson also remark:  
One of the things that sets contemporary analytic philosophy apart from its older 
variant is its ample use of thought experiments. While early analytic philosophers 
like Russell, Ayer or Carnap seldom rely on this kind of hypothetical reasoning, 
modern ones like Jackson, Searle and Putnam do not eschew the most bizarre 
accounts of Zombies, swapped brains, exact Doppelgänger, and famous violinists 
who are plugged into another body (2003: 305).  
 
In light of Nozick-Peijneburg-Atkinson’s observations, one may wonder why contemporary 
philosophers put much emphasis on thought experiments.88 Whatever other reasons may 
also be, it is undeniable that the use of puzzle cases seems to be contemporary 
philosophers’ most preferred methodology. This is no less evident in personal identity 
literature. As I briefly pointed out in § 4.1, in the context of the contemporary personal 
identity debate, the challenge one often faces is that of showing what justifies one’s 
judgment of a particular puzzle case as being more truth revealer about personal identity 
compared to the other. This problem has not been explicitly acknowledged by most 
contemporary personal identity theorists. But those philosophers who understood the 
problem, suggest what seems for some to be a radical position (see e.g., Coleman 2000). In 
this case, for example, Wilkes argues why we should discuss personal identity without 
thought experiment (1988). This is because as Wilkes argues, thought experiments in 
philosophy suffer from what she calls the lack of the ‘background conditions.’ In explaining 
the background conditions, Wilkes remarks:  
The experimenter—any experimenter, in thought or in actuality—needs to give us 
the background conditions against which he sets his experiment. If he does not, the 
results of his experiment will be inconclusive. The reasons for this is simple and 
obvious: experiments, typically, set out to show what difference some factor makes; 
in order to test this, other relevant conditions must be held constant, and the  
 
________________________ 
88 In the context of personal identity discussions, the inspiration for emphasizing on thought 
experiment comes from Locke’s the cobbler and the prince soul-swap scenario. In this regard, most 
philosophers find the methodology of thought experiment liberating in a sense of giving them unrestricted 
ways to entertain various sorts of possibilities with respect to the ground of personal identity.     
  
138 
 
problematic factor juggled against that constant background. If several factors were 
fluctuating, then we would not know which of them (or which combinations of 
them) to hold responsible for the outcome (1988: 7; cf. Popper 1959: Appendix XI).  
 
Here Wilkes puts the bar very high for those who use thought experiments in philosophy. 
Philosophers cannot meet the background conditions in constructing their thought 
experiments in anything like the way Wilkes requires. This is because, as we saw earlier, 
philosophical thought experiments are “armchair methods,” (Williamson 2007: 179). 
However, despite being armchair methods, as Williamson further remarks, “much of the 
philosophical community allows that a judicial act of imagination can refute a previously 
well-supported theory (Ibid.). At this point, it is not hard to see that there is a difference 
between scientific thought experiments and philosophical thought experiments (see e.g., 
Peijneburg and Atkinson 2003). In this case, Wilkes’s remarks are more fitting in the context 
of scientific thought experiments. This is because, her remarks are more applicable to 
experiments done in the lab.  
 
At this point, some philosophers may claim that they should be left alone to use any 
thought experiment in any way they like, since they are not doing scientific experiment (cf. 
Schlesinger 1993: 97). But Wilkes disagrees. Whether or not they are scientific or 
philosophical, Wilkes argues that all thought experiments must satisfy the background 
conditions. That means that philosophical thought experiments cannot be let off the hook. 
Wilkes defends this point by using a popular thought experiment of ‘persons splitting like 
amoebae’ or what is known as a fission thought experiment. Wilkes argues that for this 
thought experiment to work, the relevant background information must be specified. As 
Wilkes remarks:  
It is obviously and essentially relevant to the purpose of this thought experiment to 
know such things as: how often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable and 
sometimes not, like dying? Can it be induced, or prevented? Just as obviously, the 
background society, against which we set the phenomenon, is now mysterious. Does 
it have such institutions as marriage? How would that work? Or universities? It 
would be difficult, to say the least, if universities doubled the size every few days, or 
weeks, or years. Are pregnant women debarred from splitting? The entire 
background here is incomprehensible. When we ask what we would say if this 
happened, who, now, are ‘we’? (Ibid. 11).  
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To my knowledge, no contemporary personal identity theorist provided the sort of 
background information Wilkes’s requires for the fission thought experiment (see e.g., 
Parfit 1971: 3-27; Merricks 1997: 163-186; Garrett 1998: Ch. 4; Martin 1998: 13-15, Chs. 2-
3). Philosophers who take the fission thought experiment seriously claim that it reveals our 
deep-seated beliefs about what matters in survival. For example, Garrett remarks, “it 
shows, that the identity of a person can be extrinsically grounded. That is, the identity of a 
person may be fixed by the existence of another, causally unrelated, person,” (1998: 58). 
Here Garrett seems to be echoing Nozick’s, ‘the closest continuer theory.’ Nozick claims 
that the closet continuer view presents a necessary condition for identity (1981: 34). As 
Nozick explains, “something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x’s closest 
continuer. And “closest” means closer than all others; if two things at t2 tie in closeness to x 
at t1, then neither is the same entity as x,” (Ibid.). In this regard, in chapter five, I will briefly 
discuss Parfit’s and Lewis’s exchange on the implications of a fission thought experiment for 
numerical identity over time (see e.g., Parfit 1971; Parfit in Rorty 1976: IV; Lewis in Rorty 
1976: I). But if one sides with Wilkes and takes her requirement for background condition 
seriously, then it would be very difficult to see the basis for endorsing a highly 
counterintuitive proposal about a person’s identity being extrinsically grounded. If the very 
thought experiment itself is severely under-described, what compelling reason will there be 
for one to embrace it?  
However, Garrett argues that thought experiments help us to solve the problem of ordinary 
identity judgments. For example, Garrett claims that when we judge that the speaker 
before us now is identical to the speaker who began speaking two hours ago, we typically 
make this judgment of identity under optimal conditions. This is because, as Garrett points 
out, we can observe that the earlier person is both physically as well as psychologically 
continuous with the later person. In this everyday case, our basis for our judgment of 
identity is the obtaining of both physical and psychological continuities. However, Garrett 
says that our ordinary judgments of identity will not help us to determine which continuity 
(i.e., the body or the brain) is central to the identity of a person over time (1998: 14). To 
determine this matter, Garrett suggests that we must consider thought experiments, where 
these continuities come apart. Although the thought experiments we use may be 
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technically impossible (even may always be so), Garrett claims that there is no reason to 
think that most popular thought experiments in personal identity literature are physically 
impossible, in a sense that they are inconsistent with the laws of nature. In this case, 
Garrett discusses thought experiments such as brain transplant, teletransportation, 
scattered existence (i.e., brain in a vat), bionic replacement, fission, indeterminacy and 
others (1998: 15-17). Garret claims that none of the above thought experiments is logically 
impossible (Ibid. 17).  
Of course, it could well be argued that thought experiments are suggestive of various sorts 
of possibilities with respect to some states of affairs. In this case, four types of possibilities 
are commonly discussed in the literature. For example, in their Conceivability and 
Possibility, Gendler and Hawthorne explain these possibilities as follows: The first possibility 
is epistemic that takes the form, ‘‘for all I know, thus-and-such obtains.’’ The second 
possibility is nomological. That is to say that if P is said to be nomologically possible, then P 
must be consistent with the body of truths expressed by those laws—whether those be the 
laws of physics, biology or otherwise. The third possibility is logical. For example, P is said to 
be logically possible, if P does not violate the standard rules of logical inference. The fourth 
possibility is metaphysical, which is taken to be the most fundamental conception of 
possibility. This is often expressed by using locutions such as ‘how things might have been,’ 
(2002: 3-5).  
Of the four types of possibility above, the various puzzle cases used in personal identity 
debate are often linked to logical/metaphysical possibility. Once the notion of possibility is 
invoked, the notion of conceivability naturally follows. For example, Chalmers in his well-
known essay entitled, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” points out that it is a 
common practice in philosophy to use a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is 
possible and what is necessary, and in doing so to draw conclusions about matters of 
substantive metaphysics. Chalmers further points out that arguments like this proceed in 
three steps: (i) one begins with an epistemic claim regarding what can be known or 
conceived; (ii) from there to a modal claim regarding what is possible or necessary; and (iii) 
from there to a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of things in the world (in Gendler 
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and Hawthorne 2002: 145). In this regard, as Chalmers claims, the methodology of 
conceivability plays a central role (Ibid. 146).  
Chalmers claims that if one argues that some states of affairs are conceivable, then one can 
conclude that the conceived states of affairs are possible. For Chalmers, the kind of 
possibility invoked here is metaphysical possibility, as opposed to physical possibility, 
natural possibility, or other sorts of possibility (Ibid.). In light of this, for Chalmers, the idea 
that conceivability can act as a guide to metaphysical possibility is not an implausible idea. 
However, Chalmers claims that to argue that conceivability entails physical or natural 
possibility is clearly implausible. For example, Chalmers claims that it seems conceivable 
that a particular object could travel faster than a billion meters per second. Yet this 
hypothesis is hardly physically and naturally possible, since it contradicts the laws of physics 
and the laws of nature. But if we suppose a metaphysically possible world with different 
laws, then such a hypothesis would be possible. This is a world, say for example, God might 
have created, if he had so chosen. If such a world had been created, then an object’s 
travelling faster than a billion meters per second would have been possible. So in this case, 
Chalmers concludes that despite the fact that conceivability does not mirror natural 
possibility, it certainly mirrors metaphysical possibility (Ibid.). Chalmers’s essay discusses the 
relation between conceivability and possibility at great length; but for present purposes the 
details do not matter (see further Ibid. 145-200).   
Having said that, Chalmers’s ‘conceivability entails possibility’ proposal will have its own 
drawbacks, if it is seen from the standpoint of the personal identity debate. But as we shall 
see in § 4.4, one of the drawbacks of appealing to conceivability as a guide to possibility has 
to do with the fact that it encourages the use of puzzle cases without constraint. Moreover, 
even if it could be said that, say for example, P is conceivable, it could also be argued that 
P’s conceivability does not guarantee necessarily its actual possibility. Here following Bealer, 
we could ask: “Why should your conceiving that P provide you with evidence that P is 
possible?” (in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 76). As we shall see in chapter five, how one 
answers this question will have significant bearing on how one sees the role of various 
puzzle cases often invoked in personal identity debates.  
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Some philosophers like Schlesinger argue that, even if thought experiments may have some 
constraints placed on them in science, no such constraints are required in metaphysics 
(1983: 97). I disagree with Schlesinger’s claim. As I will argue in § 4.4, my view is that 
thought experiments must be utilized under some form of reasonable constraint. At this 
point, it may be asked, what counts as a reasonable constraint. Again in this chapter, it is 
not my goal to suggest any criterion by way of answering this question. However, in light of 
the three conditions I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely the Role 
Condition, the Constraint Condition and the Priority Condition, I will make my own 
suggestions concerning how thought experiments should be used. I will take up this task in 
§ 4.5. But before I do that, in § 4.4 I will briefly discuss the notion of intuition.   
 
4.4 Intuition and Thought Experiments  
Garrett claims that one of the criticisms often raised against the use of thought experiments 
has to do with appealing to intuitions. As Garrett points out, it has been claimed that we 
should not take our intuitions about thought experiments as guides to philosophical truth, 
since such intuitions may be prejudiced and unreliable (1998: 14). Notice that Garrett’s 
remarks presuppose that intuitions can be guides to philosophical truth. Before we examine 
Garrett’s claim, it will be helpful to understand what intuitions are. Goldman claims that, 
when philosophers attempt to decide the concept of something, say of, identity, they often 
consider actual and hypothetical examples. In doing so, they ask whether these examples 
provide instances of the target category or concept (2007: 1). The mental responses people 
give to these examples can be called, “intuitions” (Ibid.). Goldman further notes that these 
intuitions can be used as evidence for the correct answer (Ibid.). Bealer also characterizes 
intuition as follows: 
Intuition is the source of all a priori knowledge—except, of course, for that which is 
merely stipulative. The use of intuitions as evidence (reasons) is ubiquitous in our 
standard justificatory practices in the a priori disciplines—Gettier intuitions, twin-
earth intuitions, transitivity intuitions, etc. By intuitions here, we mean seemings: for 
you to have an intuition that A is just for it to seem to you that A. Of course, this kind 
of seeming is intellectual, not experiential—sensory, introspective, imaginative. 
Typically, the contents of intellectual and experiential seeming cannot overlap. You 
can intuit that there could be infinitely many marbles, but such a thing cannot seem 
experientially (say, imaginatively) to be so. Intuition and imagination are in this way 
distinct (Bealer in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 73). 
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Although Bealer construes intuitions using the language of ‘seemings,’ for him such 
seemings are not phenomenological. That is, when someone intuits something, he/she does 
not have an experience of what it is like to intuit that particular thing. In this sense, 
intuitions are not experience based. Rather we come to have certain intuitions on the basis 
of grasping something purely on an intellectual basis. However, it is not entirely clear to me 
whether Bealer’s characterization exhausts all that there is to intuitions. At least, in the 
context of the personal identity debate, philosophers often seem to take intuitions as 
judgments one makes concerning the possibility or impossibility of some states of affairs. In 
this case, my own understanding of the notion of intuition goes along with Goldman’s 
characterization of “intuitions” above. More specifically, we can also take intuitions in the 
words of Van Inwagen as “our beliefs,” (1990: 169). If we adopt Van Inwagen’s suggestion, 
then contra Bealer, the beliefs we hold about something, in this case, personal identity 
cannot be divorced entirely from experience. Taken this way, intuitions can also be taken to 
be person-relative, that is to say that they are not universal. In my view, that is why 
different people react differently to thought experiments such as Parfit’s Teletransporter.  
 
If this is true, then the question remains. Can we settle a particular debate that is elicited on 
the basis of thought experiments by appealing to our intuitions? The answer for this 
question seems to be far from clear. Suppose that Parfit and I engage in a heated debate 
over the merit of the Teletransporter in settling the question of whether or not numerical 
identity is what matters in survival. As it stands, this question is still divisive among 
contemporary philosophers (see e.g., Sosa 1990: 297-322; Johnston in Dancy 1997: Ch. 8). 
Most (if not all) philosophers still struggle to accept Parfit’s conclusion about whether or not 
identity matters in survival. Suppose that I am among those philosophers who struggle to 
embrace Parfit’s conclusion. How are we going to settle the debate between Parfit and 
myself? My own view is that the disagreement between Parfit and myself would be 
irresolvable. The reason is that there does not seem to be any principled way to show 
whether my intuition is superior to that of Parfit’s and vice versa.  
 
In saying this, however, I am not implying that there is no fact of the matter as to whose 
intuition is right. There may be. But how can we tell? Since intuitions seem to be person-
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relative, it seems hard to see how merely rooting them in puzzle cases will do the kind of 
job some personal identity theorists like Parfit hope they do. My point is that intuitions can 
go either way. That is to say that any given two persons’ intuitions with respect to a certain 
thought experiment could be different. For example, Swinburne defends the simple view of 
personal identity by appealing to the brain hemisphere transplant puzzle case, in light of 
which he attempts to show why neither the continuity of a mental life nor a bodily 
constitution is necessary for personal identity (see e.g., Swinburne in Gasser and Stefan 
2012: Ch. 5). On the other hand, Salmon defends a brain based view of personal identity by 
appealing to a brain swap thought experiment, in light of which he attempts to show why 
neither the body nor the psychology is necessary for personal identity (see e.g., Salmon 
2006: Ch. 11; see also Van Inwagen 1990: 169; Williams 1973: Ch. 4). This is one reason why 
it is exceedingly difficult to resolve controversies in personal identity discussions. If this is 
correct, then Garrett’s earlier claim that intuitions are guides to philosophical truth cannot 
be taken without qualification.   
 
4.5 What to do then?  
The more thought experiments are fanciful in their nature, the bigger the chances are for 
diverse intuitions to be elicited. So to narrow the gap between diverse intuitions, we need 
to come up with the sorts of thought experiments that are in some sense close to our 
experience of the world around us as well as other fellow humans. In such cases, the 
chances for thought experiments to elicit positive intuition will most likely increase. 
Suppose that I ask someone to imagine flying cars. Suppose further that this person has 
seen airplanes flying in the sky but has never seen cars flying like airplanes. In such cases, it 
seems reasonable to say that even if this person has never seen flying cars before, just from 
his exposure to flying airplanes, he/she is well equipped to make sense of the possibility of 
flying cars. As this analogy shows, the gap for this person has already been narrowed to 
make sense of the possibility of flying cars, despite having never seen such a thing before. 
Here the possibility I am talking about is physical possibility. In this case, for example, we 
can recombine the ideas of flying that we find in planes and being a vehicle, and substitute 
the plane shape for the car shape. How the details work out here, of course, is something 
that those with specialty in Aerospace Engineering can tell us about.  
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Of course, I am not implying here that every thought experiment has to be set up in a way I 
am suggesting. But as a general principle, thought experiments must in some sense either 
be grounded in experience or at least have some kind of proximity to our experience of the 
world. To make sense of all this, I will now briefly explain the three conditions that I had 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter. My goal in introducing these conditions is to 
show in what way thought experiments must be used in personal identity discussions. That 
is to say that, to get a maximum benefit from the use of thought experiments in personal 
identity discussions, at least the following three conditions must be satisfied, namely the 
Role Condition, the Constraint Condition, and the Priority Condition. That said, I must stress 
that in proposing these conditions, I am not attempting to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the use of the methodology of thought experiments. Rather the conditions 
must be taken only as suggestions that I am making which, if practiced consistently, could 
help us think in a more effective way about the problem of personal identity.   
 
1. The Role Condition. Given this condition, thought experiments in personal identity 
discussions must be used as illustrative devices. That means that we should resist the 
temptation of crafting thought experiments to make them yield the result we want. Rather, 
the metaphysical conclusion we reach about the nature of personal identity must be rooted 
in independent arguments we provide in support of it. In that case, we must make sure that 
we are using thought experiment only to help us clarify or add emphasis to our arguments 
(cf. Sorensen 1992: 15). If we grant this, then thought experiments must not be used to set 
the terms of the debate for personal identity discussions. In light of this, it remains unclear 
whether this is a kind of role Parfit’s Teletransporter plays. My skepticism in this regard 
arises from the fact that once we accept Parfit’s thought experiment, we will be forced to 
embrace a serious metaphysical assumption that Parfit advocates, which is that ‘identity is 
not what matters in survival.’ The question remains: Are we supposed to accept the 
metaphysical conclusion that identity is not what matters in survival because of the 
Teletransporter scenario or is there an independent reason that forces us to embrace it? It 
is not clear to me how in which of these senses we should understand the role of Parfit’s 
Teletransporter (cf. Gendler 2002: 34-53; Baillie 1993: Ch. 5). As we shall see in chapter five, 
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the same question can be raised regarding other popular thought experiments in personal 
identity literature.  
2. The Constraint Condition. Given this condition, thought experiments in personal identity 
discussions must be rooted in experience in one of the following senses: (i) directly 
grounded in experience, that is thought experiments that are physically possible in various 
circumstances; (ii) have some proximity to experience, that is to say that thought 
experiments that are indirectly related to a lived experience; and (iii) drawn from 
observations made based on actual cases. For present purposes, there is no need to 
advance a detailed discussion on (i)-(iii). One example here that best sums up (i)-(iii) is 
Edmund Gettier’s famous thought experiment (1963). One thing that is distinctive about 
Gettier’s case is that it is very much linked to what can actually happen, in fact often 
happens, to most us in real life. On many occasions we might have formed a false belief 
about a particular matter, without knowing that the belief we held at the time was false. Yet 
we were justified in those occasions until the real facts came to light, in light of which we 
had to revise our beliefs. So Gettier’s case, is not something that is removed from our own 
experience. In light of this, the point of the Constraint Condition is that we should not 
conjure up any scenario we like in thinking about personal identity. Again seen in this way, 
Parfit’s Teletransporter is far removed from anything we know in our experience. Hence, it 
is hard to see its merit in shaping in any positive way how we should think about personal 
identity. So as Brown and Fehige remark, “It seems right to demand that they also be 
visualized (or perhaps smelled, tasted, heard, touched); there should be something 
experimental about a thought experiment,” (1996/2014). 
3. The Priority Condition. Given this condition, thought experiments in personal identity 
discussions must not be given a chance to set the terms of the debate. What this means is 
that discussions about personal identity must begin with what I called the Aristotelian 
Question. In the literature on personal identity, it is common to see philosophers (as we saw 
in the case of Parfit), opening their discussion with science fiction puzzle cases and spend 
the rest of their time trying to work out their implications (see e.g., Perry 1972, 2002: Ch. 3; 
Salmon 2006: Ch.11). But this approach is deeply problematic, for all the reasons we saw in 
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the earlier sections. So in this thesis, I continue to insist that thought experiments must not 
be let to take the place of the Aristotelian Question. So the point of the Priority Condition is 
that in personal identity discussions, thought experiments must not be given the driver’s 
seat.  
 
Having discussed what thought experiments are and also how they should be used in 
personal identity discussions, I now turn to chapter five where, among other things, I will 
argue that the place of substance ontology for personal identity on the one hand, and the 
self/person on the other hand, should be reconsidered. However, as we shall see, unduly 
emphasis on thought experiments continues to eclipse the centrality of substance ontology 
for personal identity. In this regard, the problems I pointed out in this chapter with respect 
to the use of thought experiment again will surface in the way philosophers attempt to 
establish personal identity without making reference to substance ontology.  
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Chapter five  
 
Substance and Substantial-Self/Person Question in Contemporary Personal identity 
Debates 
 
As we recall, in chapter one in § 1.2, I identified the central issue in the contemporary 
personal identity debate as having to do with what Martin and Barresi described as the 
traditional question. This is the question that concerns itself with providing a necessary and 
sufficient condition for diachronic personal identity. Formally described, the traditional 
question can be stated in terms of the Lowe-Olson-Hudson schemata according to which, 
necessarily, if X is a human person at time t1 and Y exists at another time t2, X=Y, if and only 
if_____ (see again chapter one §§ 1.2.1 and 1.2.2). Since Locke first formulated the problem 
of diachronic personal identity (see e.g., chapter two), contemporary analytic philosophers’ 
effort since the 1970s has been attempting to fill out the biconditional at the end of the 
above schemata. Here the most popular methodology philosophers employ is thought 
experiments. In this chapter, as we shall see, the methodology of thought experiments is 
closely related to solutions philosophers propose to the problem of the criterion of identity. 
In this case, the former often provides philosophers with a way to think about various sorts 
of scenarios (often drawn from science fiction) which are deemed helpful in establishing the 
criterion of identity. In light of this, our discussion of thought experiments in chapter four 
nicely fits into the present discussion.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, my discussion will focus on the neo-Lockeans’ response to 
the famous Butler-Reid objections against Locke’s Memory Criterion. In the second part, I 
will mainly focus on the use of puzzle cases and their relation to the criterion of personal 
identity. In this chapter, my main goal is to argue that contemporary philosophers’ undue 
emphasis on thought experiments and the criterion of personal identity has only 
contributed to the present stalemate in contemporary personal identity debates. Most of 
all, in this chapter, I will argue that the imbalanced emphasis put on the above two aspects 
is also to blame for the negligence of the proper subject matter in contemporary personal 
identity discussions. Here by proper subject matter, I mean the ‘Aristotelian Question’ or 
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what I introduced in chapter one as the central question of this thesis, i.e., the substantial-
self/person question. As we recall, the substantial-self/person question concerns with 
whether or not the self/person is a substance. My own answer to this question, as I 
explained in chapter one (see again § 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.4) is affirmative. But my defence of 
this affirmative answer will wait until I get to chapter seven. That said, ultimately, in this 
chapter I want to show why Shoemaker’s observation about the contemporary 
philosophers’ negligence of the substantial-self/person question is justified (see § 1.1). But 
here in saying that Shoemaker’s observation is justified, I do not mean to condone such 
negligence itself, but only the accuracy of the observation. To remind ourselves once again, 
Shoemaker’s observation was that nowadays the question of whether the self is a 
substance and whether personal identity over time requires a substance, has a musty smell 
to it. Despite the centrality of the question in discussions of personal identity in Locke, 
Butler, Hume, and Reid, it has not been the central question in contemporary discussions of 
personal identity. As I pointed out in chapter one, Shoemaker’s observation is indicative of 
three distinct, but interrelated issues that need to be examined carefully. These are: (i) the 
rejection of the substantial-self for personal identity over time; (ii) the rejection of the 
centrality of the substantial-self question for personal identity; and (iii) the absence of the 
substantial-self question from most discussions of personal identity, respectively.  
As we saw in chapter two, Locke paved the way for (i) in rejecting the substantiality of the 
self/person. In light of our discussion of chapter two, I would say that Locke was also 
responsible in paving the way for (ii) despite allowing substance to play a central role in his 
theory of personal identity. But many philosophers claim that it was Hume who put the final 
nail on the coffin when it comes to (i) and (ii) (see e.g., John Searle 2004: 192; Kolak and 
Martin 1991: 165-167; cf. Kripke 1980: 155 footnote # 77). So given (i)-(ii), most 
contemporary philosophers feel entitled to endorsing (iii) above. It is also at this point that 
most contemporary philosophers retreat from serious discussion of the ontology of the self 
while keeping themselves busy with what are sometimes extremely confusing discussions 
involving thought experiments and the criterion of identity. In this chapter, I will pursue my 
point that there is no good reason to endorse (i)-(iii) above.   
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I contend that we have no other more plausible option than taking the ontology of the self 
seriously. Ultimately the discussion in this chapter is meant to prepare us for chapter six, 
where I will attempt to show why the naturalistic ontology that attempts to undermine the 
realist ontology of the self is far from a live option to adopt. In that chapter, we will also see 
how it is possible to engage in a sensible discussion of the ontology of the self/person 
without necessarily relying on science fiction scenarios. That said, my subsequent discussion 
in this chapter will be located within the current most influential approach taken to the 
problem of personal identity. This is the neo-Lockean view, which focuses mainly on the 
Psychological Criterion. 89   
 
5.1 The Psychological Criterion and Personal Identity  
The neo-Lockeans’ notion of the Psychological Criterion is a modified version of Locke’s 
Memory Criterion. As we saw in chapter two, for Locke, a person P is identical with 
himself/herself of a year ago or two weeks ago, etc., if he/she remembers the thoughts 
he/she had or the action he/she had done a week ago or a year ago, etc. This is often called 
‘experience-memory’ for personal identity (Parfit 1984: 205).  An ‘experience memory’ is a 
type of memory that is rooted in one’s first-person perspective. Taken this way, when one is 
said to remember something, this should be understood to mean that one remembers 
one’s own experiences and actions from one’s own first-person point of view. Or as Noonan 
__________________ 
89 For the contemporary neo-Lockeans psychological approach for personal identity over time, see 
e.g., Shoemaker (1970, 1984: 90, 1999, 1997); Perry (1972, 2002); Parfit (1971; 1984: Part III; 2012); Noonan 
(2003); Nozik (1981); Unger (1990: Ch. 5; 2000); Lewis (1976); Hudson (2001); Garret (1998); Johnston (1987). 
For the Physical/Somatic/Animalist approach, see e.g., Olson (1997; 2007); van Inwagen (1990: esp., Ch. 14); 
Snowdon in Christopher Gill (ed.) (1990: 83-107); Snowdon (2014); Ayers (1991: 278-292); William (1988); 
Mackie (1999); Wollheim (1984); Wiggins (1967; 1980); Williams (1956-7, 1970; 1973); Thomson in Dancy 
1997: 202-229). For the constitution view of persons and personal identity over time, see Baker (2000: Ch. 5). 
For the simple view approach, see e.g., Chisholm (1976); Merricks (1998: 106-124); Lowe (1996, 2008); 
Swinburne in Shoemaker & Swinburne (1984). For a more recent discussion on the Simple view approach see, 
Gasser and Stefan, eds., (2012). For a transcendental-Kantian approach, see e.g., Doepke (1996). For an 
agency based approach, see e.g., Rovane (1998). For a narrative approach see, e.g., Schechtman (1996; also 
see 2014); also cf. MacIntyre (2007, 1981: esp. Ch. 15); Taylor (1989; esp. Ch. 2); Ricoeur, trans., Blamey (1992: 
esp. Chs. 5-6); Carr (1986). For important anthologies on personal identity, see e.g., Perry (1975); Rorty (1976); 
Kolak and Martin (1991); Noonan (1993); Gasser and Stefan (2012); Martin and Barresi, eds., (2003). For 
discussions that focus on various aspects of personal identity, see e.g., http://philpapers.org/browse/theories-
of-personal-identity accessed May 10, 2014.  For comprehensive bibliography on work on identity over time, 
see e.g., Sider (2000: 81-89). For a comprehensive reference on identity and personal identity, see Gendler 
(2000).  
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remarks, in experience-memory, one reports one’s own experiences and actions in first 
person memory claims (1993: XIV). So in Locke’s view, if a person P2 at t2 and a person P1 at 
t1 are the same, then P2 is identical with P1 if and only if P2 and P1 satisfy the memory 
condition as described above. However, not everyone embraces Locke’s Memory Criterion 
for personal identity as stated above. In this regard, the objections of Locke’s earliest critics, 
Butler and Reid take centre stage.90 As we shall see, it is in light of the Butler-Reid 
objections that the neo-Lockeans modify Locke’s Memory Criterion.  
 
5.1.1. The Butler-Reid Objections and the Core Assumptions 91  
Although both Butler and Reid raised many objections92 against Locke’s Memory Criterion in 
the literature, two objections appear time and time again. Butler’s often cited objection 
concerns with the problem of circularity. As Butler put it:  
But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity 
to ourselves, yet, to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being 
the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done 
one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And 
one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity 
presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than 
knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes (In Perry 
1975: 100). 
 
Similarly, Reid’s often cited objection concerns with the problem of self-contradiction. Reid 
claims that given Locke’s criterion of personal identity, “a man may be, and at the same 
time not be, the person that did a particular action,” (in Perry 1975: 114; original emphasis). 
Here, Reid’s point is that Locke’s memory account for personal identity violates the 
transitivity relation—which is one of the properties of the logic of identity. Formally, it can 
be expressed as follows: (∀x) (∀y) (∀z) [(x=y & y=z) → (x=z)], (i.e., for all X, for all Y, for all Z,  
___________________ 
90 At this point, it may be asked why these objections have not already been discussed in chapter two, 
where Locke’s theory of personal identity was discussed. I delayed this discussion until now because its 
relevance is more tied to the neo-Lockeans’ attempt to modify Locke’s Memory Criterion.   
91 Also see Leibniz’s criticisms of Locke’s memory criterion, see The New Essays Concerning 
Understanding (1981; see also Noonan 2003: Ch. 4).  
92 See e.g., Butler in Perry (1975: Ch. 5). This section is taken from Butler’s the First Dissertation to The 
Analogy of Religion, London, MDCCXXXVI, (1736: 301-308). Also see Reid in Perry (1975: Chs. 6 and 7). This 
section is taken from chapter four of Ried’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785).  
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if X is identical to Y and Y is identical to Z, then X is identical to Z). So how does Locke’s 
memory account violate the transitivity relation? Reid explains it as follows:  
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for 
robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first 
campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, 
which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he 
was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a 
general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost 
the consciousness of his flogging (Ibid. 114). 
 
In light of this example, Reid further remarks: 
From Mr. Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same 
person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the 
same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any 
truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged 
at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his 
flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not the person 
who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the 
same person with him who was flogged at school (Ibid. 114-115). 
 
Before we look at the neo-Lockeans’ response to the Butler-Reid Objections as stated 
above, it is important to keep in mind that both Butler and Reid embrace a substance-based 
account of personal identity. That is, both of them held that personal identity consists in the 
identity of substance (see e.g., Butler in Perry 1975: Ch. 5; Reid in Perry 1975: Chs. 6 and 7). 
In light of this, their conception of personal identity is rooted in three core assumptions:  
 
(1) The identity condition of a self/person is different from that of the identity condition of 
other things, such as trees. For example, Butler describes the difference by drawing a 
distinction between ‘strict and philosophical’ sense of the term ‘same’ (i.e., identity)—
applied to selves/persons on the one hand and ‘a loose and popular’ sense of the term 
‘same’—applied to other things such as trees, on the other hand. Butler argues that the 
identity we attribute to things like a tree should be taken in a loose sense, since such things 
constantly lose particles of matter that compose them. So Butler thought that at any given 
time, what we call a tree is not strictly speaking, a numerically one and the same tree that  
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persisted over time (in Perry 1975: 100-101).93 Along similar lines, Reid also claims that the 
identity of persons is perfect. By that he means that it admits of no degrees (Ibid. 111). But 
the identity we attribute to bodies, whether natural or artificial, is not perfect, even though 
for convenience of speech, we call identity. In explaining why he denies fixed identity for 
bodies, Reid claims that except in the case of persons, in all other cases, identity “admits of 
a great change of subject, providing the change be gradual; sometime, even of a total 
change…questions about the identity of a body are very often about words,” (Ibid. 112).   
 
(2) Personal identity over time strongly presupposes numerical identity. For example, Butler 
claims that, “by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty 
years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self,” (Ibid. 100). Similarly, Reid 
insightfully remarks:  
My personal identity…implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which 
I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and 
deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I 
am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts and suffers. My thoughts, and 
actions, and feelings, change every moment; they have no continued, but a 
successive, existence; but that self, or I, to which they belong, is permanent, and has 
the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions, and feelings which I call 
mine (Ibid. 109). 
 
(3) Personal identity is primitive in a sense that it is unanalysable in terms of more 
fundamental facts than itself. In other words, no necessary and sufficient conditions can be 
given for it. For example, Butler claims, “when it is asked wherein personal identity 
consists…all attempts to define, would but perplex it,” (Ibid. 99). Similarly, Reid claims that, 
“if you ask a definition of identity, I confess I can give none; it is too simple a notion to 
admit of logical definition,” (Ibid. 108).  
_____________ 
93 Butler does not elaborate on these distinctions in detail. A well-known contemporary defense of 
these distinctions is due to Chisolm. For example, in talking about the ‘loose sense of identity’ Chisolm claims  
that, “familiar physical things such as trees, ships…may be construed as presupposing that these things are 
‘fictions’, logical constructions or entia per alio. And it tells us that, from the fact that any such physical thing 
may be said to exist at a certain place P at a certain time t and also at a certain place Q at a certain other time 
t’, we may not infer that what exists at P at t is identical with what exists at Q at t’,” (1976: 97). With respect to 
strict identity, Chisolm remarks, “this may be construed as telling us that persons are not thus ‘fictions’, logical 
constructions or entia per alio. And so it implies that, if a person may be said to exist at a certain place P at a 
certain time t and also at a certain place Q at a certain other time t’, then we may infer that something 
existing at P at t is  identical with something existing at Q at t’,” (Ibid.).  
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I shall call (1)-(3) above together the Three Butler-Reid Assumptions. At this point, one could 
ask: how would Locke on the one hand and his modern day followers, the neo-Lockeans, on 
the other hand would react to the Three Butler-Reid Assumptions? In light of our discussion 
in chapter two, Locke would have no problem of endorsing (1), since in his view, different 
sortal terms (e.g., man, persons, animals) are associated with different criterion of identity. 
But Locke would disagree with both Butler and Reid, when they claim that the loss of a 
material composition of a certain object, say of, a tree would make it impossible for such an 
object to maintain its identity over time. As we recall, Locke maintains that the identity of 
living things such as a tree consists in the same life they partake as opposed to, in the 
changing material particles that compose them and contribute to the overall internal 
organization of that life (see again chapter two, footnote # 64; see also Shoemaker in 
Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984: Ch. 14). Locke would also have no hesitation to embrace 
(2), since in his view, despite the changing bearers of persons (i.e., substances), numerically 
the same person is meant to persist over time. However, Locke clearly does not endorse (3), 
since in his view, personal identity consists in the identity of consciousness. Yet regardless 
of such a key difference, as the hitherto brief discussion indicates, Locke seems to have 
some common ground with Butler’s and Reid’s conception of personal identity.    
 
On the other hand, the neo-Lockeans, as we shall see, are very much critical of the Three 
Butler-Reid Assumptions. To see this, we need to recall the distinction I discussed in chapter 
one between the complex views and the simple view (see § 1.2.2 C). As we recall, views that 
belong to the former category reject the notion that the identity of persons is different from 
the identity of other things, say of, trees. That means that for defenders of the complex 
view, a non-circular, non-trivial and informative constitutive criteria can be established for 
personal identity (see e.g., Shoemaker in Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 6; see also Noonan 
Ibid. Ch. 4). In this case, since the neo-Lockeans are defenders of the complex view, they do 
not embrace (1). Their rejection of (1) in turn, paves the way for their rejection of (3) as 
well. This is because, since according to the neo-Lockeans’ view, the identity condition of 
persons is not different from the identity condition of other things, personal identity is not a 
primitive or unanalysable fact.     
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Where does this leave (2) then? The neo-Lockeans do not take (2) at face value. Here a good 
case in point is Parfit’s famous argument that numerical identity is not what matters in 
survival (see e.g., 1984: Ch. 12). Along similar lines, Perry also argues that “neither identity, 
nor the belief in identity, nor even the imagining of identity, is necessary for identification,” 
(in Rorty 1976: 77). For reasons we shall see, both Parfit’s as well as Perry’s remarks about 
identity are far from convincing. That said, however, in rejecting to embrace (2) at face 
value, the neo-Lockeans, such as Parfit, Perry and others, are not denying Lewis’s dictum 
about self-identity, i.e., ‘nothing fails to be identical to itself’ (1986: 192-93). Rather, the 
neo-Lockeans’ point is that in certain puzzle cases (2) suffers from a problem of 
vagueness/indeterminacy. Here by ‘indeterminacy,’ it is meant to refer to states of affairs, 
such as “whether a certain object has or lacks a certain property. If neither of these is the 
case, then the state of affairs is indeterminate, and a sentence reporting it lacks truth-
value,” (Parsons 2000: X). For example, Perry illustrates such vagueness in personal identity 
by appealing to a puzzle case he calls, ‘‘brain-rejuvenation’’. As Perry puts it: 
Smith’s brain is diseased; a healthy duplicate of it is made, and put into Smith’s 
head. On the assumptions about the role of the brain usually made in these 
discussions, the survivor of this process will be just like a healthy Smith. But will he 
be Smith? It seems that people of good faith can differ over the answer to this 
question (and, if this case is not one that is truly indeterminate, it points in the 
direction in which such a case could be constructed) (in Rorty 1976: 68; for details 
see Perry 1972: 463-488).  
 
In light of such puzzle cases, the neo-Lockeans argue that, even if there is no indeterminacy 
in identity simpliciter, personal identity can be indeterminate (see e.g., Noonan in Gasser 
and Stefan 2012: 95-101). Moreover, personal identity theorists also defend the notion of 
vagueness in personal identity by responding to Evans’s famous argument against the idea 
of vague objects (see e.g., Evans 1978, Garrett 1998: Ch. 5; Tye 2003: 154-163). As Sorensen 
nicely sums up, the gist of Evans’s argument runs as follows:  
If there is a vague object, then some statement of the form ‘a = b’ must be vague 
(where each of the flanking singular terms precisely designates that object). For the 
vagueness is allegedly due to the object rather than its representation. But any 
statement of form ‘a = a’ is definitely true. Consequently, a has the property of 
being definitely identical to a. Since a = b, then b must also have the property of 
being definitely identical to a. Therefore ‘a = b’ must be definitely true!” (Sorensen 
2012: § 8).  
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But the neo-Lockeans could not accept Evans’s argument for the simple reason that given 
their relational view of personal identity, vagueness in personal identity is unavoidable. 
However, this will not be true if one approaches the issue of personal identity from a non 
neo-Lockean standpoint. This is what I will attempt to do in chapters seven and eight. That 
said, as we shall see in § 5.1.2, of the Three Butler-Reid Assumptions, the one that takes 
centre stage in the neo-Lockeans’ attempt to modify Locke’s Memory Criterion is (2). This is 
because, the two Butler-Reid Objections, namely the circularity and the self-contradiction 
(or ‘Brave Officer Paradox’)94 have direct bearing on (2).  
 
5.1.2 The Neo-Lockeans’ Response to the Butler-Reid Objections  
The neo-Lockeans’ strategy in responding to the Butler-Reid Objections can be analogously 
explained using Strawson’s famous distinction in his Individuals, between two approaches 
he calls: ‘descriptive metaphysics’ and ‘revisionary metaphysics.’ In the case of the former, 
Strawson tells us that one engages in describing the actual structure of our thought about 
the world. In the case of the latter, one’s aim is to produce a better structure (1959: 9). 
Similarly, the neo-Lockeans strategy in responding to the Butler-Reid Objections has been 
revisionary. That is to say that the neo-Lockeans’ focus is not on describing Locke’s Memory 
Criterion in its own terms, whether or not it faces the Butler-Reid type objections. Rather, as 
we shall see, what the neo-Lockeans strive to do is to revise Locke’s account of the Memory 
Criterion in such a way that it escapes the Butler-Reid type of objections. By taking such a 
revisionary manoeuvre, the neo-Lockeans may well be able to show that Locke’s theory of 
personal identity could escape or resist Butler-Reid type objections. Yet, as we shall see, it 
remains unclear whether or not Locke himself would endorse the neo-Lockeans’ revisionary 
analysis of his view of the Memory Criterion. For reasons we shall see, my own view is that 
Locke would have some serious hesitations to embrace the neo-Lockeans’ revisionary 
analysis of his Memory Criterion.  
 
Having said that, one of the ways the neo-Lockeans apply their revisionary analysis to  
___________________ 
94 The phrase ‘Brave Officer Paradox’ is commonly used in the literature (see e.g., Perry 2002: 86).  
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Locke’s Memory Criterion is by divesting (or in some way weakening) the first personal 
aspect of Locke’s experience memory. As indicated in § 5.1, by its very nature, ‘experience 
memory’ is first personal. That is to say that ‘experience-memory’ is often reported in first 
person memory claims (e.g., I remember breaking my leg two years ago). In the literature, 
‘experience-memory’ also goes by other labels, such as ‘episodic memory’, ‘biographical 
memory’, ‘direct memory’ and ‘personal memory’ (see e.g., Sutton 2010: § 1). This form of  
memory is distinguished from other forms of memory, such as (i) ‘procedural memory,’ 
which concerns with skill memory (e.g., I remember how to drive a car); and (ii) 
‘propositional memory’, which concerns with memory of facts (e.g., I remember that St. 
Augustine lived in 4th century A.D) (see further Sutton 2010). Among notable contemporary 
neo-Lockeans, who revised Locke’s Memory Criterion include, Grice (1941/1975), Quinton 
(1962/1975), Perry (1972, 2002; 1975), Shoemaker (1970, 2003, 1984: Part Two), Noonan 
(1989/2003), Parfit (1971; 1984); and Garrett (1998).  
 
As far as the neo-Lockeans’ response to the Butler-Reid Objections is concerned, Parfit’s 
revisionism is the most influential. So my subsequent discussion in this regard will focus 
mainly on Parfit’s approach. However, my goal, here, is not just to spell out the neo-
Lockeans’ position for its own sake. Rather my main interest is to reiterate the point I have 
been making up to now regarding the marginalization of the substantial-self/person 
question. As I tried to show in the previous chapters why there are no good reasons that 
justify the marginalization of the substantial-self/person question, I will advance a similar 
argument in discussing the neo-Lockeans’ view.    
 
A. Parfit’s Revisionism    
Parfit modifies Locke’s Memory Criterion by appealing to the concept of an overlapping 
chain of experience-memories. In Locke’s view, as we recall, what allows a person’s identity 
to hold over time is what Parfit calls, ‘direct memory connections’ (1984: 205; emphasis 
original). To use Parfit’s own example, we can say that there are direct memory connections 
between X today and Y twenty years ago, if X can now remember some of the experiences 
of Y twenty years ago. Taken this way, whenever there is a break in direct memory 
connections, given Locke’s theory, a person cannot persist over time. But as Parfit rightly 
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points out, if Locke’s view in this regard was true, then it would not be possible for a person 
to forget any of the things he/she once did or any of the experiences that he/she once had 
(Ibid.) But this seems to fly in the face of our experience, since we often forget the things 
that we did or experience in the past. But from this, it hardly seems to follow that we no 
longer exist as persons.95 In this case, the neo-Lockeans understandably claim that they 
have a good reason in seeking to amend Locke’s Memory Criterion. In this regard, Parfit’s 
initial revisionary step concerns with substituting Locke’s direct memory connection 
requirement, for what he calls, ‘‘continuity of memory”—i.e., between X now and Y twenty 
years ago,” (Ibid. emphasis original). One of the advantages of such a revised version of 
Memory Criterion is that it allows a person’s memory to have some gaps. This in turn would 
alleviate the worry Locke’s strict memory connection requirement raises for a person’s 
persistence over time (for reasons we already saw). Given Parfit’s modified ‘continuity of 
memory’ requirement, a person may not be able to remember some of the things he/she 
did or experience in the past. But as Parfit explains, “on the revised Locke’s view, some 
present person X is the same as some past person Y if there is between them continuity of 
memory,” (Ibid.). For Parfit, this revision is just one small step in the right direction. To make 
Locke’s view more defensible, additional revision must be done. In this case, Parfit remarks: 
We should…revise the view so that it appeals to other facts. Besides direct 
memories, there are several other kinds of direct psychological connections. One 
such connection is that which holds between an intention and the later act in which 
this intention is carried out. Other such direct connections are those which hold 
when a belief, or a desire, or any psychological feature, continues to be had (Ibid. 
205-206).   
 
Here Parfit’s point is that, since the domain of direct experience-memory is limited, we can  
___________________ 
95 In some sense, the experience-memory constraint that Locke puts on a person’s continued 
existence seems to echo Galen Strawson’s, the Pearle view of selves/persons. According to Strawson’s Pearle 
view, “a mental self exists at any given moment of consciousness or during, any uninterrupted or hiatus-free 
period of consciousness,” (in Martin and Barresi 2003: 360). But no less than Locke’s experience-memory 
view, Strawson’s Pearle view is also unsatisfying. This is because, there are many occasions a person may slip 
in and out of consciousness. In this case, an everyday ‘sleep’ routine is one of those occasions where a person 
becomes temporarily unconscious. Moreover, it is not uncommon to see because of an injury or medically 
induced situation, a person might become unconscious for a short or long period of time and regains his/her 
consciousness. In all such cases, it is perfectly plausible to say that a person who becomes temporarily 
unconscious is the very same person with a person who later regains his/her consciousness. This is the view 
that common-sense is on its side or so it seems to me.  
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expand it by incorporating psychological relations that hold between various mental states. 
In light of this, Parfit specifies the nature of the psychological relations he has in mind by 
drawing the following key distinction (Ibid. 206): 
 
(A) Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological 
connections (emphasis original).  
 
(B) Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness (emphasis original).  
The reason I described (A) and (B) as a key distinction is because it underlies the neo- 
Lockeans’ response to the Butler-Reid Objections. To see this, we need to recall the remark I 
made earlier regarding the nature of the neo-Lockeans’ revisionary analysis of Locke’s 
Memory Criterion. In this case, my remark was that one of the ways that the neo-Lockeans 
apply their revisionary analysis to Locke’s Memory Criterion is by divesting (or in some way 
weakening) the first personal aspect of Locke’s experience memory. The question remains: 
How does Parfit’s distinction in (A) and (B) above help the neo-Lockeans achieve that goal? 
To properly answer this question, first it is important to understand Parfit’s analysis of (A) 
and (B). Parfit claims that, of the two relations described in (A) and (B), connectedness is 
more important from the standpoint of both theory and practice. For Parfit, connectedness 
is a matter of degree. This means that between X at t2 and Y at t1, there might be thousands 
of direct psychological connections. What is needed for X at t2 and Y at t1 to be the same 
person, is the presence of enough direct psychological connections between them. Here 
one may ask, what counts as ‘enough’. Parfit’s response to this question is that, since 
connectedness is a matter of degree, no precise definition can be given for what counts as 
‘enough’. For Parfit, when there are enough direct psychological connections, there is what 
he calls ‘strong connectedness,’ (Ibid. 206).  
 
Notice that in (B), Parfit defines psychological continuity in terms of the notion of ‘strong 
connectedness.’ Put differently, Parfit collapsed (A) into (B), by stripping away from the 
former, the requirement for direct psychological connectedness. In doing so, Parfit seeks to 
show how the notion of continuity can be integrated with the notion of connectedness (cf. 
Noonan 2003: 54-55). Put this way, (B) allows a person to have some strong psychological 
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connections with his/her past, without at the same time, requiring such connections to be 
strong, all the way into the distant past. That is, (B) allows for some memory gaps in a 
person’s life, without putting his/her identity at stake. In this case, all that a person needs to 
have is strong connection to his/her immediate past. For example, following Parfit, I can say 
that, I am now strongly connected to myself a month ago, when I was strongly connected 
two months ago and so on. From this, it does not follow that I am strongly connected to 
myself fifteen years ago. As Parfit remarks,  
Between me now and myself twenty years ago there are many fewer than the 
number of direct psychological connections that hold over any day in the lives of 
nearly all adults. For example, while these adults have many memories of 
experiences that they had in the previous day, I have few memories of experiences 
that I had twenty years ago (Ibid.).  
 
In addition to allowing memory gaps in a person’s life, Parfit’s notion of strong 
connectedness as discussed so far, seems to have another advantage for the neo-Lockeans. 
For example, Parfit claims that since strong connectedness is a matter of degree, it is not a 
transitive relation. Since it is not a transitive relation, it cannot be the criterion of identity 
(Ibid.). At this point, the advantage for the neo-Lockeans seems to be that strong 
connectedness can be given as a response to Reid’s the Brave Officer Paradox. As we recall, 
Reid’s main objection against Locke’s criterion of personal identity concerns with its 
violation of the transitivity relation. By adopting Parfit’s notion of strong connectedness, the 
neo-Lockeans can claim that Reid’s objection can be diffused. For example, Noonan 
remarks: 
What is needed is just the distinction between connectedness of consciousness and 
continuity of consciousness, where continuity is defined in terms of connectedness 
by saying that a later person P2 at t2 has a consciousness which is continuous with 
that of an earlier person P1 at t1 just in case he is the last link in a chain of 
connecting persons beginning with P1 at t1, each of whom is conscious of the 
experiences and actions of the preceding link in the chain…a revision of Locke’s 
account which makes personal identity consist in continuity of consciousness is 
immune to…objections of Butler and Reid (Noonan 2003: 54-55; see also Perry 1975: 
Ch. 1).   
 
So based on Parfit’s account of strong connectedness, the neo-Lockeans might respond to 
Reid’s the Brave Officer Paradox, by saying that an officer who was flogged at school is 
strongly connected with the officer who took the standard now. The officer who took the 
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standard is strongly connected with the same person who was made a general. But the 
officer is not strongly connected to the same person who was flogged at school as a child. It 
does not follow that the general is strongly connected to the same person who was flogged 
at school. But despite the presence of such a memory gap, the officer remains identical with 
the person who was flogged at school as a child. Contra Reid, the neo-Lockeans may 
conclude that there seems to be no violation of the transitivity relation. So Reid’s self-
contradiction objection is non-existent.  
 
How does the hitherto Parfit’s revised version of Locke’s view fair against Butler’s circularity 
objection? Parfit claims that the revised version does not answer Butler’s objection. To see 
why this is the case, Parfit reminds us that, “The Psychological Criterion appeals, not to 
single memories, but to the continuity of memory, and, more broadly, to Relation R, which 
includes other kinds of psychological continuity,” (1984: 119). So Parfit claims that, on one 
interpretation, Butler’s objection could be put as follows:  
It is part of our concept of memory that we can remember only our own 
experiences. The continuity of memory therefore presupposes personal identity. The 
same is true of your Relation R. You claim that personal identity just consists in the 
holding of Relation R. This must be false if Relation R itself presupposes personal 
identity (Ibid. 220).  
 
Parfit answers this objection by using a technical notion, quasi-memory. This is the notion 
first introduced by Shoemaker, who states it as follows:  
We need to consider…whether there could be a kind of knowledge of past events 
such that someone’s having this sort of knowledge of an event does involve there 
being a correspondence between his present cognitive state and a past cognitive 
and sensory state that was of the event, but such that this correspondence, although 
otherwise just like that which exists in memory, does not necessarily involve that 
past state’s having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has the 
knowledge. Let us call such knowledge, supposing for the moment that it is possible, 
as “quasi-memory knowledge,” and let us say that a person who has this sort of 
knowledge of a past event “quasi-remembers” that event (2003: 24).   
 
Here the point is that quasi-remembering something leaves the identity of quasi-
rememberer unspecified. For example, Shoemaker characterizes the difference between 
quasi-remembering and remembering as follows, “whereas someone’s claim to remember a 
past event implies that he himself was aware of the event at the time of its occurrence, the 
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claim to quasi-remember a past event implies only that someone or other was aware of it,” 
(Ibid.). Parfit also remarks: 
I have an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if (1) I seem to remember 
having an experience, (2) someone did have this experience, and (3) my apparent 
memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on the past experience. On 
this definition, ordinary memories are a sub-class of quasi-memories. They are 
quasi-memories of our own past experience (1984: 220).  
 
Although it is not part of our normal experience to quasi-remember other people’s past 
experiences, Parfit argues for its possibility by appealing to neuro-surgeons at some point 
being able to develop ways to create in one brain a copy of a memory-trace in another 
brain. Parfit says that this might enable us to quasi-remember other people’s past 
experiences (Ibid.). In responding to Butler’s objection, Parfit remarks:  
My mental life consists of a series of varied experiences. These include countless 
quasi-memories and these earlier experiences. The connections between these 
quasi-memories and these earlier experiences overlap like the strands in a rope. 
There is strong connectedness of quasi-memory, if, over each day, the number of 
direct quasi-memory connections is at least half the number in most actual lives. 
Overlapping strands of strong connectedness provide continuity of quasi-
memory…Since the continuity of quasi-memory does not presuppose personal 
identity, it may be part of what constitutes personal identity (Ibid. 222). 96 
 
 
B. Locke’s Response to the Neo-Lockeans  
It would be helpful at this point, to step back and look at how Locke himself might have 
thought about the neo-Lockeans’ revisionism of his Memory Criterion. I already conceded 
______________________ 
96 But as Oderberg argues, it remains unclear whether quasi-memory is any less identity-presupposing 
notion compared to experience-memory, which it seeks to replace. For example, Oderberg, asks us to suppose 
that Jones is trying to establish whether it was smith he saw in Cornmarket two days ago. Jones tells Smith 
that he saw someone exactly resembles him walking down the street. At this point, Smith reaches out to his 
bank of quasi-memories to decide whether it was him whom Jones saw. Oderberg further asks us to suppose 
that Smith finds he has an apparent memory quasi-memory of his walking down Cornmarket at the specified 
time. Again Oderberg asks us to suppose that Smith is the person Jones saw. In this case, it is more reasonable 
to assume that Smith is the same person as the person Jones saw. This is because, among other things, Smith 
quasi-remembers doing what Jones claims to have seen him doing. Oderberg claims that quasi-memory might 
not presuppose the identity of the person who had the experience and also might not presuppose the identity 
of the person who has the apparent memory of it. However, as Oderberg points out, quasi-memory is still 
identity presupposing in the sense that, when there is identity, say of, as in the standard case, quasi-memory 
obtains precisely because there is identity (1993: 181-182). In light of such considerations, Parfit’s response to 
Butler’s circularity objection is far from decisive, to say the least. For other similar critical discussions on quasi-
memory, see Wiggins (2001: 212-225); Hamilton (2013: Ch. 2). For those who defend the notion of quasi-
memory, see e.g., Roache (2006). 
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that the neo-Lockeans’ revisionism might be one of the ways to show how Locke’s 
problematic Memory Criterion might be improved. But given my discussion of Locke’s view 
in chapter two, I have some serious doubts whether Locke would ever happily embrace his 
modern day followers, the neo-Lockeans’ revisionism of his Memory Criterion. We saw that 
the neo-Lockeans’ revisionism mainly targets on stripping away the first personal aspect of 
experience-memory. But Locke would never have settled for such a manoeuvre in order to 
save his view from the Butler-Reid type objections. This is because, for Locke, personal 
identity is first and foremost a practical matter; and only derivatively theoretical. This fact 
makes Locke’s approach to personal identity to be significantly different from his modern-
day followers, the neo-Lockeans’ approach. For the latter, personal identity is first and 
foremost a theoretical enterprise and derivatively a practical matter. For reasons we shall 
see, I even doubt that for some neo-Lockeans such as Parfit, personal identity is a practical 
matter at all. 
 
That said, for Locke, personal identity has to answer one fundamental question. That is: 
How will God’s distribution of reward or punishment in the future eschatological era be 
just? One receives just reward or punishment from God, if and only if, His justice is 
distributed to the right person. By the ‘right person,’ I mean the very same person who 
either deserves divine punishment or reward based on his/her own actions. But for this to 
happen, one must be able to remember what one had done or had experienced in the past. 
So Locke would not have embraced the neo-Lockeans’ suggestion that, numerical identity 
can be made to collapse into mere psychological continuity, without thereby assuming the 
very same person persisting all the way through (see e.g., Parfit 1984: Ch. 12). Such 
proposal would have sounded very strange to Locke’s ears. That is to say that Locke would 
not have entertained such a proposal seriously. If the observations I made in chapter two 
about Locke’s core view of personal identity are correct, then the neo-Lockeans are 
mistaken in thinking that their revisionism puts Locke’s view of Memory Criterion in a better 
light. I disagree! The truth is quite the contrary. As the hitherto discussion shows, the neo-
Lockeans and Locke stand far apart from each other when it comes to the necessity of 
remaining numerically the same person. For Locke, no one can replace a person’s identity. 
Moreover, for Locke, a Memory Criterion, is a cornerstone of his view of personal identity.  
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For example, Locke perfectly realizes that there could be a memory loss even beyond any 
hope of retrieving it. When that happens, Locke’s own preference is not to revise his 
Memory Criterion. Instead, Locke adamantly continues in maintaining that, in the case of a 
memory loss, the first person pronoun “I” will no longer refer to the same person; but only 
to the same man (see again chapter two). This shows that Locke is extremely serious when 
it comes to the Memory Criterion. A person’s identity necessarily consists in experience-
memory. Since we know that Locke’s Memory Criterion is problematic, what are we 
supposed to do then? My own suggestion is that we should allow Locke’s theory of person 
as well as his Memory Criterion to fail on its own ground (cf. Lowe 2005: 87-97). That is, 
what I attempted to do in chapter two. So contra the overwhelming majority of 
contemporary personal identity theorists,97 I hold that the Butler-Reid Objections are 
effective against Locke’s Memory Criterion. The neo-Lockeans cannot just assume that their 
modified version of Locke’s view, even if, granting that it is successful against the Butler-
Reid Objections, can be brought in to Locke’s aid.  
 
If the neo-Lockeans’ revisionism does not succeed in impressing Locke, does it succeed on 
its own ground as a viable theory of personal identity? This is the question I intend to 
explore in the next section.  
 
5.1.3 Puzzle Cases, Criterion of Personal Identity and the Substantial-Self/Person Question  
I believe that our discussion in §§ 5.1; 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 has given us a good understanding of 
the backdrop against which the neo-Lockeans modified Locke’s Memory Criterion. In this 
regard, both Butler’s and Reid’s objections played a key role in terms of forcing the neo-
Lockeans to come up with their own solutions. However, for reasons already given, the neo-
Lockeans’ solutions would not be acceptable for Locke. That said, my subsequent discussion 
will focus on the use of the puzzle cases in personal identity and the criterion of personal 
identity. In this section, I will also discuss how the contemporary personal identity theorists’ 
emphasis on these two aspects have contributed to the marginalization of what I called the  
___________________ 
97 Here I have in mind mainly the neo-Lockeans such as Shoemaker (1970, 2003, 1984); Perry (2002); 
Noonan (2003); Garrett (1998) and Parfit (1984).  
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Aristotelian Question, i.e., the substantial-self/person question. I will approach all of these  
issues from the standpoint of the neo-Lockean view.  
 
A. Criterion of Personal Identity and the Substantial-Self/Person Question  
Disagreements over the criterion of personal identity remain unresolved. In this case, the 
debate is often dominated by two rival theories, namely: the neo-Lockeans’ Psychological 
Criterion and the Physical Criterion (see e.g., Sider 2002b: 81-89; Mackie 1999: 369-376; 
Noonan 1998: 302-318; 2001: 83-90; Parfit 2012). Even though these two theories are 
rivals, as we shall see, they come together in rejecting the substantial-self/person question. 
To see this, we should look at the precise characterization of each of these views. Although 
by now, we have a good grasp of what the main features of the Psychological Criterion are, 
it would be helpful to formally contrast it with the Physical Criterion. Here, I follow Parfit’s 
characterization of each of these criteria. Parfit describes them as follows:  
(A) The Psychological Criterion: (1) There is psychological continuity if and only if 
there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X today is one and the 
same person as Y at some past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically 
continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) there 
does not exist a different person who is also psychologically continuous with Y. 
(5) Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) to (4).    
  
(B) The Physical Criterion: (1) What is necessary is not the continued existence of the 
whole body, but the continued existence of enough of the brain to be the brain 
of a living person. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if 
and only if (2) enough of Y’s brain continued to exist, and is now X’s brain, and 
(3) there does not exist a different person who also has enough of Y’s brain. (4) 
Personal Identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) and (3).  
 
Parfit also tells us that both (A) and (B) are reductionist views. For Parfit, these views are 
reductionist because they claim:  
(i) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain 
more particular facts.  
 
(ii) that these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this 
person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are had by 
this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be 
described in an impersonal way (1984: 210).     
In defence of (ii), Parfit remarks:  
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When we describe the psychological continuity that unifies some person’s mental 
life, we must mention this person, and many other people, in describing the content 
of many thoughts, desires, intentions, and other mental states. But mentioning this 
person in this way does not involve either asserting that these mental states are had 
by this person, or asserting that this person exists. A similar claim applies to the 
Physical Criterion (Ibid.).   
 
Given Parfit’s characterization of (A) and (B) on the one hand, and the reasons he states in 
(i) and (ii) on the other hand, there seems to be no room left for the substantial-self/person 
question. Parfit’s defence of (ii) above substantiates my observation. Here the tone of 
Parfit’s remarks is Humean in nature. As we saw in chapter three, Hume argued that 
perceptions have no owners, i.e., distinct bearers. Similarly, Parfit’s defence of (ii) also 
echoes Hume’s rejection of a distinct bearer of experience (s)” (Ibid. 216). Parfit claims that, 
views that reject either or both of (A) and (B) are non-reductionist. In the non-reductionist 
view, as Parfit points out, a person is distinct from his body and brain, and his experiences 
(Ibid. 210). Parfit rejects this view out of hand. As Parfit remarks, “we are not separately 
existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical and 
mental events,” (Ibid. 216). More specifically, in his most recent essay entitled, ‘We are not 
Human Beings,’ Parfit defended what he calls, ‘Embodied Person View,’ according to which, 
persons are a thinking part of the brain (see e.g., 2012: 17). For reasons we shall see in 
chapters six, seven and eight, I find Parfit’s claim that persons are a thinking part of their 
brains as deeply problematic. However, Parfit’s official rejection of the substantial view of 
the self remains the same (see 1984: Ch. 13). In this case, Parfit speaks for many personal 
identity theorists. That said, it is important to understand that the neo-Lockeans rejection of 
the substantial-self/person question, is mainly rooted in (A). Central to (A) is the idea that 
psychological continuity requires the ‘right kind of cause.’  
 
Parfit tells us that there are three different versions of the ‘right kind of cause.’ These are:  
the Narrow, the Wide and the Widest versions, respectively. In the case of the narrow 
version, the right kind of cause is taken to be the normal cause (Ibid). We can illustrate this 
point by using what Unger calls, the two aspects of a person’s dispositional psychology 
(1990: 67). For Unger, dispositional psychology comprises of a person’s core psychology and 
her distinctive psychology. Unger claims that among the mental capacities that a person’s 
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dispositional psychology includes, we find those we share with all other normal human 
beings, namely our capacity for conscious experience, our capacity to reason and the 
capacity to form intentions, etc. Unger calls such capacities instances of a person’s core 
psychology. On the other hand, Unger also claims that there are certain aspects of a 
person’s psychology that he/she shares with some normal humans but do not share with 
others. An example of the latter could be a person’s memory of having tasted vanilla ice 
cream. Unger calls this a person’s distinctive psychology (Ibid. 68).  
 
In light of such considerations, Unger further claims that a person’s persistence condition is 
contingent (dependent) on what happens to these aspects of our psychology. Moreover, a 
person’s persistence condition is also contingent on what happens to what realizes both the 
core psychology as well as distinctive psychology. In Unger’s view, in the normal course of 
events, the realizer of the dispositional psychology is a person’s brain. Unger claims that on 
the physical approach, the importance of a person’s brain is entirely due to its realization of 
his/her core psychology (Ibid. 69). In Unger’s view, once the physical realization is in place, 
the psychological approach may be taken to guarantee what is needed for a person’s 
existence at a future time. That is, a person’s present psychology be causally carried 
forward in time as a single future of his/her own psychology. So a person to be 
himself/herself, he/she at the later time should have both his/her core psychology as well 
as distinctive psychology (Ibid.).  
 
On the other hand, in the case of the Wide version, the cause is taken to be any reliable 
cause. On the Widest version, the cause is taken to be any cause. An example of both of 
these two causes would be something like Parfit’s teletransporter, which produces one’s 
replica, who then becomes psychologically continuous with oneself (Ibid. 209). Parfit claims 
that on both the Physical Criterion and Narrow Psychological Criterion, one’s replica would 
not be oneself. By contrast, on the two wide criteria, Parfit says that one’s replica would be 
oneself (1984: 209). Notice that in each of the three versions above, a distinct bearer (i.e., 
mental entity) of psychological properties is ruled out. For example, in Unger’s account, the 
brain is the bearer of a person’s dispositional psychology (i.e., both the core psychology as 
well as distinctive psychology). But what remains unclear in Unger’s account has to do with 
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what exactly personhood amounts to. That is, is a person identical with a brain or is it the 
sum of the psychological properties that the brain is said to realize? Whichever way one 
answers this question, Unger’s account has nothing to say about the substantial-self/person 
question. Similarly, since Parfit’s the Wide and the Widest versions would allow for 
psychological continuity to hold through an impersonal means such as teletransporter, in 
this case, the question of a substantial self does not even arise.  
 
So both in Unger’s and Parfit’s accounts, the substantial-self/person question receives a 
negative answer. That means that the two most influential views of the reductionist 
tradition (i.e., the neo-Lockean approach and the physical approach) do not embrace the 
view that the self/person is a substance. In light of this, Olson is deeply mistaken when he 
claims that, “anyone who assumes person is a substance concept is in effect assuming the 
Psychological Approach,” (1997: 29). However, it could be said that some neo-Lockeans 
such as Shoemaker argue that a person is a substance (see e.g., Shoemaker 2003: Ch. 17). 
But it is far from clear what to make of Shoemaker’s own view in this regard. One of the 
difficulties we face in understanding Shoemaker’s position on this issue has to do with his 
attempt to integrate his materialist position with his neo-Lockean view of a person (see e.g., 
in Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 6; 1984: Part Two; also cf. 1963: Ch. 2). But this move has 
been criticized by some philosophers on grounds that materialism is incompatible with the 
Psychological Approach (see e.g., Van Inwagen 1997: 305-319). In § E, I will raise my own 
objection against the neo-Lockeans’ notion of a person.  
 
B. Criterion of Personal Identity, Puzzle Cases and the Current Debate   
In one of the classic anthologies of the 1970s entitled, The Identities of Persons, Rorty nicely 
sums up the contemporary debate on personal identity as follows:  
Disagreement about the criteria for personal identity have been persistently 
unresolved, the battle lines repetitively drawn over the same terrain, along familiar 
terrain, along familiar geographical strongholds. Although they disagree among 
themselves about its analysis, defenders of a physical or a spatio-temporal criterion 
are ranged against defenders of a psychological criterion, themselves uneasily allied. 
Peacemakers who argue that neither the psychological nor the physical criterion can 
be applied without implicitly reintroducing the other have been drawn into the 
battle—as peacemakers often are—as third or fourth parties. Although the 
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controversy has a long history, and although many arguments have been refined by 
repeated firings, there is little reason to expect a resolution that will not in time lead 
to renewed hostilities. What is required is not more ingenuity for more elaborate 
strategies, but an understanding of the conflicting interpretations of what has been 
at issue….Also at issue are methodological disagreements about what is involved in 
giving a criterial analysis (1976: 1-3).  
 
Three things stand out from Rorty’s remarks above: (i) disagreements besetting the criteria 
for personal identity are often recycled. That is to say that arguments often appear in new 
clothes but with no substantial change in their content; (ii) even when progress is being 
made in the personal identity debate, it often gets hampered by hostile reception; and (iii) 
multiplying ingenious strategies in the personal identity debate does not necessarily result 
in genuine progress. Rorty made these remarks nearly forty years ago now. At this point, 
the question that naturally comes to mind is this: What progress has been made since then? 
Before answering this question, let us look further at Rorty’s other remarks concerning the 
state of the contemporary personal identity debate.  
 
Rorty claims that controversies about personal identity have been intensified owing to the 
fact that there are a number of distinct questions that have not always been clearly 
distinguished from one another. Rorty claims that those who engage in debate over these 
questions often fail to make clear which of these questions is centrally interesting. Here are 
the questions Rorty talks about (Ibid. 1-2):   
(1) Class differentiation: What marks out the class of persons from their nearest 
neighbours, from baboons, robots, human corpses, corporations?  
(2) Individual differentiation: What are the criteria for the numerical distinctness of 
persons who share the same general description? This can be taken as “the 
problem of individuation.”  
(3) Individual reidentification: What are the criteria for reidentifying the same 
individual in different contexts, under different descriptions, or at different 
times? The majority philosophers who focus on individual reidentification 
analyze conditions for temporal reidentification, trying to define conditions for 
marking out successive stages of a continuing person from stages of a successor 
or descendent person.  
(4) Individual identification: What sorts of characteristics identify a person as 
essentially the person he/she is, such that if those characteristics were changed, 
he/she would be a different person, although he/she might still be differentiated 
and reidentified as the same?  
  
170 
 
The questions in (1)-(4), yield different answers depending on one’s approach in dealing 
with them. By ‘one’s approach,’ I mean whether one is trying to answer (1)-(4) within the 
framework, say of, animalism, neo-Lockeanism, constitution view of persons, substance 
view of persons and so on. To see this, first it is important to understand the key question 
that echoes at the background of (1)-(4). The question I have in mind is this: How do 
persons relate to their bodies? Let us call this the background question. One’s answer to the 
background question constrains how one tackles the questions in (1)-(4). Thomson once 
remarked that, “the simplest view of what people are is that they are their bodies,” (in 
Dancy 1997: 202). Along similar lines, Williams also argues that persons are ‘material 
bodies,’ (1973: Ch.5). If one settles for Thomson and Williams’s answer to the background 
question, then no further questions can be raised about it. But in reality, that is not the 
case. For example, some philosophers take the background question as a puzzle. In his 
Indeterminate Identity, Parsons lists four puzzles, among which, two of them have to do 
with the notion of a person. These are: (a) Is a person identical with that person’s body?; 
and (b) If a person undergoes a crucial change, is the person after the change identical with 
the person before the change? (2000: X).  
 
Notice that what I called the background question is directly linked to Parsons’s (a). In fact, 
(a) can be taken as a paraphrased version of the background question. Parsons thinks that 
since it is indeterminate (i.e., there is no fact of the matter) whether or not a person is 
identical with that person’s body, there is no solution for (a). Similarly, Parsons claims that 
since it is indeterminate whether or not a person retains its identity through drastic 
personality change, we cannot say anything definitively with respect to (b). Whether or not 
we agree with Parsons’s own conclusions with respect to (a) and (b), the issues raised here 
are central to our conception of personhood. This is because, in answering (a), we come to 
understand what kind of entities persons fundamentally are. On the other hand, in 
answering (b), we come to grasp the persistence condition of persons—i.e., what kind of 
changes persons can and cannot survive. Notice that (a) and (b) are intimately related in 
that to get a grip on (b), first we need to get a grip on (a). Taken this way, (a) and (b) inform 
each other. In the contemporary personal identity debate, (a) and (b) are overshadowed 
because of the priority given to the question of the criterion of personal identity. This is 
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nowhere more evident than in the neo-Lockean tradition. Before taking up that discussion, I 
want to briefly point out some of the non neo-Lockeans’ responses to (a) and (b).  
 
For example, if it is seen from the animalists’ standpoint, (a) should be answered 
affirmatively. Noonan describes animalism as the “thesis that any person coincident at any 
time with an animal is that animal,” (2001: 83). However, the animalists’ answer to (a) 
cannot be taken without some sort of qualification. This is because some animalists do not 
think that personhood is an integral part of animalism. For example, Olson characterizes 
animalism as a view, according to which, each of us is numerically identical with an animal. 
That is, there is a certain organism you and it are one and the same (2007: 24). In this view, 
persons are just material objects (see further Olson 2007; 1997). Moreover, Olson claims 
that animalism is not an account of what it is to be a person. Consequently, animalism 
implies no answer to the personhood question (Ibid.; also see Merricks 2001: Ch. 5). Olson 
also claims that psychological continuity is entirely irrelevant for one’s survival (1997: Chs. 4 
and 5). In light of this, a proponent of animalism may respond to (b) by saying that as long 
as a human animal is around (i.e., alive), its undergoing a radical change in his/her 
psychological state would not in any way affect its identity. This is because, in Olson’s view, 
the identity of a human animal is rooted in its capacity to coordinate and regulate its 
metabolic and other vital functions. (1997: 133). That is, “any organism, persists just in case 
its capacity to direct those vital functions that keep it biologically alive is not disrupted,” 
(Ibid.). From such considerations Olson draws the following general principle: 
If x is an animal at t and y exists at t*, x = y if and only if the vital functions that y has 
at t* are causally continuous in the appropriate way with those that x has at t (Ibid.).     
 
So given the animalist view, the mental aspect of a human person is entirely 
inconsequential for a person’s identity. Of course, for reasons we shall in chapter eight, it is 
perfectly plausible to say that personal identity is not rooted in one’s psychology. But to 
recognize this, one does not have to embrace Olson’s animalism. In fact, for reasons we 
shall see in chapter six and seven, I reject any attempt to identify a human person with the 
human animal with which it coincides.  
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The constitution view theorists’ answer to (a) is negative. In this case, for example, Baker 
argues that human persons are constituted by bodies. But in Baker’s view, constitution is 
not identity (also cf. Doepke 1996: Ch. 7; Johnston 1992: 89-105). That means that a person 
is distinct from his/her body. What is it that distinguishes a person from her body? In 
Baker’s view, a person is distinguished from his/her body by having a capacity for a first-
person perspective essentially (2000: 59). In the constitution view (as characterized by 
Baker), it seems reasonable to say that if a person were to lose his/her first person capacity, 
then he/she would no longer be a person. In that case, Baker might respond to (b) by saying 
that regardless of whatever psychological changes a person undergoes, as long as the first 
person capacity remains intact, a person remains identical with itself. That said, however, 
Baker’s view seems to be a bit puzzling. This is because, she seems to be equating 
personhood (i.e., what it means to be a person) with a dispositional property, in this case, a 
capacity for first-person perspective. For reasons we shall see in chapter eight, identifying a 
person with a dispositional property of any kind in a way that Baker does is deeply 
mistaken.   
 
On the other hand, a substance theorist, who takes a person as a substantial non-physical 
entity, responds to (a) negatively. However, that does not mean that a substance theorist 
necessarily denies that there is an intimate relation that holds between a person and her 
animal body. Since for a substance theorist, a person’s capacities do not make up a person’s 
identity, her answer to (b) will also be negative. That means that despite experiencing 
radical change of personality, a person still maintains its identity through it. Along these 
lines, I will explore my own solutions to (a) and (b), in chapters six, seven and eight. That 
said, my subsequent discussion of the neo-Lockeans’ answer to (a) will be based on 
Noonan’s Personal Identity (2003).  
 
Unlike the three views I briefly discussed above, the neo-Lockeans attempt to answer (a) by 
appealing to various sorts of puzzle cases. In this case, the neo-Lockeans begin their 
discussion by criticizing the Bodily Criterion for personal identity (Noonan 2003: 2). This is 
the most familiar personal identity criterion that readily occurs to people (Swinburne in 
Sydney & Swinburne 1984: 3-4). In the normal course of life, we often use the Bodily 
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Criterion with minimal effort, to identify people at a time and also reidentify them (i.e., over 
time). So in the Bodily Criterion view, personal identity is constituted by bodily identity or 
spatio-temporal continuity. That is, if P2 is a human person at time t2 and P1 exists at 
another time t1, P2 = P1 if and only if P2 at t2 has the same body as P1 had at t1. In saying the 
same body, however, proponents of the bodily identity are not assuming that the body 
must contain the same bits of matter over time. Due to metabolic turnover, our bodies do 
not retain the particles that compose them. However, insofar as the replacement of matter 
takes place gradually, material bodies can retain their identity through change. Likewise, 
artefacts can lose and gain different parts without the loss of identity. For example, if I 
replace the two tires of my car, I still have the same car. Of course, if I replace every part in 
my car with a different part, then I will no longer have the same car. In light of such 
considerations, proponents of the bodily criterion of personal identity, do not require 
matter that constitutes a person at any given time to remain the same over time. So a 
Bodily Criterion of personal identity allows persistence through gradual change of matter. In 
this view, personal identity is not different from the identity of other things such as a ship, 
an oak tree and so on (see further Williams 1973: Ch. 1; Olson 1997; Cf. Wiggins 1967: Part 
Four).  
 
The neo-Lockeans claim that the Bodily Criterion of personal identity comes apart with 
certain puzzle cases. One of the puzzle cases used to rule out the Bodily Criterion of 
personal identity has to do with the brain. What is so special about the brain? Of all other 
parts of the body, the brain is directly responsible in sustaining a person’s mental life. We 
know this because damage to the brain disrupts the functioning of one’s normal mental life 
(see e.g., Popper and Eccles 1977: Chs. 5 and 6). But the same is not true if a person loses 
one of his/her fingers, kidneys and so on. However, this can only be true as far as it goes. I 
say this because, if some other vital organs in a person’s body are seriously damaged, say 
of, a liver, lung or heart, the normal functioning of the brain could be disrupted. Contra the 
neo-Lockeans, the brain’s normal functioning is contingent on the normal functioning of 
other vital organs. Brain is not an organ that can simply have its own life in isolation. So 
from an empirical standpoint, the brain puzzle case is severely underdescribed (see again 
chapter four).  
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Having said that, whenever the neo-Lockeans talk about the brain puzzle case, this often 
has to do with the brain transfer scenario. In this case, the most popular brain transplant 
puzzle case is the one that has been suggested by Shoemaker. As Shoemaker puts it:  
One day…a surgeon discovers that an assistant has made a horrible mistake. Two 
men, a Mr. Brown and a Mr. Robinson, had been operated on for brain tumors, and 
brain extraction, had been performed on both of them. At the end of the operations, 
however, the assistant inadvertently put Brown’s brain in Robinson’s head, and 
Robinson’s brain in Brown’s head. One of these men immediately dies, but the 
other, the one with Robinson’s body and Brown’s brain, eventually regains 
consciousness. Let us call the latter “Brownson.” Upon regaining consciousness 
Brownson exhibits great shock and surprise at the appearance of his body. Then, 
upon seeing Brown’s body, he exclaims incredulously “That’s me lying there!” 
Pointing to himself he says “This isn’t my body; the one over there is!” When asked 
his name he…replies “Brown.” He recognizes Brown’s wife and family (whom 
Robinson had never met), and is able to describe in detail events in Brown’s life, 
always describing them as events in his own life. Of Robinson’s past life he evidences 
no knowledge at all. Over a period of time he is observed to display all of the 
personality traits, mannerisms, interests, likes and dislikes, and so on that had 
previously characterized Brown, and to act and talk in ways completely alien to the 
old Robinson (1963: 23-24).    
 
In this brain transplant puzzle case, we are told that Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson had their 
brains swapped. This is the modern day version of Locke’s soul swap thought experiment.  
We are also told that the brain swap between Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson resulted in 
Brownson. Now we are faced with a tricky question. That is, who exactly is Brownson? Is he 
Mr. Robinson or Mr. Brown? Notice that the resulting person Brownson has Mr. Robinson’s 
body. Also notice that Brownson’s brain is transplanted from Brown’s head, who has now 
Robinson’s brain. The neo-Lockeans tell us that, to answer the tricky question above, all we 
need to do is to pay attention to Brownson’s character, memories and personality. In doing 
so, we can see whose life (i.e., Robinson’s or Brown’s) Brownson’s life coincides with. Since 
in the imagined case Brownson’s mental life entirely coincides with that of Brown’s, 
contrary to a physical appearance of Brownson who has Robinson’s body, most neo-
Lockeans answer the above tricky question by saying that Brownson must be taken as 
Brown. Neo-Lockeans claim that what the brain transplant puzzle case shows us is that a 
person goes wherever his brain goes. That is why, even if Brown’s body is left behind, his 
mental life (psychology) is fully manifested in Brownson. The bottom line here is that, given 
the brain transplant thought experiment, the Bodily Criterion of personal identity is 
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undermined. That is, if P2 is a human person at time t2 and P1 exists at another time t1, P2 = 
P1 if and only if P2 has the same brain as P1 at t1. Noonan calls this: the Brain Criterion of 
personal identity (2003: 4).98  
 
However, the neo-Lockeans claim that the Brain Criterion of personal identity faces its own   
problems. To see this, they ask us to entertain another scenario that has to do with 
removing a part of one’s brain without killing a person. This scenario is entertained based 
on certain clinical cases that deal with severing the fibres that connect the two hemispheres 
of the brain to treat epileptic patients (see Sperry 1968; Nagel 1971/1975). If one day it 
becomes possible to remove a whole hemisphere without killing a person, then the Brain 
Criterion of personal identity fails to hold. In light of such considerations, the neo-Lockeans 
argue that personal identity is possible without brain identity, since one can survive with 
only a part of the brain. This proposal does not seem to be far-fetched after all. For 
example, there is a medical condition known as Rasmussen’s syndrome—a condition that 
damages one side of the brain. If one becomes a victim of this syndrome, then the solution 
is to do a hemispherectomy, i.e., the removal of half of the brain. For example, one such 
incident entitled, “Meet the girl with half a brain”, had recently been reported by 
NBCNews.com—an American News media outlet. This is the case where a nine year old girl 
had her entire right hemisphere removed due to Rasmussen’s syndrome 
(http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/36032653/ns/today-today_health/t/meet-girl-half-   
brain/accessed 12/30/2012).  
 
In this case, some philosophers argue that what we need for personal identity is not the 
whole brain, but part of it. Noonan calls this view, the Physical Criterion of personal identity 
__________________ 
98 Wiggins modifies Brown/Brownson cases by saying that rather than transplanting Brown’s brain in 
one person, we can transplant each of the hemispheres of Brown into two distinct persons. In that case, 
Brown cannot be identical to two different people because of the transitivity relation (2001: 209). But Wiggins 
also realizes that the transitivity relation will not be decisive due to Parfit’s new solution (1971). Parfit’s 
argument is that each of the persons that shares one of the hemispheres of Brown stand in relation R to him. 
From this Parfit draws a conclusion that identity is not what matters in survival. For critical discussion on brain 
transplant puzzle, see also van Inwagen (1990: Ch. 15).  
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(2003: 6; see also Wiggins 1967; Parfit 1984: Ch. 10). On this view, what is necessary for 
personal identity is not the identity of the whole of the brain, but the identity of enough of 
the brain to be the brain of a living person (Noonan 2003: 6). That is, if P2 is a human person 
at time t2 and P1 exists at another time t1, P2 = P1 if and only if P2 at t2 has enough of the 
brain of P1 at t1. In explaining why the Brain Criterion of personal identity must be rejected, 
Noonan states:  
For in such a case there will be personal identity without brain identity, the survivor 
only having part of the brain of the original person. Admittedly in this case we have 
the rest of the body to hang on to, so we could appeal to the original Bodily Criterion 
of personal identity to justify our judgement. But an obvious extension of the case 
shows that this manoeuvre gets us nowhere. Let us suppose that half of a man’s 
brain is destroyed and then the remaining half transplanted into another body with 
consequent transference of memories, personality and character traits. Here we can 
neither appeal to the original Bodily Criterion of personal identity nor to the Brain 
Criterion to justify the judgment that the surviving person is the brain hemisphere 
donor. Yet it seems quite clear that if we accept that Brownson is Brown in the 
original Brown/Brownson case we cannot deny that in this case also the survivor is 
the original brain hemisphere donor. For if we accept that a person goes where his 
brain goes it cannot make any difference if his brain in fact consists of only one brain 
hemisphere combining the functions usually divided between two (2003: 6).  
 
Having ruled out both the Bodily Criterion and the Brain Criterion, the neo-Lockeans claim 
that the Psychological Criterion of personal identity view is the best alternative (see again 
§§ 5.1-5.1.3). However, serious objections have been raised against the psychological 
continuity criterion of personal identity. Here a good case in point is Williams’s (1956-72) 
famous Reduplication Argument. Williams asks us to imagine a person he calls Charles, who 
after having experienced a radical change of character, one day woke up claiming to be Guy 
Fawkes. Charles remembers everything Fawkes did. Charles’ memory claims can be checked 
as known to historians. In such a scenario, Williams says that it would be tempting to say 
that Fawkes has come to life in Charles’ body. But Williams claims that this is not what we 
should conclude from the imagined case. This is because, as Williams further points out, 
what happened to Charles could also happen to his brother Robert. In this case, Charles and 
Robert turn out to be two candidates claiming to be Fawkes. Since as a matter of the law of 
logic, two people cannot be identical to one person, neither Charles nor Robert could be 
Fawkes. This means that in Williams’s view, personal identity is an intrinsic relation. That is 
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“whether a later individual x is identical with an earlier individual y can depend only on facts 
about x and y and the relations between them: no fact about any individual other than x 
and y can be relevant as to whether x is y,” (Noonan 1993: xvi). Following Wiggins (1980), 
Noonan calls this principle, “the Only x and y principle,” (1993: xvi; emphasis original).  
 
In light of the only x and y principle, Williams claims that even if reduplication does not 
happen, the identity relation will not hold between, for example, Charles and Fawkes. The 
bottom line for Williams is that, “the only case in which identity and exact similarity could 
be distinguished…is that of the body—‘same body’ and ‘exactly similar body’ really do mark 
a difference…the omission of the body takes away all content from the idea of personal 
identity,” (1973: 10). Although as Noonan earlier argued that the neo-Lockeans seemed to 
have an upper hand over defenders of the Physical Criterion, Williams’s reduplication 
objection shows why that is not true. In light of Williams’s objection, the advantage of the 
Psychological Criterion over that of the bodily criterion remains to be far from obvious. In 
light of the Williams’s reduplication objection, the neo-Lockeans are forced to further 
modify their psychological continuity criterion (see e.g., Nozick 1981; Noonan 1993). The 
question remains: what form will their modification take?  
 
Of course, the first thing the neo-Lockeans should do to save their Psychological Criterion is 
to attack Williams’s ‘the only x and y principle’. By attacking this principle, however, the 
neo-Lockeans will inevitably compromise the importance of a numerical identity for 
personal identity over time. Here the issue comes down to what Noonan describes as the 
‘Determinacy Thesis,’ (2003: 17). We can understand the ‘determinacy thesis’ to stand for 
what I called earlier the Butler-Reid Assumption which has to do with the determinateness 
of personal identity (see again § 5.1.1). One of the most popular ways the neo-Lockeans 
attempt to get rid of the determinateness of personal identity is by appealing, inter alia, to 
the fission thought experiment. In this regard, Parfit’s discussion with Lewis is a good 
representative.  
 
1. Parfit and Lewis on Fission  
In his 1971 essay, Parfit sets out to challenge two beliefs: the nature of personal identity  
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 (B1) and the importance of personal identity (B2). For Parfit, self-interest and emotions 
constitute the primary source of (B1). That is, we are driven to committing ourselves to (B1) 
simply because (i) we take an interest in our own numerical identity; and (ii) ‘‘when we find 
ourselves in problem case, we do feel that the question “would it be me?” must have an 
answer’’ (1971: 4; see also 1984: Part III). The most important reason for Parfit’s rejection of 
(B1) and (B2), has to do with the fact that they both entail a numerical identity (as 
understood from a common-sense point of view). Since Parfit denies a numerical identity as 
a ground for personal identity/survival, he revises (B1) and (B2). Here, Parfit’s revisionism 
calls for complete deconstructionism/reductionism of the notion of a numerical identity 
embedded in both (B1) and (B2). The upshot of Parfit’s reductionism on personal identity 
can be summed up as follows: 
A. Personal identity consists in psychological continuity/connectedness as opposed 
to a numerical identity.  
B. One’s survival must not be made contingent on one’s numerical identity, i.e., 
one’s survival must not imply a numerical identity at all.  
C. What matters in survival are relations of degree, i.e. R.  
D. The relation R assumed in (a)-(c) must not presuppose a numerical identity.  
E. Given (a)-(d), as Parfit sees it, it follows that the revisionism of (B1) and (B2) is 
justified.  
 
Parfit’s E (hereafter P-E) has been and still is the subject of a lively debate among analytic 
philosophers. In this regard, both Lewis and Perry were the early responders to Parfit’s 1971 
paper (see Rorty (ed.), 1976: Chs. I, III and IV). But Parfit points out that there isn’t a 
substantial difference between his position and that of Perry’s. So here I focus on the 
exchange that took place between Parfit and Lewis. In this regard, Lewis’ objection goes 
right to the heart of P-E. Lewis like Parfit holds that, what matters in survival is mental 
continuity and connectedness. Lewis claims that his present experiences, thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, and traits of character should have appropriate future successors. His total present 
mental state should be but one momentary stage in a continuing succession of mental 
states. These successive stages should be interconnected in two ways: First, by bond of 
similarity….Second, by bonds of lawful causal dependence (1976: 17). That said, however, 
Lewis also claims that there is another ‘compelling commonsense’ answer to the question, 
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what matters in survival? According to Lewis, the answer is identity, that is, identity 
between myself, existing now, and myself, still existing in the future (Ibid. 18).  
 
Lewis urges that since we have two competing answers to the survival question, we have to 
choose one. If we had to choose between the two competing answers, for Lewis, the 
common sense view should be chosen. But Lewis thinks that there is no pressing need for us 
to choose between the two answers, since the two answers are compatible and both are 
right. That is the claim Lewis wants to defend (Ibid.). This is precisely where Lewis’ initial 
agreement with Parfit ends. Since unlike Lewis, Parfit does not subscribe himself to the 
claim that the two answers are compatible and both are right. As can be expected, given (P-
E), a Lewisian solution is not available for Parfit. So as we shall see, Parfit insists that a 
choice has to be made between the two answers.  
 
Lewis endorses (A) in (P-E) above, while expressing his dissatisfaction with (B-C) and 
eventually with E. But Parfit claims that Lewis’ response to (P-E) is far from convincing. To 
show why this is the case, Parfit begins by summing up the fission case. As he states it:  
This case [fission] seems to involve three people: the original person, and two 
resulting people. If we decide that the resulting people are indeed, as they seem to 
be, two people, we cannot claim that each of them is the original person. But we 
may conclude that ‘the relation of the original person to each of the resulting 
people…contains…all that matters…in any ordinary case of survival.’ If this is so—if 
this relation does contain all that matters, but is not identity—then what matters 
cannot be identity (1976: 91).  
 
Parfit’s main claim here is that the post-fission people cannot be identical to the pre-fission 
person, since one person cannot be identical to two distinct persons.  So for Parfit, the pre-
fission person’s relation to the post-fission people can only be a relation other than identity. 
Since for Parfit, a numerical identity is off the table, the only relation that can be invoked 
here is psychological continuity. As Parfit sees it, Lewis’ initial agreement with him on (A) 
above did not go far enough. This is because, unlike Parfit, Lewis still maintains that (P-E) 
conflicts with our basic commonsense belief about survival. That is, one’s future survival 
requires nothing short of a numerical identity. So the pre-fission person’s future survival 
must consist of both the common sense view of identity as well mental continuity. Such 
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considerations led Lewis to redescribe the fission case, which Parfit finds it to be seriously 
problematic.  
 
For Lewis, in the pre-fission state, there are two partially overlapping continuant persons 
who share their initial stage. Lewis calls the initial stage ‘S’ and designates the latter two 
stages as ‘S1’ and ‘S2’. Lewis also designates the two continuant persons as ‘C1’ and ‘C2’. So 
‘C1’ consists of S and S1, and ‘C2’ consists of S and S2, (1976: 25). Furthermore, Lewis makes a 
distinction between what he calls the R-relation and the I-relation, which he takes to be co-
extensive. The former relation being the mental continuity and connectedness among 
person stages whereas the latter relation holds between the several stages of a single 
continuant person (Ibid. 20-21).   
 
Responding to Lewis’ redescription of the fission case, Parfit claims that if we are discussing 
this case before the division, we can ask: ‘‘Is C1’s present stage R-related to the future stage 
of C2?’’ (1976: 92). Parfit realizes that such a question might come across as irrelevant, since 
Lewis claims that when we are discussing people before a certain time, we should count 
them by the relation of identity-up-to-that–time. But Parfit claims that even if this way of 
talking about the two post-fission people as one could be tolerated, prior to the fission, 
predictions need disambiguating (Ibid). Parfit claims that if we can guess now that it is C1 as 
opposed to C2 who will win the next State Lottery, we can then ask, “Is C1’s present stage R-
related to the future stage of C2?”. According to Parfit, the answer to this question must be 
‘Yes’. This is because given Lewis’ own view, C1’s present stage is the stage S; C2’s future 
stage is S2 which presupposes that S is R-related to S2 (Ibid. 92). In light of this, Parfit thinks 
that Lewis’ main thesis (i.e., what matters in survival is both identity and R-relation) turns 
out to be unsustainable. Notice that for Lewis, the identity and the R-relations coincide. But 
for Parfit, such a coincidence cannot be shown to hold. As Parfit states: 
Can it be true that, as he [Lewis] claims, both that ‘what matters to survival’ is 
identity, and that what matters to survival is the R-relation? We have just seen that 
C1’s present stage stands to C2’s future stage in the R-relation. On the thesis, this 
relation is what matters. But if C1 now stands in the relation that matters to 
someone else in the future, how can this relation be identity?  (Ibid.)   
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Parfit’s remark here sums up the gist of his objection against Lewis’ attempt to converge 
identity and mental continuity in one’s future survival. What precisely is Parfit’s objection? 
Parfit thinks that Lewis misapplied the original puzzle case. In this case, Sider claims that 
Lewis mistakenly tried to resolve Parfit’s puzzle by claiming that since the I-relation and the 
R-relation (psychological continuity) are one and the same relation, both can be what 
matters. But Parfit’s original puzzle involved identity, not the I-relation. Hence, Sider claims 
that Parfit is right in questioning Lewis’s claim that the I-relation sufficiently captures the 
heart of the ‘commonsense platitude’ (as Lewis calls it) that identity is what matters (Sider 
in Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie Kurtz, 2006: 92-93ff). In his postscript (1983), Lewis 
responded to Parfit’s objection as follows:  
Derek Parfit rejects my attempt to square his views (which are mine as well) with 
common sense. He objects that before I bring off the reconciliation, I must first 
misrepresent our commonsensical desire to survive. Consider a fission case as 
shown. I say there are two continuant persons all along, sharing their initial 
segments. One of them, C1, dies soon after the fission. The other, C2, lives on for 
many years. Let S be a shared stage at time t0, before the fission but after it is known 
that fission will occur. The thought to be found in S is a desire for survival, of the 
most commonsensical and unphilosophical kind possible. Since S is a shared stage, 
this desire is a shared desire. Certainly C2 has the survival he desired, and likewise 
has what we think matters: mental continuity and connectedness (the R-relation) 
between S and much later stages such as S2. But how about C1? (1983:73).  
 
Regarding C1 above Lewis says: 
If common sense is right that what matters in survival is identity . . . , then you have 
what matters in survival if and only if your present stage is I-related to future 
stages…. If that is right, then C1 has what he commonsensically desired. For C1's 
stage S at time t0 is indeed I-related to stages far in the future such as S2. These 
stages are I-related via the person C2 (1983:73).   
 
But Lewis’ ingenious solution to remedy C1’s survival through C2’s I-related stages raises 
more questions than it answers. Parfit rightly claims that insofar as C1’s present stage and 
the future stage S2 are stages of the same person, it follows that they are both stages of C2. 
In light of this, Parfit asks: isn’t this the wrong person? (1976: 93). If Parfit’s objection here 
stands its ground, then it seems to me that Lewis’ solution all the more looks unconvincing, 
to say the least. This is because it is not clear how C1’s desire for survival can be said to have 
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been fulfilled simply by assuming that C2 is a sufficient condition for it (C1’s desire for 
survival).  
 
Lewis openly admits this problem in his response to Parfit. For example, Lewis claims that if 
C1 had the commonsensical desire that he himself (but not any other person) survives into 
the future, then C1’s desire is not satisfied. Yet despite that, Lewis still thinks that C1 could 
not have had exactly that desire, i.e. the desire for survival. But why does Lewis think that is 
the case? Lewis describes the reason for this as follows:  
And there is a limit to how commonsensical one's desires can possibly be under the 
peculiar circumstance of stage-sharing. The shared stage S does the thinking for both 
of the continuants to which it belongs. Any thought it has must be shared. It cannot 
desire one thing on behalf of C1 and another thing on behalf of C2. If it has an urgent, 
self-interested desire for survival on the part of C1, that very thought must also be an 
urgent, self-interested (and not merely benevolent) desire for survival on the part of 
C2. It is not possible that one thought should be both. So it is not possible for S to 
have such a desire on behalf of C1. So it is not possible for C1 at t0 to have the 
straightforward commonsensical desire that he himself survives. If C1 and C2 share 
the most commonsensical kind of desire to survive that is available to them under 
the circumstances, it must be a plural desire: let us survive (Ibid).  
 
As I see it, Lewis has not yet given us a convincing reason why C1’s desire for survival cannot 
stand on its own right independent of that of C2’s desire for survival. All that Lewis has tried 
to do so far is to force us to agree with him that C2’s desire for survival is all that we need to 
make sense of C1’s desire for survival. But this begs a question in that the reason why C1’s 
desire for survival is merged with that of C2’s desire for survival is because the latter has 
already been thought to be sufficient for the former’s desire for survival. But this is no more 
convincing than trying to calm down a hungry man by telling him/her that if someone eats 
food on behalf of him/her that his/her hunger will be satisfied.  
 
But there is a deeper problem with Lewis’ attempt to spell out a commonsense notion of 
identity in terms of stage-sharing. As we recall, the commonsense notion of identity is 
understood in relation to persons as opposed to stages. In fact, this is clearly delineated in 
Parfit’s own discussion. But Lewis’s move to link identity with stage-sharing does not 
advance his case. In talking about this problem, for example, Sider asks: how exactly does 
Lewis understand the commonsense platitude? Sider proposes one possible answer which I 
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think clearly captures Lewis’s point. As Sider puts it, “A person stage matters to my present 
stage if and only if it bears the I-relation to my present stage,” (Sider in Haslanger and Kurtz, 
2006: 93). Sider claims that here Lewis’s point concerns what matters to person stages. But 
Sider claims that our commonsense notion of ‘what matters’, is understood in relation to 
what matters to persons. In light of this, Sider claims that Lewis can only vindicate the 
commonsense platitude that identity is what matters, only if his version of that platitude 
must concern what matters to persons as opposed to person stages. Since for Lewis persons 
are not person stages, his emphasis on person stages does not address the present topic 
(Ibid. 93; see further Lowe 1998: Ch. 5; Oderberg 1993: Chs. 2-5).  
 
2. The Stalemate 
At this point, the hitherto discussion might well bring to our mind Rorty’s observation. As 
we recall, Rorty told us that, “disagreements about the criteria for personal identity have 
been persistently unresolved, the battle lines repetitively drawn over the same terrain, 
along familiar terrain, along familiar geographical strongholds,” (1976: 1). This is partly 
because the contemporary debates on personal identity are based on extremely 
underdescribed puzzle cases on the one hand, and mutually exclusive claims made with 
respect to what counts as the criterion of identity on the other hand. Moreover, thought 
experiments are proposed with no clear guidelines, for example, such as the ones I had 
suggested in chapter four, namely the Role Condition, the Constraint Condition and the 
Priority Condition. So in personal identity discussions, philosophers can come up with any 
thought experiment they like to defend a particular view of the notion of personal identity. 
This makes it hard to have a common ground in discussions besetting personal identity. This 
is one reason why, as we saw above, it is exceedingly difficult to settle the debate between 
the neo-Lockeans and their opponents. Moreover, the contemporary personal identity 
debate also tends to be far removed from lived experience. As Schechtman remarks:  
The personal identity problem has enjoyed a revival among analytic philosophers 
over the last three decades. Since questions of personal identity are of fundamental 
interest outside philosophy, there is some reason to hope that in this area 
philosophy will do what it is popularly thought to do—apply rigorous standards of 
argument and investigation to basic problems of human existence. A glance at the 
contemporary literature on personal identity, however, quickly disappoints these 
expectations. Instead of questions of self-knowledge, self-expression, and 
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authenticity, we find discussions of the necessary and sufficient connections 
between entities called individual “person time-slices” which allow us to say they are 
slices of the same person. These creatures inhabiting philosophical theories of 
identity seem to have little to do with persons as we know them, and the concerns 
about identity these theorists address seem far removed from the compelling 
identity issues familiar to us from lived experience, psychology, and literature. 
(1996: ix). 
 
Schechtman’s observations in the above passage coincide with my own observations that I 
have been making throughout this thesis. Schechtman’s observations are also in line with 
Rorty’s earlier observations. That said, however, Rorty’s own observations concerning the 
state of the contemporary personal identity debate are not free from their own 
shortcomings. For example, of the four questions, namely class differentiation, individual 
differentiation, individual reidentification and individual identification, Rorty claims that, if 
philosophers distinguish which ones are centrally interesting, then progress can be made on 
the personal identity debate. I disagree. This is because, however important these questions 
may be in their own right, none of them are central to the metaphysics of personal identity. 
Rather the central question that we need to focus on, to make progress on the personal 
identity debate, is what I called in chapter one, the Aristotelian Question. Rorty’s four 
questions are subservient to the Aristotelian Question, since they all presuppose it. So 
unless the Aristotelian Question is taken seriously, it is difficult to see how we can engage in 
a substantive discussion concerning personal identity. In this thesis, I am very much 
interested in shifting our focus from such a repetitive trend of debating about the nature of 
personal identity based on science fiction thought experiments to taking ontology and 
metaphysics seriously in thinking about the nature of the self/person.  
 
C. Outstanding Issue   
Besides the complications science fiction cases add to the existing lack of agreements on 
the criterion of personal identity, the neo-Lockeans notion of a person is no less obscure 
than that of Locke’s. The leading neo-Lockeans (Lewis, Perry, Noonan, Shoemaker et al.,) 
are all materialists. But the compatibility between their materialism and their neo-Lockean 
conception of a person is by no means obvious. For example, if as neo-Lockeans argue that 
in the case of brain transplant “a person goes wherever his/her brain goes,” then it follows 
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that (i) a person is distinct from his/her brain; (ii) a person is also distinct from his animal 
body; and (iii) a person is a thinker who is distinct from a set of properties it bears. But (i)-
(iii) together support a dualist view of a person as opposed to a materialist view of a person. 
I will defend this claim in chapter six. But in this regard, there is ongoing debate between 
animalists and the neo-Lockeans. The former arguing for the claim that there is only one 
thinker, that is, a human animal (see for details Olson 1997; 2007). On the other hand, the 
latter arguing for the claim that only a person is a thinker (see e.g., Shoemaker 1984: Part 
Two). But the neo-Lockeans reject animalism, claiming that persons are not human beings 
owing to their different persistence conditions. However, recently Noonan argued that the 
neo-Lockeans must allow for the possibility of multiple thinkers (see e.g., Noonan in Gasser 
and Stefan 2012: 89-95). Noonan’s point seems to be that the animalists as well as the neo-
Lockeans can have it their own way by allowing the possibility of too many thinkers. But it 
remains unclear how Noonan’s proposal here says anything helpful by way of settling the 
outstanding issue of what precisely is the ontology of a person, given the neo-Lockeans 
commitment to materialism.  
 
D. Summary 
In this chapter, I attempted to show that the neo-Lockeans emphasis on the criterion of 
personal identity and the puzzle cases sidelined the Aristotelian question. I also attempted 
to show why the debate between the two dominant rival views, namely the Psychological 
Criterion View and the Physical Criterion View is difficult to resolve. I then suggested that 
the way out of this impasse is to shift our focus to taking metaphysics seriously in thinking 
about the nature of a self/person. I now turn to chapter six, where I will attempt to do that.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Jackson’s Location Problem (Serious Metaphysics) and Argument from the Self/Person 
 
In chapter five, I argued that the contemporary personal identity theorists’ unduly emphasis 
on the methodology of thought experiments on the one hand and the criterion of personal 
identity on the other, for the most part is responsible for the present stalemate in 
contemporary personal identity debates. I also argued that what I called the Aristotelian 
Question, is neglected in the contemporary personal identity discussions. In light of such 
considerations, in chapter five, I tried to flag out why it is important to take the ontology of 
self/person seriously. In the present chapter, my goal is to give some reasons why we need 
to take the ontology of the self/person seriously. That said, in this chapter, I will advance my 
discussion of the self/person within the context of philosophy of mind. I will do this by 
taking two views, one from the dualist camp and the other from the strict physicalist camp. 
My discussion in this chapter is also intended to show us how it is possible to carry on a 
sensible discussion of the self/person without entangling ourselves with puzzle cases. 
Ultimately, my discussion in this chapter paves the way for my own view of the self/person 
which will be introduced in chapter seven.  
 
To what is the self or person identical? Are persons identifiable with an organic body? Or as 
Lowe argues do persons constitute a distinct sort or kind of entity and are not to be 
identified with the biological entities in which they are embodied? (1989:2).99 Such 
questions in the contemporary literature in philosophy of mind are treated in different 
ways. As I see it, at least three ways stand out: (1) Keep the self or person distinct from 
one’s body (e.g. Lowe, 2008: Part I).100 (2) Avoid the self or person and focus only on 
consciousness (e.g. Churchland, 1988 and Kim, 2006). (3) Eliminate the self or person or 
locate it within a naturalist ontology which entails a strong version of physicalism (e.g.  
 
_________________________ 
99 See further, Lowe, (2008). 
100 Also see similar argument in Lowe (1996: Chs. 1, 2 and 7; 1989a:2; 2000: Chs. 2 and 10).   
 
 
  
187 
 
Jackson 1998: ch. 1).101 Let us call (1) the thesis about the self (TS), (2) the thesis about 
consciousness (TC) and (3) the thesis about serious metaphysics102 (SM) respectively. TS and 
SM will be the main focus of our discussion. In this chapter, I will not engage directly with TC 
except briefly in relation to some objections I consider against TS.   
 
Before we move forward, here are some important distinctions and definitions of key terms 
used throughout this chapter. According to Lowe, a self or person is a being that is not 
identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain (Lowe, 
2008: 19ff). In short, a ‘self’ or ‘person’ is distinct from the physical body that embodies it. 
The precise development of such a characterization of the self or person will become 
clearer as we go along in our discussion. In light of this, my main purpose in this chapter is 
to approach the question of ‘the self’ or ‘person’ as stated above in (1). Moreover, to meet 
my purpose, throughout this chapter, I assume (unless otherwise indicated) a version of 
dualism Lowe calls Non-Cartesian substance dualism (hereafter, NCSD) which further 
expands and develops (1). As Lowe puts it, according to NCSD, “it is I, and not my body nor 
any part of it, who am the bearer of mental properties….” (Ibid: 95).103  
 
On the other hand, by philosophical naturalism, following Craig and Moreland, I refer to the 
thesis that the entities that exist are the ones that are in the spatio-temporal universe as 
studied by physical sciences (Craig and Moreland, eds., 2000).104 In light of this, by a strong 
version of physicalism, I refer to a thesis according to which the physical nature of our world 
exhausts all that exists (e.g. states of affairs, all individuals, minds, semantic content, 
properties, laws, etc.). Put in this way, the philosophical naturalists I have in mind are those 
who advance the strong version of physicalism.105 I now turn to Lowe’s theory of the self.  
_________________________ 
101 For a crucial distinction on the naturalist ontology, see, Moreland (2008: Ch.1). 
102  ‘Serious Metaphysics,’ is the term Jackson himself uses. I will explain his view in § 6.2.  
 103 Though NCSD shares some similarities with Cartesian substance dualism (CSD), it differs from it in a 
significant way as I will show at some point in the course of our discussion. Given NCSD, in this chapter my 
main aim is to argue that strong physicalism of Jackson’s version fails to account for the nature of the self.   
104 Also see Papineau (1993). I also use the term ‘philosophical naturalism’ interchangeably with 
‘scientific naturalism.’   
105 All philosophical naturalists are not advocates of strong physicalism. For example, John Searle 
endorses various emergent properties and hence, Searle can be called a ‘weak naturalist,’ see Moreland  
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6.1 Lowe’s Theory of ‘The Self’ 
Lowe argues, in his Personal Agency, that “a person or self does not appear to be simply 
identifiable with his or her organic body nor with any part of it such as the brain—and yet 
selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events, such as bodily 
movements, as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states,” (2008: 
19).106   
 
As I see it, central to Lowe’s characterization of a person or self, inter alia, is the idea that a 
person or self is not identical with one’s physical body nor with any part of it, such as the 
brain.107 For example, suppose that X is identical with Y. What does this mean? At the least, 
it means that X and Y are numerically one and the same thing. In this case, no distinction 
holds between X and Y. But if we say that X and Y are not identical to each other, then that 
means that X and Y are not numerically one and the same thing. Hence, a distinction holds 
between X and Y. Behind this assumption is the familiar Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility 
of identicals, according to which for any X and for any Y, if X and Y are identical, then for any 
property P, P will be true of X if and only if P is true of Y. The gist of this law is that if X and Y 
are identical, then X and Y share one and the same properties. What we have is not two 
entities but one and the same entity (see again chapter one § 1.2.2 A).  
 
One way a proponent of strong physicalism may challenge Lowe’s TS is by showing that the 
self is identical with the physical body which embodies it. If strong physicalists succeed in 
meeting this demand, then the self and the physical body are numerically one and the same 
thing. Hence, when we talk about the self and the physical body, we are literally talking 
about one and the same thing, that is a self just is a physical body and vice versa. But things 
do not seem to be that easy when we carefully reflect on the kinds of distinctions that we 
make. For example, as P.F. Strawson remarks, “Each of us distinguishes between himself 
__________________ 
(2008: Ch.1); Searle (1992). For strong version of physicalism, see, Jackson (1998: Ch.1) and Papineau (1993: 
Part I). 
106 For a similar line of argument, see Lowe’s other writings as indicated in footnote number 99.  
 107 Churchland argues that Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience play a key role in unfolding the 
nature of the human brain. So he rejects the notion of ‘the self’; see Churchland (1988: Chs. 6-8).  
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and states of himself on the one hand, and what is not himself or state of himself on the 
other….” (1959: 87ff). If Strawson is right in his remark, and I believe that he is, then our 
experience of making distinctions would pose a formidable challenge to the proponent of 
strong physicalism. This is precisely because for strong physicalists, the idea of the self being 
distinct from the physical body is irreconcilable with their naturalist ontology, which 
endorses only entities that exist in the spatio-temporal universe as studied by physical 
sciences. Since the self is not something that can be established on the basis of an empirical 
science (for reasons we will see later in this chapter), the strong physicalist will inevitably be 
forced either to deny that there is such a thing called the self or engage in some kind of 
reductive analysis of the nature of the self. I will say more on this in § 6.2.  
 
It seems to me then that to vindicate Lowe in his claim that the self is distinct from the 
physical body that embodies it, we need to be able to point out one thing that is true of the 
self but that is not true of the physical body and vice versa. If we could do that, then we can 
show that the self is not identical with the physical body. If I am right here, then the 
physicalist can utilize Leibniz’s law108 as stated above for his or her benefit only if the self is 
the same as the physical body or some part of it.  
 
Returning to Lowe’s TS, the key question that we need to answer is this: What is the self? As 
Lowe sees it, this question can be understood either (1) as a request for the meaning of the 
term ‘self’, or (2) as a request for an account of the nature of the self. Putting aside the 
details for the present, what we need in order to understand Lowe’s notion of self is to 
approach the question of the self from the standpoint of (2) (Lowe, 1996: 182ff).109 Taken 
this way, Lowe claims that the obvious place to start such a discussion is with first-person 
reference. That is, as Lowe puts it, “A person or self…is a being that can have thoughts about 
itself, of the sort that are appropriately expressed (in English) by sentences containing the 
first-person pronoun, ‘I’, as their grammatical subject-sentences such as ‘I feel hot’ and ‘I  
___________________ 
108 Both Kim and Churchland conflate Leibniz’s two laws on identity as stated above. See, Kim (2006: 
35 and 39); Churchland (1988: 29). 
109 Of course, opinions differ on what ‘a self’ is but getting into that discussion is not my interest here. 
For present purpose, I am only interested in Lowe’s take on the self. For more on this issue consult the 
reference in chapter one under footnote # 2.  
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am six feet tall’,” (Lowe, 2008: 20-21).110 In short, for Lowe, a self is a possible object of first-
person reference that is capable of referring to itself as ‘I’, (Lowe, 1996: 5-6 and 183).  So, 
on this view, a necessary condition for selfhood is to have a capacity for self-reference using 
the first-person pronoun ‘I’. But Lowe’s point here could easily be misunderstood if one 
thinks that anything can be a self insofar as it utters a sentence which can express a first-
person thought.  
 
For example, we may read on a computer screen a sentence that can express first-person 
thought such as ‘I am shutting down’, or ‘I am having some difficulty taking your order’, etc. 
But as Lowe claims, from this it does not follow that a computer is a self. A computer, 
despite displaying sentences on its screen that express first-person thought, is not thereby 
expressing literally the thought that the computer itself is ‘shutting down’ or ‘having some 
difficulty in taking someone’s order’, etc. But strong physicalists, who deny Lowe’s TS, still 
argue that there is no difference between persons and computers. For example, Churchland 
claims that it is possible to produce and configure a purely physical device which can 
possess genuine intelligence. According to Churchland, machines like computers insofar as 
they simulate all of humans’ cognitive activities to the last computational detail, can be 
conferred the status of genuine persons (1988: Ch. 6, see esp., 99 and 119-120). 
 
However, Churchland’s remarks here remain unpersuasive. As Alexander Pruss recently 
argued that persons have objective as opposed to socially defined identity conditions 
whereas the same can’t be said with respect to the so called ‘electronic persons’ such as 
computers or robots (2009: 487-500). All things being equal, all that computers can do is to 
process the input that has been fed into them within the parameter set for them. So, for 
instance, when a computer displays a sentence on its screen that expresses a first-person 
thought, a computer is simply executing some sort of order as an output in accordance with 
the way it has been programmed to do so.111 But if Lowe’s TS is correct, as we shall see, 
such is not true of persons or selves.  
______________________ 
110 For different views on ‘I’, see, Madell (1981: Ch. 1). 
111 For a similar argument, see, Kim (2006: 142-145), where he discusses the Turing test often used to 
show that purely physical devices can think like persons.  But Kim rightly rejects the Turing proposal on  
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However, strong physicalists may still insist that complexity is all that we need to get 
something in the neighborhood of a person. Thus, the argument goes, insofar as computers 
or purely physical devices reach a sufficient level of complexity, then we can attribute to 
them a genuine intelligence. But as Searle points out (1984: 31-32), such a thing seems not 
to be the case. No matter how complex a computer may be, it would still not be the case 
that a capacity to exercise a mental state (e.g., thinking) can be put on par with a computing 
machine that runs a program. As Searle rightly remarks, the computer’s ability to 
manipulate a set of rules or syntax does not show in any clear and plausible way that a 
computer grasps the semantics, that is, the meaning or what a set of rules represent.112 If 
Searle is right here, then it follows that the capacity to grasp semantics or meaning is 
exclusively something that only a person or self has. If this is correct, then this will give a 
further impetus for us to endorse Lowe’s TS.  
 
However, here I am not implying that Searle endorses Lowe’s TS, but that is beside the 
point. It seems then highly counterintuitive to think that a computer (by virtue of attaining a 
sufficient level of complexity) can have a concept of itself, for example, ‘shutting down’ or 
‘having difficulty’, etc. Hence, it is plausible to conclude as Lowe claims, that computers 
neither have a capacity for self-thought nor any thought at all (1996: 183). Thus, the 
argument that purely physical devices like computers can be granted the status of a self is 
far from conclusive.  
 
Since for a proponent of NCSD the self is distinct from the physical body or any part of it, it 
seems plausible to say that the capacity for first-person thought can only be had by the self, 
not by the physical body or any part of it. But notice that having a capacity for first-person 
thought per se is not sufficient to substantiate Lowe’s TS. In other words, there is more to a 
____________________ 
grounds that the input-output equivalence does not indicate the presence of mentality in physical devices. See 
Lowe’s discussion (2000: 209-214). See also McGinn’s view on this (1999: 175-196). 
112 In fact, Searle’s point here can be made without any recourse to thought experiment. However, 
one need not endorse the ‘Chinese Room thought experiment’ to get Searle’s point. For Searle’s full account 
of the thought experiment, see Searle (1984: 31-32). I also think that the ‘frame problem’ effectively shows 
that the machines neither have the knowledge nor the ability to act in a way that fits the relevant 
circumstances. But human beings have both of these things. For more on this and on ‘connectionism and the 
mind’ see, Lowe (2000: 218-229).  
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self than merely having a capacity for first person thought. In this regard, at least, there are 
three things worth mentioning. These are self-knowledge, agency and the person as an 
emergent substance, respectively.   
 
6.1.1 Self-knowledge  
Lowe claims that a self has first-person knowledge about itself. For Lowe, what a self knows 
about itself has to do with knowing that certain thoughts, experiences and actions are its 
own. That is, as Lowe puts it, “it is a logically necessary condition of selfhood that a self 
should know that it itself is the unique subject of certain thoughts and experiences and the 
unique agent of certain actions,” (1996: 183). Lowe’s point here is that there is a sense in 
which the self necessarily knows that the self itself, rather than someone else, is the unique 
subject of certain experiences and thoughts. But as Lowe claims, the question remains: 
“which thoughts and experiences are they of which the self necessarily knows that it itself is 
the unique subject?” (Ibid: 184).  Here, different answers can be given, some of which Lowe 
raises (Ibid: 184). But for present purpose I will not get into that discussion.  
 
Notice however, that the question Lowe raises here seems to presuppose that there is a 
particular kind of knowledge. If the self has it, then it follows that such knowledge is 
genuine self-knowledge. In light of this, Lowe asks us to distinguish between de re and de 
dicto knowledge. Here the terms de re and de dicto are both modal notions. That is, in the 
words of Loux, “whereas the ascription of a de dicto modality is the ascription of the 
property of necessary truth/falsehood, possible truth/falsehood, or contingent 
truth/falsehood to a proposition taken as a whole, the ascription of a de re specifies the 
modal status of a thing’s exemplification of some attribute,” (1998: 184). Yet the distinction 
drawn here between the de re and de dicto modalities is not welcomed by all. In fact, there 
are philosophers who reject the de re modality in favor of the de dicto modality (e.g. see 
Quine, 1963: 148; 1960: 199). But for present purpose, I will not belabor Quine’s objections 
against the de re modality even though Quine’s own objections are far from conclusive (e.g. 
see Davidson ed., Plantinga, 2003: Ch.1).  
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According to Lowe, the de dicto knowledge does not show that the self has a genuine self-
knowledge. The reason for this is that the knowledge claims that we make in the de dicto 
sense arise purely from our understanding of the fact that thoughts and experiences are 
individuated by their subjects. Thus, Lowe claims that the de dicto knowledge claims barely 
qualify as expressions of self-knowledge. So this leaves us with de re knowledge, according 
to which one’s knowledge claim has to do with a thing or an object. For example, I 
necessarily know of the thought or experience of presently writing this thesis, that it is my 
own, that I (and no one else) am the subject of this thought or experience. Thus, as Lowe 
puts it, “when I have a conscious first person-thought—such as the thought that I feel hot—
I regard myself as being the subject of this thought, both in the sense of being the thing 
having the thought and in the sense of being the thing that the thought is about,” (2008: 
21). But Lowe is not claiming here that one also necessarily knows the other person’s 
present conscious experiences or thoughts, of which the other person is their only subject. 
In light of such asymmetry between knowledge of self and knowledge of others, for Lowe 
only the de re knowledge is a genuine instance of self-knowledge (1996: 185; cf. Coliva, ed., 
2012).113 Here Lowe’s remarks remind us of our discussion of Descartes’s Cogito, which as I 
argued is rooted in de re knowledge (see chapter one § 1.1.1.1).  
 
So assuming that the self has self-knowledge, the question remains: what then can we say 
about the body that embodies the self, that is, can we say that one’s body or one’s brain is 
also the subject of the thought or experience? If Lowe’s TS is correct, then this question 
must be answered in the negative. This is because only the self is the subject of thoughts. 
This is both in the sense of the self being the thing having the thought and also in the sense 
of the self being the thing that the thought is about (2008: 21). It then seems that we can 
deny that the body or any part of it (e.g, the brain) is the subject of the thought or 
experience. For instance, when I think of doing something, I do not understand my ‘thinking 
of doing something’ in terms of my body or any part of it ‘doing the thinking’ I am engaged 
in. Similarly, if I make the statement, ‘I hate so and so’, then it would not make any sense to 
___________________ 
113 Lowe extends this discussion beyond what I have covered here, see (Ibid. 185-203). 
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understand it in terms of my organic brain (despite using it to think) or my hands or my 
eyes, etc., as the subject of the thought of hating. So, in this case, it must be the self that is 
the subject of the thought of hating. Since the ‘thought of hating’ itself is a non-physical 
mental state, it is also distinct from the physical/brain states (e.g., neuronal activity such as 
C-fiber stimulation). Put differently, mental states are to the self as the physical states are 
to the physical body or any part of it. I will say more on this as we proceed in our discussion. 
Given what has been said so far, it seems plausible then to assume that a property of self-
knowledge necessarily belongs to selfhood.  
 
Hence, from this it follows that the self cannot be made identical with the body that 
embodies it. Thus, self-knowledge is one of the qualities that we attribute only to the self as 
opposed to the physical body or any part of it. In light of this, we can say that we have here 
a strong ground to justify the claim which I have been advancing from the outset. That is, in 
order to show whether a distinction holds between the self on the one hand, and the body 
or any of its parts on the other, we must point out one thing that is true of the self, but not 
true of the physical body and vice versa. As it seems then, self-knowledge is one of those 
things that is true of only the self, which is not true of the body nor any part of it, such as 
the brain. Hence, we can say that in light of this, Lowe’s TS is tenable.  
 
6.1.2 Agency  
Lowe claims that the self is by its very nature an agent, that is, the self is naturally capable 
of performing intentional actions, some of which bring about physical results (2008: 23ff). 
On Lowe’s view, an action A is said to be an intentional action, just in case an agent 
performs it in a certain way knowing that an agent is so acting. It seems to me that here, 
part of what constitutes being an agent, is the ability to perform intentional actions. But this 
is not enough. Lowe claims that for an action to count as intentional, an agent must also 
know that he/she is performing a particular action in a particular way. But here, I am not 
saying that for Lowe all there is to be an agent is the ability to perform intentional actions. 
However, performing intentional actions is one of the crucial aspects of the self’s nature. 
We can then ask: can we draw a clear demarcation between intentional actions vs. 
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unintentional actions? Different philosophers have different opinions on this. In this 
chapter, I will not pursue this issue (see Lowe 2000: Ch. 9).    
 
As we recall, for Lowe, the self is necessarily capable of self reference (e.g., via the use of 
the first-person pronoun ‘I’). In light of this, Lowe claims that the self necessarily possesses 
agency, that is, the ability to do intentional actions. Lowe sees self-reference as a species of 
intentional action (2008: 24). Thus, as Lowe puts it, “to refer to oneself as ‘I’, whether in 
speech or merely in thought, is to perform a kind of intentional act,” (Ibid: 24). The  point  
here  is  that  to  refer to  oneself  as  ‘I’  presupposes  one’s  engagement  in  some  sort of  
intentional act. As Lowe sees it, if done only in thought, such an act may not have physical 
results. But if done in speech, such an act will bring about physical results (Ibid: 24). 
Furthermore, for Lowe, only the self (capable of performing intentional actions) can have a 
concept of causation. In light of this, Lowe claims that possessing such a concept of 
causation is a necessary condition of self-reference. Thus, on Lowe’s view, possessing a 
concept of causation is linked with selfhood itself. Since an intentional action itself is a 
causal concept, when an agent performs an intentional action, Lowe thinks that an agent 
thereby also causes some sort of event to take place. This in turn will have a physical result, 
unless otherwise done merely in thought.   
 
So, for Lowe, the key notion here is that selfhood requires agency. By ‘requires agency’ here 
I understand Lowe to mean that either the self is the primary source of an intentional act or 
that it is the self or person that is capable of bringing about intentional acts. If this is 
correct, then it follows that the physical body or any part of it does not require agency in a 
sense stated above. For example, suppose that ‘I consciously desire a Starbucks coffee. Here 
at the least, I can say that I am in a Starbucks coffee ‘desiring state’. But to be in such a state 
is not in any clear way to be in a physical state. If this is correct, then to have a desire for a 
Starbucks coffee, in this case, pertains to a purely mental state. Thus, a mental state does 
amount, for example, neither to c-fibers firing inside my brain nor to some sort of publicly 
observable behavior. However, here I do not want to deny that there is a correlation 
between a mental state and a brain/physical state. For example, if I am a coffee addict, 
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then, when I drink coffee my headache goes away or I can better focus on doing something, 
etc. Here, I put aside the issue of whether such correlation is contingent or necessary.  
 
So it seems pretty clear that my desiring a Starbucks coffee (mental state) coupled with 
drinking coffee will result in some sort of physical experience (e.g., having no headache, 
etc). However, the question remains: what is it that, in the first place, makes me go to 
Starbucks to drink coffee? We may say that it is primarily the desire I have (not to mention 
the belief I also have of the existence of the Starbucks coffee shop itself at a specific 
location, etc.) to drink the Starbucks coffee. But here I do not take my ‘desire’ to drink 
coffee as necessarily playing a decisive role in my being at the Starbucks coffee shop. This is 
because, despite my desire to drink coffee, I can suppress my desire and fail to act on it.114 I 
assume that we do this with a host of other issues as well.  
 
Therefore, as Lowe rightly argues, all things being equal, to perform an intentional action, 
an agent or the self first must will to do so.115 In this case, I must will to go to the Starbucks 
shop knowing that I am going there to drink coffee. So, in light of the desire I have to drink 
coffee, what enables me to go to the Starbucks coffee shop is my own willing to do so. In 
other words, being an agent per se is not sufficient to bring about an intentional action 
which has a physical result. An agent also needs to engage in volition or in an act of will. But 
for one to engage in an act of will, at the least, one should be able to exercise a power to 
choose otherwise.116 So, given that the self or person is by its very nature an agent that is 
capable of performing an intentional action, we can point out human agency as one of 
those things that is true of the self but not true of the physical body or any part of it. Thus, 
we can say that the self is not identical with the physical body nor any part of it. From this  
___________________ 
114 There are philosophers who argue that beliefs and desires cause our actions. See, for example, Kim 
(2005: Ch.1).  
115 Lowe provides a detailed analysis on agent causation, event causation and volitionist theory, he 
himself favoring the latter one. See on this, Lowe (2008: 121-212; 2000: Ch.9).  
116 This issue is very controversial because not everyone accepts that humans are free in a libertarian 
sense, which is the ability to do otherwise. Since my sole purpose here is to deal with how the notion of 
agency implies Lowe’s TS, I do not want to digress from my main issue in pursuit of something else off my 
main agenda. But I will return to this issue briefly in § 6.4.1. For debate on free will, see Kane, ed. (2002).  
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then Lowe’s TS follows.   
 
6.1.3 The Self as an Emergent Substance  
Lowe claims that the self or person is a substance. By ‘substance’, Lowe has in mind a 
traditional notion of substance as a concrete individual thing or continuant. Here an 
example of substance would be an individual dog. A substance is said to be continuant just 
in case it persists through qualitative change. For example, if X’s skin color goes from being 
black to being white via cosmetic surgery, then the very same individual X must endure such 
a change and remain the same through such a change (see chapter one § 1.2.2.B; see also 
Lowe 1996: Ch. 1). In light of this, inter alia, a substance underlies a change a property 
undergoes. A lot can be said here, but for present purpose I want to focus only on some 
aspects of Lowe’s discussion on substance. I will pick up this discussion again in chapter 
seven where I will sketch out my own view.  
 
As Lowe argues, the self is a psychological or mental substance, whereas the physical body 
is a physical or material substance. Since a substance is a bearer of properties, Lowe rightly 
claims that a mental substance bears mental properties, whereas a physical substance bears 
physical properties. But does this mean that these two substances are radically different? 
Here different answers can be given. For example, as we shall see in §§ 6.2 and 6.3, a strong 
physicalist only endorses a physical substance at the expense of dispensing with a mental 
substance. On the other hand, for Descartes, the mental substance (the mind) is radically 
different from that of the physical substance (the body).117 Why think this is the case? One 
reason is that (as we recall from our discussion in chapter one), for Descartes, a mental 
substance is purely immaterial whereas the physical body is purely a material substance. 
Thus, for Descartes, a mental substance bears only mental properties. In other words, the 
self cannot have a physical property. One of the obvious serious problems here, of course, 
would be how to make sense of the causal interaction between two such radically diverse 
substances. In my opinion, this remains a tough obstacle for the plausibility of the Cartesian 
_______________ 
117 See, for example, Rene Descartes, ed., by Donald A. Cress, Discourse on Method and Meditations 
on First Philosophy 1998: 63-69; 92-103. See also Lowe (2000: Ch.2). 
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model. But this is not my concern here. By contrast, according to NCSD, the two substances 
raised above are not radically different since the self or person is embodied by the physical 
body, yet distinct from the physical body or any part of it. The question remains: how 
should we understand the claim that the self or person is an emergent substance?  
 
In the literature, the term ‘emergence’ is employed in two distinct senses, namely strong 
emergence and weak emergence. As Chalmers explains, a high-level phenomenon is 
strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon 
arises from the low-level domain. Yet, truths concerning that phenomenon are not 
deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain. Strong emergence is often 
discussed in philosophy. By contrast, a high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with 
respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level 
domain. Yet, truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles 
governing the low-level domain. Weak emergence is often discussed in science (Chalmers in 
Clayton and Davies 2006: Ch. 11). I will take up this issue in Chapter eight in some detail.  
 
For Lowe, the self is an emergent substance in the strong sense of emergence. In this case, 
the self or person is ontologically distinct from the physical body that embodies it (2008: 92-
118; cf. Hasker 1999).118 To say that the body embodies the self is to say that the body 
concretizes it—i.e, makes it concrete, tangible or visible. This is contrasted with the 
constitution view. In this view, to say that the body constitutes the self/person, is to say 
that the body is related to the self/person as the statue is related to the piece of clay that 
constitutes it. In this case, the two objects occupy the exact same region of space yet with 
their own persistence condition (see again Ch. 1: § 1.1; Baker 2000). By contrast, the 
embodiment relation is based on what I shall call the ‘having relation’. That is, the 
self/person has the body that allows him/her to move, to sense, to see, to hear and so on. 
Although particles constitute a person’s body, given the embodiment model, the same 
cannot be said of the self/person itself. In other words, nothing constitutes the self/person 
(see further Lowe 1989).  
_______________ 
118 By ‘emergent substance’, I understand Lowe to mean ‘a new kind of substantial entity.’  
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In light of this, Lowe claims that the self has a causal power. But such causal power 
attributed to the self is not reducible to the causal power of the physical body that 
embodies it. Nor does such a causal power, on the other hand, exist totally independent of 
the causal power of the physical body. Thus, Lowe sees the causal power of the self as 
complementing and supplementing that of the physical body, as opposed to being in 
conflict with it. Unlike Descartes who thinks that the self has no physical properties, Lowe 
claims that there is a sense in which the self is a ‘physical’ thing. That is, the self is a thing 
that possesses physical characteristics such as height—even though it has different identity 
conditions from those of the body or brain (Ibid: 22).   
 
To see Lowe’s point more clearly here, we need to understand that for Lowe, the self is a 
simple substance. We say something is a simple substance just in case it is not composed of 
parts. But for X to have a part, X itself must be a substance. For example, our physical body 
(material substance) is composed of a number of parts, namely hands, legs, eyes, etc. So we 
can say that the eyes or any other part of the physical body taken individually is a 
‘substantial part’ of the material substance (in this case, the physical body) taken as a 
whole. But since for Lowe, the self is a simple substance, it does not have such parts. In light 
of this, Lowe distinguishes a substantial part of a thing from a merely spatial part of it (Cf. 
Heil 2012: Ch. 2). It is the latter sense that Lowe employs for the self. That is, the self has a 
spatial part, where ‘spatial part’ refers to some geometrically defined section of it. 
However, here the word ‘section’ should not be taken to mean something is literally cut out 
from the self. Instead Lowe tells us that when we refer to the self’s spatial part, we refer to 
it only in a sense that the self has a region that is defined by certain purely geometrical 
boundaries (1996: 36).  Hence, when we attribute a physical characteristic to the self, such 
as ‘X is five feet tall’, all we are saying according to Lowe, is that the self has spatial parts as 
opposed to substantial parts. Since the self has no substantial parts, it is distinct from the 
physical body or any part of it.  
 
Moreover, for Lowe, the self is a subject of experience. In this context, by ‘experience’ Lowe 
means that not only does the self have sensory and perceptual experience but also inner 
awareness and thoughts (2008: 94; cf. Moreland 2009: 110-111). Since only the self bears 
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mental properties, it must be distinct from the physical body or any part that embodies it. 
Of course, the self exemplifies mental states (e.g., pain), when the physical body or part of it 
is in a certain physical state. But the question remains: does this imply that the self must 
have a physical body or any part of it in order to have a mental state? Lowe thinks not. That 
is, as Lowe sees it, “I being the subject of all and only my own mental states, am such that 
every one of those mental states does depend upon me…hence…neither my brain as a 
whole nor any part of it can qualify as the subject of all and only my mental states and so be 
identical with me,” (2008: 97). If Lowe is right here, which I believe that he is, then bearing 
mental properties is something which is true of only the self but not true of the physical 
body or any part of it. So once again this shows that Lowe’s TS is plausible.  
 
In light of what has been said so far above, I believe that Lowe’s theory of the self makes a 
strong case for TS. However, the strong physicalist may employ some ways to object to 
Lowe’s TS. Such an objection could be raised, for example, by suggesting that we can only 
have a plausible understanding of the nature of the self, if and only if, we either locate it 
within the framework of physicalism or eliminate it. The question then becomes: can we 
give a purely physical account of the nature of the self? Put differently, can we locate the 
self within the framework of physicalism in favor of the identity of the mental with the 
physical? Before we answer these sorts of questions in some detail, we need to see the full 
package of the strong physicalist’s story which I primarily consider as a direct objection 
against Lowe’s TS. In this respect, Frank Jackson’s SM is a good representative. I now turn to 
a brief exposition of Jackson’s SM.  
 
6.2 Jackson’s Serious Metaphysics (Location Problem) 
In his From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998: Ch. 1),119 Jackson tells a story about what he calls  
__________________ 
 119 Frank Jackson (1998: Ch.1). In the philosophical literature, there are objections or counter-
examples raised against different formulations of the theory of the self. Some of these objections include 
multiple personality disorder, split-brain patient, etc. But my interest here is not to revisit those familiar 
objections/counter-examples. Rather, I would like to see the issue raised here from a fresh angle (though by 
‘fresh angle’ I do not pretend that my approach is entirely original) by formulating Jackson’s SM as an 
objection against Lowe’s TS and then give a rejoinder to Jackson’s objections. For discussions surrounding the 
common objections against the theory of self see: Dennett (1991: Ch. 13); McGinn (2000: 157-174); for 
analysis and rejoinders see Lowe (1996: 26-7, 29-30, 40, 184, and 195); Swinburne (1986: 145-160). Recently 
Bayne, in his paper entitled “The Unity of Consciousness and Split-Brain Syndrome” argues that the disunity  
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SM within the framework of strong physicalism, according to which the physical nature of 
our world exhausts its entire nature. By SM, Jackson refers to a metaphysics that maintains 
that we can attain comprehension of the nature of things without drawing up big lists. That 
is, to understand the features of the world, all that we need is a limited number of basic 
ingredients. Even if for Jackson, metaphysics is about what there is and what it is like, this 
does not mean that metaphysics is concerned with any old shopping list of what there is 
and what it is like. Rather, as Jackson suggests, metaphysics seeks a naturalistic account 
(e.g., purely physical) of some subject matter—whether that turns out to be the mind, 
semantic properties, or everything—in terms of a limited number of more or less basic 
notions. So for Jackson, SM is the investigation of where these limits should be set. Thus, 
Jackson claims that by its very nature, SM continually faces the location problem. Because 
the ingredients are limited, some putative features of the world are not going to appear 
explicitly in some more basic account. The question is: whether putative features 
nevertheless figure implicitly in the more basic account. As Jackson claims, since SM is 
discriminatory, at the same time claiming to be complete, a host of putative features of our 
world either must be eliminated or located.  
 
By location problem, Jackson refers to an attempt to locate some entities within the 
framework of physicalism. But Jackson understands that some entities such as semantic 
properties, de se content, mind, etc., do not seem to fit within the framework of 
physicalism. Thus, we face the location problem. However, Jackson claims that one way to 
solve the location problem is to embrace what he calls: the ‘entry by entailment thesis,’ 
according to which an entity is entailed by a basic physicalist story iff it is entailed by the 
basic constituent of that story. Moreover, such an entailment would enable us to identify 
what appears explicitly in an account from what appears implicitly in it. For Jackson, in this 
regard, science plays a pivotal role. For example, Jackson claims that science tells us about 
the basic constituents of tables, chairs, etc., without mentioning solidity. That is, science  
______________________ 
models of the split-brain are highly problematic and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-
brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all 
times.” ‘The Journal of Philosophy,’ v. 6, (June 2008), 276-300. I will discuss Bayne’s article in chapter eight.        
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tells us that a dry object like a table is an aggregate of molecules held by a lattice-like array 
by intermolecular forces. Such intermolecular forces keep the molecules from encroaching 
on each other’s spaces. In such a scientific story, even if we have not come across the word 
‘solidity,’ from this it does not follow that nothing is solid. Since objects like tables are solid, 
solidity gets location or place in the molecular story about our world by being entailed by 
that story.  
 
Jackson gives three examples: (1) for Jackson density is not a property that is over and 
above mass and volume, instead density is entailed by mass and volume; (2) solidity is not 
an additional feature over and above the way a lattice-like array of molecules tend to repel 
each other;  (3) in the same way, to say that Jones is taller than Smith is not something that 
we can take as a feature of how things are, which is additional to Jones’s being five foot and 
Smith’s being four foot nine, if in fact Jones is five foot and Smith is four foot nine.   
 
So for Jackson, if the features of our world are entailed by the account told in terms favored 
by the metaphysics in question, it has a place in the account told in the favored terms. In 
other words, the one and only way of having a place in an account told in some set of 
preferred terms is by being entailed by that account. In the same vein, the psychological 
appears in the physicalists’ account of our world iff that account entails the psychological 
account of our world. Hence, as Jackson states, the distinctive claim of physicalism is that 
“the world is entirely physical in nature, that it is nothing but, or nothing over and above, 
the physical world, and that a full inventory of the instantiated physical properties and 
relations would be a full inventory simpliciter,” (1998: 9). Jackson also claims that an 
obvious way to approach completeness in physicalism is to assume that there is no 
independent variation. This suggests that we should look for a suitable supervenience thesis 
to capture the sense in which physicalism claims completeness. In light of the distinctive 
claim of physicalism, variation in the nature of a world independently of variation in the 
physical nature of that world is impossible.  
 
Jackson also claims that egocentric or de se claims have owners. That is, such claims are 
about how things are with us. For example, I might believe that there are lions near me. 
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Moreover, egocentric claims have a perspective or point of view that is built into them. So 
they can be produced from the perspective of the holder of the belief. But for Jackson, this 
is as far as it goes. That is, since the strong physicalist story does not accommodate in any 
direct way notions like ‘egocentric claims’, ‘one’s point of view,’ etc., Jackson claims that the 
best way to approach such notions is by giving a perspective-free account of our world. We 
can do this, according to Jackson, by reducing egocentric or de se content to the non-
egocentric or de dicto content. As Jackson puts it, “…claims and beliefs about how things are 
with the claimer or believer can invariably be translated in some way or other into how 
things are with the world,” (1998: 19). In short, we talk about how things are with the world 
as opposed to how things are from one’s own perspective.  
 
Finally, Jackson asks us to imagine a story in which  be the story as told in purely physical 
terms. Jackson claims that such a story is true at the actual world and all the minimal 
physical duplicates of the actual world. But such a story is false elsewhere. The story 
imagined here is a hugely complex, purely physical account of our world. Jackson also asks 
us to imagine the  be any true sentence which is about the psychological nature of our 
world. By this, Jackson means that if supposing that there is such a true sentence, then it 
can only become false by things being different psychologically from the way they actually 
are. That is, every world at which such sentence ( is false differs in some psychological 
way from our world. As it were, the idea is that  counts as being about the psychological 
nature of our world. The reason for this is that making false requires supposing a change 
in the distribution of psychological properties and relations. In light of this, if we grant that 
any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our 
world, then every world at which  is true is a duplicate simpliciter of our world, and so a 
fortiori a psychological duplicate of our world. However, every world at which  is true is a 
world at which  is true—that is how Jackson says that  entails  (1998: 25).  
 
I now turn to my formulation of Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS.  
 
6.3 Jackson’s SM against Lowe’s TS  
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Remember that Lowe’s TS, inter alia, is a claim about the distinction that holds between the 
self and the physical body that embodies it. But as we briefly saw in § 6.2 above, making 
such a sharp distinction between the self and the physical body, is unacceptable for 
philosophical naturalists who advocate strong physicalism. Thus, given the physicalist story 
as told by Jackson, it seems clear that the strong physicalist finds it difficult to embrace 
Lowe’s TS. The strong physicalist equally finds it hard to endorse various sorts of mental 
phenomena, namely belief, desire, fear, hope or, in short, intentional states of the self, 
unless any such states are understood/described in a purely physical way. For example, 
Jackson argues this point explicitly elsewhere.120 
 
What sort of a purely physical description can a strong physicalist give for Lowe’s TS? This is 
precisely the answer that we want to know in light of Jackson’s SM. In order for Jackson to 
succeed here, it seems decisive for him to be able to show us how we can get around 
notions like the self and still make sense of our experience of mental states (e.g., I feel a 
pain). But why is doing this important for a physicalist? It is important for at least four main 
reasons: (i) dualists think (or Lowe’s TS entails) that intentional states as well as other 
mental states are states of a subject or states of their owners. If this is right, then it follows 
that mental states fail to exist on their own unless they have owners, namely selves or 
persons. (ii) Since mental states are not the same as physical states as shown in § 6.2, the 
strategy (so it seems to me) that the strong physicalist needs to put in place is the one that 
shows why the dualist view, both on mental states and on the nature of the self, is mistaken 
or even false. (iii) Since for Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of doing intentional 
acts, the strong physicalist must also account for human agency from a purely physicalist 
perspective. (iv) The dualist claims that the self has first-person knowledge about oneself 
(e.g., the self knows that certain thoughts, experiences and actions are one’s own). Since 
the strong physicalist denies first-person perspective, he/she should suggest a better way to 
understand claims made from first-person perspective via using first-person pronoun ‘I’ as  
__________________ 
 120 For example, see Jackson’s view on mental states in Michael Smith (ed.), “Consciousness,” (2005: 
310-333).  
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discussed in §§ 6.1 and 6.1.1. If the physicalist can come up with a better alternative 
account of (i)-(iv), then Lowe’s TS can be shown to be either a thesis that should be rejected 
altogether or one that needs to be revised in a way that suits Jackson’s SM.  
 
To do this, as Jackson argues above, there seems to be three main options that are 
available: (1) locate the self or person within the physicalist ontology via a process Jackson 
calls, the ‘entry by entailment’ thesis according to which, an entity is entailed by a basic 
physicalist story iff it is entailed by the basic constituent of that story; (2) eliminate the self 
if it is not locatable within the physicalist ontology; (3) refuse from the beginning, on a priori 
or nonexperiential ground, to select the self as one of those ingredients to be included in 
the physicalist ontology. Notice here that Jackson’s SM is discriminatory, that is SM can set 
a limit as to what entities are to be included and what others are to be excluded from the 
physicalist ontology. What then follows from the above options set up by the physicalist? 
Here are some of the things I think would follow. For example, if (1) obtains, then the 
dualist claim that the self is distinct from the physical body or any part of it that embodies it 
will be undermined. This is because locating the self within the physicalist ontology 
necessarily requires the obliteration of the distinction that Lowe thinks to hold between the 
self and the physical body that embodies it. Likewise, if (2) obtains then, the same result we 
saw in (1) will be true, that is, if the self is eliminated, then there will be no distinction that 
Lowe’s TS implies between the self and the physical body that embodies it. In this case, we 
need to say goodbye to Lowe’s TS. If (3) obtains then, the physicalist will have no reason 
whatsoever to bother himself/herself with thinking about the entity that has not been part 
of his/her ontology in the first place. So Lowe’s TS simply remains a nonissue for the 
physicalist.  
 
In Jackson’s case then, of the three options listed above, the one that is important for the 
physicalist to explain away the self is to use option (1). In light of this, I do not take Jackson 
attempting to use options (2) and (3) above to explain away the self being distinct from the 
physical body or any part of it. This is because Jackson acknowledges that we have beliefs 
and also make claims with respect to how things are with us. For example, I might believe or 
assert that there are deers near me. Here the belief as to the presence of deers near me is 
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produced from my own perspective as a holder of such a belief. So we can at least say that 
Jackson’s SM prima facie does not eliminate the self from the physicalist ontology. Instead 
Jackson is looking for a way to locate the self within physicalism. Thus, I suspect that the 
physicalist at this point might want to challenge Lowe’s TS on the basis of (1). If the 
physicalist could do that, then Lowe’s TS will be undermined. Given Jackson’s SM, there are 
two main ways to do that: 
 
First, the physicalist employs a third-person description strategy whereby first-person 
assertions or de se claims are deprived of having a first-person reference in favor of 
understanding such claims to be referring only to facts about the world. In other words, the 
physicalist can reduce de se claims, as Jackson tells us, to de dicto or non-egocentric claims. 
For instance, a claim like I myself wrote a letter is irreducibly about me, in a sense that I 
have the first-person knowledge of I myself writing a letter or my own experience of writing 
a letter. But the physicalist would say that such is not the case. Instead, the claim I myself 
wrote a letter is simply the physical property of writing a letter and nothing beyond. In 
other words, even if de se claims entail first-person perspective, in a sense that such claims 
are made from the perspective of the claimer, the physicalist story, as Jackson argues, is a 
“perspective-free account.” So it seems then that the strong physicalist could easily explain 
away first-person perspective. Thus, in giving this sort of reductive analysis of de se claims, 
the physicalist can avoid the notion of the self or person. Recall here that Lowe’s theory of 
the self argues that the notion of the self is captured by the first-person pronoun ‘I’ or an 
indexical “I”. But if the physicalist’s argument here is correct, then Lowe’s theory of the self 
faces a serious challenge. This is because Lowe’s TS implies that there is such a thing as a 
first-person perspective (for example, self-knowledge).    
 
Second, the physicalist claims that the truth or falsity of egocentric or de se claims and 
beliefs supervene on the de dicto story about the world. That means de se claims and beliefs 
have no independent role whatsoever unless seen in the light of the de dicto claims. But 
such an assumption does not seem to be compatible with the first-person perspective 
scenario. We saw this earlier in § 6.1.1., in our discussion of self-knowledge. That is to say 
that what a self knows about oneself has to do with knowing that certain thoughts, 
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experiences and actions are one’s own. But according to Jackson’s notion of supervenience, 
variation in the nature of the world independently of variation in the physical nature of that 
world is impossible. What grounds this notion of supervenience is the conjunction of the 
following two theses: (B) “any world which is a minimal physicalist duplicate of our world is 
a duplicate simpliciter of our world” (1998: 12); (B*) “any world which is a minimal physical 
duplicate of our world is a psychological duplicate of our world.”(Ibid: 17).  
 
The implication of such a physicalist supervenience thesis taken in light of (B) and (B*) 
above for Lowe’s TS seems to boil down to this: that nothing can be true of the self, which is 
not already true of the physical body or any part of it. That means that whatever is true of 
(B) necessarily must be true of (B*) as well. If the physicalist is correct here, then it seems to 
follow, despite the dualist claim to the contrary, that the psychological properties are 
identical with the physical properties. But notice that Lowe’s TS implies that the self is an 
emergent simple substance, that is, the self is ontologically distinct from the physical body 
or any part of it, such as the brain. Moreover, the self as an emergent simple substance is 
neither reducible to nor divorceable from the physical body that embodies it. But this does 
not seem to be the case, if Jackson’s supervenience thesis above is the case.  
 
Following Jackson then, the strong physicalist objection against Lowe’s TS can be summed 
up as follows: if (B) above is true, then every world whereby the purely physical story told in 
the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. From this it also follows that (B*) 
above is true: every world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a 
psychological duplicate of our world. This means that for the strong physicalist, every world 
wherein the purely physical story told in the actual world is true, is a world wherein the 
story told about the psychological nature of our world is true. This again shows that the 
purely physical entails the psychological nature of our world. As Jackson puts it: 
What about sentences with egocentric content? We can think of a purely physical 
story as being in part about the physical nature of an individual as well as being 
about the physical nature of a world-thus the story might include…that I myself 
weigh 75 kilos-and by an obvious extension of the argument in the text, the 
physicalist must hold that the relevant egocentric psychological story about, say, me, 
is, if true, entailed by the relevant purely physical story about me as well as about 
the world (Ibid: 25).  
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Hence, for Jackson, it seems that the only way we can make sense of the notion of the self is 
by locating it within the framework of physicalism as stated under option (1) above. What 
then can we say in response to Jackson’s SM? I now turn to that discussion.  
 
6.4 Critical Reflection on TS and SM Models 
The two different models, as presented by Lowe’s TS and Jackson’s SM, clearly lead us to 
two different conclusions as to the nature of the self. In a nutshell, Lowe’s TS simply rejects 
any attempt to identify the self with the physical body that embodies it. Moreover, even if 
the self is a physical thing in virtue of possessing physical characteristics as discussed in §§ 
6.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3, for Lowe, mental properties which the self bears are not physical 
and thus, are not reducible to something physical. By contrast, Jackson’s SM allows us to 
identify the self or person with the physical body simply because that is what best suits the 
scientific account of our world (e.g., Jackson’s SM seems to verify this point in § 6.2). To put 
it differently, we do not need first philosophy to settle the issue of the nature of the self. 
Instead, we need to stick to the scientific account of our world. This is because it is only via 
science that we come to a good grasp of the nature of the self.121 For example, given 
Jackson’s SM, our world is such that only one sort of properties are exemplified (e.g., 
physical properties). Hence, the non-physical mental properties which Lowe’s TS implies 
must undergo some sort of reductive analysis and be identified with the physical. In short, 
such is Jackson’s way of arriving at a true scientifically justifiable picture of our world (Cf. 
Moreland 2008: Ch. 1).  
 
So the key question is: which model best fits our ordinary conception of the self? By 
‘ordinary conception’ here, I refer to what people in general think is obvious or central 
about their own experience as selves or persons. Of course, each side of the debate can 
favor its own conception of the self. So in that sense, the answer for the above question can 
go both ways (e.g., the dualist way on the one hand, and the physicalist way on the other). 
But obviously, we cannot affirm both answers for the simple reason that the answers we  
__________________ 
121 For example, see also Jackson’s view on science in Michael Smith (ed.), “Consciousness,” (2005: 
310-333). 
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get from each side negate each other. So the question remains: how should we address 
such a problem? The best thing to do here is to examine the reasons given by each model 
on the nature of the self. If we accomplish such a task, then we can be in a better position 
to adjudicate over which model gives a plausible account of the nature of the self. In doing 
so, we can also have a better grasp of which model best reflects our ordinary conception of 
the self.   
 
But the strong physicalist might protest here by saying that we do not need to be concerned 
with our ordinary conception of the self or person. To know about ourselves, all we need to 
do is to pay attention to what scientific theories currently available say about our world and 
the place we have in it. The main reason then for such disapproval of our ordinary 
conception of the self is its incompatibility with currently accepted scientific theory, 
according to which the notion of the self is analyzed in terms of third-person description. I 
will say more on this very objection at a later time. I will return to this issue again in chapter 
seven. But for now let me give one reason as to why I think our ordinary conception of 
ourselves, as persons, is pertinent in our overall effort to understand what it means to be a 
person.  
 
Suppose that I get seriously sick, and thus I go to the hospital to see a doctor. Insofar as I am 
able to communicate, the first thing the doctor does is to ask me to explain to him/her how 
I feel. Of course, I may misconstrue and thus, misreport how I feel. But the report the 
doctor gets from me is very important to his/her understanding of the health problem I 
have, which in turn helps the doctor to decide what kind of treatment I should get. So the 
report I give to the doctor on how I feel is not a theory I have over what kind or how many 
sorts of feelings I have. Instead my explanation of how I feel is a direct report that I give to 
my doctor from my own first-person perspective. Here, my experience of how I feel has, in 
the words of Sydney Shoemaker, “immunity from error through misidentification.”122 For 
example, if I experience pain in my abdomen, then it is hardly plausible to think that I  
__________________ 
122 Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1998): 555-67., 
as quoted in Lowe, (2000: 267). Also see Shoemaker (1996: 15, 196-7, 211).   
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misidentify such a pain experience with someone else’s pain experience. Of course, it may 
be the case that I may report wrong things about how I feel, but that per se does not 
invalidate the fact that there is such a thing as the first-person perspective, such that I 
necessarily know about my own pain experience. The point here then is not the accuracy of 
the report I give to a doctor on how I feel, but whether I could give a report of how I feel 
(whatever truth value it has) from my own first-person perspective.  
 
Here let us also consider the ‘phantom’ pain phenomenon. Sometimes people with an 
amputated leg claim that they still experience pain in the amputated leg. Imagine saying to 
such people that they simply must be kidding and nothing they say is true. We say this 
because it seems ludicrous to believe that there can be such a pain experience in the 
absence of a leg that has already been amputated. Such discussion can be controversial but 
getting into that is not my wish here. But the question is: on what basis can we then deny 
such reports of the ‘phantom’ pain, since the ‘phantom’ pain experience itself is being 
reported from someone’s first-person perspective? The answer clearly is that there is not 
any plausible basis for a third party to deny someone’s claim of the ‘phantom’ pain. The 
lesson here, is that as Lowe argues, the capacity for self-reference and also knowing certain 
experiences to be one’s own are some of the fundamental features of our experience via 
which we develop our ordinary conception of what it means to be a self or person.    
 
So the bottom line here is that contrary to the strong physicalists, our ordinary conception 
of our experience of things from our own first-person perspective, and as a result of that, 
the report we give on our experience is not irrelevant at all. In fact, the claims we make 
from first-person perspective do not depend on scientific theories of one sort or another, 
for the simple reason that such claims resist third person analysis. I will say more on this at 
a later time. Thus, to deny first-person perspective because of its incompatibility with a 
scientific theory of some sort and because of that to claim that we should redefine the 
notion of the self in terms of third-person description is a non-sequitur.   
 
The strong physicalist can still try to suggest other counter-examples, like in the case of 
infants or babies who cannot explain how they feel, and people who go into a deep coma or 
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become temporarily unconscious, and so must depend on their doctor’s third-person 
analysis of their situation. Thus, such scenarios can be defeaters for the preceding 
discussion on first-person perspective. In response, we can say that the assumption here is 
misguided. In the case of both infants and people who are in a deep coma or are 
temporarily unconscious, their own first-hand experience is left unarticulated due to 
different reasons. In the case of infants or babies, we can say that they have not yet 
developed their capacities of speech to engage in verbal or linguistic activity. But from this it 
does not follow that infants do not experience things from first-person perspective. This is 
because the absence of an immediate ability to verbally communicate, or even not being 
aware of things from the first-person perspective, does not rule out the capacity babies 
have to communicate, for example, by crying, becoming restless, not wanting to eat, etc., to 
indicate that they are not feeling well. Of course, things such as crying, lack of appetite, etc., 
are behaviors we observe from the third-person perspective but this by itself still does not 
show that babies themselves do not have their own first-hand story to report even if we 
know that they cannot verbally report at the moment. If I am right here, then for infants or 
babies, it is just a matter of time until they reach a certain age level where they can verbally 
express themselves and their experiences from a first-person perspective. I will say more on 
issues related to this point in chapter eight.  
 
We can offer a similar argument when it comes to those who experience a deep coma or 
become temporarily unconscious. Due to a serious medical condition or because of an 
accident, people might not be able to articulate their own experience. But it is fallacious to 
conclude from such a scenario that they lack a first-person perspective regarding their 
experience. This is because persons have first person perspective, independent of some 
situations that might prohibit them from exercising it. For all we know then, people at such 
moments cannot verbally utter their experience nor do they seem to be aware of what they 
experience. Of course, no one can say anything whatsoever on behalf of what their 
experience would be like other than the people themselves. We can only wait and see what 
these people would say regarding their experience after they gain back their consciousness. 
Therefore, we can safely say that the physicalists’ attempt to replace first-person 
perspective by third-person perspective is deeply implausible. If I am right, then first-person 
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perspective necessarily belongs to oneself. Thus, even if the doctors analyze the problems 
of both the infants and the people who are in a deep coma or temporarily unconscious from 
the third-person perspective, what the doctors still fail to know, is as Nagel argues, ‘what it 
would be like’ to be sick or be in a deep coma or to temporarily become unconscious, etc., 
from the perspective of people who go through such experience (see for details Nagel 
1986).  
 
In light of what has been said so far, it seems to me that Jackson’s claim that we can do 
away with de se or egocentric claims by reducing them to de dicto claims or facts about the 
world is problematic. This is because the process of reducing de se claims to de dicto claims 
necessarily brings the loss of first-person perspective. But since, as we saw above, the first-
person perspective is irreducible, it follows that we cannot capture the meaning of de se 
claims via de dicto claims. Contrary to Jackson then, the notion of de dicto claims cannot 
play the role of the de se claims without thereby leaving out the first-person point of view. 
As Lewis argues, “…some thought is egocentric, irreducibly de se, and then its content 
cannot be given by the propositions whose truth is relative to nothing but worlds; for 
propositions do not discriminate between inhabitants of the same world,” (1986: 55).  As 
Lewis further remarks, there is no difficulty in understanding how different sorts of 
egocentric experiences are irreducible; unless we stubbornly insist that such experiences 
cannot be what they seem (Ibid. 125).123 In light of what I have said so far, Lewis is correct in 
telling us that we can take various de se thought or belief instances at face value, that is 
without reducing de se claims to de dicto claims. If this is right, then Jackson is mistaken in 
his claim that the truth or falsity of de se claims are fully determined in the light of the de 
dicto claims.  
 
But Jackson could respond to such a rebuttal by saying that the physicalist story (which is 
based on science) is a ‘perspective-free’ account and thus, the physicalist should not be 
concerned to retain the first-person perspective in a way that the dualist wants. But 
Jackson’s response faces its own problems. First, it seems to beg a question in that if the 
__________________ 
                      123 See also Lewis’s “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88 (1979): 513-543 
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physicalist account of the world is a ‘perspective-free account’ of our world, then isn’t the 
physicalist assuming a ‘perspective’ to tell us about the physicalist story being a 
‘perspective-free account?’ Second, since science per se neither establishes nor can tell us 
about the nature of reality (as I will try to show at a later time) without some sort of 
philosophical assumptions first put in place, it remains both entirely unclear and also 
controversial to invoke a ‘perspective-free account’ of the world as Jackson states it.  
 
But there is another serious problem with Jackson’s claim about a ‘perspective-free 
account’. Suppose that the physicalists think that their position, physicalism, is the accurate 
description of the world we live in and who we are as human beings. Suppose further that 
the physicalists formulate a theory known as strong physicalism (e.g., as Jackson’s own 
theory SM shows). At this point, the physicalists obviously want to convince their opponents 
of the plausibility of their physicalism. I would assume this is also true of not just 
physicalists, but in general anyone who defends some sort of theory in philosophy or 
science or any other discipline. If there is a position one argues for, then how can we 
divorce the perspective from which it is argued? If indeed as Jackson claims that physicalism 
is a ‘perspective-free account’, then what does physicalism amount to as a theory? How can 
physicalism be a position that the physicalists argue for if the position itself is empty of 
perspective? Jackson might obviously suggest as a response here the need to reduce 
egocentric claims to non-egocentric claims. But as we have already seen, that kind of 
reduction will not help the physicalist. The only alternative the physicalist seems to have 
here, I think, is either to drop his claim on the so called ‘perspective-free account of the 
world’ or bluntly face the problems raised above. But none of the alternatives seems 
impressive, to say the least.  It seems then fair to say that Lowe’s TS model in emphasizing 
the first-person perspective as one of the fundamental features of the nature of the self or 
person poses a formidable challenge to the strong physicalists’ denial or attempt to reduce 
first-person perspective to third-person description or perspective.  
 
The other way Jackson’s SM challenges Lowe’s TS is by explaining away the self via 
supervening the truth or falsity of egocentric or de se claims and beliefs on the de dicto 
story about the world. That means that de se claims and beliefs do not have an independent 
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role to play unless they are seen in the light of the de dicto claims. But such an assumption 
is incompatible with the first-person perspective scenario we discussed above. Since I have 
already said enough as to why reducing or leaving out the first-person perspective from 
one’s ontology is problematic, at this point, I only want to respond to one crucial aspect of 
Jackson’s supervenience claim. Remember, for Jackson, supervenience is the conjunction of 
two claims as identified earlier as (B) which states that any world which is a minimal 
physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world and (B*) which states 
that any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a psychological 
duplicate of our world.  
 
Once the supervenience relation between de se claims (made from first-person perspective) 
and de dicto story about the world are understood in light of (B) and (B*) above, it seems 
that the dualist has to think about what the causal history would be like between the 
physical and the psychological. Remember that dualists attribute causal power to the self 
without which the self would lose one of the decisive features of selfhood. Dualists also 
argue that the self is a bearer of mental properties which are non-physical states. Since de 
se claims imply mental states (e.g., I am afraid of bandits near me) which are causally 
autonomous, Jackson’s supervenience claim here, if true, creates a problem of causal 
exclusion. For example, Kim argues that the problem of causal exclusion arises from the 
“supervenience” argument and it is the main problem of mental causation (1998: Chs. 1-2). 
One of the things that make the exclusion problem distinctive is that it strikes at the very 
heart of physicalism. Hence, the basic problem of mental causation is concerned with giving 
an account of how it is possible for the mind to exercise its causal powers, given a world 
that is fundamentally physical. So the problem of causal exclusion boils down to showing 
whether a mental cause is possible, since every physical event that has a cause has a 
physical cause. The question then becomes, as Kim remarks: what place does mental cause 
have in a world in which only physical cause is responsible to bring about physical event? Or 
if we acknowledge that P has a physical cause P* at t, then the question to ask would be: 
given that P has a physical cause P*, what causal work is left for M to contribute?   
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The biggest worry for the physicalists then, is that in a world where only physical causes are 
acceptable, leaving room for the non-physical causes or mental causes would have a 
troubling result for physicalism. As Kim remarks, if mental event m, occurring at time t, 
causes physical event p, and if this causal relation holds in virtue of the fact that m is an 
event of mental kind M and p an event of physical kind P, does P also have a physical cause 
at t, an event of some physical kind N? Here, to deny that p has a physical cause at t, yet at 
the same time to grant that only mental event m taking place at t as a cause of physical 
event p would be a violation of the causal closure of the physical domain, according to 
which no physical event has a non-physical cause. As I see it, at this point, those 
philosophical naturalists who accept the causal closure principle as stated above will unite 
in rejecting top/down causation. That means that given the physicalist story, non-physical 
mental causes do not operate in the physical world. Thus, as Kim argues, the physicalists 
can avoid overabundance of causes, for example, if they take P to be a cause of P* and M 
supervenes on P, then M* supervenes on P*. Hence, given the physicalists’ account, the M-
to-M* and M-to-P* causal relations are only apparent, arising out of a genuine causal 
process from P to P*. I think Kim’s conclusion here directly resonates well with Jackson’s 
supervenience claim—grounded in (B) and (B*) above.  
 
The question remains: what implications does Jackson’s move to supervene de se claims 
upon de dicto claims have for the nature of the self? As we saw earlier, if the de se claims 
are rooted in the first-person perspective in a sense that such claims are produced from the 
point of view of the holder of a certain belief, then such claims clearly have a mental 
content. Moreover, for the dualist, claims with a mental content are causally relevant. But 
as the strong physicalists argue, if the mental cannot cause the physical, then every causal 
phenomenon has to be reduced to physical cause. In this sense, strong physicalism is 
inherently reductionistic. For example, if mental properties which the self or person bears, 
lack genuine causal power and appear to be having only an apparent causal power, then by 
strong physicalist’s reasoning, the psychological and the physical properties must be 
identical. That means that we can only talk about physical causation as opposed to mental 
causation. Why should we think that is the case? Since our mental states–our beliefs, 
desires and intentions–have causal effects in the physical world, to deny that mental states 
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have a genuine causal power is counterintuitive at the least. Moreover, the physicalists’ 
causal closure claim, as stated above, is problematic for the simple reason that it begs a 
question. This is because the strong physicalists assume that without reducing mental 
properties to a physical domain, mental properties are irrelevant to establish causal relation 
between the mental and physical states.124  
 
So even if the supervenience relation between the de se claims and the de dicto claims 
holds, it will not be a solution for the physicalists to establish their claim that everything 
must be described on the basis of physics. This is because giving the physical description of 
the supervenience relation as stated above, per se, does not answer the key question, why 
in the first place such a supervenience relation exists between the de se claims and the de 
dicto claims. Thus, the supervenience relation here simply remains a problem yet to be 
solved. Insofar as I can tell, Jackson’s SM has not solved it. But Jackson might respond to the  
__________________ 
124 Lowe (2008: 25-40; Chs. 2-3), looks at several arguments surrounding the causal closure of the 
physical domain. In my opinion, Lowe in his book raises devastating challenges against physicalism in general, 
and strong physicalism in particular. For lack of space, I will not go into those arguments. However, I will say 
something briefly about the main ideas of the arguments. Lowe evaluates different versions of the causal 
closure arguments and shows why he thinks that it is possible for the psychophysical dualist to be open to the 
stronger causal closure principle which will not invite the transitivity problem. According to Lowe, a persuasive 
case can be made with respect to taking mental states to have a full causal power, in a sense that mental 
states can cause physical events. But such an assumption need not lead one to think that mental states are not 
themselves a product of prior physical evolution. In fact, part of Lowe’s main point is to argue for the thesis 
that mental states are themselves a product of prior physical evolution, yet, Lowe makes it clear that the 
distinction between the mental states and the physical states needs to be maintained. Of course, physicalists 
would not want to embrace the claim that non-physical mental states cause physical events. For the 
physicalists, such causal relation between the mental and the physical would amount to violating the physical 
closure principle. But, on the other hand, if the physicalists’ physical closure principle is true, then the dualists 
claim that mental states can cause physical events would be false. But Lowe argues that there is no good 
reason to let the physicalists get away with their causal closure claim for the simple reason that it is perfectly 
possible to argue that ultimately, mental causation can be shown to fall within the framework of physical 
evolution. If this is true, then as Lowe claims, we can understand mental causation to be linked with the 
physical causal history. As Lowe puts it, “it is possible…that every physical event has a set of wholly physical 
causes which are collectively causally sufficient for the occurrence of that event-and yet for it also to be true 
that some physical event, P, has a non-physical event or state, M, amongst its causes (without envisaging this 
as involving the causal overdetermination of P). This is because M itself may have a set of wholly physical 
causes which are collectively causally sufficient for its occurrence. If M is a cause of P, then, by transitivity of 
causation, all of those physical causes of M are also causes of P- and clearly they may form a subset of wholly 
physical causes which are collectively causally sufficient for the occurrence of P.” (p.26). Such an assumption 
as laid out above, is perfectly consistent as Lowe argues with (i) the self or person being distinct from the 
physical body or any part of it, such as the brain; (ii) the self or person being an agent capable of engaging in 
intentional acts, some of which bring about physical outcome. If Lowe is right, then the strong physicalist’s 
claim that denies a non-physical mental cause for physical event must be rejected.   
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above remarks by saying that his physicalism is only a claim about the actual (our) world to 
the effect that its physical nature exhausts everything about it. In light of this, Jackson may 
even grant that the above mental causation scenarios might be acceptable, given that such 
mental causations are not taking place in our world. So insofar as our world is concerned, 
autonomous non-physical properties cannot be instantiated. 
 
In response to Jackson, I have two things to say. First, Jackson’s claim that any physical 
event is not outside of the physical domain and everything can be explained on the basis of 
physics is problematic. This is because such is a strong philosophical claim which can hardly 
be accommodated within the physicalist domain. That is, the statement ‘‘everything can be 
explained on the basis of physics’’ itself cannot be explained on the basis of physics or 
science. That means that the statement itself cannot live up to its own scrutiny. If this is 
right then, to make a claim that a complete physical explanation of everything is possible is 
self-defeating. Second, contrary to Jackson, for all we know, our world is such that non-
physical mental states can cause physical events. For example, if I believe that it will rain 
this afternoon, then I might take an umbrella with me to school. 
 
But if mental states do not have a genuine causal power, then they are merely 
epiphenomenal or causally impotent. This means that there is no top/down causation that 
is from mental to the physical. Instead, for the physicalists there is only bottom/up 
causation (e.g., from the physical to the mental). But denying top/down causation, as the 
physicalists do is deeply flawed, given what we know about intentional states and our own 
first person awareness of them. Thus, no plausible physicalist case is made that refutes 
Lowe’s TS. However, an objection can be raised against these remarks as follows. First, one  
one may say that our personal experience of intentional states as causally efficacious is just 
an illusion. Second, what I considered ‘implausible’ above is what a physicalist will consider 
plausible. So, my case against physicalism remains unpersuasive.  
 
My response to the first objection rests on the semantics of the word ‘illusion’ which as I 
see it, can be understood both epistemically as well as metaphysically. Taken in the former 
sense, X is said to be an illusion just in case for all we know, X is not what it appears to be. 
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Taken in the latter sense, X is an illusion just in case there is no fact of the matter as to the 
very existence of X. Of the two senses, the latter one is the strongest. In light of this, if the 
causal efficacy of intentional states such as our desires and beliefs are said to be an illusion, 
then the most familiar part of our life is not what we normally think that it is. To see this, 
consider this scenario. When I feel thirsty, I open my refrigerator and look for juice/Coca-
Cola or water. In this case, I believe that there is water in the refrigerator. In drinking water, 
my desire is to quench my thirst. Before I cross the road, I make sure that the road is clear 
from the traffic; otherwise, I get hit or killed. Examples of these sort can be multiplied in 
their thousands. The point is that in all such cases, we take for granted that we act on the 
basis of our desires or beliefs to explain our actions as we experience the world around us, 
as well as interact with other fellow humans.  
 
Of course, this does not mean that our experience is incorrigible or indefeasible. But from 
this it hardly follows that our intentional states have no causal input into our actions. In this 
case, our realism in the causal efficacy of intentional states is not contingent on us first 
refuting the ‘illusion’ objection. So it remains unclear what motivates a defender of the 
causal efficacy of intentional states to take up the task of refuting the illusion objection 
before she establishes her case. More importantly, if the ‘illusion’ objection is taken in its 
metaphysical sense, then the burden of proof squarely rests on the one who says that 
intentional states do not even exist, to give us concrete evidence that substantiates such 
claim. In this regard, if there is one thing that the last five decades debate in philosophy of 
mind has shown, it is how difficult it is to establish the ‘illusion’ objection (see e.g., Kim, 
2006; 2005). Hence, the ‘illusion’ objection against the causal efficacy of intentional states 
does not seem to pose any serious threat to those who defend it. My response to the 
second objection revolves around the notion of ‘plausible’ vs. ‘implausible’. These notions 
are closely related to the notion of persuasion’. If one finds certain philosophical argument 
plausible (i.e., reasonable) then one most likely will find it persuasive. On the other hand, if 
one does not find certain argument plausible, then one most likely will remain unpersuaded 
by it. In light of this, the dualists find the physicalists’ denial of the causal efficacy of 
intentional states implausible. On the other hand, the physicalists find the dualists’ realism 
about the causal efficacy of intentional states implausible. So what is going on here? Is the 
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disagreement between dualists and physicalists over the causal efficacy of intentional states 
substantive or merely verbal? This is a metametaphysical issue which I have no interest to 
pursue for present purposes (see e.g., Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009). That said, 
however, the plausible vs. implausible objection raised here cuts both ways in that it does 
not favor the dualists’ position over that of the physicalists’ or vice versa. So the only thing 
one can do in this case is to state one’s position as best as one can. Although persuading 
someone is what a philosopher always hopes to do as she presents her case, it is not within 
her power to ensure that persuasion actually happens. We need to keep in mind that 
persuasion is person-relative. In philosophy, even after we present our very best argument 
in defense of our position, our opponent, if she wishes, could always find some reason to 
deem it as implausible. This is one reason why there is almost no issue in philosophy which 
is free from controversy. So I conclude that as it is in the case of the first objection, the 
second objection also does not seem to threaten the dualists’ realism about the causal 
efficacy of intentional states.  
 
6.4.1 The Location Problem  
To see whether or not Jackson’s SM model solves the location problem (as presented in § 
6.2), it is important to answer a simple question such as this one: are there things for which 
we cannot find a place in the physical world? Put differently, is a purely physical description 
of everything on the basis of modern science possible? Given Jackson’s SM, the physicalists 
would say yes. But the dualists deny such a positive response, yet they obviously grant that 
certain things can find their place in the physical world or can be described on the basis of 
physics. So, if the dualists want to rebut the physicalist’s bold claim above, then he/she 
should point out entities that resist having their place in the physical world or resist the 
complete physical description of their nature. If the dualist could show this, then the 
physicalist’s claim that every entity indiscriminately can find a place in the physical world 
will be undermined. For present purposes, I will raise only two points. 
 
A. Emergent Properties  
Jackson’s SM model ignores fundamental aspects of the nature of the self. To see this point 
we need to recall that for Lowe, even though the self is a physical thing in a sense that the 
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self possesses physical characteristics, the self is a bearer of non-physical mental properties. 
So, one of the things that characterize non-physical mental properties is that they are 
emergent properties.125 An emergent property, as Moreland argues, is a simple non- 
structural property unique to the “emergent” level of reality. Hence, an emergent property 
cannot be captureable, for example, in terms of the spatio-temporal, physical, causal 
relations among the states as well as parts at the lower level reality. Moreover, as Moreland 
further notes, an emergent property, being a new kind of property, is different from and 
not composed of the parts, properties, relations, and events at the subvenient level. If this 
is the right characterization of an emergent property, then this would put Jackson’s SM in 
an awkward position. That is to say, an emergent property does not fit within the physicalist 
ontology. Thus, an emergent property cannot be entailed by physicalism as the basic 
constituent of that story. For example, phenomenal consciousness has a qualitative feel (for 
example, seeing yellow) in a sense that it is about ‘‘what it is like to be sentient’’.  
 
Suppose then that I experience a sharp pain in the middle of my back. Suppose further that 
my wife looks at my grimaced face and asks me what is wrong with me. Will I then tell my 
wife to go to the hospital to ask the doctors to find out about my pain experience? The 
answer is clearly no. This is because, since I am the one who experiences such pain, I have 
direct access to my own pain experience which qualifies me to tell my wife how hurtful the 
pain in my back is. The pain in this case has a distinctive quale or felt sensation that 
constitutes my pain experience. If I am right, then all that the doctors can do is analyze what 
is wrong with my physical body from the third-person point of view. But giving an account 
of the experience of pain itself and its distinctive hurtfulness has nothing to do with physics 
and chemistry or the scientific analysis of the pain.  
 
Of course, the strong physicalists would reject the above argument for at least two reasons. 
First, the physicalist might say that since mental states are identical with physical states, 
there is nothing to introspect or privately access as if mental states are distinctly 
recognizable. Second, even if mental states exist they are epiphenomenal, i.e., with no  
_____________________ 
125 In this regard, see an excellent discussion in Moreland (2008: 1-7).  
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causal role whatsoever. Hence, there is nothing to introspect about causally impotent 
states. But such rejection is rooted in the physicalist’s ‘‘grand’’ story about our world, which 
is entirely physical (see also Moreland 2008: Ch. 1). But the dualist can still argue that there 
is no good reason to endorse the physicalist rejection of mental states. In response, the 
dualist can run a similar argument as advanced above. That is, we can introspect our mental 
states and properties. Since mental states are properties that we exemplify, then mental 
properties stand to us as inner. But ‘‘inner’’ here should not be taken to mean spatially 
inside, since ‘‘inner’’ stands for property exemplification. Moreover, our mental properties 
are not accessible by a third party unless we ourselves want to make that to be known to 
others. In other words, we have direct unmediated access to our own sensations and 
conscious states (see also Chapter one § 1.1.1.1).  
 
But none of this is true of physical objects or brain states. For example, my sensation of my 
car is not mediated by other sensations. This is a self-presenting property when instantiated 
by a subject, it presents both the intentional object (car) and itself to the subject. As Lycan, 
(who is not a friend of dualism) remarks, “to anyone uncontaminated by materialist 
philosophizing, the mental does not seem physical in any way at all, much less 
neurophysiological,” (2008: 2). Lycan’s remark here clearly strengthens what the dualists 
have been saying all along about the non-physicality of mental states. In light of all this, the 
physicalists’ denial of mental properties being accessible privately to their owners flies in 
the face of our experience. Thus, physicalism fails to give us a complete physical description 
of the nature of the self that bears non-physical mental properties. Ergo emergent 
properties cannot be located in the physical world.   
 
By contrast, we can give a complete physical account of things if, in this case, what we have 
in mind is structural property. Here by structural property, I refer to a property that is 
identical to a certain way of arrangement among the subvenient level. This means that 
unlike emergent properties, structural properties are not new kinds of properties but rather 
they are new arrangements of subvenient entities. Since there is no new kind of entity here, 
nothing stands over and above those entities that are already at the subvenient level. For 
example, Jackson’s analogy on solidity, as stated in § 6.2, is a perfect example of structural 
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property. As Jackson argues, science tells us that a dry object like a table is an aggregate of 
molecules held together by a lattice-like array by intermolecular forces.  
 
In such a scientific story, even if we have not come across the word ‘solidity,’ from this 
nothing follows to the effect that nothing is solid. Since objects like tables are solid, solidity 
gets location or place in the molecular story about our world by being entailed by that story. 
However, Jackson’s analogy faces a problem here. That is, solidity is disanalogous to a quale 
as stated above. While there is a ‘what it is like to feel’ a pain (emergent property), the 
same cannot be said of solidity.  From all this then, it follows that physicalism is ill-prepared 
to deal with emergent properties.126  I will say more on the notion of emergence in chapter 
eight.  
 
B. Agency   
Jackson’s SM model explains away the fundamental aspect of human agency. To get clear 
on this point, we need to remember that for Lowe, the self is by its very nature an agent 
that is capable of engaging in intentional actions, some of which bring about physical 
results. One of the difficulties we face then in discussing human agency, has to do with the 
question of whether human free will is compatible with determinism or not. Of course, one 
can deny that human agents possess libertarian or self-determining freedom in favor of 
holding that agents are only free to do as they want and are morally responsible for the 
choices they make. I explain the details of this argument in what follows. In light of this, one  
___________________ 
126 If the above discussion on emergent properties vs. structural properties is correct, then it would 
have great significance for those who advance arguments for consciousness as an emergent phenomenon that 
does not depend on the subvenient level in a way that structural properties do. For example, see Moreland’s 
Consciousness and the Existence of God, 2008; Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, pp. xii and 
chapter 10; Eric LaRock, argues for the irreducibility of consciousness on empirical ground, see his essay ‘Is 
Consciousness Really a Brain Process?’ International Philosophical Quarterly, v. 48, No. 2, Issue 190 (2008),  
201-229. But philosophical naturalists of different stripes have different reactions on the nature of 
consciousness. For example, Searle takes consciousness as an emergent phenomenon, but locates it within the 
neurobiological processes (see e.g., Searle 1992: Chs. 4-5); McGinn argues that consciousness is a deep 
mystery (see e.g., McGinn 1999: Chs. 1-2); Churchland dismisses consciousness (see e.g., Churchland 1988), for 
Jackson’s view see Jackson in Michael Smith (ed.) (2005). My own view is in line with Moreland and Swinburne 
that consciousness is an emergent property. Since the self is the bearer of consciousness, in light of the 
reasons we saw so far, it also seems hardly possible to find a place for consciousness in the physical world in a 
sense that the physicalists point out. I will say more regarding the emergence of consciousness in chapter 
eight.  
 
  
223 
 
can conclude that human free will is compatible with determinism.   
 
For present purpose, we are only interested in understanding the notion of human agency, 
given that our world is all in all physical. By ‘human agency’ I refer to the self’s capability to 
perform intentional actions. Notice that for human agency to obtain, the antecedent 
condition, in this case mental causation has to be possible. However, given our preceding 
discussion, we cannot find a place for mental causation in a world that is fundamentally 
physical. Then the question becomes: which model, SM or TS, fits our ordinary conception 
of human agency? Of course, the strong physicalist might say that such a question is an 
irrelevant one in relation to his/her main argument. For example, Jackson argues that 
redefining our ordinary conception of human agency is one of the tasks that his SM sets out 
to accomplish.  As Jackson puts it, “there is nothing sacrosanct about folk theory. It has 
served us well but not so well that it would be irrational to make changes to it in the light of 
reflections on exactly what it involves, and in the light of one or another empirical discovery 
about us and our world,” (1998: 44).  So from Jackson’s remarks, it seems clear that as a 
physicalist, he wants to reformulate the way human agency is supposed to be understood. 
For example, for Jackson our intuitions are the primary sources for our view of free action, 
determinism, etc. 
 
But in order to have a correct understanding of what we claim to know on the basis of 
intuitions, there is further work to be done, which would include elucidating the possible 
situations covered by the words we use to ask questions regarding free actions, among 
others. At this point, the dualist legitimately may ask whether the pre-theoretical 
conception of human agency needs to undergo a sort of revision that the physicalist 
demands. For present purpose, I do not want to pursue matters related to Jackson’s 
conceptual analysis. However, in light of his SM, the big question we need to answer is this: 
can we locate agency in a world that is fundamentally physical? To answer this question, let 
us briefly analyze the notion of human agency in light of strong physicalism on the one 
hand, and dualism on the other.  
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Since the SM model primarily is a claim that everything must be described on the basis of 
physics, the best we can get from such a model is a sort of human agency which is rooted in 
determinism. By determinism127, here I have in mind a notion that refers to a family of 
views. Taken this way, determinism stands for the idea that everything in the world, human 
action included, is controlled by universal laws of nature. ‘Psychological determinism’ is 
another member of that family, according to which our desires, purposes, needs, etc., are 
motivators of our behavior. In light of this, if SM is correct, then for every event E that 
happens, there is an antecedent cause C such that given C, nothing else could have 
happened. That means that if determinism is true, then every human action, say for 
example, raising my hand in one of my classes to ask a question, is causally necessitated by 
prior events that already took place prior to my hand going up, which also includes events 
that existed before I was born. According to this model then, human agency remains fixed 
by the way the world is.  
 
On the other hand, given the TS model, we can say that free human actions are not 
compatible with determinism. If human agents have real freedom, that is freedom 
undetermined by an antecedent cause of some sort, then it follows that agents have control 
over their own actions. If understood in this sense, libertarianism is a view that holds that 
agents determine their own actions freely. Unlike determinism as stated earlier, 
libertarianism rules out antecedent causes or factors as being responsible for an agent’s 
choice of action. Of course, one’s desires and beliefs are capable of influencing one’s choice. 
But from this it does not follow that free acts are caused by antecedent factors in the agent. 
Hence, agents have control over their own will or at least have control to will to act. For 
example, if I am given a choice to live in the US for the next ten years or go back to my 
home country Ethiopia, nothing save for my own will determines that either choice is made. 
Since I am an agent, I can exercise my own causal power to do one alternative or refrain 
____________________ 
127 Hard determinists deny the existence of free will whereas soft determinists accept the free will but 
claim that it is compatible with determinism. I will not be concerned with either view here. There is also a  
version of determinism known as theological determinism, according to which if God knows in advance what 
free agents would do then such divine knowledge of the future actions of free agents makes human actions to 
happen out of necessity in which case, human agents are not free to do things out of their own free choice. 
This version of determinism will not be discussed in this chapter.  
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from doing it altogether.128 According to the TS model, selves or persons are capable of 
bringing about effects that have not been predetermined by something other than the 
agent itself. So in the TS model, human agency is not fixed in terms of the way the physical 
world is.  
 
Given the above discussion, the SM model faces serious difficulty in finding a place for 
agency in a world that is fundamentally physical. Here is why. First, since mental causation 
is not possible in a world that is fundamentally physical, it makes perfect sense to say that 
genuine agency is not possible either. Second, since the self is an agent and genuine agency 
requires causal autonomy, it follows that a complete physical world turns out to be unable 
to accommodate agency. This is however, only if the physicality of the world is taken in a 
strict physicalist sense. On the other hand, notice that Lowe argues that his TS is consistent 
with the following claim: “Every physical event has a set of wholly physical causes which are 
collectively causally sufficient for the occurrence of that event—and rarely if ever is a 
physical event causally overdetermined,” (2008: 20). Third, since mental causation is a 
species of an emergent property, and since an emergent property is not locatable in the 
physical world (for reasons we already saw), it follows that the SM model simply leaves out 
agency. By leaving out agency, the SM model faces another problem which I will discuss at a 
later time. So this leaves us with the TS model as a plausible alternative.  
 
Jackson might reject the previous analysis of agency by saying that if we expand the 
extension of the term or concept we use to talk about ‘free action’ or use the phrase ‘free 
action’ to cover more cases than what is normally recognized, then it can be shown that 
free action is compatible with determinism. If Jackson is right, the objection is that folk 
conception of free action as stated in a libertarian sense will no longer be needed. As a 
result, the physicalist can say that free action amounts to actions which have been prefixed 
or predetermined to happen in accordance with physical law. In response, we may agree 
with Jackson in a sense that we can paraphrase concepts and words we use to mean slightly 
different things than the way we frequently use them. We may even expand the extension  
_____________________ 
128 See for example, van Inwagen (1983); also see Lowe (2008: Chs. 6-10).  
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of what those concepts and words mean. But this is as far as Jackson’s conceptual analysis 
brings us. This is because his conceptual analysis method turns out to be very problematic 
when it comes to moral responsibility. When people take responsibility for their actions, it 
seems to me that this is because there is a deeply entrenched intuition that informs them 
that they acted one way while still they could have acted the other way, had they chosen to 
do so. It is usually in light of this realization that people show true remorse for their bad 
actions; praise for their good deeds. Surprisingly enough, even children at an early age are 
capable of reasoning in this fashion. For example, children know that when they do 
something they should not have done, they will be held accountable for their actions. Such 
understanding may not be as precise as we like it to be, but the point is that when people 
reason out properly, they realize that for some of their actions they will be held 
accountable. 
 
Suppose that John embezzles more than three billion dollars from a company he works for 
and reasons to the company’s administrative office in these words: ‘Folks, what I have done 
is something that has a long causal-chain that goes back to the time even before I was born. 
So I have no good reason to feel sorry, let me go home.’ Who would buy John’s reasoning? 
The answer is obvious, no one, unless there were a really good reason to the contrary.  For 
this and countless other scenarios which have to do with human actions, the only plausible 
response would be to assume the libertarian view of freedom. So given a libertarian view of 
freedom, John was in complete command of himself when he did what he did. Only if we 
have such convictions about human free will, will we be justified in taking responsibility for 
our actions. But how could this be true if the world is such that only physical laws are 
responsible for causing anything that happens? How can we make sense of the very idea of 
taking responsibility for our actions? For example, it is very clear that we ungrudgingly take 
responsibility only if we believe that we have a causal power, such that the action 
performed is the result of an intentionally informed decision. As far as I can tell, Jackson’s 
SM does not have any plausible answer for these sorts of questions. 
 
If indeed every human action is the outcome of factors existing prior to an agent’s acting in 
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a certain way to bring about some sort of result, then the very notion of agency is confused. 
On the contrary, if an agent is capable of bringing about effects by willing (as we discussed 
in § 6.2), then the physicalists’ claim that a complete account of everything including human 
free will can be given on the basis of a fundamentally physical world must be false. It makes 
perfect sense then to say that human agency is hardly locatable in a world that is 
fundamentally physical. If I am right here, then it follows that Jackson’s SM fails to locate 
some important things, one of which is agency.    
 
6.4.2 Methodological Issues and Jackson’s SM 
As we saw previously, Jackson’s SM cannot locate important things that define the nature of 
the self, namely emergent properties and agency. Of course, the list here is not exhaustive. 
But we have said enough to make our point that Jackson’s SM leaves out important things 
mentioned above from the physicalist ontology. As we will shortly see, in leaving out things 
like emergent properties and agency, physicalism will face its own serious problem. It seems 
then that some of the main reasons for the physicalism’s inability to locate emergent 
properties as well as agency within its ontology have to do with at least two things: (i) the 
rejection of first philosophy; (ii) the setting forth of science as the only credible and 
adequate methodology to account for the nature of things. When the strong physicalists (as 
Jackson represents them) stick to (i) they often fail to give a complete account of the nature 
of things on the basis of only (ii).  
 
As Lycan remarks, there also seems to be a misguided attempt on the part of the 
physicalists to frame the debate between physicalism and dualism, such that dualism is 
competing with neuroscience or a science whereas in reality, dualism competes with 
materialism, an opposing philosophical theory (2008: 9). Here Lycan’s comment is well 
taken because primarily the issue that surrounds the debate between dualism and 
physicalism rarely hangs on what science says about important issues such as those 
mentioned above (e.g., agency). On the contrary, the heart of the debate between dualism 
and physicalism is precisely philosophical in nature. But whenever philosophical and 
scientific domains/issues get conflated, the result often is favoring (ii). But the problem here 
is that as we saw previously through various examples, (ii) has its own serious limitations. 
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Moreover, rejecting first philosophy in favor of (ii) also leads us to an ever deeper problem, 
as I will explain in what follows.   
 
As Moreland persuasively argues, it seems to me that the other contributing factor for the 
confusion that emerges over the debate between dualism and physicalism has to do with 
the strong physicalists’ failure to make necessary distinctions between four major types of 
questions. As Moreland puts it, these questions are: (a) Ontological questions such as To 
what is a mental or physical identical? What is a human person? (b) Epistemological 
questions such as How do we come to have knowledge or justified belief about minds and 
about our own mind? Is there a proper epistemic order to first-person knowledge of one’s 
own mind and third-person knowledge of other minds? (c) Semantic questions such as what 
is meaning? What is a linguistic entity and how is it related to a meaning? Is thought 
reducible to or a necessary condition for language use? (d) Methodological questions such 
as How should one proceed in analyzing and resolving the first-order issues that constitute 
the philosophy of mind? What is the proper order between philosophy and science? Should 
we adopt some form of philosophical naturalism, set aside so-called first philosophy and 
engage topics in philosophy of mind within a framework of our empirically best-attested 
theories relevant to those topics? (Moreland, 2008: 158-159).   
 
Jackson, because of his commitment to science (of course, better to say to ‘‘scientism’’) 
ignores to take questions (a)-(c) at face value. Rather Jackson’s SM, tries to merge (a)-(c) 
with or reduce them to (d). Since (d) above helps the physicalists to frame their theory in a 
way that fits their commitment to the physicalist ontology, questions (a)-(c) can only be 
answered in light of the philosophical naturalism that rejects first philosophy. Of course, the 
suggestion that metaphysical knowledge must be under the umbrella of science echoes very 
much Quine’s well-known doctrine of naturalized epistemology (see e.g., Quine 1969: Ch. 
3). Once the physicalist achieves this goal, then appealing to science as stated in (ii) above, 
will be the only game in town. This is precisely why Jackson’s SM hangs on the picture of our 
world as described by modern science. The question then becomes: what consequence will 
the physicalist view of science bring to the very position that they advocate?  
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At least three things come to my mind. First, the physicalists’ view of science suffers from 
scientism, according to which all forms of knowledge have to be empirically based. There is 
a serious problem here though. That is, the very claim that ‘all forms of knowledge have to 
be empirically based’ is not itself a scientific claim, but rather is a philosophical claim about 
what sort of limit science sets with respect to what counts as knowledge and what does not. 
So here, there is a clear conflation of a first-order discipline (e.g., science) with the second 
order philosophical claim about science. Here Lowe’s remarks hit home:  
…devotee of scientism…fail to see that science presupposes metaphysics and that 
the role of philosophy is quite as much normative as descriptive—with everything, 
including science, coming within its critical purview. Scientists inevitably make 
metaphysical assumptions, whether explicitly or implicitly, in proposing and testing 
their theories—assumptions which go beyond anything that science itself can 
legitimate. These assumptions need to be examined critically, whether by scientists 
themselves or by philosophers—either way, the critical philosophical thinking that 
must be done cannot look to the methods and objects of empirical science for its 
model. Empirical science at most tell us what is the case, not what must or may be 
(but happens not to be) the case (Lowe 1998: 5; see also Moreland, 2008: 158-159).  
 
Insofar as scientism is problematic as stated above, the physicalists can hardly account for 
everything on the basis of science. Thus, the dualists are within their own epistemic right to 
advance their metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self without basing it on 
science. Second, since emergent properties, agency, etc., are things which cannot be 
explained (at least primarily) on the basis of science, yet they are part of the fabric of 
human nature and experience, then the strong physicalist’s claim that the accurate picture 
of our world is the one that only modern science gives us, must be false. So leaving out 
important things such as agency from the physicalist ontology only shows the inadequacy or 
the incompleteness of the theory. Third, strong physicalism relies on either a reduction or 
elimination method to deal with emergent properties. But the problem, as we have already 
seen, is that such properties are irreducible. Thus the physicalists’ methods to either reduce 
them or eliminate them remain unsuccessful. This is because such methods could do 
neither job for the physicalist.    
 
But Jackson rejects the above remarks because he thinks that it is a methodological mistake 
to think that philosophy should revise science. If philosophy revises science, then for 
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Jackson, this amounts to giving philosophy and metaphysics an immodest role.129 Jackson’s 
point here is a bit puzzling. He seems to be implying that there is a sort of self-sufficiency for 
science. If this is what Jackson has in mind, then when he tells us that neither philosophy 
nor metaphysics ought to revise science, Jackson’s claim again amounts to another instance 
of a philosophical claim about how science should be treated. If I am right, then Jackson’s 
claim should be rejected because it has a self-defeating nature, in that the philosophical 
claim he makes is incompatible with his own conception of science. To say that it is a 
methodological mistake for philosophy to revise science is not a scientific statement at all. 
Hence, if indeed it is a methodological mistake for philosophy to revise science, then all that 
it implies is that if philosophy were to revise science, then philosophy only ends up violating 
not science, but scientific naturalism upon which the very physicalism itself is based. I think 
we need to heed Moreland’s remarks, “scientists cannot adequately discuss the central 
topics in philosophy of mind without making substantive philosophical claims, but 
philosophers need not discuss scientific data to treat adequately these same philosophical 
issues,” (Moreland, 2008: 173).  Of course from such remarks nothing follows to the effect 
that science is irrelevant in matters of philosophical discussion. But that is another issue. 
From all this, it follows that Jackson’s attempt to unnecessarily compartmentalize science 
and philosophy remains unpersuasive.  
 
6.5 Summary  
In this chapter, I discussed Lowe’s theory of the self, according to which the self is distinct 
from the physical body or any part of it, such as the brain. The self is also an intentional 
agent. Even if the self is a physical thing in virtue of possessing physical characteristics, the 
self is a bearer of non-physical mental properties. I have also considered objections against 
Lowe’s TS and responded to those objections. I also discussed Jackson’s theory of serious 
metaphysics and argued that Jackson’s attempt to locate everything in the physical world is 
unsuccessful. I have raised objections against Jackson’s SM and tried to show why Jackson’s 
rejoinders fail. After having looked at the two models, TS and SM, my own conclusion is that 
Lowe’s TS has a superior explanatory advantage over a range of phenomena discussed in  
______________________________________ 
129 See Jackson (1998: 42-43). Also see, Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar, eds., (2004: 23-24).  
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this chapter. By contrast, Jackson’s SM fails to succeed in what it set out to accomplish, that 
is, to locate everything in a fundamentally physical world. In light of all this, I would say that 
there is every good reason to endorse Lowe’s TS and reject Jackson’s SM. Thus, Lowe’s TS is 
superior to Jackson’s SM.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Neo-Aristotelian Account: The Substantial-Self/Person 
7.1 Summary  
In the last six chapters, my main emphasis has been on the centrality of substance ontology 
for the substantial-self/person question on the one hand and personal identity on the other. 
In chapter one, I attempted to establish the substantial-self/person question. I also provided 
a survey of the main issues in the contemporary personal identity debate. In chapter two, I 
argued, inter alia, why substance ontology is central to Locke’s theory of personal identity. 
In chapter three, I argued why despite earning him many followers, Hume’s anti-substance 
ontology project is hardly successful. In chapter four, I argued why the methodology of 
thought experiments, has paved the way for the radical shift in the subject matter of the 
contemporary personal identity debate. That is, what I called the Aristotelian question, i.e., 
‘what is X’ question has been put in the back seat whereas the puzzle cases and the 
criterion of identity question have been let to ride in the driver’s seat. In chapter five, 
therefore, based on the observations made in chapter four with respect to the 
marginalization of the ‘what is X’ question, I argued that most, if not all, contemporary 
debates on personal identity have been set off in the wrong direction. In this regard, I have 
located my discussion within the framework of the currently most influential view of 
personal identity, namely the relational/neo-Lockean view. I also briefly discussed other 
contemporary views such as animalism, the constitution view of a person and a substance 
view of a person in relation to the neo-Lockeanism.  
 
In chapter six, I discussed the ontology of the self in the context of the philosophy of mind. 
In that chapter, I based my discussion on two representative views, one from the dualist 
camp and one view from the strict physicalist camp and argued why strict physicalism 
suffers from a lack of explanatory adequacy with respect to a wide range of issues we 
grapple with in philosophy of mind (e.g., mental causation, human agency). In the present 
chapter, my main goal is to pull together the thread of various arguments I have given in the 
last six chapters in regards to the realist ontology of the self/person, and to sketch out the 
view of the self/person that I shall seek to defend. This is the view I am calling: the Neo-
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Aristotelian View of Substantial-Self/Person. As indicated in chapter one in § 1.1.2.3, I will 
locate this view within the framework of the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics with 
reference to substance ontology. In doing so, I will attempt to explain what this view 
amounts to in light of the Aristotelian metaphysics. In chapter eight (which is the final 
chapter of this thesis), I will consider a couple of objections against this view. I will then 
conclude the thesis with some remarks about future areas of research.  
 
7.2 Traditional Metaphysics in a Nutshell 
In his essay entitled, ‘On What Grounds What,’ Jonathan Schaffer correctly observed that 
unlike the currently dominant Quinean view, which reduces the core inquiry of metaphysics 
to what there is, (e.g., whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether 
numbers exist), metaphysics in the traditional Aristotelian view, is about what grounds what 
(in Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, eds., 2009: 347). As Schaffer argues, metaphysics so 
conceived does not dwell on asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist, 
which most people could agree that they do exist. Rather the real business of metaphysics 
taken in its traditional sense [inter alia], is to deal with whether or not the things that exist 
are fundamental (Ibid.; see also Kit Fine in Tahko 2012: Ch.1).130 So what does Aristotle take 
fundamental existent to be? Here at the top of the list we find, primary ousia, which 
Aristotle takes it to be the central subject matter of his metaphysics. So without taking 
metaphysics seriously, we cannot have an adequate grasp of Aristotle’s substance ontology. 
In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle describes the central concern of ‘first philosophy’ as follows:  
There is a discipline which studies that which is qua thing-that-is and those things 
that hold good of this in its own right. That is not the same as any of what are called 
the special disciplines. For none of the others examines universally that which is qua 
thing-that-is, but all select some part of it and study what is coincidental concerning 
that; as for instance the mathematical disciplines. But since we are seeking origins, 
i.e. the most extreme causes, it is plain that these are necessarily a particular 
nature’s in its own right. If therefore these origins were also sought by those seeking  
___________________ 
130 In his essay, Schaffer also points out that contemporary textbooks often introduce metaphysics in 
the spirit of the Quine-Carnap debate, declaring Quine as a winner. But why start with the Quine-Carnap 
debate? [As is well-known, for Carnap, traditional metaphysical claims are meaningless owing to their failing 
to fit into the verificationist epistemological mold]. But Schaffer asks: Why think that the best understanding 
of metaphysics is to be found in a debate between a positivist teacher and his post-positivist student, both of 
whom share explicitly anti-metaphysical sympathies? (Ibid.) Schaffer’s question here entirely resonates with 
what I have been emphasizing myself all along in this thesis.  
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the elements of the things-that-are, the elements too are necessarily of that which is 
qua thing-that-is, not coincidentally. Hence we also have to find the first causes of 
that which is qua thing-that-is (Metaphysics Γ.1. 1003a21). 
 
Here the gist of Aristotle’s point is that the object of the investigation of first philosophy is 
not as limited as some special sciences, which only tend to focus on their respective area of 
interest. For example, mathematics focuses on things that are countable and measurable. 
But for Aristotle, metaphysics is a universal science that studies being qua being (cf. 
Grossmann 1983: Ch. 1). But what does Aristotle mean by ‘being qua being’? As S. Marc 
Cohen remarks, Aristotle’s description of ‘the study of being qua being’ does not imply as if 
there is a single subject matter—being qua being—which is under investigation. Instead the 
phrase ‘being qua being’ involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter (being), and 
(3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied, i.e., qua being (S. Marc Cohen 2008: 2). 
As Cohen further points out, Aristotle’s study does not focus on some recondite subject 
matter identified as ‘being qua being’. Rather it is a study of being. In other words, for 
Aristotle, first philosophy studies beings, in so far as they are beings (Ibid.).  
Loux (1998: 3-4) argues that metaphysics considers things as existents and tries to specify 
the properties they exhibit in so far as they are beings. So the chief goal of metaphysics is 
not just grasp being itself, but also general features of being such as identity, difference, 
similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to everything that there is. In light of this, Loux 
further remarks that central to Aristotle’s metaphysics is the description of what Aristotle 
refers to as categories. These are the most general kinds under which things fall. So the 
business of a metaphysician is to identity those general or highest kinds. But the task does 
not end here. A metaphysician is also supposed to specify the features unique to each 
category.131 The upshot of engaging in such an activity provides us with a map of the 
structure of all there is (cf. Lowe 2006). This is to say that metaphysics is the study of the  
_________________ 
131 For an excellent survey of various conceptions/systems of categories since Aristotle to 
contemporary philosophers, see Thomasson (2004/2013). For more details on contemporary approaches to 
systems of categories, see e.g., Chisholm (1996); Lowe (2006); Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994); Grossmann 
(1983); and Ingvar Johansson (1989). For the view that sees ontological categories as systems imposed on the 
world as opposed to being reflectors of the way the world is, see Westerhoff (2005).  
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fundamental structure of reality (cf. Sider 2012). Or as Schaffer notes, “metaphysics is about 
what grounds what,” (in Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, eds., 2009: 347). So given the 
Aristotelian approach, a metaphysician’s success in the investigation of the nature of reality 
depends on whether or not his/her approach is a realist one. That is to say that whether or 
not one accepts the existence of a mind-independent reality (cf. Heil 2012; Yagisawa 2011: 
270). Aristotle takes a mind-independent reality as the starting point of his metaphysical 
theorizing. In Aristotle’s view, metaphysics underlies our overall approach in our 
investigation of the nature of reality. In this regard, Fine is right in saying that “I take 
Aristotle’s primary concern in his metaphysical and physical writings to be with the nature 
of reality rather than the nature of language. I am rarely tempted, when Aristotle appears 
to be talking about things, to construe him as saying something about words…,” (Fine in 
Lewis and Bolton, eds., 1996: 83-84).132  
 
The gist of Fine’s remarks above, is that, Aristotle’s primary agenda in doing ontology is not 
to engage in mere conceptual analysis of the words we use to talk about the things or the 
objects of our investigation.133 Rather, the central aim of doing ontology has to do with 
grasping the nature or essence of things—i.e., what makes something what it is (cf. McGinn 
2012). Taken this way, language serves only as a medium through which we construct and 
communicate our concepts regarding the things we investigate (see e.g., Cat. Chaps. 1-4). If 
we adopt such an Aristotelian approach toward ontology, then it has important 
implications, inter alia, for our conception of the self/person. For example, in this case, one 
of the key questions that can be asked is this: is the notion of the self/person a theoretical 
construct or primarily a prephilosophical notion? I will attempt to give my own answer for 
this question in § 7.4.  
 
7.3 Skepticism against Traditional Metaphysics 
________________ 
132In this case, the Aristotelian approach to the investigation of reality stands in sharp opposition to 
Dummett-Putnam’s anti-realism, according to which there is no access to mind independent reality. See 
Dummett in Hales (1999: Ch. 4); Putnam in Hales (1999: Ch. 5). For an excellent critical discussion on 
Dummett-Putnam anti-realism, see Loux (1998: Ch.7). I will have something to say, in due time, against 
general scepticisms raised toward traditional metaphysics.  
133 For example, for philosophers who seem to take conceptual analysis as the main method in doing 
ontology, see Jackson (1998) and Chalmers (2012).  
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The hitherto brief description of the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics, however, receives 
an immediate resistance if one follows Kant’s lead. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant opens 
his discussion by telling us that human reason has paramount relevance in our attempt to 
understand some fundamental questions about reality, yet at the same time, human reason 
has its own severe limitations in terms of grasping the nature of reality that goes beyond 
the boundary of experience (A vii: 5ff, trans., Pluhar 1996). Kant takes traditional 
metaphysics as a purely speculative discipline which cannot give us access to mind-
independent reality (Ibid. Bxv: 20). In modern times, it was also rejected by post Hume-Kant 
influential thinkers such as Quine.  
 
Most notably, a serious attack was launched against the traditional metaphysics by the 
1930s and 40s Vienna Circle logical positivists, such as Carnap and others (see e.g., Ayer 
1936: 44-47 and Ch. 3). As is well known, logical positivists promoted a movement that 
restricts the source of genuine knowledge to what can only be empirically verifiable (see 
e.g., Uebel 2012). Though, at present, the ‘verification principle’ largely has fallen out of 
favor, it is safe to say that it is making a comeback (see e.g., Ladyman and Ross, 2007; also 
see Ladyman, Ross and Kincaid, eds., 2013). Recently, Price in his essay entitled, 
“Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost Who Walks?” argued that metaphysics [traditional] is 
‘as dead, or at least deflated, as Carnap left it’ (in Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009: 
322; see also Chalmers 2012). Along similar lines Hofweber also remarks, “The questions 
that metaphysics tries to answer have long been answered in other parts of inquiry….What 
metaphysics tries to do has been or will be done by the sciences. There is nothing left to do 
for philosophy,” (Ibid. 260). Price’s as well as Hofweber’s negative attitude towards the 
traditional metaphysics is also strongly embraced and echoed by Ladyman and Ross in their 
works (see the references above).  
 
However, Price’s and Hofweber’s remarks are not only very strong but they are also very 
questionable in light of the work of notable contemporary neo-Aristotelian advocates of 
traditional metaphysics (see e.g., Lowe 1998, 2002, 2006; Oderberg 2007; Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz 1997; Schaffer in Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, eds., 2009: chap. 12; 
Gibb, Lowe and Ingthorsson, eds., 2013; Loux 1998; Heil 2012; Tahko, ed., 2012; Novotný & 
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Novák, eds., 2014). One can confidently say that Aristotelian metaphysics is back on the 
stage, contra Price’s and Hofweber’s claim and all those who are sympathetic to their 
remarks. But I do not intend to argue for this broad claim, since here my interest is to put 
the Aristotelian metaphysics to a good use in defending my own account of the self/person. 
That said, despite some knee jerk reactions of some modern philosophers, traditional 
metaphysics occupies a central place in our discussion of substance ontology, which 
provides us with a framework, inter alia, for our concept of individuation, identity, 
persistence, agency and causation (see e.g., Ruggaldier in Corradini, Galvan and Lowe, 2006: 
Ch.3; also see Lowe 1998: Chs. 4-7).   
 
7.4 Approach  
In this section, I will explain what is unique regarding the Neo-Aristotelian View of 
Substantial-Self/Person. As indicated in § 7.1., this is the view that gets its inspiration from 
the traditional Aristotelian substance ontology. But in the mainstream contemporary 
personal identity literature, Aristotelian substance ontology has been severely marginalized.  
Even when the neo-Aristotelian personal identity theorists engage with Aristotle’s views in 
the Categories, their discussion usually does not go beyond the notion of substance 
simpliciter (see e.g., Wiggins 1980/2001; Lowe 1998; cf. Loux 1998: 123-135). Although as 
we saw in chapter six, Lowe identifies the self/person with substance, he does not make an 
explicit connection with Aristotle’s Categories. Similarly, Wiggins does not attempt to make 
such a link with the Categories, although he argues that the notion of a person coincides 
with the notion of human being (see e.g., in Perry 1975; see also in Peacocke and Gillett 
1987: 4). Furthermore, defenders of animalism, despite talking about the animality of 
human beings (Aristotle’s insight), do not engage with Aristotle’s works (see e.g., Olson 
1997 and 2007; see also Van Inwagen 1990; cf. Merricks 2001).134 To my knowledge, I have 
not come across any work in the contemporary mainstream personal identity literature (see 
e.g., chapter five footnote # 88), where a deliberate attempt has been made in linking the  
_______________ 
134 In personal conversation, Olson told me that he never thought about how his animalism is related 
to Aristotle’s metaphysics. That said, however, Aristotle’s views of man, psyche/soul, matter and form and the 
like are often located in the context of philosophy of mind, where the focus is on appropriating these issues to 
defend a certain view of mind and body dualism (see e.g., Oderberg 2007: Ch. 9).  
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notion of the self/person to Aristotle’s Categories. So in this regard, my Neo-Aristotelian 
View of the Substantial-Self/Person will bridge this gap in the literature, thereby also urging 
Aristotle’s place to be reconsidered in the contemporary personal identity discussion.  
 
Moreover, Aristotle does not discuss personhood in his Categories, which is also true of his 
Metaphysics.135 This is another incentive for me to explore new territory in terms of 
connecting the notion of the self/person to Aristotle’s conception of substance. My primary 
source in developing my Neo-Aristotelian View of the Self/Person will be the Categories. 
Aristotle also discusses the notion of substance in his Metaphysics, where he links it to the 
notion of form and matter, inter alia. In § 7.6, I will make some brief remarks about 
Aristotle’s view of form and matter without getting into Aristotle’s extremely intricate 
analysis.136 That said, I need not also necessarily assume that  Aristotle  is right  in  
everything  he  says  about  substance.  Nor do I also assume that Aristotle himself 
necessarily would endorse everything I say with respect to the connection I make between 
the notion of the self/person and his theory of substance. For present purposes, I am only 
interested in the insights that can be gleaned from the above two texts, which I can then 
put to a good use in developing and defending my own Neo-Aristotelian View of the 
Substantial Self/Person.   
 
As one may recall, in chapter one § 1.1, I identified the notion of the self with the 
Aristotelian notion of substance. I then subsequently worked my way through Descartes’s 
and Boethuis’s notion of the entityhoodness of the self/person. In §§ 7.6 and 7.7, I will 
sketch out in some detail how I understand the entityhoodness of the self/person.  
 
7.5 The Starting Point   
As David Lewis (1986: 192-193) once characterized the notion of identity as utterly simple  
__________________ 
 135 Aristotle’s De Anima might be the closest of Aristotle’s work that can be associated with 
contemporary discussions on personhood (see Michael Durrant 1993; Ronald Polansky 2007).  
136 For exegetical issues and controversies on Aristotle’s view of substance, see, e.g., Gill (1989); 
Terence Irwin (1988); Lewis and Bolton, eds., (1996); Allan Code (1978); Loux (1991, 2008); Theodore Scaltase 
(1994, 2010); Stephen Makin (2006); and Ross, vol. 1 & II (1924).  
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and unproblematic, I too want to claim that the notion of the self/person is utterly simple 
and unproblematic. However, my claim here immediately faces resistance from those who 
think that the notion of the self is deeply perplexing. For example, Rudd remarks:  
One might think, naively, that the concept of the self is not one that should present 
great problems for us. After all, we are all selves, so shouldn’t we all just know what 
it is we are? But the concept of selfhood is in fact among the most troubling and 
contentious in philosophy. And not only in philosophy—the concept has been 
puzzled over by neurologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists, 
sociologists, theologians, historians, and—in rather different ways—by novelists, 
dramatists, and film-makers (2012: 1).  
 
Here I can think of two senses in which one may or may not agree with Rudd’s remarks. The 
sense in which one may agree with Rudd has to do with the obvious point that the notion of 
the self is understood differently in different contexts (see also e.g., chapter one footnote # 
2). So in such diverse contexts, accounts of the notion of the self could be mutually 
exclusive and incompatible. Hence, such accounts could be perplexing, indeed! But what 
does it follow from such diverse accounts of the notion of the self? For example, does it 
follow that we do not have a pre-philosophical sense of our own selfhood? If Rudd’s 
remarks in the above passage are taken to give an affirmative answer to this question, then 
one (which includes myself) is within his/her own epistemic right to disregard Rudd’s 
remarks. This is because no matter how much perplexing and controversial the notion of 
the self could be, as we shall see, selfhood/personhood is always presupposed at the 
background. In this case, the reality of the unavoidable pre-philosophical sense of oneself is 
beautifully captured by Taylor. Here is a passage from his Metaphysics:  
However unsure I may be of the nature of myself and of the relation of myself to my 
body, I can hardly doubt the reality of either. Whether I am identical with my body, 
or whether I am a spirit, I cannot doubt my own being, cannot doubt that I am part 
of the world, even prior to any philosophical reflection on the matter. For surely if I 
know anything at all, as presumably I do, then I know that I exist. There seems to be 
nothing I could possibly know any better. And this is, of course, quite consistent with 
my great ignorance as to the nature of that self of whose existence I feel so assured. 
I know, further, that I have a body. I may have learned this from experience, in the 
same way that I have learned of the existence of innumerable other things, or I may 
not have; it is, in any case, something I surely know. I may also have only the vaguest  
conception, or even a totally erroneous one, of the relationship between myself and 
my body; I can nevertheless no more doubt the reality of the one than the other. I 
may also be, as I surely am, quite ignorant of the nature and workings of my body 
  
241 
 
and even of many of its parts, but no such ignorance raises the slightest doubt of its 
reality (1974: 11-12).  
 
Taylor’s remarks here hinge on one basic premise, that is, we all have a pre-philosophical 
notion of a sense of selfhood/personhood (see also, Moore 1959; Elder 2004; Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz 1997: 1-7; Paul 1961: 19; O’Hear 1985: 216-217). Such pre-philosophical sense 
of one’s own selfhood/personhood is primitive in that we do not arrive at it on the basis of 
analysing other concepts. Rather such sense of our own selfhood/personhood is our starting 
point to make sense of other things. Put differently, it is also what allows us to distinguish 
ourselves from other people on the one hand, and other things around us on the other. If 
this is right, then a pre-philosophical sense of our own selfhood/personhood is an important 
contributor to self-individuation. It seems then that a pre-philosophical notion of one’s 
selfhood/personhood can be taken as a base-level or primary epistemic source for other 
aspects of diverse self-conceptions we may see in different contexts. In this case, Rudd’s 
remarks we saw earlier can be said to make sense only if they are grounded in the base-
level epistemic source. Here by ‘base-level epistemic source,’ I mean to refer to what I said 
earlier that our pre-philosophical sense of our own selfhood/personhood is primitive. It is 
such primitiveness that serves as a base-level epistemic source for our conception of the 
selfhood/personhood.  
 
If we grant such primitiveness to play the primary role towards our pre-philosophical 
conception of the self, then we should be prepared to reject any suggestion that our basic 
notion of selfhood or personhood is the result of some sort of theoretical achievement or 
theory laden (see e.g., Armstrong 1980: 64-65; Churchland 1988: Chaps. 2-4; cf. Harré in 
Kolak and Martin 1991: 370). I will give reasons why there is a sense in which a theory-laden 
conception of our basic sense of self is deeply mistaken. I will return to this issue in § 7.6. In 
saying this, however, I am not implying that a theory laden understanding of one’s own self 
is of no value. Quite the opposite. Rather my claim is that, a theory laden conception of 
one’s sense of self is always posteriori to that of a pre-philosophical conception. It is difficult 
to see how one can even come up with any credible story about one’s own basic sense of 
self in abstraction from a pre-philosophical conception. In this regard, Aristotle’s approach 
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is instructive, since as Hoffman and Rosenkrantz noted, the entities Aristotle lists in his 
categories all belong to commonsense or folk ontology (1997: 1). It is in light of such 
considerations, that I too want to sketch out my Neo-Aristotelian View of the Substantial-
Self/Person. Before I do that, I will discuss Aristotle’s theory of substance in his Categories.  
 
7.6 Substance in the Categories 
As we saw in chapter one § 1.1, the Greek word ousia, the noun from the verb ‘to be’ (einai) 
has a technical meaning, which its equivalent English term ‘substance’ fails to capture. This 
is because the English term ‘substance’ could be misleading, implying a kind of stuff (Cohen 
2009: 197). The closest meaning that does justice to Aristotle’s ousia is ‘being’ or ‘entity’ 
(J.L. Ackrill 1963: 77). Ousia can also be construed as ‘reality’ or ‘fundamental being’ (Cohen 
2009: 197) or ‘an ontologically basic entity’ (Loux 1991: 2-3).  
 
Right from the outset the questions remain: what confers ‘substance’ the status of an 
ontologically basic entity? What does it mean to say that ‘substance’ is fundamental or an 
ontologically basic entity? Why do other non-substantial entities (e.g., qualities) lack similar 
status, i.e., an ontologically basic entity? For Aristotle, these and similar other questions are 
critical in his characterization of ousia. In his Categories, Aristotle mentions ousia as one of 
the ten most general kinds (categories) under which entities in the world fall. As Aristotle 
states:   
Of the things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or 
quantity or qualification or relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or 
having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are 
man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of 
a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of 
when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-
shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, 
being-burned (1963: 1b25).137  
 
Before we see whether or not there is anything distinctive about ousia, it is crucial to keep 
in mind that the categories above classify things not words (Ackrill 1963: 73-78). Irwin also  
__________________ 
137 Here and in his Topics 1.9 103b20 Aristotle lists ten categories. However, in his Physics and 
Metaphysics K. 12 1068a8, Aristotle mentions seven categories.   
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claims that for Aristotle, the items in the categories are beings (onta), whose classification 
are based on their relation to a non-linguistic subject (Cat., 1963:1a20ff) (Irwin 1988: 52-53; 
also see Ross Vol. 1, 1924: 1XXXII- XC). So even if Aristotle makes distinctions between 
words, they do not reflect common grammatical distinctions (Irwin 1988: 52-53).138 This 
shows that Aristotle’s focus is on the study of ‘beings’ as opposed to the language we use to 
talk about them. In this regard, the category of substance remains at the center of 
Aristotle’s investigation (see again § 7.2).  
 
In Categories 5, Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances. An 
example of primary substance is the individual man or the individual horse; whereas 
secondary substances are the species and genus, for example, man and animal respectively 
(1963: 2a11-19). But why should we think that the individual man (or the individual horse) is 
a primary substance as opposed to a certain quality such as the individual white? For 
Aristotle, the reason is because unlike the individual man, that is neither said of a subject 
nor in a subject (1963:2a11), the individual white is in a subject, but is not said of any 
subject (see e.g., 1963:1a23-8). Aristotle uses the phrase ‘in a subject’ technically. As he 
states: “By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist 
separately from what it is in” (1963: 1a24-25).  
 
Scholars still debate about Aristotle’s use of the two phrases, i.e., ‘something said of a 
subject’ and ‘something in a subject’ (see e.g., Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997: 14-16; 
Ackrill 1963: 74-76; Ross v.1 [1924], 1xxxii-xc). But as Ackrill rightly remarks, in Aristotle’s 
view, the phrase ‘said of a subject’ distinguishes species and genera from individuals (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, the phrase ‘in a subject’ serves to distinguish qualities, quantities, and 
items in other dependent categories from substances, which do not depend on other things 
for their existence (Ibid.). The dependency relation that exists between primary substances 
_________________ 
138 Ibid. Grammatically similar words may have different roles to play in terms of signifying items in 
different categories. For example, as Irwin remarks, for Aristotle, if we take two grammatically similar words 
‘man’ and ‘musician’, the former signifies an item only in the category of substance (e.g., a human being) 
whereas the latter signifies an item in two distinct categories, i.e., substance, a human being as well as one of 
his qualities, musicality. Aristotle’s conception of categories stands in sharp contrast to that of Kant’s, since for 
Kant categories are only features of our thought (see e.g., Carr 1987: 2-7).  
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and items in other categories is ontological, in that if X inheres in a subject Y then, X cannot 
exist independent of Y.  
    
 In this case, for Aristotle, only substances enjoy the privilege of being ‘not in a subject.’ That 
is to say that “all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in 
them as subjects,” (1963: 2ba34-35). To use Aristotle’s own example, the animal is 
predicated of man as well as the individual man. Similarly, colour is in body as well as in an 
individual body. For Aristotle, the upshot of such predication relation between substances 
and other things predicated of substances boils down to this: “if the primary substances did 
not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist,” (1963: 2a43-45). 
Hence, primary substances are ontologically basic in that they do not require other things 
for their existence whereas the converse is not true.  
 
In light of this, what can we say about the nature of the relation that holds between the 
primary substances and the secondary substances? Before we see Aristotle’s response to 
this question, here we can take (even if we don’t come across the terms in the Categories), 
primary substances as particulars, whereas secondary substances as universals. This is 
consistent with Aristotle’s definitions of such terms in De Interpretatione: “Now of actual 
things some are universal, others particular (I call universal that which is by its nature 
predicated of a number of things, particular that which is not; a man, for instance, is a 
universal, Callias a particular),” (1963: 17a38).  
 
Aristotle claims that if we want to say what the identity of a concrete particular such as 
Socrates is, then the appropriate thing to say is that Socrates belongs to a kind man. On the 
other hand, it is wrong to take properties such as ‘white’ or ‘runs’ or anything like that to 
constitute the identity of Socrates (1963: 2b29ff). This is because to be a human being for 
Socrates is an essential property without which Socrates would lose his existence. But the 
same cannot be said regarding properties such as being white or being a runner. For 
example, Socrates may lose the property of being a runner without thereby ceasing to exist 
or losing his identity. This is because, being a runner is only an accidental property that 
Socrates has or instantiates. An accidental property is a property, which a subject can lose 
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without losing its existence. But if we take away from Socrates a kind man (which is an 
essential property), then Socrates no longer retains his identity much less his existence.  
 
Aristotle argues that secondary substances, are not in a subject, in this case in a primary 
substance in the manner entities in other categories are (e.g. qualities). As he states, “It is 
obvious at once that they [secondary substances] are not in a subject. For man is said of the 
individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man,” 
(1963:3a11-12).139 Even if secondary substances are not said to be in a subject, ontologically 
they still depend on primary substances. Aristotle tells us that the manner of such 
dependency relation is not that of the inherence. As he puts it:  
Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’. As regards the primary substances, 
it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘this’; for the thing 
revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards to the secondary 
substances, though it appears from the form of the name—that a secondary 
substance likewise signifies a certain ‘this’, this is not really true; rather, it signifies a 
certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, but man and 
animal are said of ‘many things”(1963:3b10-19).  
 
Here Aristotle anticipates that there may be a temptation to lump secondary substances 
with the category of quality, since secondary substances are also labeled as ‘qualification.’ 
But Aristotle rejects such a move on the basis of the difference that exists between the 
category of quality and that of the category of substance. As he states:  
However, it [secondary substance] does not signify a certain qualification, as white 
does. White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus 
mark off the qualification of substance—they signify substance of a certain 
qualification (1963: 20-24).  
 
Commenting on this passage, Cohen remarks that Aristotle seems to be saying that what 
makes species and genera secondary is that they are kinds or collections. A collection of 
individuals stands for species, whereas a wider collection of the individual members of the 
species that fall under it is the genus. As Cohen further explains, for Aristotle, without those 
__________________ 
139 Similarly, Aristotle extends the same conclusion to differentiae of a substance— “roughly, the 
properties that are in the definition of the substance,” (Cohen 2009: 198). As he states: the differentia also is 
not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a subject; neither two-
footed nor footed is in man.  
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individuals, there would be no species, and without species there would be no genera 
(Cohen 2009: 199). This means that for the species ‘man’ to exist, there must be the 
individual men. According to Aristotle, then real things are the individual men. What then 
are the species and genera? For Aristotle, the species and genera are in the words of Cohen 
“simply the way specimens are classified and organized,” (Ibid.). At this point one may ask 
whether or not there is a mutual ontological dependence between them. Cohen claims that 
although Aristotle does not comment on this point in the Categories, he explicitly talks 
about it in the Topics, “It is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it is entirely 
transferred out of its species, just as the same animal could not at one time be, and at 
another not be, a man,” (IV.5 125b37-40)”.140 As Cohen notes, “the fact that the said-of 
relation seems to amount to what Aristotle elsewhere calls essential predication makes this 
idea even more plausible,” (2009: 199). Here Cohen is referring to Aristotle’s point in the 
Categories—“if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily 
predicated of the subject,” (2a19-20).” For Aristotle, telling the definition of X amounts to 
explaining the essence of X (Topics, 1.5 101b38, VII.5 154a31 as quoted in Cohen (2009: 
200)).  
Aristotle also claims that there is nothing contrary to substances. As he states, “there is 
nothing contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to 
animal,” (1963:3b24-28). Aristotle further claims, “this is not peculiar to substance but holds 
of many other things also, for example, of quantity [such as]…four-foot or ten” (1963:3b29-
31). Aristotle also claims that substances do not come in degrees. However, this does not 
mean that one thing is not more substance than the other. For example, Aristotle takes a 
species, man to be more substance than the genus, animal. This is because, for Aristotle, a 
species man is much closer to the individual man than animal (see further 1963: 2b7ff). In 
talking about why any substance does not admit of degrees, Aristotle remarks:  
For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than 
another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called 
more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called  
_________________ 
140 As quoted in Cohen (2009: 199).  
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more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. 
Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now 
than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit 
of a more and a less,” (1963:3b30-48).    
        
The other distinctive feature of substance has to do with numerically one and the same 
substance being able to receive contraries. Aristotle claims that in no other case can we 
think of anything that is numerically one and the same and yet receives contraries. For 
example, for Aristotle, “colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and 
white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with 
everything else that is not substance,”(1963:4a10-17). By contrast, Aristotle claims, “an 
individual man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another and hot 
and cold, bad and good. Nothing like this is to be seen in other cases,” (1963:4a19-21). 
Aristotle’s point here is that substance remains numerically the same through qualitative 
change.  
 
In the Categories, Aristotle does not treat primary substances as complex bodies. But he 
does treat primary substances as complex bodies in his Metaphysics (see further Gill, 1989: 
Ch.1). Because of such a shift in Aristotle’s thinking, there is a debate on whether complex 
entities, i.e. entities with combination of matter and substantial form are primary 
substances. Yet Aristotle’s own commitment to the primacy of substance over stuff still 
stands (see e.g., Loux 1991). Since for Aristotle, stuff has only potentialities as opposed to 
actualities, stuff fails to be basic. To say that rock is stuff of a building is to say that rock has 
only a potential to become a building. By contrast, actuality is prior to potentiality (Book Θ 
8, 1049b 18-25). Since substance is actuality, it follows that substance is prior to stuff. That 
said, however, for Aristotle, matter is what something is made of or as some call it 
‘proximate matter’ as opposed to being a particular kind of space filling stuff (Lowe in 
Oderberg 1999:2-3). Moreover, Aristotle does not subscribe to the notion of the ultimate 
constituents of bodies, such as atoms, since he does not endorse atomism. As Robinson 
puts it, ‘matter’ for Aristotle is “the name for whatever, for a given kind of object, meets a 
certain role or function, namely that of being that from which the object is constituted,” 
(2009). For example, if we take relative to the human body, matter is not the 
  
248 
 
molecules/atoms that make up the human body but rather flesh and blood. Similarly, the 
matter of the table is the wood from which it is. On the other hand, the ‘form’ answers the 
question, ‘what kind of thing a certain object is’ (Robinson 2009). More precisely, as Cohen 
remarks that the ‘form’ Aristotle has in mind is not to be identified with a mere property a 
substance happens to bear. Rather, for Aristotle, the ‘form’ is constitutive of what the ousia 
by its very nature is (Cohen 2009; see also Met. 3 1028b37-1029a6).  
 
7.7 Sketching Out the Neo-Aristotelian View of the Substantial-Self/Person  
As I explained in chapter one §§ 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.4, my defence of the Neo-Aristotelian 
View of the Substantial-Self/Person will be constrained by two conditional statements, 
namely: (CS-1) If the Aristotelian substance ontology is true, then….; and (CS-2) If I am a 
self/person, then I am a certain kind of entity, i.e., a substantial entity. Notice that (CS-1) 
and (CS-2) are related in that the former provides a framework within which the latter will 
be developed. Taken this way, the Neo-Aristotelian View of the Substantial-Self/Person 
attempts to spell out the entityhoodness of the self/person in terms of the category of 
substance. As we may recall, in chapter one (see e.g., §§ 1.1, 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.4), I explored 
four ways through which one may attempt to give an analysis of the notion of the self in 
terms of the category of substance. The four ways have to do with different readings of the 
copula ‘is’ namely: (a) the ‘is’ of predication; (b) the ‘is’ of identity; (c) the ‘is’ of 
instantiation; and the ‘is’ of constitution. Having examined (a)-(d) in light of Aristotle’s 
conception of substance as explained in the Categories, I argued why the readings of (a), (c), 
and (d) would fail as an answer to the substantial-self/person question. I then argued why 
alternatively, (b) can be a good answer to the substantial-self/person question. Given (b), I 
argued that the ‘is’ in the statement, ‘the self is a substance’ must be understood as the ‘is’ 
of strict numerical identity. 
 
A. The Category of Substantial Entity  
To say that X is a substantial entity is to say that, inter alia, X belongs to a distinct kind of an 
ontological category, namely the category of substance. The question remains: what follows 
from X’s belonging to the category of substance? Given Aristotle’s account of substance as 
discussed in § 7.6, a number of things seem to follow:  
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(1A)  X is an ontologically basic entity or fundamental being.  
(2B) X stands in certain relation to nonsubstantial entities that exist in other 
categories.  
(3C)  X persists both at a time, as well as over time, through qualitative change as 
numerically one and the same entity.   
(4D) X does not come in degrees.   
(5E) X is a frame of reference to its own intentional acts—whether those acts are 
being done in thought, verbally, or otherwise.  
(6F) Talk about the category of X is not simply talk about the terms simpliciter 
involving X. Rather it is talk about the very X itself as communicated by those 
terms.  
(7G) There is a sense in which X is its own principle of individuation.   
 
In light of the affirmative answer given in chapter one to the substantial-self/person 
question, the above (1A)-(7G) together apply to the notion of the self/person. In this case, 
we can substitute the variable ‘X’ in (1A)-(7G) for the term, ‘the self/person’. This gives us 
the following modified desiderata:   
(1A’) The self/person is an ontologically basic entity or fundamental being.  
(2B’) The self/person stands in certain relation to non-substantial entities that exist in 
other categories.  
(3C’) The self/person persists both at a time, as well as over time, through qualitative 
change.   
(4D’) The self/person does not come in degrees.   
(5E’) The self/person is a frame of reference to its own intentional acts—whether 
those acts are being done in thought, verbally, or otherwise.  
(6F’) Talk about the category of the self/person is not simply talk about the terms 
simpliciter involving the self/person. Rather it is talk about the very X itself as 
communicated by those terms.  
(7G’)  There is a sense in which the self/person is its own principle of individuation.  
 
As we shall see, the above (1A’)-(7G’) are interrelated in a sense that what we say about one 
will have direct bearing on what we say about the other. Moreover, (1A’)-(7G’) collectively 
show the centrality of the category of the self/person. According to the Neo-Aristotelian 
View of the Substantial Self/Person, such centrality of the self/person, inter alia, consists in 
the self/person being the subject of experience, the unifier of experiences and a causal 
agent (Cf. White 1991).  
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B. The Analysis of the Desiderata of the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person 
Given (1A’), the self/person is an irreducibly basic substantial entity. I understand the 
irreducibility of the self/person from three standpoints: (i) the self/person is our starting 
point of our inquiry into the nature of other things. In saying that the ‘self/person is our 
starting point,’ I mean that the reality of the self/person is something that is taken for 
granted. In other words, the reality of the self is not a theoretical construct. Rather, the 
datum for the reality of the self/person is already given in common-sense ontology. As 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz nicely put it:  
Our culture possesses a single ordinary, commonsense, or “folk” conceptual scheme 
which has certain ontological presuppositions. Foremost among these 
presuppositions is the idea that there are enduring things, or individual substances: 
continuants such as human persons….The idea that there are such substantial beings 
is at the core of this commonsense or folk ontology (1997: 1).  
 
In light of this, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz further remark:  
Any ontologist must begin as a point of reference with a consideration of folk 
ontology, even if in the end he or she revises it in some way. If entities of a certain 
kind belong to folk ontology, then there is a prima facie presumption in favor of their 
reality. Since living and nonliving things or individual substances are a part of folk 
ontology, there is a presumption in favor of their existence. Belief in the existence of 
such entities is justified so long as this presumption is not undermined. Thus, those 
who deny their existence assume the burden of proof (1997: 7).  
 
(ii) If we grant the suggestion that the reality of the self/person is the starting point of our 
inquiry into the nature of other things, then the self/person has an ontological primacy over 
other things existing in other categories. As we recall, this is a central notion in Aristotle’s 
Categories (see § 7.6). Given the Aristotelian approach, for example, an entity E, has an 
ontological primacy over other entities Ys, just in case Ys are dependent on E in some 
ontologically important sense. To see this point, we need to explain in what sense as stated 
above in (2B’), the self/person stands in relation to non-substantial entities that exist in 
other categories. Quite generally, entities that could not exist without being conjoined with 
other objects cannot be identified with an individual substance. Such things are often 
referred to as dependent particulars. As Hestevold nicely sums up:  
There do exist edges, scratches, shorelines, waves, shadows, lines of latitude, holes 
and their boundaries, reflections, wrinkles, and smiles. Such things, however, 
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apparently depend on other things such as marble cubes, tables, bodies of water, 
ships, doughnuts, tires, mirrors and faces. Though a cube can obviously exist 
detached from all other three dimensional objects. A body of ocean water could 
exist without a wave, but no ocean wave could exist without the water. A tire can 
exist without its shadow, but the shadow cannot exist without the tire nor can the 
shadow exist without some other object that shadows it. The grandmother’s 
reflection depends, in some sense, both on a reflective surface and on the face 
reflected; and the grandmother’s smile and wrinkles depend on her face, which 
existed years ago independently of that smile and those wrinkles (Hestevold in Hales 
1999: 415; see also Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1994: Ch. 1).  
 
The gist of Hestevold’s observations in the above passage has to do with a certain 
dependence relation that obtains between substantial and non-substantial entities. In this 
case, the dependence relation is existential, in a sense that non-substantial entities cannot 
exist unless substantial entities sustain their existence. Taken this way, the existential 
dependence relation that holds between non-substantial entities and substantial entities is 
asymmetrical, as illustrated in the above passage (see also Fine 1995: 269-290; Simons in 
Oderberg 1999: 23). In a similar way, the dependence relation that exists between the 
substantial self/person and the non-substantial mental particulars, such as beliefs, desires, 
intentional states, phenomenal consciousness, and the like is existential in nature. Contra 
Hume, it is not possible for mental states, such as perceptions or other mental states to 
exist without an owner. Anyone who thinks otherwise is setting himself/herself up to 
embracing most likely an indefensible position. For example, if ownerless mental states 
exist, then how are we supposed to individuate them?  
 
These are just some of intuitively compelling points and questions that can be raised to 
raise suspicion about the plausibility of the very idea of ownerless mental states. Of course, 
defenders of a bundle view can claim that various ordinary particulars are constituted by 
properties that are associated with them (Loux 1998: Ch. 3). As we saw in chapter two, the 
advantage often attributed to a bundle view is far from clear compared to that of the 
substance based view of ordinary particulars (see e.g., Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1994: Ch. 
1; Loux 1998: Ch. 3; cf. Cleve in Hales 1999: Ch. 26). Furthermore, if we follow Aristotle’s 
lead, we should reject the bundle view for one key reason. That is, although a substance has 
features, those features are not part of a substance. For example, the legs of a chair are 
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certainly parts of a chair. However, the size and shape of a chair are not parts of a chair. If 
this is right, then bundle theorists are making a category mistake in claiming that a certain 
concrete object like a substance is constituted by its properties. In light of such 
considerations, what confers the self/person ontological primacy over mental states has to 
do with the latter’s dependence on the former for their existence.  
 
(iii) Given the Aristotelian approach, individual concrete entities that belong to the category 
of substance are primitive in that they are not further analysable in terms of more 
fundamental things than themselves. Similarly, since the self/person is a concrete 
substantial entity, it too is primitive. For example, in his Individuals, Strawson characterizes 
the concept of a person as a type of entity to which both predicates that ascribe states of 
consciousness on the one hand, and predicates that ascribe corporeal/physical 
characteristics, are equally applicable to a single individual of that type (1959: 101-102). 
Strawson calls the former P-predicates and the latter, M-predicates. An example of the P-
predicates includes, ‘is in pain’, ‘is going for a walk’, ‘is thinking hard’, etc. An example of the 
M-predicate includes, ‘weighs 10 stone,’ etc., (Ibid. 104). Strawson thinks that despite the 
fact that we have two distinct categories of property (i.e., P-predicate and the M-predicate), 
we do not have two distinct subjects as their bearers (see e.g., Ibid. 98-101). Strawson’s 
basic point is that even though the properties that are attributed to a person are analysable 
in terms of a person, the converse does not hold. It is in this sense that Strawson’s notion of 
the primitiveness of the concept of a person needs to be understood.  Although I embrace 
Strawson’s view about the primitiveness of the notion of a person, I sharply disagree with 
his proposal about only one subject being a bearer of two distinct properties. As we recall, 
in chapter six, I defended the notion that the self/person is distinct from the body that 
embodies it or any part of it such as the brain. In light of this, I also argued why it makes 
sense to think that the bearer of physical properties is physical substance, whereas the 
bearer of mental properties is mental substance. If the reasons we saw in chapter six in 
defence of these notions are right, then Strawson’s proposal of a single subject as being a 
bearer of two distinct properties turns out to be unconvincing.  
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Given (3C’), the self/person persists by being wholly present at different times. But what is 
the basis for such a claim? Loux claims that there are analogies between an Aristotelian 
substance theory and an endurantist account of temporal persistence. Even if endurantists 
do not necessarily embrace an Aristotelian substance theory, as Loux points out, the two 
theories share a lot in common. The main reason for such commonality between these two 
theories has to do with the fact that both are rooted in our pre-philosophical experience of 
the world. Loux claims that our pre-philosophical conception of the world is one that leads 
us to come up with various categories, namely trees, cats, human beings and so on. Given 
our pre-philosophical conception of the world, we take such ordinary familiar objects as 
fully real, as opposed to them being things that are constructed out of things that are more 
real. Furthermore, Loux claims that our belief in the ontological irreducibility of ordinary 
familiar objects and our belief in their literal diachronic identity is presupposed by our pre-
philosophical conception of the world (Loux 1998: 230-231). The self/person is a substantial 
entity that persists over time through qualitative change.  
 
However, a person does not persist by having temporal parts of any kind, for example, as 
Lewis argues (1986); or by having stages, for example, as Hawley argues (2001); or by 
having instantaneous stages as Sider argues (2001). In the Aristotelian picture, a person/self 
persists through time by being wholly present at different times. Since persons are concrete 
persisting substantial entities, they cannot have temporal parts like processes or events. 
Although a person’s career can be said to have temporal parts, persons themselves do not 
extend in time and thus have no temporal parts. For example, as Olson remarks, “your 
career or history may be stretched out in time, and consist of earlier and later parts, a first 
half and a second half; but you yourself are not,” (1997: 5). Along similar lines Shoemaker 
also argues that, when a particular thing persists over an interval of time, there is a series of 
events and property instances that constitutes the career of the particular thing during that 
interval. In this case, the events in the series are understood as causally connected series of 
property instances. But as Shoemaker further argues, persisting things should not be 
identified with their careers. In saying this, Shoemaker is directly objecting to the 
perdurantists’ views of persistence (Shoemaker in Gasser and Stefan 2012: 124; see also 
Olson 2007: Ch. 5).  
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If this is right which I believe that it is, then it leads us to (4D’), which states that the 
self/person does not come in degrees. What this means is that, inter alia, that no 
self/person is more person/self than the other. A self/person is what it is only in virtue of 
being the kind of entity that it is, in this case, a substantial entity. In chapter eight, I will 
spell out in detail the implications of this claim in my response to three contemporary 
philosophers who defend a degreed notion of a person/self. According to these 
philosophers, not all human beings are persons. This is because, as these philosophers 
argue, to be included in the class of persons, certain conditions have to be met. That said, in 
saying that the self/person does not come in degrees, it is also assumed that the self/person 
has a determinate identity, in the strict literal sense of the term. Here my view echoes that 
of both Butler’s and Reid’s, who argued as we saw in chapter five that personal identity is 
determinate.  
 
As we saw in chapter five, indeterminacy in personal identity is entertained in the context of 
certain types of puzzle cases. But in the Aristotelian approach, puzzle cases such as the 
fission of selves/persons look highly counterintuitive. The Aristotelian argues that 
persons/selves are not the kinds of entities that undergo fission. There is no evidence that 
shows that persons naturally undergo the biological process of fission like an amoeba. So no 
matter how attractive entertaining the possibility of persons as entities that could undergo 
fission may be, the Aristotelian remains unmotivated to draw any metaphysical conclusion 
about persons based on such scenarios. The Aristotelian is also within her own epistemic 
right not to even use bogus science fiction scenarios in developing her ontology of the 
self/person. In this case, the Aristotelian can say that there should not be any prerequisite, 
philosophically speaking, to use puzzle cases as a methodology proper in thinking about the 
ontology of the self/person. But this does not mean that the Aristotelian does not engage 
with those who develop their ontology of the self/person based on considerations of 
various sorts of puzzle cases. Nor does it also mean that, if she wishes, the Aristotelian 
cannot use puzzle case scenarios insofar as they are utilized within the proper constraint as 
suggested in chapter four. The point here is that given (4D’), personhood is not something 
that someone has and loses depending on whether or not that person meets certain 
conditions; rather personhood is something a person has by belonging to a kind human. 
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Again that does not mean that a person is not distinct from the animal body that embodies 
it.  
 
Given (5E’), the self/person is a frame of reference to its own intentional acts—whether 
those acts are being done in thought, verbally, or otherwise. To get this point, first we need 
to remove certain conceptual obstacles from our way. As we recall, in chapter one, I 
rejected using the third personal language in talking about the self/person. By this, I do not 
mean that we cannot use third personal language when we talk about other people as in for 
example, ‘my friend is depressed’. My rejection of the third personal language in talking 
about the self has to do with when I myself talk about myself using the term ‘self,’ in third 
personal language. I rejected this way of talking about the self, because it is misleading in 
giving a false impression that the self is something to be had as some sort of commodity.  
 
For example, suppose that I am a Cartesian soul. Do I have a soul or am I a soul? Most 
people commonly say that they have souls or selves. Such way of talking, if it is taken as a 
manner of speech, may not be problematic.  But if by ‘having a soul’ one means literally 
he/she has a soul, then such talk must be wrong. This is because, if one is a Cartesian soul, 
then one is essentially a soul. So one should not talk about soul using the locution of 
‘having,’ unless he/she uses it as a manner of speech. However, one can say that one is an 
‘ensouled being’ thereby implying that one is an embodied being (cf. Moreland and Rae 
2000: Part I). What seems to me to be the right thing to say then is this: it makes sense for 
me to say that I have a body, assuming that I am not essentially my body. But if I am not 
essentially my body, then I am essentially, say, for example, a Cartesian soul. On the flip 
side, suppose that I am not a Cartesian soul. In that case, then I am an essentially material 
being. Or following Olson, l can say that I am essentially an animal (see e.g., Olson 1997; 
2007). Again suppose that I am neither a Cartesian soul nor a purely material being, then in 
that case I am an atomic simple (see e.g., Moreland 2009: 119-120). So there are many 
other ways by which one could characterize one’s identity depending on what one takes 
himself/herself essentially to be.  
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The point of raising the above clarificatory points is intended to show that the notion of the 
self/person, if it is taken from the first person perspective, cannot be eliminated without 
presupposing the very entity one tries to eliminate.141 This means that the notion of the 
self/person is so central to our conception of ourselves, as human beings. Take for example, 
locutions such as ‘self-deception’, ‘illusory self’, ‘no self’ and so on (cf. Sidertis, Thompson 
and Zahavi, eds., 2011; Sorabji 2006: Ch. 16). If one makes such assertions from the 
standpoint of one’s own first person perspective, each of these locutions presupposes the 
reality of the self. One can only engage in self-deception, if one is a kind of entity that is 
capable of doing such a thing. Similar, if I say ‘the self is illusory,’ then for my claim to have 
any hope of making sense, I must assume that it is a sentence that is produced by a 
thinking, conscious, reflective being and so on. Furthermore, if I utter a sentence, ‘there is 
no self’, one can always ask: who is doing the denying? The answer we get for this question 
is clear, that is, a denier must be an entity that is capable of doing such an act of denying. In 
light of this, if the notion of the self/person is understood from the standpoint of the first 
person perspective, it always functions as its own frame of reference. As Kosso remarks in 
another context:  
When I say the train is moving, it is simply understood that it is moving with respect 
to the platform. But it is always an incomplete description to say that something is 
moving or sitting still. Moving in relation to what? Saying simply that the earth is 
moving is as meaningless as saying that the earth is bigger. Bigger than what? (1998: 
35). 
 
Here the gist of Kosso’s remark is that notions such as ‘motion’, ‘bigger’ necessarily 
presuppose things that move or things that are bigger. Similarly, any attempt to deny the 
reality of the self or eliminate it from one’s ontology stubbornly presupposes it. If this is 
right then, the notion of the self/person is so fundamental that trying to explain it away is 
not as easy as it might seem to be. If my hitherto observations are right, then they further 
consolidate my earlier claim about the primitiveness of the notion of the self/person. This is 
one of the main reasons why the Aristotelian thinks, as indicated in (6F’) that talk about the  
_________________ 
141 In light of this, I reject the view of those philosophers who argue that ordinary familiar things do 
not exist, including people. These philosophers base their arguments on Sorties Paradox. For such nihilism, see 
e.g., Unger (1979); Stone (2005); and Heller (1990: Ch. 3).  
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category of the self/person is not simply talk about the terms simpliciter involving the 
self/person. Rather it is talk about the very self/person itself as communicated by those 
terms. So for the Aristotelian, the category of substance is not the category of concept. This 
way of thinking stands in sharp contrast to how the notion of person is used by most 
contemporary philosophers. As we recall from our discussion in chapters one and five, the 
functional notion of a person allows the notion of a person to function like an indefinite 
description (e.g., a President of Ethiopia), thereby constraining its application to whatever 
that satisfies it (see Daly 2013: 14-15). But the Aristotelian rejects a functional notion of a 
person. Given that the Aristotelian takes the category of the self/person as a category of 
being, what is its implication for the individuation of such beings?  
 
The above question brings us to (7G’), which states that there is a sense in which the 
self/person is its own principle of individuation. Quinton once wrote that individuation is 
one of the four problems of substance (1973: 4). Can the Aristotelian address the problem 
Quinton points out? The answer is yes. There are two senses of the term ‘individuation’, 
namely a metaphysical and an epistemic sense (Lowe in Loux and Zimmerman, eds., 2003: 
75). As Lowe remarks, taken in an epistemic sense, “for someone to individuate an 
object…is for that person to ‘single out’ that object as a distinct object of perception, 
thought, or linguistic reference,” (Ibid.). On the other hand, taken in the metaphysical 
sense, as Lowe further remarks, “individuation is an ontological relationship between 
entities: what ‘individuates’ an object, in this sense, is whatever it is that makes it the single 
object that it is—whatever it is that makes it one object, distinct from others, and the very 
object that it is as opposed to any other thing,” (Ibid.). Given the latter sense of 
individuation, Loux points out that for an Aristotelian, the kind to which a concrete 
substantial entity like the self/person belongs marks it out as a particular that is numerically 
distinct from other particulars. One way the Aristotelian expresses this matter is by taking 
universals like human being, dog, and oak tree as individuative universals. The kinds under 
which concrete particulars like selves/persons fall cut the world up into individual human 
beings, individual dogs, individual oak trees and so on. In doing that, the kinds provide us 
with principles for identifying, distinguishing, and counting objects. In light of this, Loux 
claims that we invoke the kind horse to identify a particular horse, to distinguish different 
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horses and to count horses, saying “one horse, two horses and so on”. Moreover, Loux 
points out that when we do these things we are only recounting the way the kind has 
partitioned off the world into its instantiations (1998: 130; cf. Moreland 2001: Ch. 7). As 
Loux sums up: 
The kind constitutes the essence or core being of each of its members; but in virtue 
of being an instance of its proper kind, a concrete particular can be the subject for 
attributes—properties—that are external to its core being. So concrete particulars 
do have a structure that the ontologist can characterize: there is a core being or 
essence furnished by a kind of and a host of properties that lie at the periphery of 
that core and, hence, are accidental to concrete particulars. But while they have 
structure, concrete particulars are not constructions out of more basic things. Since 
the kind furnishes their essence is an irreducibly unified form of being, concrete 
particulars are themselves irreducibly unified entities. Their being what they are—
human beings…is not to be analyzed in terms of lower-level constituents; they are 
basic entities (Ibid. 130-131).   
  
So in the Aristotelian picture, it is not up to us to curve reality at its joint. This means that 
the Aristotelian rejects conventionalism, according to which it is up to people to decide 
what reality is like (see e.g., Sidelle 1989; cf. Hirsch 1982: 302).  
 
C. What is the Difference?  
The above view sketched out as the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person is 
different from Descartes’s view of the self in one important respect. As we recall from our 
discussion in chapter one, for Descartes the self/person has no physical basis, since its 
essential nature consists in thinking. Descartes also established the existence of the self on 
an a priori basis, for example, through conceiving his own distinction from his body. 
According to the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person, sketched out above, the 
self/person has a robust physical basis. By ‘robust’ I mean the self/person is embodied by 
human animal. In the Aristotelian picture, the self/person has deep unity with the animal 
body that embodies it. Unlike the Cartesian model that introduces the separation between 
the self/mind and the body, the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person does not 
imply any such separation. However, this view maintains that the self/person is distinct 
from the body or any part of it such as the brain. In this respect, my view is compatible with 
that of Descartes’s, since Descartes also accepts the distinction between the mind and the 
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body. On the other hand, unlike Descartes who proposed his view of the mind and the body 
on an a priori ground, my view assumes that the history of the self/person (i.e., its origin) as 
coincident with that of the history of the material body that embodies it. In short, the view 
defended here assumes that the self/person begins to exist through the natural biological 
process of conception (i.e., fertilization). Thus, unlike Descartes’s, my view roots the 
self/person in the natural world. According to this view, simply because the self/person has 
a physical base, it does not mean that the self/person itself is physical.  
 
In fact, my own view is that the self/person is not physical. Being a subject of my mental life, 
I am in the word of Moreland, a “simple conscious self” (2009: 116). I am also inclined to 
think that persons survive the destruction of physical death (cf. Gillett 1986: 337-386). In my 
view, ultimately this is not an issue that philosophy or science can have a last word on it.142 
That is to say that the possibility of surviving the destruction of physical death is a matter 
that everyone finds out for himself or herself upon death.143 If as some argue that 
consciousness may well continue to exist after brain death, then this suggests a live 
possibility of persons surviving their physical death (see e.g., Kelly, Greyson and Kelly 2007; 
Beauregard and O’ Leary 2007:155). In this case, my view differs from that of Lowe’s, since 
he does not endorse the disembodied existence of persons (see e.g., 2006: 5).  
 
My view is also different from Locke’s view of the self. As we discussed in chapter two, 
despite the problematic nature of Locke’s view of the self, he rejects the substantiality of 
the self. But according to the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person, the 
self/person is a substantial concrete persisting entity. This view is also different from 
Hume’s view in that for Hume (see chapter three), there is no distinct property bearer such 
as a substance. Instead the self is a bundle of properties. The Neo-Aristotelian View of  
__________________ 
142 See Sorabji’s discussion on this issue, 2006: Chaps. 17-19. See also Lewis (1978). Fischer, ed., 
(1993). Malpas and Solomon, eds., (1995).  
143 In saying this however, I do not mean that, for example, as it is widely believed in Christianity, that 
there are no good reasons to be certain about one’s own survival of physical death. In this thesis, it is not my 
goal to either enter into such debates or try to settle the issue. For detailed discussion on this issue from the 
standpoint of Christianity, see e.g., Rea (2009); Davis (1993). That said, however, as I pointed out in chapter 
one, a theory personal identity must address both the theoretical as well as practical aspects of one’s own 
destiny.  
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Substantial Self/Person is also different from some of the mainstream views of personal 
identity. For example, my view is different from the neo-Lockeans view of the self/person, 
since for the neo-Lockeans, the self/person is not a substantial concrete entity (Parfit 1984: 
Part III). My view is also different from animalism, since defenders of animalism do not 
believe in a distinct self/person in addition to the animal physical body (see e.g., van 
Inwagen 1990). My view is also different from the constitution view of the self/person that 
relates the notion of the self/person to having a first person perspective (see e.g., Baker 
2000). The neo-Aristotelian view defended here, embraces that the self/person has a 
capacity for first person perspective, but it rejects equating such capacity with personhood 
as Baker does.   
 
Unlike most of the views surveyed above, the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial 
Self/Person grounds a person’s identity and individuation in the nature of the entity itself. It 
takes the commonsense notion of the self/person seriously. Although commonsense 
ontology needs to be refined in light of the new evidence, it’s contribution to our 
knowledge of the ontology of the self/person is still significant.  
 
D. Application to Contemporary Issues: Persistence  
According to the Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person, the persistence of 
persons over time, presupposes that they are substantial entities that endure through 
qualitative change. Whatever qualitative change(s) a substance undergoes, it is not the case 
that such changes affect the substance’s own persistence over time. However, notice that, 
here the issue of numerical identity itself turns out to be contentious, if it is seen from the 
perspective of the composite objects. Composite objects are composed of other objects, 
which in turn are considered as parts of them (e.g., table, human beings). What can we say 
about a change such composite objects undergo? For example, the bike my mom had 
bought me when I was in high school is still in my mom’s house in Ethiopia. But over the 
years, parts of my bike have been replaced. Can we then say that the bike my mom first 
bought is the very same bike that is now in my mom’s house?  
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Here the natural answer that comes handy is to say that ‘yes’, the bike that is now in my 
mom’s house is the very same bike that my mom bought. One of the reasons for this is that 
my bike still retains most of its original parts. But the question remains: how is it that an 
object (in this case my bike) remains one and the same bike despite having gone through 
changes of its parts? What if all the parts of my bike had been replaced entirely by new 
parts? Can we still say that the bike my mom bought me is the very same bike whose parts 
are now entirely replaced? In an attempt to answer such sorts of questions, philosophical 
discussions generated puzzles and paradoxes. In this regard, the puzzle of the ship of 
Theseus and the paradox of the thousand and one cats, among others, are the most familiar 
(see e.g., Lowe 2002: Ch. 2). But for present purposes, we won’t discuss whether such 
counterexamples pose any serious threat to our main claim that a substance endures as one 
and the same via qualitative change.  
 
However, a number of non-reductionist philosophers have shown that such 
counterexamples do not pose a threat to the assumption that a substance endures 
thorough qualitative change (Ibid.). So, when it comes to the non-reductionists’ account of 
personal identity over time, as Baillie rightly remarks, we can answer the persistence 
question in light of the following considerations: (1) persons are [distinctly] existing basic 
entities apart from a body and brain as well as sets of mental and physical states; (2) 
personal identity is a ‘further fact,’ in terms of being irreducible to these other facts; (3) 
whether or not identity holds through time is necessarily a determinate matter; and (4) a 
person’s survival is essentially what matters to him or her regarding the future (Baillie 
1993a: 8-9).  
 
Notice here that (1) above makes it clear that persons are not identical to (i) their physical 
bodies; (ii) part of their bodies such as the brain and (iii) the mental and the physical states 
that they bear. What then are ‘persons’? Persons are concrete substantial enduring entities. 
More importantly, persons or selves are subjects of experience. That is, as we saw in 
chapter six, persons have a capacity to recognize the fact that they themselves are the 
subject of their own experience. In this sense, not only do persons possess reflexive self-
knowledge, that is, knowledge of one’s own identity but they also have knowledge of their 
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conscious mental states, which is a knowledge of who one is and of what one is thinking and 
feeling. Moreover, persons are intentional agents who can bring about intentional acts 
simply in virtue of intending to do such acts.   
 
(2) Above makes it clear that personal identity is primitive in that it does not need any 
further grounding nor is it explainable in terms of more fundamental terms than itself. In 
short, personal persistence is an ultimate and unanalyzable fact. If this is true about 
personal identity, then observable experiences such as memory, spatiotemporal continuity 
of a person’s body or brain can hardly be used to establish personal identity over time.144 
Notice here however that to give a criterion of identity for something is to imply that, that 
thing is no longer basic. But if personal identity is an unanalyzable fact in a sense that there 
is nothing more fundamental than itself, then to try to provide a criterion of personal 
persistence would be to mistakenly assume that personal identity is not basic. But such 
remarks should not be taken as begging a question against the reductionists, who in fact 
deny the primitiveness of personal identity (see again chapter five). This is precisely because 
the very primitiveness of personal identity is the case which can be established independent 
of our judgment. In short, primitiveness here is constitutive of the very nature of personal 
persistence. Hence as Lowe nicely explains:  
We can rule out any criterion of identity for a simple substance….For no such 
criterion would be consistent with the assumed substantial status of the object 
concerned. One way of demonstrating this then is to point out that if a concrete 
object is genuinely a simple substance then it could, metaphysically, exist 
unaccompanied by any other concrete entity apart from certain concrete entities 
strongly existentially dependent upon itself—and continue to exist, or persist, in this 
condition. From this it follows that persistence could not depend on the 
preservation of any relationship involving the other, independently existing concrete 
particulars, such as other substances….This being so…the diachronic identity of a 
simple substance cannot be grounded in any equivalence relation defined over 
objects distinct from itself—which is just to say that it can have no diachronic 
identity at all (1998: 170). 
 
(4) Above makes it clear that given the non-reductionists’ commitment to the numerical 
identity of personal persistence through time, it is necessarily the case that personal  
________________ 
144 As we saw, defenders of complex view ground personal identity in one of these things.  
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identity over time cannot be indeterminate. Since numerical identity is an ‘all or nothing’ 
relation, there just does not seem to be any room to let personal identity over time to rest 
on or come in degrees. (4) Above makes it clear that everyone takes his or her future 
survival seriously. For human persons, the issue of their own personal identity through time 
is an existentially important matter in a sense that most people take their own future 
survival seriously. As Noonan (an ardent reductionist himself) puts it, “…unlike other 
philosophical problems, the nature of personal identity is not merely of interest to 
professional philosophers, but also a matter of great practical concern to all of us, 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Man has always hoped to survive his bodily death, 
and it is a central tenet of many religions that such survival is a reality,” (Noonan 1989: 1).    
 
So by endorsing (1)-(4) above, the non-reductionists are ontologically committed to taking a 
human person as an immaterial substance. But for present purpose, the different ways by 
which the non-reductionists’ spell out the notion of an immaterial substance should not 
concern us here.145 At the least, the non-reductionists’ agree that an immaterial substance 
is distinct from a purely physical substance such as the body or any part of it such as the 
brain. So the bearer of all mental states (e.g., belief, desires) is an immaterial substance; 
whereas the bearer of all physical states (e.g., the firing of neurons) is a physical substance. 
But the relationship that exists between the immaterial substance and the physical 
substance is contingent or not absolute. In this case, while the immaterial substance can 
survive the destruction of the body (e.g., disembodied existence as widely testified in near-
death experiences) that embodies it, the same cannot be said of the physical body itself. For 
example, here we certainly are not implying that the physical body is irrelevant. Rather the 
point here is that given the foregone discussion, it is the person as an immaterial substance 
as opposed to the physical body which embodies it (person) that is primitive and 
ungrounded. On this score, Moreland’s remarks hit home: 
I am an all or nothing sort of thing…my identity to myself, in contrast to the degree 
of similarity between two different objects, does not come in degrees but it, rather, 
is an absolute fact. My body can gain and lose parts while I retain absolute sameness 
through such a change…,” (Moreland 2009: 113).  
________________ 
 145 For various non-reductionists’ characterization of the concept of immaterial substance (see e.g., 
Lowe 2008; Moreland 2009). 
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In light of such considerations, therefore, we can provide no necessary and sufficient 
conditions to establish personal identity over time. Since a person is essentially an 
immaterial substance, it may well be the case that a person survives the destruction of 
his/her body while continuing to exist without the body. If this is the correct analysis of 
personal persistence over time, then a person P2 at t2 is the same person as person P1 at 
earlier time at t1, if and only if a person P2 at t2 is numerically identical to person P1 at earlier 
time at t1 or at different stages of a person’s life. But here by ‘stages of a person’s life’ I do 
not mean to indicate that a person’s identity over time is grounded in temporal parts.146  
 
However, here the reductionist might say that the non-reductionists’ characterization of the 
criterion of personal identity is both trivial and uninformative. Instead the reductionist 
might insist that we should consider either the bodily criterion of identity, the brain 
criterion of identity or the psychological criterion of identity to establish a non-trivial and 
informative criterion of personal identity over time. As we already saw in chapter five, there 
is no agreement among philosophers whether bodily or psychological criterion is the best 
way to analyse personal identity over time. Thus, it remains very difficult to see how a non-
trivial and informative criterion can be established that everyone accepts.   
 
Since we have already made a case for personal identity as primitive and ungrounded, what 
importance does the evidence question have when it comes to the debate on personal 
identity? By ‘evidence question,’ I mean, how we find out whether the same person persists 
through time. The importance of answering the evidence question has to do with the 
derivative evidential role it plays for personal identity. For example, in our engagement with 
other human persons, we usually rely on human organisms as a guide to personal identity. 
The unique physical characteristics such as fingerprints are a reliable guide to the identity of 
human organisms, which derivatively can also be used as a reliable guide to personal 
identity. Thus, in the evidential sense of ‘criterion’ there is nothing illegitimate in speaking 
of ‘bodily criteria’ of personal identity. Ditto for the ‘memory criterion’ of personal identity  
________________ 
146 See for example an excellent critique of this view Lowe (2002, Ch. 3). 
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(Lowe 1989b: 136-137).  Yet from this, it does not follow that the evidential criterion tells us 
anything metaphysically interesting about what personal persistence consists in. As Olson 
rightly claims, “If the criminal had fingerprints just like yours, the courts may conclude that 
he is you. But even if that is conclusive evidence, having your fingerprints is not what it is for 
a past or future being to be you: it is neither necessary (you could survive without any 
fingers at all) nor sufficient (someone else could have fingerprints just like yours),” (Olson 
2010).  
 
E. Summary  
In this chapter, I have mainly attempted to sketch out the view I called The Neo-Aristotelian 
View of the Self/Person. While the view needs to be developed further, all I have attempted 
to do at this stage, was to explain the main aspects of the view. I also applied this view to 
the issue of persistence. In the next chapter, I will respond to some of the objections I 
anticipated against this view and will also show how the view could be further enriched 
through future research.   
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Chapter Eight 
 
Some Objections and Future Direction 
 
In chapter seven, I sketched out the view I am calling the Neo-Aristotelian View of 
Substantial-Self/Person. I attempted to give a neo-Aristotelian characterization of the 
nature of the self/person that is rooted in traditional metaphysics with reference to 
substance ontology. While I fully recognized that the view I sketched out needs to be 
further developed, I argued that as it stands, it has the potential to contribute to our 
understanding of the nature of the self/person or, at the very least, in bringing to the table 
a distinctive way of thinking about the substantiality of the self. In this final chapter, my 
main aim is to take some objections which I anticipated at several points in the course of my 
discussion in the last seven chapters. Although it will not be practical to try to respond to 
every possible objection I might have expected, here I will consider the ones that have 
immediate relevance and application to the present discussion.  
 
In light of this, this chapter gives me a chance to bring the main thread of argument I have 
advanced in the last seven chapters, to some kind of closure. In this chapter, I will also point 
out in what specific way the view I sketched out in chapter seven could be further 
developed. So the main goal of this chapter is both to conclude in some meaningful way 
what I have been voicing in defence of a realist account of the ontology of the self/person 
as well as to point out future directions in which the view could be enriched.  
 
8.1 Objections 
A. Bermúdez’s Circularity  
As we recall, one of the issues I repeatedly emphasized in this thesis has to do with a non-
theory laden conception of our own selfhood/personhood. In chapter one (§ 1.1.1.1), I 
explained this point in detail using Descartes’s cogito. I argued, inter alia, that Descartes’s 
cogito ultimately has to be taken as a de re knowledge. Understood this way, de re 
knowledge, which also entails self-consciousness, is rooted in the first-person perspective 
(cf. O’Brien 2007: Ch.1). One of the central roles of the first person pronoun has to do with 
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its referentiality (see e.g., Bar-On 2004: Ch. 1). More specifically, when a person 
comprehendingly uses the first person pronoun, he/she cannot fail to refer to 
himself/herself. For example, after a very busy day, if I say to my wife, ‘I am so tired,’ then 
the ‘I’ in the statement ‘I am so tired’ has a clear referent. In this case, the ‘I’ unmistakably 
refers to me—the producer of the utterance. Dorit Bar-On calls such utterances—‘avowals’ 
which have special security from being prone to referential error (see 2004: Ch.1; also see 
O’Brien 2007: 4-6; cf. Snowdon in Coliva 2012: 245-256). Although this might seem to be 
obvious for most of us, some philosophers still want to dispute the referentiality of the first 
person pronoun (e.g., Anscombe in Cassam 1994: Ch. VIII). I will take up this issue in relation 
to another objection that I will discuss in due course.    
 
In this section, my focus will be on Bermúdez’s circularity objection. Given that my focus so 
far has been on the first person knowledge of our own selfhood, my claim directly faces 
Bermudez’s circularity objection. As I briefly explained in chapter one § 1.1.1.1, Bermúdez 
claims that self-consciousness is paradoxical. This paradox arises, according to Bermúdez, 
when we ponder on what seems to be the common thread that ties the various 
manifestations of self-consciousness together (1998: 1). Bermúdez claims that this paradox 
raises the question of how in the first place self-consciousness is possible (Ibid.). The 
paradox consists of two types of circularity, namely explanatory and capacity, respectively 
(1998:14-24; cf. Sainsbury and Tye 2012: 18). Regarding the explanatory circularity, 
Bermúdez remarks:  
 Any theory that tries to elucidate the capacity to think first-person thoughts through  
linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun will be circular, because the 
explanandum is part of the explanans either directly…or indirectly (1998:16).  
 
 
Regarding the capacity circularity Bermúdez remarks:  
 
The capacity for reflexive self-reference by means of the first-person pronoun 
presupposes the capacity to think thoughts with first-person contents, and hence 
cannot be deployed to explain that capacity. In other words, a degree of self-
consciousness is required to master the use of the first-person pronoun (1998:18).   
    
In Bermúdez’s account of the paradox of self-consciousness, he also suggests how we can 
diffuse both forms of circularity. He sums it up as follows:  
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A nonconceptual content is one that can be ascribed to a thinker even though that 
thinker does not possess the concepts required to specify that content. 
Nonconceptual first-person contents are those that fall into this category and that 
can be specified by means of the first-person or indirect reflexive pronouns. This 
nonconceptual first-person content offers a way of breaking both forms of circularity 
(1998:49ff).  
 
Reply: Why should we think that self-consciousness is paradoxical in a way that Bermúdez 
thinks that it is? Before we answer this question, it is crucial to point out the core 
assumptions at work behind Bermúdez’s proposal of self-consciousness as a paradox.  
Bermúdez seems to be assuming that the capacity to think first-person thoughts, as well as 
the capacity for reflexive self-reference, comes through effortful linguistic mastery of the 
use of the first-person pronoun. In light of this, Bermúdez thinks that one cannot account 
for the phenomenon of self-consciousness without at the same time running into the 
problem of circularity, namely the explanatory and the capacity, respectively. Bermúdez 
suggests that the solution to avoid the circularity problem, in this case, requires us to 
divorce self-consciousness from the first-person perspective. I am unpersuaded by 
Bermúdez’s remarks for at least three main reasons.  
 
First, Bermúdez is wrong in thinking that self-consciousness can be divorced from the first-
person perspective. If such divorce is possible, then how can we elucidate the very notion of 
self-consciousness? (see e.g., Hamilton 2013: 17). To see the force of this question, we need 
to understand what the notion of self-consciousness amounts to. Hamilton characterizes it 
as follows: “self-consciousness is a phenomenon expressed by use of a self-referring device 
with the properties of the first person,” (Ibid. 10). At least two things seem to follow from 
Hamilton’s characterization of self-consciousness: (i) the first-person perspective is built 
into the very notion of self-consciousness. That is to say that one cannot stand without the 
other. If this is right, then it is hard to see how one can establish a real separation between 
the two; and (ii) there is no guarantee that one succeeds in giving a non-circular account of 
self-consciousness (cf. O’Brien 2007: 8-9). If we grant (i) above, then there will always be a 
residue of an unavoidable circularity at the background of any account of self-
consciousness. However, I take such circularity to be benign as opposed to vicious. By 
‘benign circularity,’ I refer to a situation/an explanation that does not lead in a non-
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ending/continuous fashion to a series of subsequent explanations. For example, the use of 
the first person pronoun “I” one uses to refer to oneself is circular, since it presupposes 
one’s prior grasp of what its referent is. So a non-circular account of the use of “I” does not 
seem to be available. For reasons we shall see shortly, such circularity is benign. Similarly, as 
Burgess points out, “we need to experience redness to master the concept of redness. We 
need to experience redness in order to know what redness is,” (2008: 223; cf. Alston 1986: 
1-30). On other hand, by ‘vicious circularity,’ I understand a situation/explanation that 
continuously leads to a non-ending subsequent series of explanations with no real progress.  
For example, Burgess uses the following example:  
1. X is putrid =df x is decayed 
2. X is decayed =df x is rotten 
3. X is rotten =df x is foul 
4. X is foul =df x is putrid. 
 
As Burgess points out, here the series of definitions in (1)-(4) leads us precisely back to our 
point of departure. Burgess says that the image invoked here is that of a dog chasing its 
own tail, of the process of definition going nowhere (2008: 216-233). This sort of vicious 
circularity is not philosophically acceptable for it does not advance a particular argument or 
thought. By contrast, benign circularity is philosophically acceptable, since it does not stand 
on the way of a particular argument or thought progression. Hence, self-consciousness is 
not viciously circular.  
 
So even if for the sake of argument we agree that the two types of circularity that Bermúdez 
is concerned with should be avoided from our account of self-consciousness, there is 
another sort of circularity I have in mind which seems to be unavoidable. This is a sort of 
circularity that is rooted in the phenomenology of self-consciousness itself. For example, the 
reason why I believe that I am a creature with self-consciousness is because, there is what it 
is to be like a creature with self-consciousness, which is firmly grounded in my first person 
awareness. It is such phenomenological experience that primarily enables me to realize that 
I have the property of self-consciousness. So if I were to give an account of self-
consciousness, then my account inevitably would presuppose my prior grasp of my being a 
creature with self-consciousness. This is an instance of what I shall call: phenomenological 
circularity. As I said earlier, even if for the sake of argument we agree with Bermúdez that 
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there could be a way to avoid a kind of circularity that he is concerned with, I see no good 
reason to think that we can do the same with phenomenological circularity. The only 
scenario we can hope to avoid phenomenological circularity is by abandoning the very 
notion of self-consciousness, which seems to be rather an extremely unattractive option, to 
say the least. It is then fair to say that even if Bermúdez succeeds in avoiding his version of 
the circularity problem, his strategy fails to secure a complete eradication of circularity from 
our account of self-consciousness. As we shall see, I have doubts about the possibility of 
avoiding even the types of circularity that Bermúdez has in mind.  
 
Second, if we grant what I earlier called phenomenological circularity, then contra  
Bermúdez, there is nothing wrong in explaining the capacity for reflexive self-reference by 
means of the first person pronoun. Bermúdez thinks that, since the use of the first person 
pronoun presupposes the capacity to think thoughts with first-person contents, it cannot be 
deployed to explain that capacity. My claim is that given my version of phenomenological 
circularity, we cannot give entirely neutral, that is, a non-circular account of our capacity for 
reflexive self-reference that does not involve or in some way presuppose the first-person 
perspective. Hence, either way, we are still stuck with some sort of circularity. If I am right, 
then Bermúdez’s fear of circularity is far-fetched. At this point, it may be asked whether my 
arguments are intended to show that circular explanations are in principle unproblematic. 
My answer for such worry would be to say that I do not support explanatory circularity.  
 
However, in the present context, what I am calling phenomenological circularity should not 
be equated with Bermúdez’s explanatory circularity. This is because, from a 
phenomenological standpoint, when one gives an account of self-consciousness, one does 
not do that on the basis of any theory. Nor is it that one is trying to give a theoretical 
account of what self-consciousness is like. Rather in such situations, what one does is simply 
state the way things are or appear to be to oneself from the standpoint of one’s 
phenomenological experience. In fact, taken in this sense, what Bermúdez calls the 
‘capacity circularity’ can be taken as a species of what I am calling phenomenological 
circularity. Both cases of circularity are instances of one’s prior grasp of self-consciousness.  
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Third, if I am right about the unavoidability of some form of circularity in our account of 
self-consciousness, then Bermúdez’s appeal to a non-conceptual content as a way to diffuse 
the problem of circularity (whether that be the explanatory or the capacity version) is 
undermined. Bermúdez thinks that if we specify non-conceptual first-person contents by 
means of the first person or indirect reflexive pronouns, then we will have a way of breaking 
both forms of circularity. But this strategy does not seem to work. For example, as I briefly 
mentioned in chapter one, we can understand non-conceptual first-person content in 
dispositional terms. Taken this way, the non-conceptual first-person content only needs the 
right kind of circumstance for its manifestation in terms of a capacity, namely for reflexive 
self-reference via the use of the first person pronoun. So once we take a dispositional 
approach to understand non-conceptual first person content, it remains unclear how it can 
be used as a solution, as Bermúdez suggests, to diffuse the paradox of self-consciousness 
(assuming that there is such a paradox).  
 
Bermúdez may respond to all of this by saying that my criticisms of his explanatory 
circularity and capacity circularity miss their target. He might say this because of his 
conviction that self-consciousness is a paradox. This may well be so. However, if as I tried to 
show that a non-circular account of self-consciousness is hard to come by, Bermúdez still 
bears the burden of proof to show us how a complete non-circular account of self-
consciousness is possible. I conclude then that the objections I pushed against Bermúdez’s 
circularity claims still stand.  
 
From all this, once again, it seems to follow that our basic sense of our conception of 
ourselves as selves or persons is primitive—i.e., it is not theory-laden (cf. Bennett and 
Hacker 2003: 367-377; see also Akeel Bilgram in Coliva 2012: Ch. 12). In this case, I disagree 
with Harré when he says that self-consciousness is a learned ability to speak and think 
about oneself (Harré in Peacocke and Gillett 1987: 6; cf. Eilan in Bermudez, Marcel, and 
Eilan, eds., 1995: 339). I understand self-consciousness, rather to be a dispositional property 
that a creature of a certain kind has, which, given the right kind of circumstances, a creature 
of that kind manifests and exercises effortlessly. But this does not mean that disciplines 
such as neuroscience/cognitive science and psychology do not shed light on the mechanism 
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of self-consciousness (see e.g., Bermúdez, Marcel, and Eilan, eds., 1-27; Popper and Eccles 
1977: 440-442, 476-478; Bennett and Hacker 2003: 12). That is a different matter. My point 
is rather that the metaphysics of self-consciousness does not depend, at least initially, on 
the findings/discovery of empirical science.    
 
B. Tooley-Dennett-Singer’s conditions on Personhood/Selfhood 
In this thesis, I defended the substantial conception of the self/person, according to which, 
inter alia, the self is distinct from the capacities it has. I also argued within the framework of 
Aristotelian substance ontology that a substantial entity such as the self/person does not 
come in degrees. If we take the Aristotelian approach, it makes little sense to say that the 
self/person comes in and goes out of existence depending on whether or not it satisfies 
certain conditions that confer to it the status of selfhood or personhood. However, largely 
due to Locke’s influence, contemporary neo-Lockeans on the one hand and bioethicists on 
the other hand advanced the ontology of the self/person that stands in sharp conflict with 
the one defended in this thesis. In this section, my aim is to respond to this objection by 
drawing insights from the contemporary discussions on the metaphysics of dispositions. My 
response in this regard is novel, since discussions besetting personhood in the 
contemporary personal identity literature are not connected, at least in any direct manner, 
to dispositions.  
 
Despite drawing insights from the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics of 
dispositions, it is not my goal to enter into the current debates regarding dispositions 
simpliciter (see e.g., Bird 2007; Choi 2006/2012; Mumford in Beebee, Hitchcock and 
Menzies 2009: Ch. 12). For present purposes, I am only interested in examining the 
ontology of personhood that is based on certain philosophical assumptions. In this case, I 
focus on Tooley’s, Dennett’s and Singer’s views of what it means to be a person. Unlike 
Dennett, both Tooley’s and Singer’s discussion of personhood takes place in the context of 
the current debate on the moral status of abortion. In this thesis, it is not my goal to enter 
into these debates (see e.g., Oderberg 2000).  
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1. Class Distinction  
Central to Tooley’s, Singer’s and Dennett’s notion of personhood is what I shall call the 
Lockean person-making or person-constituting properties/capacities. First, in his influential 
article, Abortion and Infanticide, Tooley remarks:  
What properties must something have in order to be a person, i.e. to have a serious 
right to life? The claim I wish to defend is this: An organism possesses a serious right 
to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences 
and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity….which 
I will call the self-consciousness requirement (Tooley in Singer 1986: 64; see also 
Tooley in Steven Luper 2014: Ch.15). 
 
Second, Singer remarks: 
I propose to use ‘person’ in the sense of a rational and self conscious being, to 
capture those elements of the popular sense of ‘human being’ that are not covered 
by members of the species Homo Sapiens (1993: 87).  
 
Third, Dennett remarks:  
The first theme is that persons are rational beings….The second theme is that 
persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which 
psychological or mental or Intentional predicates, are ascribed….The third theme is 
that whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude 
taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it….The fourth theme is that the 
object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of reciprocating 
in some way…The fifth theme is that persons must be capable of verbal 
communication…The sixth theme is that persons are distinguishable from other 
entities by being conscious in some special way….sometime this is identified as self-
consciousness….(in Amélie Rorty 1976: 177-178).  
 
Tooley, Singer and Dennett all agree in characterizing a person as a psychological being with 
capacities such as rationality, self-consciousness, self-concept and so on. As we saw in 
chapter two, these are the sorts of capacities that Locke explicitly mentions in his 
characterization of the notion of a person. Furthermore, Tooley, Singer and Dennett also 
agree in restricting the class of personhood to those who meet the sorts of conditions listed 
above. In doing so, they tell us who is (should be) excluded from the class of persons. In this 
regard, Dennett’s list of the excluded group include: (i) infant human beings; (ii) mentally 
defective human beings; and (iii) human beings declared insane by licensed psychiatrists 
(Dennett in Amélie Rorty 1976: 175). Singer’s list include: (i) non-human animals; (ii) new-
born infants; (iii) some intellectually disabled humans (1993: 101). Finally, Tooley’s list 
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include: (i) foetus; and (ii) new-born babies (Tooley in Singer 1986: 60-62). In light of this, 
they also argue that the terms ‘human being’ and ‘person’ should not be used 
interchangeably, since these terms belong to members that belong to two distinct classes 
(see e.g., Tooley in Singer 1986: 60-62; Singer 1993: 86-87 and Dennett in Amélie Rorty 
1976: 175-176). The question remains: Who is then privileged to be included in the class of 
persons? Unlike they did with the excluded group, Tooley, Singer and Dennett do not give 
us any explicit list of the privileged group. Of course, were they to give us such a list, their 
list would probably suffer from the problem of vagueness, since the Lockean person-making 
properties come in degrees (cf. Williams 1985: 114). Are we then prepared to say that 
Tooley, Singer and Dennett succeeded in establishing the class of persons that does not 
have as its members anyone from the excluded group mentioned above? As I indicated 
earlier, I will attempt to answer this question within the framework of the metaphysics of 
dispositions.  
 
2. Objects, Dispositions and their Manifestations  
Suppose that a certain object O exists. What can we know about O? Depending on how it is 
specified, we may know a good deal about O. For example: (i) we may know what 
dispositions O possesses; (ii) we may know under what circumstances those dispositions 
could be manifested; (iii) we may know what sorts of circumstances may hinder the 
manifestation of those dispositions and so on. If we grant this, then at least initially, 
following Martin, we can make the following assumptions. As Martin remarks:  
A particular disposition exists or it does not. You could say of any unmanifesting 
disposition that it straight-out exists, even if it is not, at that time or at any other 
time, manifesting any manifestation. It is the unmanifested manifestation, not the 
disposition itself, that is the would-be-if or would-have-been-if anything is. There 
can be a disposition A for the manifestation of acquiring a further disposition B and, 
of course, disposition B need not itself have any manifestation, but disposition B can 
still be unfulfilled terminus of that for which A has a specific directedness (1994: 1-2; 
see also Mumford in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies 2009: 269-270).  
 
In the above passage, Martin has made two critical points with respect to the nature of 
dispositions. First, the absence of the manifestation of certain dispositions does not in any 
way show that they do not exist. Second, if for whatever reason(s), dispositions are not 
manifested, then they can be taken as unmanifested manifestations. Consider a china cup. 
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It has certain dispositions, for example, the disposition to shatter if struck. Here the verb 
‘struck’ stands for what is taken to be a stimulus condition and ‘shatter’ stands for what is 
understood to be a manifestation. So the question remains: will it be the case that every 
time a stimulus condition is met that we should necessarily expect to see a manifestation of 
a certain disposition? More specifically, should we necessarily expect to see a china cup 
shatter when struck? Of course, under normal circumstances, the answer for such questions 
must be ‘yes’. However, consider again a slightly modified scenario whereby a china cup is 
placed inside a sturdy box, such that when struck, the sturdy box completely absorbs the 
forceful impact—blocking it from reaching the china cup. In this case, the china cup remains 
un-shattered. Such is an example that seems to capture Martin’s phrase ‘unmanifested 
manifestation.’ But is there any other way by which we can take the unmanifested 
manifestations themselves to be the actual manifestations of a different kind? Following 
Heil (2012: 120-130), I would say ‘yes’. For example, Heil remarks: 
A ball’s sphericity endows it with a power to roll. But it is also in virtue of being 
spherical that the ball has the power to make a concave, circular impression in a 
cushion, the power to reflect light so as to look spherical, the power to feel spherical 
to the touch. Talk of single-and-multi-track dispositions or powers is confused from 
the outset. Powers quite generally are multi-track, if this means that they would 
manifest themselves differently with different reciprocal partner (2012: 21).147  
 
Here Heil is echoing Martin’s two points that concern with the nature of dispositions. 
Martin is an ardent defender of multi-track dispositions. Originally, the term ‘multi-track’ 
was coined by Ryle (1963: 114). These are dispositions that are believed to have more than 
one kind of stimulus condition or manifestation, or both (Bird 2007: 21). Taken this way, 
powers or dispositions have many reciprocal partners. That means that negative interfering 
factors such as absences, preventers, antidotes, blockers, inhibitors, etc., will no longer be 
taken as stopping a certain power from being manifested. This is because such things 
themselves are dispositions manifesting themselves with various reciprocal partners (Heil 
2012: 126-130). Again as Heil remarks:  
What of scurvy and the lack of vitamin C? A living body’s healthy condition is a 
mutual manifestation of myriad finely tuned reciprocal disposition partners. When 
_______________ 
      147 At this point, following Heil I also want to understand dispositions as powers (2012: 120-130; cf. 
Mumford in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies 2009: 269-270). 
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one of these is missing, you have a different sort of manifestation, just as you have a 
different sort of manifestation when you remove one of the cards from a pair of 
propped-up playing cards. Here, as elsewhere, what you have is not an absence’s 
stepping in and producing a particular kind of effect, but a different collection of 
reciprocal powers yielding a different kind of manifestation. An absence is not an 
entity, not something with properties providing it with distinctive powers. But 
certain kinds of manifestation require appropriately propertied something as 
reciprocal partners. When these are missing, the result is a different kind of 
manifestation (2012: 127).  
 
The gist of Heil’s point here is that, once we take a multi-track powers model, the 
manifestation of dispositions is not a one way street, whereby one thing causes another in a 
linear fashion. On the contrary, the manifestation of powers is the result of causings, i.e., 
mutual manifestings of various reciprocal partners (Ibid. 120). Such considerations help us 
to have a good grip on Martin’s earlier remarks. That is to say that rather than talking about 
unmanifested manifestation, now we can talk about manifestations tout court. The 
manifestation of powers is multi-faceted in that the apparent absence the manifestation of 
certain powers does not show that no manifestation is taking place. Rather it only means 
that a different kind of manifestation is happening. So where does all these leave us? As I 
already indicated earlier, I will use the hitherto discussion on powers, to respond to Tooley-
Dennett-Singer’s conditions on Personhood/Selfhood.  
 
Reply: If one examines Tooley-Dennett-Singer’s conception of personhood by taking a 
popular functionalist approach, then the conclusion one arrives at on that basis will be 
radically different, if one were to examine it from the standpoint of ontology. A functionalist 
approach can be stated as follows: (i) X is a person iff X manages to play certain agreed 
upon roles. As I indicated in chapter one § 1.1.2.4, the extension of (i) is open ended 
allowing artefacts (e.g., robots, corporations, computers) to fall under the sortal term 
‘person’. Taken from the standpoint of (i), Tooley-Dennett-Singer’s conception of 
personhood may be taken to be unproblematic. However, the underlying assumption 
behind Tooley-Dennett-Singer’s conception of personhood is ontological in nature. The 
underlying assumption I have in mind can be described as follows: (ii) X is a person iff X 
exercises certain properties that are believed to constitute personhood. So my own focus 
will be on (ii).  
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Given the multi-track powers model, what is the merit of the class distinction Tooley, 
Dennett and Singer introduced between ‘human being’ and ‘human person’? Tooley, 
Dennett and Singer think that foetuses, newly born babies and mentally disabled humans 
are not human persons. This is because, as they see it, humans with various sorts of mental 
disability have stopped manifesting powers essential for personhood. On the other hand, 
foetuses, and newly born babies have not yet begun to manifest powers essential for 
personhood. In light of such reasoning, Tooley, Dennett and Singer freely assume that the 
class of ‘human beings’ is different from that of the class of ‘human persons’. However, it 
remains far from clear how Tooley-Dennett-Singer’s class distinction can be plausibly 
maintained, if examined from the standpoint of the multi-track dispositions’ model.   
 
Whether it is in the case of foetus or mentally disabled people, the manifestation of powers 
is always taking place. In the case of a developing foetus or newly born babies, we can 
understand personhood in light of the concept of potentiality which is often contrasted with 
actuality. Although I do not speak French, I have a second order capacity to acquire the first 
order capacity to speak French. Notice that here both the first and the second order 
capacities are equal capacities. Simply because I do not speak French now, it does not 
follow that the second order capacity I have to learn French is not an actual capacity (cf. 
Frankfurt 1971: 1-2). So the notion of potentiality I suggested above should not be 
understood as docile, since it is an instance of the manifestation of power (cf. Aristotle 
Metaphysics Theta). In light of such similar considerations, Oderberg remarks, “conception 
does not bring into existence potential human beings, but an actual human being with a 
potential to develop, given the right external factors, into a mature human being [human 
person]”, (2000: 21; see also Oderberg 2008: 263-267). Similarly, Puccetti remarks, “a 
human infant, for example, is not expected to make moral judgments: but since he can 
enter the human conceptual scheme he is a developing person and is expected to have a 
moral character of his own some day” (1968: 9; see also Williams 1985: 114). Both 
Oderberg’s and Puccetti’s remarks echo the assumption that underlies the multi-track 
powers.  
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Moreover, in the case of anencephalic infants (i.e., without brains), we can see powers 
being manifested albeit in a very different way than we normally expect. Ditto with mentally 
disabled people. For example, if a person becomes totally amnesiac, adopting Tooley-
Dennett-Singer’s conception of personhood, forces us to conclude that the amnesiac is no 
longer a person. However, if we adopt the multi-track powers model, the right thing to say 
would be that, an amnesiac is still a person like the rest of us—despite suffering from a 
neurodegenerative disease. The only difference between a normal person and that of an 
amnesiac person lies in the latter, no longer being able to utilize his/her cognitive abilities. 
This happens due to an entirely different kind of manifestation that led to the loss of the 
amnesiac person’s cognitive abilities. The same is true of comatose patients and other cases 
of severely disabled people. Despite the current orthodoxy that attempts to divide humans 
into entirely conventionally based classes, the powers ontology briefly discussed above 
shows why there is no justification for such a move. In light such considerations, the class 
distinction suggested by Tooley, Dennett and Singer should be rejected. In rejecting the 
class distinction, however, one need not thereby also deny the distinction that obtains 
between a person and the animal body that embodies it. In my own case, as I argued, I 
maintain such a distinction.   
 
To all of these, Tooley, Dennett and Singer might respond in two ways. First, they may reject 
the multi-track dispositions model altogether. In that case, it is hard to see what compelling 
reasons there could be for rejecting it. Moreover, in rejecting the multi-track dispositions 
model, Tooley, Dennett and Singer owe us a better model. Again it is hard to see what that 
might be. Second, they might insist that the class distinction between ‘human being’ and 
‘human person’ is not something they originated. Rather, it is the standard view that is 
accepted by an overwhelming majority of contemporary philosophers. The standard view 
invoked here primarily takes a person as a functional concept. But I already argued why the 
functional concept of a person is deeply unsatisfactory. So the ground for maintaining the 
class distinction as suggested by Tooley, Dennett and Singer remains to be less than 
adequate, to say the least.  
 
  
279 
 
So what should we say about (ii) above? Recall that (ii) states that: X is a person iff X 
exercises certain properties that are believed to constitute personhood. As it stands, (ii) is 
too restrictive in that it only allows something to be included in the category of persons 
provided that certain properties are exercised. As we saw, given the powers ontology 
adopted here, the idea of unexercised powers could be problematic as we saw in the case 
of Tooley-Dennett and Singer. However, many realists about powers are perfectly happy 
with the idea of a power existing unexercised. But here is a more pressing ontological issue. 
How does an object acquire the powers it possesses?  
 
No doubt this question receives different answers in different contexts. But in relation to 
human persons, we can give a broadly Aristotelian answer for it. In this case, the key 
assumption that an Aristotelian brings to the table is this. That is, human persons have both 
natural as well as acquired/learned dispositions. As I understand it, a disposition is natural, 
just in case an object has it in virtue of being a kind of entity that it is. On the other hand, a 
disposition is learned just in case an object has it through learning. Two qualifications to 
keep in mind here, however. First, to have acquired dispositions, sometimes natural powers 
may be prerequisites. Second, to have acquired dispositions, natural powers may not be 
prerequisites. For example, we may teach a dog certain skills, say of, riding on the scooter, 
which is a learned disposition. But no matter how hard we try, we cannot make a dog to be 
a language speaker, since it lacks a natural disposition. But in the case of Lockean Person 
Making Properties, all humans have the natural dispositions for self-consciousness, self-
concept and so on, in virtue of being the kinds of entities that they are. So whether these 
dispositions are manifested in normal ways or not, no human being is more privileged in 
having them than the other. If I am right here, then it follows that all humans have equal, 
i.e., unconditional ontological status. In light of such considerations, (ii) above collapses. I 
conclude then that such a broadly Aristotelian approach, that grounds the powers objects 
have in their nature, is far superior to the kind of conventionalist approach adopted by 
Tooley, Dennett and Singer.  
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C. Personality Fragmentation and Personhood  
Sometimes it has been claimed that some neuropsychological and psychiatric phenomenon 
poses a serious problem for the continuity of the self (Bermúdez, Marcel, and Eilan, 1995: 
6). For example, in his article entitled, Fragmented Selves: Temporality and Identity in 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Fuchs describes the experience of patients with borderline 
personality disorder. As Fuchs explains, people who suffer from borderline personality 
disorder lack the capacity to establish a coherent self-concept. They switch from one 
present to the next, thereby identifying themselves with their momentary state of affect. As 
a result, such people experience a temporal splitting of the self (2007: 381).  Even more so, 
people who suffer from borderline personality disorder experience:  
A shifting view of oneself, with sharp discontinuities, rapidly changing roles and 
relationships and an underlying feeling of inner emptiness. There is no sense of 
continuity over time and across situations, no concept of self-development that 
could be projected into the future, but only an endless repetition of the same 
affective states, creating a peculiar atemporal mode of existing. The patients often 
rapidly change their goals, jobs and friends as well as their convictions and values; 
they are unable to commit themselves to a set of self-defining values, enduring 
relationships and long-term aspirations (2007: 382).  
 
What can we say about the implications of such experiences? Do they show that the 
continuity of the self/person can be called into question? My own answer would be not at 
all. This is, at least, for three main reasons. First, such stories always presuppose a subject of 
experience, insofar as they are told directly from the first person perspective of those 
people who have the experience (cf. Westerhoff 2011: Ch. 3). So when one experiences the 
loss of a sense of self, that does not by itself imply the discontinuity of the self/person. If 
that were the case, such stories could not have been told in the first person language. 
Second, such psychiatric phenomena are indicators of how the self/person can experience 
complicated cognitive, emotional and psychological pathologies (see e.g., Hobson 1993; 
Higashida 2007; Grandin 2013; Radden in Gallagher 2011: Ch. 23; Hobson in Gallagher 2011: 
Ch. 24; Parnas and Sass in Gallagher 2011: Ch. 22; Cavell in Gallagher 2011: Ch. 25). This 
could be for many reasons. To lesser or greater extent, such experiences are common to 
people in general. I see, therefore, no compelling reason to think that the fragmentation of 
the self/person, no matter how worse it could be, that it necessarily implies the 
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discontinuity of the self. Perhaps, the most convincing reason that supports this conclusion 
comes from our earlier discussion on powers ontology. As we recall, multi-track powers or 
dispositions have various reciprocal partners. Given the multi-track powers model, the 
manifestation of powers takes multiple directions. Even if we have a sense of self, in some 
situations, we might lose our sense of self.  When that happens, the right thing to say is not 
that I no longer maintain my identity over time. Rather, I should understand my situation in 
terms of the manifestation of the exact opposite disposition. That is, when I was normal, I 
used to have a clear sense of myself; but after I experience some sort of cognitive, 
emotional or psychological crisis, I may experience the loss of a sense of myself. That means 
again that I am now a subject of a different sort of experience, albeit an undesirable sort.  
 
D. Unified Consciousness and Personhood/Selfhood   
One of the objections raised against the unity of the self can be linked to the unity of 
phenomenal consciousness. Here, I will advance my discussion by drawing upon Bayne’s 
article entitled, “The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome” (2008: 277-300). 
In this article, Bayne defends the claim that phenomenal consciousness is unified. That is, 
subjective experiences such as our visual experiences, auditory experiences, bodily 
sensations, emotional and mood experiences and the like, other conscious cognitive states, 
do not occur as phenomenal atoms, rather they occur simultaneously. Put differently, such 
experiences occur as a conjoint phenomenology, which is to say that there is something it is 
like to have all of these experiences together, which entails that they are so had. Unified 
consciousness refers to subjects having total phenomenal state. However, when subjects 
lack total phenomenal state, such subjects experience disunities in their consciousness.  
 
In this regard, split-brain syndrome can be taken as a paradigm example. The split-brain 
procedure involves severing the corpus callosum (structure in the brain which connects the 
left and the cerebral hemispheres) to prevent epileptic seizures from traveling from one 
hemisphere to the other. The widely held view is that the split-brain patients lack unified 
consciousness. This is because studies have shown that split-brain patients suffer from 
behavioral disunities, i.e., inability to give a complete report, when asked to identify objects 
they are shown. Other studies have shown that such people suffer from representational 
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disunities, i.e., inability to integrate between the content of the patient’s conscious states. 
For example, as Tye describes:  
A subject, S, is told to stare fixedly at the centre of a translucent screen that fills his 
visual field. Two words are flashed onto the screen by means of a projector located 
behind, one to the left of the fixation point and one to the right, for example, the 
words ‘pen’ and ‘knife’. The words are flashed very quickly (for just 1/10 of second) 
so that eye movements from one word to the other are not possible. This 
arrangement is one that ensures that the word on the left provides input only to the 
right hemisphere of the brain and the word on the right provides input only to the 
left. S is then asked what he saw. S shows no awareness, in his verbal responses, of 
‘pen’. However, if S is asked to retrieve the object corresponding to the word he saw 
from a group of objects concealed from sight, using his left had alone, he will pick 
out a pen while rejecting the knives. Alternatively, if S is asked to point with his left 
hand to the object corresponding to the word he saw, he will point to a pen. 
Moreover, if S is asked to sort through the group of objects using both hands, he will 
pick out a pen with his left hand and a knife with his right. In this case, the two 
hands work independently with the left rejecting the knives in the group and the 
right rejecting the pens (Tye 2003: 109-111).  
 
But, despite such instances of disunities of consciousness, a series of experiments have 
shown that the split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times (see e.g., 
Bayne 2008: 277-300).148 Tye also argues that, “split-brain subjects are single persons 
whose phenomenal consciousness is briefly split into two under certain special 
experimental conditions, but whose consciousness at other times is unified,” (2003: 111-
113).  
 
While agreeing with both Bayne and Tye, I would add that the situation we see in split-brain 
subjects can be understood better in light of the multi-track powers analysis I gave earlier. 
That is, the incompatible responses split-brain subjects give in an experimental environment 
can be attributed to the manifestations of different powers or dispositions under different 
________________ 
148 Bayne rightly points out that the notion of the unity of consciousness can be understood in 
different ways. But following Bayne, here I am only interested in phenomenal consciousness and to see 
whether split-brain syndrome shows the disunity of phenomenal consciousness. In his book First Person Plural: 
Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind, Braude (1995) gives compelling reasons regarding the 
presence of psychological unity in people with even the most severe forms of multiple personalities. He rejects 
the hypothesis that multiple personalities, as well as split brain syndromes, show the presence of more than 
one self. Such observations further strengthen my own view regarding the continuity of the self over time, 
despite cognitive and other dysfunctions (see § C above; see also Hacking 1995). For further debates on this 
issue, see Sperry (1968: 723-733); LeDoux, Willson and Gazzangia (1977: 417-421); Mark Bajakian’s multiple 
person view (2011: 195-204).  
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circumstances. That said, given that the split-brain patients maintain a complete 
phenomenal state, it seems totally reasonable to say that even the malfunctioning of the 
brain (as seen in the split-brain patients) by itself does not seem to necessarily impair one’s 
capacity to have an undivided phenomenal consciousness. In this case, a person with a split-
brain syndrome on the one hand and a person without such a disorder on the other hand 
equally enjoy a unified consciousness. At this point it may be asked: what brain mechanism 
is responsible in allowing us to have a unified consciousness? Is phenomenal consciousness 
generated by the brain as whole? If not, is there any specific region in the brain that is 
responsible for generating phenomenal consciousness? These sorts of questions are not 
easy to answer. For example, the majority of neuroscientists are well aware of the fact that 
our cognitive and emotional processes are mediated not by one specific region in the brain 
but by several brain regions working together in an integrated fashion (Mario Beauregard 
and Denyse O’Leary, 2007: 47; see also Gallagher, ed., 2011: 4). More precisely, the reason 
why a single area in the brain does not seem to underlie our phenomenal experiences has 
to do with what neuroscientists refer to as the combinatorial capacity problem. That is, as 
LaRock remarks, “the possible combinations of features that are represented throughout 
our lives would seem to far exceed the neural machinery with which we are equipped.” 
(2008: 201-229).   
 
Even if it could well be the case that our experience of unified consciousness may be aided 
in some way by neuronal subassemblies occupying separate areas in our brain, we are still 
left with the central question of how the brain, whether taken as a whole or a single part of 
it, is capable of producing unified consciousness. An eminent neuroscientist, Jeanette 
Norden states, “...there is no area in the brain where it all comes together. Yet what is my 
subjective experience? That it’s happening to a (sic) “me,” and that it is unitary. It is an 
experience which is happening to me. And we yet have not come up with a better 
paradigm. We have no idea how the brain is accomplishing this,” (Norden, 2007: Part 3, 
118). This problem often is referred to as the binding problem (Ibid. 211). It seems that the 
binding problem presents a serious problem for any view that attempts to undermine the 
unity of consciousness. One wonders how in the first place unified consciousness is 
possible. My own view is that the unity of consciousness presupposes its bearer, which I 
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take it to be the self/person. I will say something briefly about this point later in the 
chapter. In light of the hitherto considerations, it seems reasonable to say that unified 
consciousness goes hand in hand with unified self.  
 
E. The Reference of First Person Pronoun “I” and Personhood/Selfhood  
One of the most popular objections against a realist ontology of the self has to do with the 
reference of the first person pronoun “I”. Ryle once remarked that, “the enigmas that I have 
in mind all turn on what I shall call the ‘systematic elusiveness’ of the concept of ‘I’ (in 
Cassam 1994: 31). Along similar lines, in his ‘On The Phenomeno-Logic of the I,’ Castañeda 
remarks, “many mysteries surround the self, but many of them arise from the fact that a 
self refers to itself in the first-person way,” (in Cassam 1994: 160; see also Evans 1982: 205). 
Ryle-Castañeda’s observations are right in that, ‘I’ is not a concept to which we can give a 
ready-made analysis, since it defies the philosophers’ usual a ‘necessary and sufficient 
category.’ Perhaps, one has to accept the primitiveness of ‘I’, in a sense that it is a term that 
cannot be further analysed in terms of anything more fundamental than itself. But most 
philosophers do not want to settle for the primitiveness of the term ‘I’. In the literature, two 
dominant responses have been given.  
 
The first one is Descartes’ answer, i.e., ‘I’ is a referring expression (see chapter one § 
1.1.1.2). Of course, those who follow Descartes’s footstep in taking ‘I’ as a referring 
expression, do not necessarily embrace his dualism. The stand one takes with respect to 
whether or not ‘I’ is a referential term must not necessarily be based on solving the mind-
body controversy (cf. Zemach 1972: 70-72). Descartes is not the only one who takes ‘I’ as a 
referring expression. For example, Castañeda also takes it as a referring expression. As he 
remarks, “…a correct use of ‘I’ cannot fail to refer to the entity to which it purports to refer; 
moreover, a correct use of ‘I’ cannot fail to pick up the category of entity to which it refers,” 
(in Cassam 1994: 161). Similarly, Evans remarks, “someone who understands a term as 
referring to himself must be disposed to regard, as relevant to the truth or falsity of certain 
utterances involving that term, the occurrence of certain experiences which he is in a 
position immediately to recognize,” (1982: 233; see also Strawson in Cassam 1994: Ch. XII; 
Kripke 2011: Ch. 10).    
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On the other hand, there are those philosophers who categorically reject the referentiality 
of ‘I’. For example, Anscombe in her famous article the ‘First Person,’ argued that, “I’ is 
neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at 
all (in Cassam 1994: 154; cf. Wittgenstein 1958: §§ 398, 404, 405 and 410). Similarly, Kenny 
remarks, “the grammatical error which is the essence of the theory of the self is in a manner 
obvious when it is pointed out….It will not do, for instance, to say simply that ‘I’ is the word 
each of us uses to refer to himself, a pronoun…synonymous with the name of the utterer of 
the sentence. I is not a referring expression at all, since it is possible to describe one’s own 
action in the third person” (1989: 87; see also Vesey 1973: 24-37).   
 
As we recall, I defended the first person perspective in detail in chapters one and six. For all 
the reasons given in those chapters, I will not follow the anti-referentialists’ stance against 
the term ‘I’. Contra Anscombe, I take the term ‘I,’ as a logically proper name that refers to a 
person, who self-consciously uses it—with no chance of reference failure (cf. Strawson in 
Cassam 1994: Ch. XII; also see Shoemaker in Cassam 1994: Ch. IV; Madell 1981: Ch. 2).  The 
referentiality of ‘I’ is not rooted primarily in the grammatical structure. As I argued in 
chapter one and seven, my basic awareness of myself is prior to my coming to grasp with 
the semantics of the term ‘I’. That means that, I need the term ‘I,’ in order to express what I 
already know about myself. If this is right, then the referentiality of the term ‘I’ is rooted in 
the intention of the user—who uses it to refer to himself or herself. In this case, the user of 
‘I’ is not primarily concerned with the sentence he/she constructs by using the term ‘I’. 
Rather the user is literally thinking of himself/herself as a subject/referent of the term ‘I’. 
Putting aside the question of whether the identity of the referent is material or immaterial 
self, it remains hard to see what motivates Anscombe’s and Kenny’s extreme positions 
when they categorically announce the term ‘I’ as a non-referring expression. I see no good 
reason to follow them in this regard.  
 
F. Neuroscience and Personhood/Selfhood 
In her excellent series of lectures entitled, Understanding the Brain (2007: I-III), 
neuroscientist, Nordan claims that it is not for neuroscience to worry about questions 
related to the existence of self. Neuroscience does not and cannot tell us whether there is 
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some kind of quality present in humans that survives the death of both the brain as well as 
the death of the body. For Nordan, the goal of modern neuroscience is to show and 
understand how the brain and, ultimately, the mind are related. Notice here that Nordan 
portrays neuroscience as a neutral discipline on the issue of whether or not the self exists. 
We may agree with Nordan on this point. It could well be argued that neuroscience qua 
neuroscience simply attempts to understand the structure and the function of the human 
brain (without holding any position one way or the other on the ontological status of the 
existence of the self). Yet the immediate worry that pops up here is this: how consistently 
do neuroscientists avoid the nagging question of human nature which deals with notions 
such as self, mind, etc.,? The answer seems to be not at all. This is because there are 
neuroscientists who grapple with the issue of the nature of the self (see e.g., Beauregard 
2007).   
 
However, Nordan claims that the central issue in neuroscience is the relation that exists 
between the brain and the mind. Here we need to know how we are supposed to 
understand the term ‘mind’. We also want to know what role the term ‘mind’ is supposed 
to play. In light of this, we can ask if there is something that is true of the mind but not true 
of the brain and vice versa. More specifically, here our goal is to see if there is a sense in 
which we can understand ‘mind’ to be an ontologically distinct feature that refers to 
thinking persons, as opposed to the material body that embodies such thinking beings. But 
before we discuss these issues, let us look at Nordan’s description of how the brain and the 
mind are related:  
Perception and cognition—our ability to perceive an external world, to appreciate it; 
our ability to think about it or have self-reflection; to think, to reason—is also the 
result of underlying brain processes. The brain gives rise to our subjective sense of 
experience. We don’t know how it does it, but we are sure that it does. When we 
see, hear, feel, think, or do is the result of underlying brain processes….It’s the 
neural activity of our brains that allows for our ability to have experience in the 
world. We [can see] from…clinical examples that the corollary of this is true, that is, 
anything can be taken away with the right brain lesion. You can lose selectively 
nouns from your speech. You can lose the ability to distinguish dogs from cats or 
roses from lilies. You can lose the ability to apply morality to ethical decisions. You 
can lose your sense of self. All of these things can be lost with the right brain lesion 
(Part 3:165; Cf. Seung 2012).  
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Nordan clearly distinguishes the various dimensions of our experience. Nordan is right in 
saying that we experience the external world via perception and sensation. She is also right 
in pointing out that we have phenomenal consciousness, i.e. we feel something in certain 
ways (e.g., pain as painfulness). Moreover, we cannot deny the fact that certain 
neurological cases (e.g. associative agnosia in which a person fails to identify shapes) 
disturb the normal functioning of the brain, resulting in mild to severe disabilities. So far so 
good! But this is not the end of the matter. Nordan still makes some controversial claims. 
For example, she assumes that our ability for perception, sensation, reasoning, self-
reflection, etc., are all part and parcel of the brain activity. This is rather a very interesting 
claim with some serious philosophical ramifications. If ultimately every aspect of our 
experience (as Nordan claims above) arises from the brain activity, then the mind (which is 
meant to be the bearer of our subjective as well as cognitive experiences) must be identical 
with the very brain from which it arises. In this case, mind is not a substance in its own right; 
rather what we call ‘mind’ is equivalent to higher-order cognitive as well as subjective 
experiences that humans instantiate. In Nordan’s understanding, the firing of neurons in 
our brain is what is responsible for subjective experiences as well as self-reflective ability 
that humans have. The bottom line here is that the brain does it all for us (see also, Murphy 
and Brown 2007; cf. Patricia 1986).   
 
But does it? If we follow Nordan’s reasoning here, we must be prepared to endorse that the 
mind is just the brain and in fact, the converse must also be true. In short, here the identity 
of the mind and the brain is established. Thus, we do not have to suppose an immaterial 
entity of any sort, such as the self as the primary bearer of our subjective experiences. 
Notice that for Nordan, the term ‘mind,’ is just the brain functioning at a higher-level. But 
Nordan’s identification of the mind as the brain’s higher function raises more questions 
than it answers.  
 
Granting that the brain is a physical substance, which bears physical properties, such as the 
firing of neurons, metabolic activities, electrical activities, etc., we are still at a loss as to 
how such activities give us a hint regarding the emergence of the non-physical subjective 
experience. Here, Nordan’s understanding of the role of neuroscience, faces what Levine 
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(1983) calls an ‘explanatory gap’ problem. For example, how does the c-fiber firing in one’s 
brain gives rise to the feeling of painfulness rather than itches? (cf. Kim 2006: 220-224). It is 
one thing to say that these are the regions in the brain that are responsible for memory or 
vision or hearing or thoughts or whatever. Yet it is another story altogether to answer the 
question: why do I seem to experience objects of my perception in distinctive ways? In fact, 
no amount of the knowledge of the physical brain, whether that be taken at the cellular or 
molecular level, seems to be capable of giving us access to a person’s private subjective 
experiences. As neuroscientist, Schwartz states:  
Not even the most detailed fMRI gives us more than the physical basis of perception 
or awareness; it doesn’t come close to explaining what it feels like from the inside. It 
doesn’t explain the first person feeling of red. How do we know that it is the same 
for different people? And why would studying brain mechanisms, even down to the 
molecular level, ever provide an answer to these questions? (2002: 27).  
 
To my knowledge, Schwartz’s question has not been given any satisfactory answer (cf. 
Lockwood 1989: Chaps. 1-4; see also Beauregard 2007). In light of such considerations, it 
remains difficult to make sense of Nordan’s use of the term ‘mind’. Should we understand 
the term ‘mind’ as a bearer of the higher-level cognitive/subjective properties or just as a 
higher-order property simpliciter? If understood in the former sense, then the term mind 
seems to be a non-physical substance in its own right. Alternatively, if the term ‘mind’ is 
understood in the later sense, then we are once again back in circles to face the explanatory 
gap problem, i.e., how does the physical brain give rise to the non-physical higher order 
property? Nordan’s construal of the term ‘mind’ remains ambiguous. Once again such 
considerations seem to magnify the importance of having a proper ontology of the 
self/person.  
 
8.2 Future Direction  
Throughout this thesis, I forcefully argued that the ontology of the self/person needs to be 
taken seriously. In arguing for this claim, I also explained that the Aristotelian substance 
ontology plays a central role. In the course of the discussions I advanced in this thesis, there 
was one particular issue that I would have liked to discuss. The issue I have in mind here has 
to do with the emergence of phenomenal consciousness and the self/person. This is the 
issue I want to purse in my post-doctoral research. Discussions on the metaphysics of 
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phenomenal consciousness often tend to be conducted without a direct or explicit link to 
the ontology of the self/person (see e.g., Chalmers 1996). But if as I argued in this thesis, 
mental states of whatever variety need a distinct bearer, both for their existence as well as 
individuation, then the same thing should be true of phenomenal consciousness. That is to 
say that, phenomenal consciousness too needs a bearer. As we recall, in chapter two, Hume 
rejected a distinct property bearer. Instead he proposed that perceptions can exist without 
any bearer. However, as Hume himself later admitted (see e.g., the Appendix in the Treatise 
of Human Nature), he could not establish an independent existence of perceptions without 
a bearer. Similarly, in talking about phenomenal consciousness, we cannot get rid of the 
self/person. This is because, the self/person is a subject of phenomenal consciousness. The 
two are inseparable. That is to say that phenomenal consciousness and the self/person are 
intimately united. In fact, the former ontologically depends on the latter for its existence (cf. 
chapter seven § 7.6 A-B). If this is right, then this shows us once again, why we need to take 
the ontology of the self/person seriously.  
 
A. The Questions  
If the above remarks are right, then there is good reason to further investigate the 
nature of phenomenal consciousness. In this case, for example, we can ask whether 
consciousness is emergent or merely structural property. If it is the former, then we 
want to know whether it is strongly or weakly emergent. Such considerations lead us to 
other questions that have to do with the relation between the activity of the brain and 
consciousness. In light of this, we also want to know whether or not brain activity is the 
source of phenomenal consciousness. If it is not, then we still want to know whether or 
not its relation to the brain is based on merely intimate correlations. So to give an 
adequate account of the nature of consciousness, all aspects of the above questions 
need to be taken into account. Although the questions are interdependent, they also 
need to be treated on an individual level (cf. McGinn, 1991 and 1999). More 
specifically, we can identify the questions in two ways, namely as I shall cal l them: (1) 
the property question; and (2) the origin question. As we recall, (1), attempts to 
determine the nature of the property of consciousness—i.e., whether it is strongly 
emergent or weakly emergent. On the other hand, (2) focuses on the origin/source of 
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consciousness. In most cases (1) is discussed within the context of mental causation, 
the causal closure principle and the supervenience/exclusion argument (see e.g., Kim 
2005: Chs.1 and 2; cf. Gibb, Lowe and Ingthorsson, eds., 2013; Gibb 2010). But the 
same level of attention has not been given to (2) (see e.g., 
http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-mind, Accessed 26 March 2014).  
 
Moreover, (2) is often discussed in relation to the explanatory gap problem (see e.g., 
Levine 1983; 2001). That is: How is it possible for a subjective experience (e.g., pain) to 
arise from a purely physical/neurobiological system such as the brain? This question is 
related to what is known as: the problem of phenomenal consciousness or the hard 
problem of consciousness (see e.g., Block 2007; Chalmers 1996; Tye, 1995; 2003). Nagel 
(1974), describes the hard problem of consciousness as: ‘what it is like’/what it is like to 
be in such and such state. But for reasons we shall see, I take both the explanatory as 
well as the hard problem of consciousness primarily as an epistemological, as opposed 
to a metaphysical problem. But the key point to note here is that dealing with either 
problem (i.e., explanatory or hard), does not get to the heart of the problem of (2). This 
is because, in (2) our primary focus is on figuring out the origin/source of consciousness. 
So it seems that until we settle this issue in (2), making genuine progress in (1) may 
prove difficult. Since as I pointed out earlier that the self/person and phenomenal 
consciousness are deeply united, any insight we get into (2) will at the same time shed 
light on the origin of the self/person. That means that tackling (2) will take the notion 
of the self/person defended in this thesis one step further. It does this, by giving us 
insights into the emergence of the self/person (cf. chapter six).   
 
B. Approach  
In light of this, the best way to approach (2) would be from the standpoint of the 
diachronic as opposed to the synchronic problem of the origin of consciousness. Here 
by ‘diachronic problem of the origin of consciousness,’ I refer to the emergence of 
consciousness over time; whereas in the synchronic case, I mean the emergence of 
consciousness at a particular time. However, whether or not the diachronic approach 
tackles the origin problem in (2) is a moot point, which needs to be taken seriously. As 
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far as my own view is concerned, I do not think that it is free from problems. Once we 
realize these problems, we might need to look for the solution elsewhere.   
 
How might one then go about addressing the questions identified in (1) and (2) above?  
While many different approaches could be employed in addressing these questions, my 
own preference is to pursue them within a framework of the view I shall call: the non-
causal spontaneous emergence of phenomenal consciousness. This view stands in sharp 
contrast with the currently dominant bottom-up causal account of the origin of 
consciousness. By contrast, this view adopts a top-down model for the origin of 
consciousness. I will develop this view by drawing upon insights from the contemporary 
discussions on the metaphysics of emergence (see e.g., Humphrey, 1997; Lowe, 2008; 
O’Connor and Yu Wong, 2005; Clayton and Davies, eds., 2006). I will also be linking my 
view to relevant scientific works. In this case, I will draw upon insights from the origin 
of life research in biochemistry, where the question of the origin of life takes center 
stage, which is analogues to the problem of consciousness as stated in (2) above (e.g., 
Schopf, 1999; Fry, 2000; Davies 1999); quantum mechanics, where the focus is on the 
causal efficacy of consciousness (e.g., Stapp, 2009; Gao, 2007); and neuroscience, 
where the emphasis is on neuroplasticity/brain rewiring capacity with implications for 
top-down mental causation (e.g., Schwartz, Stapp & Beauregard, 2005). The strength of 
these scientific works lies on attempting to tackle an ‘explanatory gap problem’  
between the physical and the mental. But these scientific works have very little to say 
about the origin of consciousness simpliciter.  
 
In the contemporary emergence debate, inter alia, the issue of the causal efficacy of 
emergent properties takes center stage (see also chapter six). Furthermore, there is a 
debate concerning whether ‘strong emergence,’ has any scientific relevance. For 
example, Bedau (prominent defender of weak emergence), remarks :  
Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. 
How does an irreducible…downward causal power arise, since by definition it 
cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal 
powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only 
indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their 
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mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails 
illegitimately getting something from nothing. But the most disappointing aspect 
of strong emergence is its apparent scientific irrelevance (1997: 377).  
 
Bedau’s remarks above raise what I shall call: a three-pronged objection against a 
defender of strong emergence (SE):  
(a)  The incompatibility of SE with materialism. 
(b)  The incompatibility of SE with science. 
(c) The incompatibility of SE with some causal necessity (i.e., cause-and-effect 
relations). 
 
If one grants (a)-(c), then obviously one will be forced to dismiss SE. Notice that the 
underlying assumption of (a)-(c) seems to be that, the emergence of something 
necessitates some kind of cause. So where such a cause is not available, no genuine 
property would emerge. Since I take consciousness as an irreducible simple/non-
structural emergent property—with its own autonomous causal power unique to that 
of the base/subvenient level, my view directly faces Bedau’s three-pronged objection. 
But as we shall see, Bedau’s objection is not insurmountable.  
 
C. The View  
Having said that, I now discuss the gist of the view I am calling: the non-causal 
spontaneous emergence of phenomenal consciousness . This is the view that attempts to 
establish the origin of consciousness as a strongly emergent property. Here following 
Moreland, I understand finite consciousness to be an irreducible emergent property—
i.e., a simple non-structural property that is unique to the “emergent” level of reality. 
Taken this way, an emergent property is not captureable, for example, in terms of the 
spatio-temporal, physical, causal relations among the states as well as parts at the 
lower level of reality. This means that, an emergent property being a sui generis, i.e., a 
new/novel kind of property, is different from and not composed of the parts, 
properties, relations, and events at the subvenient level (Moreland 2008: Chs.1-2). One 
way to make sense of this view is by distinguishing it from a structural property—which 
is constituted by the parts, properties, relations, and events at the subvenient level—
that is identical to a configuration pattern among the subvenient entities. Unlike an 
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emergent property, a structural property is not a new kind of property (Ibid.: 15). 
Understood this way, a structural property (e.g., solidity) can be both reducible to and 
identifiable with a purely physical property (see e.g., Jackson 1998: ch.1). The key 
aspect of the above characterization of phenomenal consciousness as an emergent 
property has to do with its emphasis on its non-causal origin. That is, according to the 
view I am proposing, there is no causal-link between a strongly emergent property (in 
this case, consciousness) and its base level—although the base level (as far as we know) 
serves as a sufficient condition (but not as a necessary condition) for its emergence (cf. 
Levine 2001: 7).  
 
In this regard, my view differs from orthodox accounts of the emergence of 
phenomenal consciousness—which requires some sort of causal  link to its base level, at 
least, initially (see e.g., Chalmers in Clayton and Davies, eds., 2006: 244; O’connor 
2000: 110-121; Sperry 1969; cf. Searle 1992: Ch.5; Murphy and Brown 2007). Those 
who think of the emergence of consciousness in causal terms, often have in mind, brain 
complexity as a source of such causality. However, the causal proposal faces two 
serious empirically supported objections. I shall call these objections: the gametes 
problem and the complexity problem, respectively. The first objection deals with 
conception (i.e., fertilization) and the impossibility of tracking down/spotting the 
origin/emergence of consciousness at any point during the process of the development 
of a foetus. This objection effectively poses the question: ‘when does consciousness 
begin?’—which is very much similar to another question both bioethicists and medical 
experts struggle with. That is, ‘when does life begin?’ The second objection focuses on 
demonstrating that, no amount of analysis of the physical basis of complex brains will 
unfold anything substantial about the origin of consciousness (cf. McGinn 1999). Both 
of the two objections above target the diachronic (i.e., over time) account of the origin 
of consciousness mentioned earlier.  
 
As we recall, the origin question in (2) lies entirely at the heart of the account of the 
non-causal emergence of consciousness. If this is right, then the emergence of 
consciousness has no informative analysis. Put differently, it is a fundamental/primitive 
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fact in the natural world—which cannot be further analysable in terms of more 
fundamental facts than itself. That means that the emergence of consciousness is an 
ontological add-on, i.e., has no ordinary causal explanation for its emergence (cf. 
Moreland 2003:208). However, considering consciousness as a primitive fact faces 
objection. For example, philosophers like Bedau claim that accepting phenomenal 
consciousness as primitive is ‘too much like magic.’ For now, two things can be said in 
response. First, if phenomenal consciousness is like magic, and by ‘magic,’ if it is meant 
something hard to make sense of its origin, then that only speaks about our own epistemic 
limitations. In that case, I cannot see the force of the objection. By contrast, if by ‘magic’ if it 
is meant to show a situation where someone simply postulates how things are due to lack 
of any other way to account for it, then the primitiveness of phenomenal consciousness can 
be called into question. But my own proposal of the primitiveness of phenomenal 
consciousness will not be prone to such an objection, since I do not take the origin of 
consciousness as a brute postulation. Rather, I take it to be an objective feature of reality.  
 
Second, the ‘too much like magic’ objection seems to assume that everything has to have 
some form of empirically confirmed analysis or explanation. At the least, the assumption 
that is buried beneath the objection is that, if something is not explainable on the basis of 
some sort of generally agreed upon criterion of explanation, then any other explanation 
that is not constrained by such parameters has to be deemed as mysterious. I remain 
unpersuaded by such an objection. For one thing, we believe in so many things despite the 
fact that we lack any knowledge regarding their origin. Here is one example. That is, no one 
knows when or how the first living cell emerges; but that does not prevent us to talk about 
or understand its nature (see e.g., Rana 2011: 102-112; Rana and Ross 2004). No one has a 
clue as to how to define life itself. But that does not mean that we cannot characterize it 
(Ibid. 24-31). If there are things that reflect an objective feature of reality, I see no good 
reason not to accept them at face value and live with them. In this case, they only sound 
more ‘like magic’ for finite creatures like us. However, I do not claim that this is a decisive 
answer against the objection considered here. But at the least, I tried to unlock the 
motivation behind it. I find the motivation deeply unsatisfying. The objection considered 
here is very much similar to another objection raised against a realist conception of the 
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ontology of the self. But in chapters one, six and seven we saw why such objections against 
the primitiveness of the concept of the self/person do not hold water. It seems like reality 
contains many such primitives and our job is to try to distinguish those that really are 
primitive. In saying this, however, I do not mean to suggest any criterion we should use. 
That is not my present goal.    
Having discussed the non-causal approach to investigating the nature of consciousness, 
we also need to think about how once it emerges, consciousness enters into what I 
shall call: the domain of causal interaction—with brain states. It is at this point that we 
can plausibly grant both the top-down causal influence of phenomenal consciousness 
on the base level on the one hand, and the causal influence of the base level (i.e., 
bottom up) on consciousness as well as other mental states on the other. It is also at 
this point that we can properly address both ‘the explanatory gap problem’ and ‘the 
hard problem of consciousness’—each of which I briefly mentioned earlier. In short, it 
is at this point, where we face the age-old problem of the link between mental 
properties and physical properties.    
 
Finally, we also need to explain in what manner phenomenal consciousness continues 
to co-exist with its physical base (e.g., brain). To show this, we must use the notion of 
correlation and its relation to causation. The key point here is that correlation is not 
causation (see for details: Maudlin 1994/2002: Ch.5). As neuroscientist Jones nicely 
sums up: 
The simple act of finding neural correlates for certain behaviours or attitudes 
provides few, if any, insights into causative factors. Even if a certain brain 
structure were strongly associated with…[some sort of subjective] experience, 
this says nothing about whether the structure generates that experience. Simply 
because brain region “R” is active when behaviour “B” is undertaken does not 
mean that changes in “R” cause “B” to take place. The opposite, in fact, could be 
the case, in that when an individual displays behaviour “B,” brain region “R” is 
modified, and if this occurs sufficiently often, there are significant changes to 
“R.” Yet again, the interplay between “R” and “B” may be so close that the only 
tenable conclusion is that there is no definitive causative factor-the one feeds 
on the other, (Jones, 2010: 125; also see Schwartz and Begley 2002; Robinson 
2007).     
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In light of Jones’s remarks above, we can see that from the temporal/physical 
standpoint, the correlation between phenomenal consciousness and brain state is 
necessary. For example, a normal functioning of brain is necessary for normal function 
of mental state. But from this nothing follows to the effect that such correlations are 
metaphysically necessary. It may very well be the case that consciousness can continue 
to exist in the absence of brain or brain function (see e.g., Edward F. Kelly et al., 2007). 
Such considerations show the utter implausibility of the reductive materialist views 
that deem consciousness as nothing but brain function (e.g., Place, 1956; Prinz, 2012;   
Dennett, 1991; Crick and Koch, 1990; Crick, 1994).  
 
D. Summary 
I introduced a three-stage analysis of the view of consciousness I proposed. The first 
one has to do with a non-causal stage. The second one has to do with a causal stage. 
Finally, the third one has to do with a correlation stage. Putting things in this way clears 
up a lot of confusion that is prevalent in the contemporary debate on the nature of 
consciousness. Often time philosophers and neuroscientists claim that they are making 
inroads on the origin problem. But as it turns out, they are only confusing their 
achievement in phase two (which is a causal phase) with that of phase one (i.e., a non-
causal phase). The origin question in (2) as pointed out earlier still remains unresolved. 
There is also wide spread confusion with respect to the third phase in that many 
theorists mistake correlation for causation. So my three-phase analysis of 
consciousness clearly identifies the three features that make up the nature of 
consciousness. That said, in light of what has been said so far, Bedau’s three-pronged 
objections can now be laid to rest or at least the foregone discussion has shown us how 
we can effectively meet such objections.   
 
8.3 Conclusion  
I began this thesis with what I called the substantial-self/person question. In chapter one, I 
gave an analysis of this question within the framework of the Aristotelian substance 
ontology. Similarly, adopting Descartes’s notion of the entityhoodness of the self and 
Boethius’s notion of a person, I linked the two notions together with the notion of a 
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substance. In doing so, in the first half of chapter one, I established the conditional claim 
that I defended in this thesis. That is: If I am a self/person then I am a certain kind of 
substantial entity. I then located this claim in the second half of chapter one, within the 
context of the contemporary personal identity debate. In chapters two and three, I 
discussed how two important historical figures, Locke and Hume, respectively dealt with the 
substantial-self/person question, substance and personal identity. In chapter four and five, I 
tried to assess the contemporary personal identity debate against the historical backdrop of 
Locke’s and Hume’s views of substance and personal identity.  
 
My central claim in this thesis has been that to make a real progress in our understanding of 
the ontology of the self/person, we need to take metaphysics seriously. In light of this, I 
expressed my skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the contemporary personal identity 
discussions. My skepticisms in this regard stem from two main observations. The first 
observation has to do with the contemporary personal identity theorists’ excessive 
emphasis on the issue of the criterion for personal identity. The second observation has to 
do with the issue of the methodology of thought experiments in the contemporary personal 
identity discussions. In light of both of these observations, I argued that the proper subject 
matter which I called the Aristotelian Question (i.e., ‘what is X?’) has been side stepped. 
Throughout this thesis, therefore, I insisted that this trend has to be reversed. That is, I 
argued that the Aristotelian Question must be restored to its proper place. By this I meant 
that our focus on personal identity discussion must be, first and foremost, to grasp the 
nature of the kind of an entity we call a self/person. I also argued that without taking 
ontology seriously this question cannot be adequately pursued. In this case, I strongly 
suggested that traditional metaphysics, as conceived by Aristotle, provides the most 
preferable framework to pursue the question of the ontology of a self/person.  
 
In light of this, in chapter six, I argued against the naturalistic ontology that tries to 
undermine the traditional metaphysics. Alternatively, I attempted to show how we can have 
a robust understanding of the ontology of a self/person if we take metaphysics seriously. I 
defended this claim further in chapter seven, where I sketched out the view I called the 
Neo-Aristotelian View of Substantial Self/Person. In chapter seven, I argued that one of the 
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advantages of traditional metaphysics is that it respects our common-sense conception of 
ourselves. At the background of everything I said in this thesis in defence of a realist 
conception of a self/person, the common-sense conception is assumed. I argued that 
common-sense conception of ourselves is the proper starting point in thinking about the 
ontology of a self/person. I argued that theory-laden understanding of the ontology of a 
self/person puts the cart before the horse. In this chapter, I tried to show that our common-
sense conception of ourselves gives us an unadulterated initial insight into how we naturally 
view ourselves. For example, most people view themselves as persisting entities over time. 
Most people also have strong convictions about the possibility of surviving in some form 
their own bodily destruction. Most people naturally view themselves as agents who can 
engage in intentional actions. I assumed that such pre-philosophical convictions people 
have about themselves must be taken seriously as opposed to being explained away. Taking 
such things into consideration, in this chapter, I sketched out the Neo-Aristotelian View of 
Substantial Self/Person. I located this view entirely within the framework of Aristotelian 
metaphysics with reference to substance ontology. Although the view I sketched out needs 
to be developed further, I tried to show how, at the least, Aristotelian substance ontology 
can be put to a good use. Given that Aristotle’s theory of substance has not been given the 
attention and the place it deserves in the contemporary personal identity mainstream 
literature, I consider my attempt to be a step in the right direction.  
 
In this final chapter, I picked out a handful of objections often raised in the literature to 
challenge a realist conception of an enduring/persisting self/person. I tried to show how 
these objections do not pose any serious problem for the view of the self/person defended 
in this thesis. In this chapter, I tried to show how the metaphysics of dispositions or powers 
ontology provides us with an excellent framework to respond to most of the objections I 
considered. Finally, I ended this chapter by mapping out a specific area of future research, 
the emergence of phenomenal consciousness and the self/person. This will be a second 
phase of my research. I hope in this thesis, I made a strong case for why we need to take 
traditional metaphysics as well as substance ontology seriously in order to come up with a 
robust ontology of the self/person.  
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